US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Thursday 6th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Indeed; those countries have all been involved in conflicts, and we have come near to the use of nuclear weapons in the case of Korea and in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Clearly, their existence poses a threat. When the House debated Trident renewal in 2007, many Members took the view that Britain’s security depended on having nuclear weapons. If that was the case, someone could argue for any country in the world developing nuclear weapons on the basis that that would guarantee its security.

As I have explained, the reality is that the vast majority of nations do not have nuclear weapons and do not want them. Although some are under a nuclear alliance such as NATO, many are not and do not possess nuclear weapons, yet have massive natural resources. Many countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia are part of nuclear weapons-free zones. That is my view.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I appreciate that I will have the opportunity to speak after the hon. Gentleman, but I want to take him back to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) said that if nuclear weapons were used, there would be dire effects on the environment and on the planet, but does he not recognise that people who believe in deterrents believe that the nuclear deterrent is constantly in use, because the use resides in the possession, which results in the deterrent effect on any other power against using such weapons against this country?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The hon. Gentleman and I have debated that view, and I simply do not agree that they provide security. Yes, they are in existence every day and therefore clearly are potentially a threat to somebody, but it did not do the USA much good on 11 September 2001. Nuclear weapons were not much help on that occasion; nor are they much help in dealing with poverty, environmental disasters and people who are forced to flee and seek refuge elsewhere.

My purpose today is to debate the mutual defence agreement and that, of course, is central to Britain’s nuclear relationship with the United States. I turn to the history of the agreement. The USA had the McMahon Act, which did not allow the sharing of its nuclear or defence information with any other state, notwithstanding the provisions of the NATO treaty of 1948. Britain, which had a very close relationship with the USA throughout the 1940s and ’50s, could not legally share a relationship of nuclear information with the USA. The McMahon Act was then amended, and straight after the amendment was agreed, the mutual defence agreement came into being, by which information and technology is shared between Britain and the USA.

An interesting legal point relates to the use of testing facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston and plutonium, which it would be completely illegal to use or test in the USA. I would be grateful if the Minister said whether there is any testing involving plutonium or potential uses of plutonium at AWE Aldermaston, because it is a significant part of the issue.

The mutual defence agreement has been amended a number of times in its history and was most recently renewed, on a regular 10-year cycle, to allow arrangements for the transfer of special nuclear materials and non-nuclear components. The treaty was last extended in 2004 and will be extended a further 10 years from this year. As I have explained, the US Congress debated it earlier; we were not able to debate it.

The next issue relates to what I have just said about the use of AWE Aldermaston, but also to the legality of nuclear weapons and the relationship of the agreement to the non-proliferation treaty, which is the result of an initiative by a previous Labour Government to try to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty has two central themes. One is that all states that do not possess nuclear weapons and that sign the non-proliferation treaty agree not to possess them, take them on board or develop them. The other is that the five declared nuclear weapon states—Britain, France, China, Russia and the USA—agree both to take steps towards disarmament and not to allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So it would be interesting to know how Israel managed to get hold of its nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities.

It would also be interesting to know how this Government or any other Government can justify nuclear rearmament within the terms of the articles of the non-proliferation treaty. In a legal opinion released in July 2004 for Peacerights, BASIC—the British American Security Information Council—and the Acronym Institute, Rabinder Singh, QC, and Professor Christine Chinkin of Matrix Chambers concluded that

“it is strongly arguable that the renewal of the Mutual Defence Agreement is in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.

I would therefore be grateful if the Minister said in his reply to the debate what the legal process is in the evaluation of the mutual defence agreement and how he believes that it is compatible with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is coming up for its five-year review in May 2015—unhelpfully, during the general election period in this country. Will he explain exactly what power and what finance have been used, in advance of the Trident replacement programme, to ensure that the British Government have that money available, even though there has been no main-gate decision, which is due to be taken in 2016?

I shall quote from written evidence given to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs by Nick Ritchie of the Bradford disarmament research centre:

“The UK is entirely dependent upon the United States for supply and refurbishment of its Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles… The missiles themselves are produced and serviced in the United States by Lockheed Martin. The UK does not actually own any individual missiles, but purchased the rights to 58 missiles from a common pool held at the US Strategic Weapons facility at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia. British Trident submarines also conduct their missile test firings at the US Eastern Test Range, off the coast of Florida.”

The obvious point is that the claim that Britain has an independent nuclear deterrent must be treated with the utmost caution, if not derision, when what is quite clear is where the technology comes from, the relationship with the mutual defence agreement, the expenditure involved and the testing facilities that are available for Britain to use in the USA.

[Dr Lewis]

There is a question of independence in terms not of manufacture, but of control. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it is entirely a matter for the United Kingdom Government whether the deterrent would be fired—as opposed to used—in response to a nuclear attack on this country and that the United States could do nothing to prevent that from happening?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

That is indeed a very good question. I hope that the Minister can assist the hon. Gentleman with the answer, because it is fundamental. We have been told all my life that we have an independent nuclear deterrent in Britain and that we can operate independently. The mutual defence agreement should not have been necessary in 1958 if that was the case. It clearly was the case before 1958. Whether it was after that, I doubt, and it certainly was not the case at all after Polaris came in during the 1960s. That was a US import, as is the current technology. Could Britain fire off a nuclear weapon independently of the United States? No, I do not believe that it could. I believe that it would require the active participation of the US military and US Administration to undertake that. I simply do not believe that it is an independent nuclear weapon. I hope that this debate begins to raise more of those extremely important questions.

I was referring a few moments ago to the activities at AWE Aldermaston. Stanley Orman, a former deputy director of the AWE, said in 2008 that

“we also devised a technique...of imploding a non-fissile plutonium isotope. Now because it was plutonium the laws in the States would not allow you to implode this even though it was non-fissile, because it was plutonium. So again the American scientists would come across and use our laboratories because they couldn’t use theirs.”

If that is the case, one has to ask this question. Why is this treaty so one-sided that the USA is unable to do some testing in its own jurisdiction and therefore does it in ours, when the mutual defence agreement has received very limited parliamentary scrutiny, apart from today?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

I wish I knew the answer. I have asked that question many times, and it takes me neatly on to the two reasons why it is important that we have a debate on this subject, even though Parliament seems relatively relaxed about it. There is no doubt that if we look at the arithmetic of the 2007 vote that took us through the first stages of the successor programme to the Vanguard class submarines, it was exactly as the shadow Minister says—virtually every Conservative MP and a substantial majority of Labour MPs voted for continuing the deterrent into the next generation, and a significant minority of Labour unilateralists voted against the measure. The figure was about 80 or 90, if I remember correctly.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

One hundred.

[Dr Lewis]

One hundred exactly. Any advances on 100? No, so let us take that as the figure.

There is no doubt that, if there were to be a free vote in the House of Commons, this matter would proceed. One of the reasons why I want to continue having these debates until such a vote happens is that there should already have been a vote. The shadow Minister is right about that. The main-gate contracts were due to be signed during this Parliament, and it was entirely a result of coalition politics and a back-door deal with the Liberal Democrats, who are opposed to renewing Trident, that the vote was not held and that the life of the existing submarines was extended by five years. The key vote has now been put off until 2016.

