(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberAs we have discussed already, Members across the House are particularly concerned about what is happening on university campuses. As I have said a couple of times, the Department for Education has a five-point plan, which it set out just a few weeks ago and which includes withdrawing visas from international students who are inciting racial hatred. Anyone who is not a British citizen who incites racial hatred or commits criminal offences in this area should be removed from the United Kingdom. People who come to this country need to respect our laws, and our citizens and their rights and dignity, and people who are not British citizens should be removed either under the Immigration Act 1971 or section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 if they incite racial hatred; I know the immigration Ministers will take action there.
We want vice-chancellors to do more and have written to them asking them to do so. We have had meetings with the Office for Students—the regulator—to make sure it is doing more to clean up what is happening on campuses; we are doing more to make sure that criminal referrals—from universities to the police—are made when antisemitism happens; and, as I have said, I think and the Department for Education thinks that every single university should sign up to the IHRA definition of antisemitism.
Does my right hon. Friend know that synagogues in the west end of London are being targeted by these so-called protesters, and that this has happened not only once or twice but now on multiple occasions—to the extent that they are even looking to see what time the services finish so that old people, the young, parents and so forth are being terrorised? This is not supporting Palestine; this is antisemitism—this is attacking Jewish people. I hope my right hon. Friend will call in the commissioner and sort it out.
My hon. Friend is right to raise that issue. Gathering outside a synagogue with the purpose of intimidating people coming out is completely unacceptable. That is not protest; it is deliberate intimidation, and it has no place on our streets whatsoever. The police have substantial powers to act in this area; I will not recite all the various sections and Acts, but the police have numerous powers to act. We have regular meetings with policing leaders—one is coming up in just a few days—and I will certainly be raising this point. If my hon. Friend could send me a couple of examples, I would be very happy to raise them with the Metropolitan police in the coming days.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI declare my interest as chairman of the British Shooting Sports Council. I have to start by saying that I was somewhat surprised to see the measures presented in a private Member’s Bill, rather than Government legislation. There was a full Government consultation on the issue, with a very large number of responses. It came to a consensus—I think that has been generally recognised this afternoon—but one does still wonder: why a private Member’s Bill? Having said that, the Bill is good, including from the BSSC’s perspective. I congratulate the Bill’s promoter—or should I say promoters? We need to thank the very large number of people who contributed to the consultation, and to the drafting of the clauses, not least the National Small-bore Rifle Association, which created the framework of clause 1 on miniature rifle ranges.
On clause 1, target shooting with small-bore rifles is a challenging sport that is open to men and women of all ages, and accessible to competitors with a wide range of disabilities. British shooters regularly achieve international success, and since 2000, the home nations competing at the Commonwealth games have won seven gold, eight silver and eight bronze medals in small-bore rifle shooting. The law allows people to use small-calibre rifles at miniature rifle ranges without holding a firearm certificate. That exemption has provided an opportunity to introduce scouts, cadets, youth organisations, schools, colleges, universities and the wider public to the sport of shooting. I welcome the fact that the Government recognise the value of that exemption and are retaining it.
The BSSC agrees that the operator of a miniature rifle range should hold a firearm certificate in order to purchase, acquire and possess firearms and ammunition. That will ensure that they are subject to the same checks as other firearm owners and that they are responsible for the security of the firearms and ammunition. Miniature rifle ranges have traditionally used .22 rim-fire rifles. I agree that that should remain the case. I am pleased that the Government have clarified the point, and that it has appeared in the Bill.
Firearms law is administered by the police, in accordance with guidance issued by the Home Office, and no doubt the Minister will explain that the guidance is to be amended to recognise the new legislation. The non-statutory guidance sets out the “good reason” that is required to justify possession of a firearm. I will be grateful if the Minister confirms that the operation of a miniature rifle range will be regarded as a good reason for possessing suitable firearms and ammunition.
Large numbers of law-abiding shooters reload their own cartridges. They do so to save costs, to improve accuracy and to provide them with ammunition that is not commercially available—for example, for vintage or historical firearms. Viable ammunition requires a primer and a propellant, and there are already controls on those components. Some elements of the drafting of clause 2 on ammunition components—specifically, bullets and cartridge cases—mean that those are not controlled. That may need some review for clarity. I hope that the Minister and the Bill’s promoter can engage on that as the Bill proceeds.