One of the two main reasons why it is valuable to continue having these debates is that it is important that Front Benchers from both main parties put their respective positions on the record as often as possible. Let us face it, much as Labour and Conservative Members might regret it, there is always the possibility that we may end up with another hung Parliament that is once again dependent on the Liberal Democrats, or conceivably on the UK Independence party or, worst of all, the Scottish National party—I say that without reference to the fact that the party’s parliamentary leader, the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), has just vacated his place—if Labour suffers as badly in Scotland at the general election as some predict. It is therefore terribly important that the Front Benchers of both main parties have their feet held to the fire as often as possible so that there can be less room for wriggling out of it in the event of another hung Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

What I am saying is quite clear. If we end up with a hung Parliament and the balance of power is held by a small unilateralist party, it will be able to blackmail one or other of the main parties into not doing what should be done, which is to sign the contracts to make the renewal of Trident for another generation a certainty. I am clear that that was part of the potpourri of things that were negotiated in private. At the time I described it as a love gift to the Liberal Democrats. I thought it was absolutely wrong. It was a shock and a surprise, and it is not something of which any Conservative should be proud. Having said that, I look to my own party’s Front Benchers for an assurance that nothing like that will ever happen again, and I look to the Opposition spokesman for an assurance that no Labour leader will be tempted to conclude such a deal either.

The second reason why it is important to have a debate on this subject at this time is that the terms of trade, as it were, in international relations have changed. When the hon. Member for Islington North and I addressed these matters in January 2013, when we debated the nuclear deterrent, and in June 2013, when we debated the non-proliferation treaty, much of the argument was focused on the fact that the cold war was over and showed no sign of returning and that the nuclear deterrent was therefore irrelevant to the threats that then confronted us. As some of us stated at the time, it was far from certain that we could ever know significantly in advance whether those circumstances were going to change. We all hoped that Russia, having shed communism and started along a more democratic path, would continue to go in that direction, but there could be no guarantee.

Even now, we cannot tell where our relationship with Russia will be in the next 10, 20 or 30 years. Nobody predicted the crisis that has arisen over Ukraine, and some might argue that if Ukraine were a member of NATO, the Russians would not have done what they have done. Conversely, it could also be argued that if Ukraine were a member of NATO and the Russians had done what they have done, we would possibly now be on the brink of an extremely dangerous east-west confrontation.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that there was an agreement between Russia and the west at the time of Ukrainian independence that Ukraine would not join NATO and would not be a nuclear power? Indeed, at the time Ukraine itself renounced nuclear weapons and their presence in Ukraine.

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed, Ukraine did renounce nuclear weapons. I strongly suspect that public opinion in Ukraine might now be divided, to put it mildly, over the wisdom of that decision. Given that they were Soviet nuclear weapons, Ukraine probably had little choice in the matter.

It would be a mistake to put countries on the path to NATO membership—I have said this consistently—if other NATO members would not be prepared to go to war in defence of their borders. It is all well and good to say that everyone would like to be a member of every alliance, but NATO has been so successful for so long because there is no doubt about its security guarantee. That is the importance of deterrence. In order to deter, we must be able not only to threaten an aggressor with an unacceptable level of punishment but to ensure that he is in no doubt that that unacceptable punishment will inevitably follow if he commits himself to an attack using weapons of mass destruction.

It was said earlier in the debate that the fact that the nuclear deterrent did not prevent the attacks on America in 2001 disproves the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. It does nothing of the kind. The efficacy of nuclear deterrence lies in its ability to deter another country with weapons of mass destruction from firing them in an act of aggression against you—not you personally, Sir Roger, but the person trying to deter the potential aggressor from attacking. The fact that the ability to deter one form of attack does not act as a panacea to prevent all forms of aggression or attack is neither here nor there.

The question we must ask ourselves is what the situation would have been if a country that did not possess nuclear weapons but had overwhelming conventional power faced a country that was weaker conventionally but could nevertheless deploy even a small number of nuclear weapons in an act of aggression. The answer is that no amount of conventional forces could make up for it.

When I saw that the hon. Member for Islington North wanted this debate, I knew that although it would hinge on the mutual defence agreement, that would be only a peg on which to hang the wider argument. The truth of the matter is that the mutual defence agreement is merely a facilitator for the UK’s continuing ability to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

When somebody is against maintaining the nuclear deterrent, there are a number of ways for them to campaign against it. They can try to win votes in Parliament, but as we have seen, when votes are held in Parliament on the issue, the majority of MPs are in favour of continuing the deterrent. They can try to win the battle for public opinion, but as we have seen in general elections during the cold war and in subsequent opinion polls, most members of the public think that the country should continue to possess some nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them. Therefore, the advocates of unilateral British nuclear disarmament must try to find indirect means of pursuing it. They think that if they can cite the non-proliferation treaty or the mutual defence agreement and derail the latter or get a legal opinion about the former, they might achieve by indirect means what they cannot achieve directly.

The truth of the matter is that nuclear weapons indeed have terrible humanitarian consequences, but those consequences arise when such weapons are fired; they do not arise when the weapons are used as they are meant to be used by democratic states. As I said in my first intervention on the hon. Member for Islington North, they are used in order to show any country that might contemplate or toy with the idea of aggression against the United Kingdom—a NATO democratic country—that that cannot be undertaken without the certainty of incurring unacceptable levels of retaliation.

Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty says:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

The only thing that is time-limited is the

“cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”.

I am sure that the Minister will spell out how this country least of all the nuclear powers can be accused of being involved in a nuclear arms race—I am glad to see him nodding—because it has done more to reduce its nuclear stockpile than any other nuclear country.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

To take the hon. Gentleman back to what he said a couple of moments ago about the effects of nuclear weapons, surely he must be as aware as I am of the effects of nuclear testing in Australia, the Pacific, the United States and the former Soviet Union. To say that nuclear weapons’ existence has no effects is simply not correct.

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the testing of nuclear weapons—they were physically fired and exploded—had effects. That is why there have been subsequent agreements to ensure that no testing of that sort is ever done again in the atmosphere. He is absolutely right about that, but I am afraid that we have moved long beyond that point now. We are now at the point where we must decide which is the more humanitarian way to proceed. I would argue that the lesson of 50 years’ stand-off during the cold war, albeit with some intense crises at one time or another, is that the people who first thought about such matters in 1945 were correct. They viewed it slightly differently from Clement Attlee.

The hon. Gentleman—I like to call him my hon. Friend—quoted Clement Attlee at the beginning of this debate as saying that the only way to prevent catastrophe would be to outlaw war. I believe that the only way to prevent catastrophe—he has heard me quote this before, but I am afraid that will not prevent me from quoting it again—was set out in 1945 by Professor Sir Henry Tizard, the leading defence scientist of the day, when he was considering the future nature of warfare in a secret report for the chiefs of staff. He was not allowed to consider the coming of the atomic bomb in any detail, but he could not resist making a general observation about it:

“A knowledge that we were prepared, in the last resort,”

to retaliate with an atomic bomb

“might well deter an aggressive nation.”

He drew a rather revealing parallel:

“Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood 20 paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.”

[Jeremy Corbyn]

It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman quotes Tizard. He could also have quoted Sir William Penney, but I suggest that he look at the profound comments of Einstein, who said that if he had known what was coming, he would rather have been a clockmaker. Joseph Rotblat, whose work was crucial to the Manhattan project, was so appalled by the power of nuclear weapons that he spent his whole life campaigning for a nuclear-free world. Surely they are more apposite than Tizard.

[Dr Lewis]

I am afraid that I have not put my argument across sufficiently well. I was not trying to suggest that we should accept the argument based on the eminence of Sir Henry Tizard; I used the argument because of its innate strength. The fact is that many distinguished philosophers have been ardent nuclear unilateralists, including some who worked on the bomb. I gave that quote not so much because of who said it, although I felt it necessary to spell that out, but because of the truth that it contains, which is that when a weapons system is not only able but certain to inflict unacceptable damage, therefore making retaliation unavoidable to those who wish to commit aggression, people will think much more deeply and carefully before they embark on attack, aggression and conflict. The experience of the cold war proves that, and the majority of people in Parliament and among the public recognise that.

There is therefore nothing to fear in debating issues such as whether or not the mutual defence agreement should continue, because what the agreement amounts to is a method of ensuring that this country can never be threatened by an undemocratic state brandishing atomic, nuclear, thermonuclear or chemical weapons. Also, if we look not at the question of who manufactures the components of the weapons system but at who has control over whether the weapons would ever be fired, we can be in no doubt, and neither can any potential aggressor, that any attempt to threaten this country with nuclear blackmail would be suicidal.

It is not a nice thing to live under a balance of terror, but it is a lot better than living under a monopoly of mass destruction weapons that are in the hands of undemocratic countries.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I always love it when an Opposition Member precisely anticipates my final point. My love, affection and esteem for coalition politics are legendary. I want Ministers to give me the explanation—so far, we have been denied it—that there is indeed a rational alternative to the paranoid belief currently abroad that all this is being rushed through because we wanted to stifle debate, were afraid what the public would say and feared the context of all the revelations of secrets.

Let us get to the heart of it: if the truth is that it took this long for the Conservatives and the Liberals to agree what they wanted to introduce, there is nothing to be ashamed of in saying so; it is a natural downside of coalition politics. I appeal to my hon. Friend the Minister, who does these things with such panache and dependability, to put his head above the parapet and simply say that this was one of the many disadvantages of coalition politics—which Conservative Members and Labour Members look forward to seeing the back of in a few months’ time.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I support amendment 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson), who made his case extremely well.

Surely the issue is simply this: Parliament is here to scrutinise what the Executive do and to try to represent public opinion. We need to take advice from the public, organisations, lobby groups and so on, but all I have managed to find was an interesting and quite useful briefing from Liberty that came in yesterday—all credit to Liberty for getting a reasonable briefing together in a very short time—and a series of articles in The Guardian and one or two other newspapers.

But this Bill has massive implications in relation to the ability of the state to dip in and out of people’s telephone and e-mail accounts. Because it takes on itself a global reach, it has huge implications all around the world. If we are to take the global reach to dip into e-mail accounts all around the world, what are we to do, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) said in an intervention, when an unpalatable regime decides to do the same and pitches up in a British court and says, “Well, you’ve taken these rights unto yourself. Why shouldn’t we do exactly the same?”? The implications of the Bill go a very long way indeed.

I am always suspicious when the House is summoned in an emergency and told, “This is an absolutely overriding, desperate emergency, so we’ve got to get this thing through all its stages in one day,” and Front Benchers from both sides of the House get together and agree that there is a huge national emergency. I am sorry, but what is the emergency?

There was a court decision some months ago, about which the Government have since done very little and made very few statements. There has apparently been an interesting debate between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party in the coalition. In the interests of public scrutiny, we should be given the minutes of the discussion between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister, and of all the sofa discussions that have no doubt taken place. I thought that sofa politics ended with new Labour, but apparently it still goes on in Downing street. We need to know the nature of that debate.

What is the objection to a sunset clause that would bring the—to me—very unpalatable Bill to a conclusion in six months’ time? Such a clause would at least give lawyers an opportunity to make a detailed case, and the Government an opportunity to explain their case a bit better. It would give the Home Affairs Committee a chance to discuss it, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights a chance to examine it, which we as Members of Parliament would also be able to do.

In an age of social media, it is interesting to see the numbers of people following the debate online and live. They are interested in social media, privacy and communication, and they all have views and opinions. I have no idea what all their views and opinions are. All I know is that as an individual Member of Parliament, I, like all colleagues in the Chamber, must vote on this piece of legislation without having had the chance to reflect or consult.

This is not a good day for Parliament. It is not a good advertisement for Parliament. It is not a good advertisement for democracy. The very least that we can do is to agree that this wrong-headed piece of legislation will expire by the end of this year and force the Government to come up with something more palatable, more carefully thought out and more sensible in respect of the protection of privacy and civil rights for all. That is why we were elected to Parliament. We should be given the opportunity to do our job, and should not have to lie down in front of a steamroller and accept something that we know in our hearts to be ill thought out and wrong.

Egypt

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Until now!

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I pay tribute to both previous speakers and, despite the friendly sedentary intervention of my friend, the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), I intend to follow in their footsteps. I congratulate in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) on introducing such an important subject. I am pleased that people have not gone automatically into a mode of suggesting that all the good is on one side and all the evil on the other. In Egypt, we are confronted with a choice of which is the lesser evil. I agree with the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Mr McKenzie) that the correct course to follow is not to rush to endorse what has happened in Egypt. We should ensure that we maintain pressure on whatever Administration or regime emerges to follow a path back to constitutional democracy at the earliest opportunity.

It sometimes bothers me that people think that when a dramatic development occurs, it is automatically to be interpreted in the context of what we have experienced in recent European history. I felt the very coinage of the term “Arab spring” to be inappropriate. I did not feel that the spate of revolutions that took place in one middle eastern country after another should be compared to the attempt by central and eastern European countries, which had been well set on the path to constitutional democracy before they were hijacked by the Soviet empire, to go back to the democratic path. There was no direct comparison between those European countries asserting their right to return to democracy and what was happening in at least some of the middle eastern countries.

In 1941, Churchill was famously teased by one of his left-wing opponents when he spoke up for Russia after it was invaded by the Nazis. After all, Churchill was the architect of British intervention in the Russian civil war, and he famously wanted to “strangle Bolshevism at birth”. He had the right answer to his critic: he said that if Hitler invaded hell, he would at least have a good word to say for the devil in the House of Commons. In other words, he recognised that it was a choice between evils.

It is often thought that when a totalitarian regime emerges, based on a totalitarian ideology, it does so in a coup, with no popular support at all. That is not necessarily the case; in fact, I would say that it is not usually the case. There was certainly popular support for the Nazis, as well as for the communists in many cases where they succeeded in coming to power. The paradox in trying to deal with such situations was that there was a degree of democratic legitimacy to the initial taking over of the country, but once that had happened, the regimes proceeded to dismantle the very framework of democracy—however great or limited it was at the time—that had enabled them to come to power on the basis of some form of popular support. Such popular support was often allied to a specific type of devious perversion of political language when the regime was consolidating its grip on power.