Completed cartridges, to which section 1 of the 1968 Act applies, may be possessed only with a suitably conditioned firearm certificate. Any ammunition loaded must conform to the calibre and quantity specified on the firearm certificate, and cartridges must be stored securely to prevent access to them by unauthorised people. I was pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd South recognised that in his remarks. Shooters who hold the relevant, valid certificates, permits and licences, and who load section 1 cartridges authorised by their certificates, do not commit an offence.
The BSSC was consulted on the changes proposed by the Government and discussed those matters with them. It will no doubt remain a matter for the police and the courts as to how intent to manufacture ammunition unlawfully is to be proven. However, I am satisfied that in the case of lawful shooters, reloading ammunition that they have authority to possess, no offence is committed under the proposed legislation.
On the Opposition amendments, I note that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, referred to recent incidents. I understand her wishing to debate such issues—I do not in any way discount them, or indeed the comments of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport in that regard, because they are important—but I hope that the Minister believes that we need to stand back, review the facts, the coroners’ reports and other evidence, and consult, rather than legislating immediately in a private Member’s Bill.
I am delighted to speak in the Bill Committee, not least because I was for a decade a member of the Association of Chief Police Officers’ firearms committee, working alongside NABIS, the National Ballistics Intelligence Service. I therefore welcome the Bill, which is much needed.
For more than 25 years, we have prided ourselves in the UK on having the best firearms legislation in the world. We only have to look to places such as America to see how good the UK is, and we cannot deny the strength of our firearms legislation. However, there is a clear need, 25 years on, to address some problems with it.
We need new legislation partly because the internet has grown, and there is now 3D printing, which can produce 3D guns. The internet also allows people to order ammunition, leading to the disruption we have seen. People receive parcels of ammunition just through using the internet.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe question is at what stage do we bring a Bill forward—do we wait for it to be perfect or do we bring forward what we can get at a certain point? The right hon. Lady raises some interesting points. She knows my views on SLAPPS; indeed, in a former incarnation, I may have expressed them extremely clearly. She knows that we share views on asset seizures too. I should point out, however, that no common law jurisdiction has successfully solved the question of asset seizures, although many of us have tried and, indeed, some of us are in conversation with others to try to work out ways of doing it—forfeiture and seizure are not quite the same thing.
I will give way; I should have known that I was lining that up.
Yes, because my right hon. Friend touched on asset seizures and tempted me. Of course, Canada has enacted an Act of Parliament that provides for freezing orders to be translated into seizing orders at the request of the Attorney General of Canada.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, but he is also no doubt aware that there is much discussion in the Canadian legal community about whether those orders will be challenged in different ways and how exactly they will work. There is still a serious debate about the nature of translating from forfeiture to seizure.
My right hon. Friend is generous in giving way again. All this law is new: our unexplained wealth orders were new, and they have been questioned in the courts, so that is not the question. The question is whether we have the guts to stand up and move on this issue, as the whole western world wants to see.
Has my right hon. and learned Friend also considered the Bribery Act, where a similar set of procedures was forced on corporates, with dramatic results?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Of course, he was a Minister in the Ministry of Justice when the Bribery Act was brought into force at the end of the 2005 Parliament, and he has direct experience of this issue. He is absolutely right that the Bribery Act has been of huge value. In fact, under the regime of deferred prosecution agreements that the Government brought in in the early part of the last decade, of the 11 DPAs that have been made by the Serious Fraud Office with corporates, nine were for “failure to prevent offences”—failure to prevent bribery—and just three were for the offence of fraud. That accounts for 90% of the £1.7 billion in revenue that the SFO has brought in through DPAs. It is clear that that has been an important step change in the way we deal with wrongdoing or indeed the threat of wrongdoing.
For people who think this is some sort of academic exercise, I draw their attention to the LIBOR scandal and the forex rate rigging scenario. There was no bringing to account of anyone involved—there was impunity. That is not good for the rule of law or the economic wellbeing of this country.If we want people to invest in the United Kingdom—we do and we have excelled in direct foreign investment over generations—then they need to have the confidence that if there is a problem, there is redress of grievance, accountability and a way of recouping the loss or making sure their investment is safe. That is what I believe the new clauses go to.
We have been careful in the test we wish to apply to the “failure to prevent” offences that form the subject of new clauses 4 and 6. It was tempting to follow the recommendation in the report by the House of Lords’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, chaired by my noble Friend Baroness Morgan of Cotes, to apply the wider test contained within the Criminal Finances Act 2017 relating to failing to prevent tax evasion. That would not require an intention by the corporate or the individual to confer a benefit on the company or a benefit on a person to whom the suspect—the defendant— is providing services on behalf of the company. I have sought not to go that far, but to replicate the Bribery Act test, which is the intention to confer a benefit. It is important that when we seek to draft legislation, we are as mindful as possible of not widening it to an extent that could in many ways create further unfairness. We have an obligation to ensure that balance is maintained.