The question that must be faced by democracies looking on as such situations develop is what we do when a group of people come to power, initially with a greater or lesser degree of democratic legitimacy, and proceed to subvert the system so that they will never again have to submit themselves to democratic elections. I suggest that what was happening in Egypt was a movement in that sort of direction. The country was faced with the choice of whether it wished to see Islamism take control, as it has done following what I prefer to call the Arab uprisings, to the disappointment of many of us who were hoping to see constitutional democracies emerge in other middle eastern countries. The issue is what we do about that. Do we simply rush to condemn the fact that Islamists have been ejected from power in Egypt, or do we recognise the real difficulty of the choice that Egyptians have had to make between one extreme situation and another?

Trident Alternatives Review

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am pleased we are having this debate and that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has spoken, because he sincerely believes in nuclear weapons as much as I sincerely disbelieve in them. Interestingly, he quoted Tizard as one of the main scientists involved in the Manhattan project and the development of nuclear weapons, but we should also recall that many of the others involved, including Joseph Rotblat and Einstein himself, were later appalled at what they had discovered, at how it had been used and at the consequences for humanity of possessing nuclear weapons at all.

I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), I and one or two others might manage to bring to the Floor of the House a sense that there are alternatives to Trident. The review that the Liberal Democrats have asked for and that was no doubt produced at enormous expense is not a discussion of the alternatives. It is a discussion of weaponry and, in part, of perceptions of security and risk, but it is not a discussion of the alternative to Trident and nuclear weapons, which is not to have them at all and instead to aspire to a nuclear-free world. Interestingly, when those who support nuclear weapons are challenged, they all say they want to live in a nuclear-free world—

[Dr Julian Lewis]

indicated dissent.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Not all of them. I beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon. I exempt him from my last remark. He wants to live in a nuclear world, but many who agree with him about the decision on Trident want to live in a nuclear-free world, yet they go on to say that they cannot do anything about it, because now is not the time to do it, and then they head off rapidly down the road of weaponry and cold war attitudes towards deterrence and defence.

One or two fundamental questions need to be asked. A nuclear weapon is not a targeted weapon. Let us imagine we set off a nuclear weapon against, say, France. Let us suppose a Conservative Government got very angry with President Hollande. They are frequently angry with the French on most matters. They have never quite forgiven them for the 100 years war or the French revolution—[Interruption.] See, they are cheering up now. They are licking their lips at the prospect of war with France. Indeed, this whole building is festooned with memorabilia about the French revolution and the defeat of Napoleon. If they wanted to teach the French a lesson by sending a nuclear weapon against them, it would not take out a military establishment or an airport; it would take out millions of people in the civilian population, just as it would if used against Moscow, Pyongyang, Tehran or anywhere else. A nuclear weapon is a weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction against a civilian population. Small nuclear weapons were used in 1945 over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were tiny in comparison with one warhead on one part of a Trident submarine now, and the cancers from those weapons have existed and lasted for 60 years. The use of a nuclear weapon sets off a nuclear winter and an environmental disaster for those affected.

To those who want us to spend, in reality, £100 billion on Trident, I say that by 2020—if the main-gate decision is taken in 2016—a large proportion of the defence budget will be taken up in building new submarines and the warheads to accommodate them. Will defence chiefs at that time accept cuts in every other area of defence expenditure to accommodate the construction of those new submarines and new missile systems? I seriously doubt it. Those in the House who talk so glibly about nuclear weapons know full well that there is a serious debate in the Royal United Services Institute and the defence establishment about targeting defence expenditure on nuclear weapons when so many other demands are apparently being put forward by different service chiefs.

To my colleagues in the Labour party, who have been through this debate on nuclear weapons many times, I say that if we win an election in 2015—obviously, I hope we do—the demands on that incoming Government about apprenticeships, student fees, benefits, hospitals, schools, council housing, railways, roads, and a whole range of things, will be massive. Will we say to our supporters, “Sorry, the priority is weapons of mass destruction. The priority is nuclear weapons”? I like to think we would not.

Yes, we face threats in this world, including from terrorists, but holding nuclear weapons did not do the USA much good on 9/11, or us much good on 7/7, and it has not done anybody else much good. We must look to the causes and the humanitarian effects of war. A 1996 International Court of Justice ruling stated that

“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”

Let us look for alternatives such as nuclear weapon-free zones, supporting a non-proliferation treaty, or a conference of middle eastern states to bring about a nuclear weapon-free middle east. The review is not an alternative document but one that leads us down the road of nuclear proliferation and danger. The real alternative, produced by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, sets out an agenda for peace and investment in people, jobs and a good future for this country, not investing in weapons of mass destruction.

I hope I have managed at least to bring an alternative view to this debate.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Thursday 20th June 2013 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am delighted that we are having this debate on the operation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the UK contribution to it. This is an extraordinarily serious issue, and our attitude towards nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons states, as well as the prospects for our own disarmament, are hugely important. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us what the Government’s commitment is to promoting nuclear non-proliferation.

Nuclear weapons have existed since the second world war. They have been used only once in a war scenario—at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Several hundred thousand people lost their lives in a flash—literally—but the cancers have carried on for 50 years. The cancers brought about by nuclear testing and nuclear pollution around the world have carried on for a long time. We are dealing with weapons of mass destruction, which would cause very large numbers of civilian casualties, should they ever be used again.

The development of nuclear weapons by the United States during the second world war was supported by a lot of scientists from Britain. For a short period during the war, and for a long period afterwards, all the powers relied on captured Nazi scientists to develop their own nuclear weapons—that was particularly true of the USA and the rocketry that went with them.

Shortly after the second world war, the then Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons, followed by Britain and France, and lastly China, which exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964. Interestingly, the development of British nuclear weapons was always shrouded in secrecy and mystery. Brilliant as he was in many ways as a Prime Minister, the post-war Labour leader, Clement Attlee, managed to spend £200 million—an enormous sum now, never mind then, when it was worth far more—on secretly developing Britain’s own supposedly independent nuclear missile. That practice was copied by a later Prime Minister, Jim Callaghan, who in 1979 managed to develop the Chevaline project in secrecy, without even the Cabinet being informed.

Since the development of nuclear weapons, there has been one major occasion when there was a serious likelihood of their use. That was the Cuban missile crisis of 1963, which was resolved when the Soviet Union agreed not to put nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. In return the United States agreed to remove its nuclear missiles that were targeting Soviet targets from Turkey—although that was done secretly. A year later, both the leaders who negotiated on that were either dead or gone. Khrushchev was removed by an internal process, and Kennedy of course was assassinated. What came out of that period was a realisation of just how dangerous nuclear weapons are, and how dangerous it would be if they proliferated further. A great achievement was the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which was signed in 1970.

There are several elements to the treaty. One is the agreement, by countries that sign it, not to develop nuclear weapons. They can develop nuclear power and civil nuclear facilities, but not nuclear weapons. They also place themselves open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is based in Vienna. The five declared nuclear weapons states—Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the USA and China—agreed to ensure that there was no proliferation of their weaponry, and to take steps towards their own eventual nuclear disarmament.

The treaty’s progress has been patchy, to say the least. It is subject to a five-yearly review, and I have attended several review conferences as vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and chair of the parliamentary CND group. I am not making a declaration of interest, as there is no pecuniary gain in being an officer of CND; indeed, it costs quite a lot of money, but it is a joy to do. The review conferences are designed to monitor what is happening, but also to make proposals for a step forward. The review conference of 2010, with the support of a large number of states, proposed an international conference on the humanitarian effects of nuclear war.

That conference was held in Oslo, Norway, last year, and was supported by 77 countries. Unfortunately, none of the permanent five members chose to attend. There is no undertaking as yet about whether the UK Government will participate in its recall, which is due to happen in Mexico early next year. I think that the conference should be supported, and that we should recognise the good work that Mexico has done in being prepared to take the baton from Norway and make sure the conference happens. The situation is even more peculiar given the close relationship between Britain and Norway, and, indeed, their co-operation on nuclear disarmament issues and the decommissioning of nuclear weapons. Will the Minister give a firm undertaking that the UK will attend the conference?

Several countries have in the past 20 years taken steps that have lessened nuclear tensions in certain places. The most dramatic example was when post-apartheid South Africa, led by President Mandela, announced that it would no longer develop any nuclear weapons, and would completely disarm. That in turn brought about a nuclear weapons-free continent of Africa. That was an amazing step forward. We must ask ourselves who has the greater moral standing in the world: Britain, France, Russia, China and the USA, for their continued holding and developing of nuclear weapons; or South Africa, for ridding itself of apartheid and, shortly afterwards, of nuclear weapons? Those events were followed by nuclear weapons-free zones for the whole of Latin America and for central Asia, and a continuing debate about the possibility of such a zone for the Arctic, which would be a major achievement. I hope that we shall be able to develop a nuclear weapons-free middle east, which would be a huge prize.

A humanitarian initiative was adopted at the end of the Oslo conference and signed by 77 of the 106 states attending, and it is a lesson for all of us. It says:

“The catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed. All efforts must be exerted to eliminate this threat. The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination. It is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulfilling the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality.”

There is a message for all of us from the countries that have deliberately not developed nuclear weapons.

India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel do, unfortunately, have nuclear weapons, and I want to talk about them, and the question of Iran. India and Pakistan were both initially signatories to the NPT. Both declared that they did not want to develop nuclear weapons, and eventually both did. Each has its weapons targeted at the other, and it would be the ultimate folly for either side to use them—the madness of mutually assured destruction. If a nuclear weapon were sent from Delhi to Lahore, or Lahore to Delhi, neither side would know which was sent first, because both sides would be annihilated. There is also something tragic about the fact that, although India is in many ways a fast-developing economy and a rapidly modernising country, it still has the largest number of poor, starving children in the world. Why on earth would it spend its resources on nuclear weapons, when they could be spent on education, health and welfare? The same applies across the border in Pakistan. Any encouragement to India and Pakistan to decommission their weapons and come back into the fold of the non-proliferation treaty would be very welcome.

I have attended nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conferences and preparatory committees for the past few years. Often they are dominated by the question of Iran, and whether it has nuclear weapons. Together with the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and two other Members on the all-party group on Iran, I attended a meeting with the IAEA in Vienna to discuss that very question, and the obstructions, or otherwise, that Iran put in the way of inspections.

It is clear to me that Iran is developing a nuclear power system and processing uranium, which it is open about admitting. It absolutely declares that it does not have nuclear weapons, and religious leaders and others in Iran have said that they have no wish to develop them. I know that this is a highly contentious position, but we now have an opportunity, with the new President—President Rouhani—to engage with Iran on this question.

The way forward has to be engagement through a nuclear weapons-free middle east, which was in the declaration of the 2010 review conference. A nuclear weapons-free middle east would of course have to include Israel, which is the only country in the region to possess nuclear weapons—it has 200 warheads—and is not signed up to any treaty obligations.

There is, however, a significant nuclear peace campaign in Israel and throughout the middle east, which is supported by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. I pay tribute to Sharon Dolev and all who have campaigned so vigorously and effectively in Israel to draw attention to the insecurity, not the security, that nuclear weapons offer.

At the recent preparatory committee in Geneva, I listened carefully to the speeches made by delegates from all the Arab League states. The Arab League obviously has a great interest in the possibility of a nuclear weapons-free middle east, and strong statements were made by both the Arab League and individual countries, such as Egypt. They bluntly told the permanent five, “If you don’t progress the question of a conference for a nuclear weapons-free middle east, we will either walk out or develop our own nuclear weapons.” The obvious counter to Israel holding nuclear weapons is their development by other states in the region.

The Egyptian statement, which I heard, said:

“Egypt strongly supports the NPT regime. It has always championed the cause of a nuclear weapon free world. However, the establishment of a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone is essential for our national interest. We cannot wait forever for the launching of a process that would lead to the establishment of this zone, a process that was repeatedly committed to within the NPT. We cannot continue to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that do not get implemented, yet be expected to abide by the concessions we gave for this outcome.”

After making that statement, Egypt withdrew from the process.

There is now a serious danger that other countries in the middle east—one thinks of Saudi Arabia and others—will decide to withdraw from the NPT process, because of the failure of the secretariat and the permanent five to ensure that the Helsinki conference on a nuclear weapons-free middle east is held. I have repeatedly asked the Foreign Secretary—I now ask the Minister, who is well intentioned on these matters—whether a date has been set for the nuclear weapons-free middle east conference, which, sadly, did not happen in Helsinki when it was supposed to last year.

We need to move very urgently on the issue. The crisis in Syria suggests the need for a political solution there, but the election of a new President of Iran is an opportunity, not a problem. We should see it as an opportunity to progress this issue very quickly. If western countries that are so ready to give economic aid, arms supplies and political support to Israel cannot put pressure on Israel to attend that conference, that says a great deal about the permanent five’s rather limited commitment to a nuclear-free world.

An issue that has recently come up, as it does increasingly, is North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. One could discuss for a long time why it has developed nuclear weapons. Is it because it feels threatened by the possibility of American ones being placed in South Korea, or is it concerned about seaborne ones being used against it by the USA or somebody else? Undeniably, there is a terrible imbalance within North Korea: the country can barely feed itself and has many people living in desperate poverty, yet at the same time it wastes goodness knows what resources on the development of nuclear weapons and a missile system to go with them.

The six-party talks made some progress, but then completely broke down. More recently, at the end of the latest stand-off, with all the hyperbole from the new North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, there has been some clear news. An Associated Press report stated:

“North Korea’s top governing body on Sunday”—

last week—

“proposed high-level nuclear and security talks with the United States in an appeal sent just days after calling off talks with rival South Korea.”