I have set out three separate offences in the provisions: fraud, money laundering and false accounting. I think fraud and false accounting are probably self-explanatory, but the Government might have a bit of a question about money laundering. They might be thinking about the 2017 money laundering regulations, and regulation 92 in particular, where there is already a corporate offence where, with the consent or connivance of an officer of the company, an offence is committed or an offence is attributable to neglect on their part. What I would say gently to the Minister is that I do not think that cuts it. It still leaves significant evidential and prosecutorial challenges. The Financial Conduct Authority has, I think, used it vanishingly rarely. Therefore, I urge him very strongly to look carefully—I hope he will accept the thrust of my argument, even if he cannot accept the detail of my new clauses today—at bringing forward provision that covers money laundering as well as fraud. That would be my strong exhortation to him today.
I thank the hon. Lady for her point, which is well made. The thing is that the Government were curious, and they did this review, which is sitting there. That is clear—the one thing that the written statement confirmed was that a review had been done and recommendations had come from it, but all we got was a summary of the recommendations. What I take from that is that they were curious and they found out, but now they do not want to tell us. What on earth happened? It is not a good look.
To move on from golden visas, we desperately need to see more action in a number of other areas to ensure that we properly tackle economic crime, particularly by kleptocrats. It is right that we focus on Russians, but it is worth saying that the Bill will apply to many other flavours of kleptocrats and bad people. As other hon. Members have said, this could be our last chance for many years to get this right, so we should consider how else it might apply. Last year, for example, Hong Kong Watch highlighted concerns about the dirty money that Hong Kong officials had gained through corruption and that has now been spent by the families of officials in the UK, including on property. I raised those concerns at the time and I will continue to press Ministers on them.
I tabled new clause 30, about Iran, to show how important it is to focus not on a single country, but anywhere there are human rights abuses. Anoosheh Ashoori made the point that
“there are a large number of children and relatives of the regime that, like the Russian oligarchs, like living the high life here and have assets here.”
Why are we not pursuing them? The new clause asks the Government to use existing legislation to do an audit and report back to Parliament. We should apply the Bill to as many places as it can be effective.
All that takes resourcing—a familiar refrain in the House—which is addressed by new clause 31. Frankly, resourcing is a lacuna in this Bill and its predecessor. I was encouraged by the number of amendments on establishing an economic crime fighting fund, which shows that it is clearly the shared will of hon. Members on both sides of the House that we put the resourcing and money behind this legislation to ensure that it is done properly. The Liberal Democrats wholeheartedly share that commitment. I say to the Minister that that money would not be frittered away; it would be an investment, because if we fund the agencies properly, they will start to bring the money back in. We know the exorbitant amount that we think we are losing to economic crime, so any investment in getting some of that money back would surely be good.
In conclusion, I urge Ministers to take note of the willingness of hon. Members on both sides of the House to act, and to take heart from it. There is much more to be done. I hope that the Bill is the next chapter, but not the last, in the House’s fight against economic crime in this country. I sincerely hope that Ministers will continue to work with us in our common aim of bringing about transparency and light to tackle this once and for all, so that we are never again left in this embarrassing position.
I rise to speak to new clause 23, in my name and those of the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) and 17 other hon. Members on both sides of the House, for whose support I am grateful. This comprehensive Bill is significant in its scope and its intention to counter fraud, which is wholly welcome, but new clause 23 speaks to its lack of focus on the proceeds of economic crime, which are the proceeds resulting from acts committed in the UK and overseas.
Such proceeds have circulated in the national economy, largely unimpeded, for too long, and a host of existing limitations and issues, such as the lack of proper financing for related law enforcement bodies, which has been much discussed over the last two days, have a compounding negative effect. Unfortunately, those limitations are all too frequently at the expense of and to the detriment of hard-working and honest taxpayers in all our constituencies—not least mine—and those who often stand to benefit are the criminals and those sanctioned for reasons related to foreign affairs. Tackling that issue is the primary motivation behind the new clause.
More broadly, like-minded countries are increasingly focusing on this area, including our fellow parliamentarians in Canada. In June last year, they made technical yet significant changes to their economic sanctions legislation, including the Sergei Magnitsky law regime. Effectively, those changes allow existing sanctions for freezing assets to be converted into orders for the seizure of those assets. Similar measures are being considered by the European Commission, in other European capitals such as Tallinn, and in the United States. Unless our regulatory measures vis-à-vis the proceeds of economic crime are reviewed and strengthened, the UK risks falling behind, which I believe would be both morally and politically unpalatable.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022 (S.I., 2022, No. 705).