North Korea’s position appears to be that it wants to talk not just to South Korea, but to the USA. One hopes that such talks can bring about not only a continuation of the ceasefire between North Korea and South Korea, but a permanent end to the state of conflict and both sides’ enormous waste of resources on the development of greater levels of armament to potentially attack each other. There is something very dangerous about that, but I hope that we seize that opportunity to encourage direct talks with the USA.

President Obama was in Berlin yesterday, on the anniversary of President Kennedy’s speech at the Brandenburg gate. He proposed a further reduction in nuclear warheads as a way of promoting some degree of peace. That has to be welcomed, although so far the Russian response is a little confused. It is not clear what is being suggested, but it has to be seen as a way forward. In response, Kate Hudson, general secretary of CND, said:

“We welcome President Obama’s call for further reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles. His proposals, which echo his speech against nuclear weapons in Prague in 2009, give voice to the concerns of billions around the world who wish to see a world without these catastrophic weapons… The only way to create genuine peace and security for future generations is to follow up these admirable words with concrete actions.”

One obviously hopes that that will be the case.

What can we do in Britain? We are a country of 65 million people on the north-west coast of Europe, with challenges on public expenditure and the delivery of public services. We need to invest a large amount in infrastructure. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves why we spend so much money, resource, time and energy on maintaining nuclear weapons.

The history of nuclear weapons is that Attlee initially envisaged something independent and British, but that later developed into the importing of US weapons such as Polaris, Cruise and Trident. We are now locked into a programme: the initial gate decision has been made to replace the Trident system and to develop a new submarine system at enormous cost, and a main gate decision will be taken in 2016.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

No debate would really be complete in which I did not intervene on the hon. Gentleman. On the renewal of the submarines, does he acknowledge that the Trident missiles have many years of life left in them? Therefore, the decision about whether to replace the ageing fleet of Vanguard submarines that carry the Trident missiles could not possibly contravene the terms of the non-proliferation treaty.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

It is quite clear that the massive cost involved is largely for the replacement of the submarines. I argue that it is a breach of the treaty to replace submarines that will carry nuclear weapons, because that is an expansion of the nuclear capability, even if the number of warheads carried on each submarine is reduced as a result.

A review is being undertaken within the Government, following pressure from the Lib Dem part of the coalition. It fought the election on the basis of not having a like-for-like replacement of Trident.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I sometimes think that the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and I missed our profession. We have both been arguing the merits and demerits of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence—I would like to think passionately but also reasonably—for at least the last 30 years. Perhaps we should cast ourselves as the nuclear version of “Les Misérables”, but which one of us would be the fugitive and which one the pursuer is a matter for others to decide. Certainly, I would like to think that our relationship is a bit more positive, if adversarial, than that of Jean Valjean and his nemesis, but the fact is that we do disagree, and we represent two diametrically opposed schools of thought. I genuinely congratulate him on securing this debate. I was away with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the United States when he applied for it. Had I not been, I would have been happy to support him in applying for it, just as he supported me very fully earlier this year when I applied for the debate that we both secured on Trident, which most people thought was beneficial and extremely valuable, whichever side of the debate they happened to support.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that, and inform him that I prayed in aid his undoubted wish to have this debate in order to continue our lifelong struggle for nuclear peace.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted to hear that, and that is what I hoped he would do. I will try to follow the chain of the hon. Gentleman’s argument—not too pedantically, I hope. I will start where he did, in 1945, because as he said, that was the one occasion on which nuclear weapons were used. However, it all depends on what we mean by the verb “to use”, because although they were used, very controversially, to end the war with Japan, I contend that they have been used frequently, indeed continuously, ever since. Once we get to the stage of mutual nuclear deterrence, the use of the nuclear deterrent lies not in firing it, but in possessing it, so that no one else will ever be tempted to do to a country what America was able to do to Japan. Whether we regard that as right or wrong in the circumstances is irrelevant. We want to ensure that no one is tempted to do that again in the future. The use of the nuclear deterrent is to deter anyone from attacking a country with mass destruction weapons.

Towards the end of the hon. Gentleman’s speech, he said that nuclear weapons were a fat lot of use as far as 9/11 was concerned. That is an update of an argument that we used to hear in the 1980s, when it was said, “Well, your nuclear deterrent didn’t stop Argentina invading the Falklands, did it?” My answer to the more modern version of that has to be the same as my answer to the earlier version: if a weapons system does not deter every sort of threat—and it does deter some dangerous threats—there is no more reason to get rid of it than to get rid of the antidote to a deadly disease just because it could not cure us of other, unrelated diseases.

The question of nuclear deterrence was substantially worked out before nuclear weapons made their existence known. In 1944-45, the British chiefs of staff commissioned a study by defence scientists under a famous professor, Sir Henry Tizard, to try to imagine what the future nature of warfare would be once Germany and Japan were defeated. Tizard was not allowed to go into the question of nuclear weapons, even though he knew that they were under development, but he could not resist putting in his report, in 1945, that he and his fellow senior defence scientists could see only one answer to the atomic bomb, if indeed it was developed. He said:

“A knowledge that we were prepared, in the last resort”

to retaliate with such a weapon

“might well deter an aggressive nation. Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood 20 paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.”

The hon. Member for Islington North said that Nazi scientists played a great part in the subsequent development of nuclear weapons. I do not think that that is quite true. The Nazis went down a blind alley as far as nuclear weapons development was concerned. They were subject to eavesdropping at Farm hall, where intelligence experts heard them doubting and wondering whether it was true that the Americans had successfully developed the atomic bomb used in Japan. However, he is absolutely right that Nazi scientists played a key role in developing the rocketry that could carry such weapons to their destination, should they ever be fired. As I like to stress over and over, that is not what their use consists of, once the stage of stable nuclear deterrence is reached.

Similarly and interestingly, the hon. Gentleman said, again rightly, that the Cuban missile crisis was probably the most dangerous point in the cold war—the point when the possibility of a nuclear exchange was at its highest. The concession that the Americans made was even a little greater than he suggested, because they had nuclear-armed missiles based in Turkey. It was not a question of targeting Turkey; the US had missiles based in Turkey, which Kennedy wisely decided the US should offer to remove as a way of giving Khrushchev some face-saving ability, so it would not look too much like a straightforward climb-down for him to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Although the hon. Gentleman talked a great deal about non-proliferation, he did not quote from the relevant article in the non-proliferation treaty, which is often quoted incompletely. The preamble to the treaty states that nuclear disarmament should occur

“pursuant to”—

that is, in conformity with—

“a treaty on general and complete disarmament”:

in other words, worldwide conventional disarmament.

Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty states in full:

“Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

There are three elements to article VI: the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, a world free of nuclear weapons, and a world with general disarmament. On the first, Britain has never been part of the nuclear arms race. It is true that the superpowers have: they piled up nuclear weapons on both sides of the iron curtain.

The one thing on which I always used to agree with the famous former general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Monsignor Bruce Kent, was his view that the Americans and the Russians could each unilaterally cut their nuclear arsenals by 10% without any loss of security whatsoever. I agreed entirely: both sides had massive overkill capability. However, Britain never did. For that matter, China never has, and nor has France. We in this country have always followed a policy of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence. In other words, it does not matter if another country has the ability to wipe us out 50 times over, because we can cause unacceptable levels of devastation in retaliation, which is why the other country will not do it in the first place.

The hon. Gentleman—I nearly called him my hon. Friend, because I regard him as an honourable friend—asked rhetorically which country had greater moral standing in the world: South Africa, for renouncing its programme, or the United Kingdom. I suppose it depends on one’s standard of morality and how one measures it. I would say that it is a little like arguing that the neutral countries in 1940—for instance, Holland, Belgium and Norway—had greater moral standing than democracies such as Britain and France, which at least tried to have armaments with which to defend themselves. However, that is not my standard of morality or my way of measuring it. My way of measuring it is to ask which country, by adopting a particular policy, will do most to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out. It was implicit—at one point, it was virtually explicit—in some of the hon. Gentleman’s remarks that he accepts that both of us share the same end. We do not wish a nuclear war to happen; we just disagree as much as it is possible to disagree on the means of achieving that laudable end.

I will say a few words about Britain and the renewal of Trident, and about the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and that will probably be enough. On the question of Britain’s renewal of Trident, I underscore what I said in the intervention that the hon. Gentleman generously allowed me to make. The Trident missiles that currently constitute the British strategic nuclear deterrent are not up for renewal. They have decades of life left in them. The only question is whether we should replace the submarines that carry them.

Of course, one could argue that not replacing the submarines would effectively disarm this country of its nuclear deterrent. That is why the hon. Gentleman and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament would like the submarines not to be replaced. Equally, it is why I am determined to do everything that I can to put pressure on the Government to ensure that they fulfil their promise to replace them. However, I do not think that it is credibly arguable, by any stretch of the imagination, that replacing four submarines that are reaching the end of their design life with three or four new submarines to carry the same missiles—indeed, the new submarines will have a smaller missile compartment, so arguably they will carry fewer missiles, although I freely acknowledge that the flexibility in the number of warheads that can be put on missiles probably means that it is a distinction without a difference—comes anywhere near a breach of the provisions in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, whatever one regards our undertakings as being.

As I said before, the only time frame is ending the arms race “at an early date”. We have never been a part of the arms race, due to our policy of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence, and as far as I can see, there is nothing in the treaty that says that we must go for a nuclear-free world before the world is conventionally disarmed. In the next and final stage of my remarks, I will argue that that would be dangerous and destabilising.

To return to the point about Trident, we continue to follow a policy with the same weapons system that we have deployed ever since HMS Vanguard first went to sea in the 1990s. Whatever other arguments might be used to say that Britain ought not to build the new fleet of successor submarines, contravening the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty is not one of them.

Let me move to the final component of my argument, which is whether a nuclear-free world would be desirable, or a least a nuclear-free world that was introduced prior to general and complete disarmament—conventional disarmament—which is referred to in the same clause of the NPT that refers to a world free of nuclear weapons.

If nuclear weapons had not existed, it is unlikely that the cold war would have remained stalemated, as it did, rather than boiling over into a third global conflict. If nuclear weapons ceased to exist, but the world remained armed to the teeth and still as mutually hostile as it is, there would be nothing to prevent the first nation to cheat on the question of its abolition of nuclear weapons from using—that is, firing—secretly manufactured devices before any such temporary monopoly of them was broken.

I particularly draw attention to the example of what happened with a treaty that undoubtedly would have had the support of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1972, when it was signed: the biological warfare convention. I always remember that brilliant columnist, Bernard Levin, who wrote an article at the time of the biological warfare convention, talking about the fact that the Russians were apparently disposing at sea of all sorts of horrible biological weapons, under the terms of the treaty. He said that whatever things they were consigning to the depths of the ocean, he was pretty sure that biological weapons were not among them. He was dead right, because we now know that in 1973, the year after Russia signed the treaty, the Soviet leadership set up Biopreparat—a massive organisation—secretly to continue its deadly biological weapons research into such charming weapons as smallpox, bubonic plague, anthrax, brucellosis, tularaemia and Ebola.

We know about this because in 1989—I remember when it happened—a defector from that organisation, Vladimir Pasechnik, revealed everything that was going on. We were able to get away with that cheating, because we had the ultimate fall-back of a nuclear deterrent system, which meant that it would have been just as dangerous for Russia to have exploited its secret monopoly of biological weapons, which it kept while everybody else kept to the terms of the treaty and disarmed. We would have been able to retaliate against those weapons with our nuclear deterrent, but heaven help us if we had not the nuclear deterrent as a back-up.

The question that people who advocate a nuclear-free world have to ask themselves is this: is it a sensible policy, in the real world as we know it today, to make the world safe once again for conventional warfare between the great powers? I would love to see a nuclear-free world, but I would love to see it only when I see a weapons-free world; for that to happen, there has to be a world Government and, above all, a reformation of the mind of man and a change for the better in human nature.

Nuclear Deterrent

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Thursday 17th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I will give way, but it will be for the last time as otherwise I will be in danger of taking too much time. [Interruption.] I thank my hon. Friend for his courtesy in resuming his seat.

I wish briefly to make four political points. The first political argument is that when people are asked whether it is safer for this country to continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them, a large majority of the population consistently take the view that we should do so and that it would be unwise and dangerous to renounce them unilaterally. We can ask different poll questions that seem to point to a different answer, but when that question is asked, the answer is surprisingly consistent.

The second political argument is that in the 1980s, under cold war conditions, two general elections demonstrated the toxic effect of one-sided disarmament proposals on a party’s prospects of gaining power. The third argument is that it was and remains widely believed—this refers to the intervention made by my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Henry Smith) a few moments ago—that the nuclear stalemate of the cold war enabled all-out conflict between the majors powers to be avoided for 50 years, despite their mutual hostility and in contrast to what happened in those many regional theatres where communists and their enemies could and did fight without fear of nuclear escalation. The final political argument is that the ending of the east-west confrontation has not altered the balance of public opinion on this question. First, that is because a danger could easily re-emerge of a reversion to a confrontation of that sort. Secondly, it is because even today there are unpleasant regimes, such as Iran’s, on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons and some, such as North Korea’s, that have already done so.

The role of our strategic nuclear force remains what it has always been: to deter any power armed with mass destruction weapons from using them against us, in the belief, true or false, that nobody would retaliate on our behalf. The use of our deterrent consists of its preventive effect on the behaviour of our enemies. The actual launching of a Trident missile would mark the failure of deterrence and would presuppose that a devastating attack had already been inflicted on our country.

Because strategic nuclear deterrence is largely irrelevant to the current counter-insurgency campaigns with which the British Army has been involved, some senior Army officers have been suggesting that we must choose between fighting “the war” of the present and insuring against the more conventional prospect of state-versus-state conflict in the future. I say that that choice is unacceptable, and that the underlying message that the era of high-intensity, state-on-state warfare is gone for good is a dangerous fallacy. Every sane individual hopes that such warfare will never return, but to rely on that in the face of past experience would be extremely foolhardy. The lesson of warfare in the 20th century, repeated time and again, was that when conflicts broke out they usually took their victims by surprise. Obvious examples are: the failure to anticipate the first world war; the follies of the “10-year rule” from 1919 to 1932; and the entirely unanticipated attacks on Israel in 1973, the Falklands in 1982, Kuwait in 1990 and the United States in 2001. Conversely, and on a brighter note, the speed with which the Soviet empire unravelled from 1989 left even its sternest critics largely nonplussed.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Lewis]

I will not, because I am about to finish. I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.

Our current counter-insurgency campaigns are very important indeed, but they cannot be compared with battles for the very survival of the United Kingdom homeland. Such existential threats confronted us twice in the past 100 years and, if international relations deteriorate, they could easily confront us again.

My final remark concerns the alternatives. I can see only three possible alternatives to renewing Trident other than getting rid of the nuclear deterrent completely. The first is that suggested by the Liberal Democrats of putting cruise missiles on Astute class submarines. I have said in the past and say again that that would be more expensive and less effective, would put the submarine at risk because of the shorter range of the missiles, which would bring the submarine closer to shore, and could start world war three by accident because no one would be sure whether the launched missile had a conventional or nuclear warhead. Apart from that, it is a great idea.

The second alternative is to come off continuous at- sea deterrence, to put the nuclear deterrent on stand-by and to say that we will reactivate it if things get worse. That is an extremely dangerous suggestion as having a part-time deterrent is probably as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than, having no deterrent at all.

The final suggestion is that we could perhaps combine our deterrent with that of the French and therefore have fewer submarines. All I can say about that is that our deterrent is strongly connected with the excellent working relationship we have with the United States, which would not admit of such a solution.

I hope that I have given people plenty of food for thought. We have an hour and three quarters left and I very much look forward to hearing both sides of the argument in the time that remains.

Trident

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point. Not only is she a CND stalwart, but she has great responsibility, for she is a member of the CND national council, as I am. I am pleased that she is a member as well. She is quite right—many in the defence community express horror at equipment shortages of all sorts, the privatisation of air and sea rescue, and all those kinds of things that are planned, while at the same time someone is going ahead and planning to spend and spend on replacing Trident, a massive vanity project; that is what it is. It does not seem to bear any relation to any foreign policy strategy or to British membership of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which requires clearly under article 6 that the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are also the five declared nuclear weapon states, take steps towards nuclear disarmament. Britain is not taking steps towards nuclear disarmament—it is reducing the number of warheads, but the capability is to be increased. Any Government, whether this one or a future one, could increase the number of warheads.

When the National Audit Office looked at the matter recently, in November this year, it cited problems with the Astute class submarines currently being built. They are now expected to cost £6.67 billion, a full £1.47 billion more than anticipated when the project was approved. Apparently, it is also running five years and one month late. Also, a report, “Looking into the Black Hole”, states that

“spending on the successor programme will rise sharply, probably reaching a peak of around 30% of the new equipment budget by 2021-22 or 2022-23”—

exactly the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)—

“when the first-of-class begins production. It is likely to remain close to this level until after the planned delivery of the first submarine in 2028.”

I want to turn to the issue of transparency—

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is no finer person to be transparent than the hon. Gentleman.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I know that I am going to get one shot at this, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his great courtesy. I would like to remind him that there was a parliamentary debate and a vote in, I think, the spring of 2007. It is not as if Parliament has not had one vote on the matter, and it will have another one. Does he agree that the cost overrun for the Astute class submarine was so great because of the gap that had been allowed to develop between the completion of the nuclear deterrent submarines of the Vanguard class and the initiation of the Astute class? By ensuring that the next generation of boats follow closely on from the Astute class, any such increase should be avoidable. There is precedent for that, because both Polaris and Trident came in on time and on budget.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is a precedent for this debate, which was the full debate that was held four years ago in 2007, in which a significant number of MPs from my party—100—voted against the replacement of Trident. Every other debate was initiated by Back Benchers, some of whom are present today. That is the function of Parliament, and I hope that, when the Minister replies, he will be able to assure me that there will be regular statements to update Parliament.

Ministry of Defence (Procurement)

Debate between Julian Lewis and Jeremy Corbyn

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I do not know whether you care to cast your mind back to May 1997, Mr Hood, but you drew the short straw of being the hon. Member who had to respond to my maiden speech. That speech was about nuclear weapons—Trident—and I fear that this one will be on the same subject. Indeed, I suspect that it will not be the last one that you or other hon. Members hear from me on the subject. I sometimes think that I should go into a sort of partnership with the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). We have debated this subject many times over the years. He never changes his tune, and I never change mine, but the debate remains live. It relates to procurement, in addition to strategy and the ethics or otherwise of nuclear deterrence, because of course the procurement process for Trident has been much disrupted.

The hon. Gentleman made great play of the fact that Parliament has not yet had the debate. Well, excuse me, I think that Parliament did have a debate. If I remember correctly, it was in the spring of 2007, and both the Labour party and the Conservative party were wholly in favour of the next generation of Trident being constructed. I recall the then Leader of the Opposition—now the Prime Minister—to whose speech I had contributed, passing me an Order Paper on which he had inscribed the words “Julian gets his way”. Sadly, of course, there’s many a slip between cup and lip or, indeed, between a vote in Parliament and the deployment of a successor generation. The slip concerned came in the failure of the Conservative party to win an overall majority at the last general election. That ought not to have been a problem for the procurement process for Trident, given that the Labour party had gone into the election pledged to renew the nuclear deterrent and so had the Conservative party. Only the Liberal Democrats were opposed to that.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I know that the hon. Gentleman loves the fact that the Conservatives are in a coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats—it is what gets him out of bed every morning and into work—but in his discussions with his Liberal Democrat colleagues, has he reached any conclusion about whether they do or do not want a nuclear missile or whether they want a different type of nuclear missile in the review that apparently is being undertaken?

[Dr Lewis]

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman—I am tempted to say “my hon. Friend”—that the Liberal Democrats really differ from both of us, because he knows where he stands on nuclear weapons and I know where I stand, but the Liberal Democrats stand firmly with a foot in both camps. They know that they do not want Trident, but they do not want to put themselves in his camp by telling the truth, which is that the majority of their activists are one-sided nuclear disarmers and do not want a strategic nuclear deterrent at all. Therefore, they come up with this fiction that it is possible to have a viable strategic nuclear deterrent with an alternative system to Trident.

That ought to have made no headway at all when the coalition was formed. The reason for that was that I and all the other Conservative Members of Parliament, who were being addressed by the Prime Minister-to-be at a meeting in Committee Room 14, were told what the terms of the coalition agreement would be, or some of the basic outlines of the terms. We were told that we would have to accept certain things that the Liberal Democrats wanted that we did not want, such as a referendum on the alternative vote, but that the Liberals would have to accept things that we wanted that they did not want, such as the renewal of Trident—that was the very example chosen. I remember my friend and colleague the future Chancellor of the Exchequer looking up at that moment, catching my eye—because at the time I was still the party spokesman on the Royal Navy and the nuclear deterrent—and nodding vigorously in confirmation of what the leader of the party had said. You can imagine, Mr Hood, my surprise and dismay—