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. The statutory instrument regulates the ability of our courts and tribunals to allow the remote observation of proceedings across our justice system, subject to judicial discretion. The instrument provides the initial regulations for the power contained in the new section 85A of the Courts Act 2003, as inserted into the Act—together with new section 85B—by section 198 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. It was made using the made affirmative procedure on 28 June 2022 by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals. I will come on to why the use of the made affirmative procedure was appropriate.
New sections 85A and 85B of the Courts Act 2003 replace the legislation contained in section 55 and schedule 25 of the Coronavirus Act 2020. That coronavirus legislation was repealed on 28 June 2022, save for a very minor purpose relating to three measures in tribunal rules, in order to give the tribunals in question time to amend or replace the measures, which will expire on or before 24 December 2022. The new legislation became effective on the same date as today’s instrument was made.
For Members who are not familiar with it, I will briefly outline the history of the legislation. At the outset of the pandemic, our courts and tribunals moved swiftly to temporarily hold all hearings remotely, using audio and video technology. To ensure that legal proceedings remained appropriately public and transparent, temporary and emergency legislation in the Coronavirus Act allowed most courts and tribunals to transmit audio or video footage of their proceedings to remote observers who had specifically requested access. Thus our courts were able to satisfy their obligations for publicity under the common law principle of open justice and article 6 of the European convention on human rights.
The legislation was very well received, especially by court reporters and legal bloggers, who do valiant work reporting what happens in our justice system to the wider public. It allowed courts and tribunals to offer a digital equivalent to the public gallery where they saw fit, thereby improving the transparency of our justice system, while maintaining the necessary safeguards for court users and controls on privacy. Consequently, the Government decided to make the option for remote observation a permanent feature of our justice system. The necessary primary legislation was enacted as part of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, and initial regulations for that legislation are contained in today’s instrument.
The regulations, which have been scrutinised and approved by the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, allow the recently enacted remote observation powers to be utilised by our judiciary when they see fit in a far wider set of scenarios than before. It allows the powers to be used with judicial discretion in all of our courts and tribunals, and any bodies that exercise the judicial power of the state, except for the Supreme Court and devolved courts and tribunals.
Will the Minister explain the wider purpose? She gave a good reason why the powers are needed for the administration of the court process, but am I right in thinking that they could also be used to, in effect, have more US-type show trials, such as the OJ Simpson trial, whereby the public could look at the trial conducted, as well as the people involved in the trial itself?
That is a very useful point, which shows some misunderstanding by the public, not by my hon. Friend, regarding what the SI is about. Remote observation is distinct from broadcasting. It certainly would not be US-style broadcasting; this is remote observation only, following an application by somebody who would ordinarily be able to watch the proceedings physically in a gallery. There needs to be a prior application with name and address supplied. It is not open broadcasting. If I can make a little progress—
If the public gallery has 20 members, is the Minister saying that 20 people would be given remote access?
Those who apply for remote access would need to apply before the hearing in the normal way to ask for permission and a link would be sent. It is certainly very distinct from broadcasting.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise that point and to highlight the legal basis on which we can confiscate assets, property and so on. Unexplained wealth orders are one of several tools we can use that are covered in the Bill.
A lot of houses are owned by criminal gangs for money laundering purposes, often in rural areas, and left empty. If people do not register, will the Bill allow us not only to impose a fine on them, but sell those properties so that they can go back to the community rather than be left there to rot?
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I shall address part 3, on public order, having joined the inquiry by the all-party group on democracy and the constitution, which reported on this part of the Bill last week in the context of the march events at Clapham common and Bristol. We found not just a lack of justification for many of these proposed new powers but—of equal concern—a lack of understanding of the current law among the relevant police.
Everyone, including the local police, knew what was going to happen in every event, and yet the local activist organisers were not only ignored, but threatened with prosecution. What should have been a quiet, well-organised vigil for a slain innocent woman became an increasingly disorganised public order situation, with police using extreme, repressive techniques. As a result, public safety at that event was diminished—first, as a result of the police’s omission to engage in advance; secondly, because of their lack of preparedness, engagement and intelligence; and, finally, because of their overreaction on the day. That is why the Bill ought to set out the basic human rights position, along the lines of that which is in new clause 29.
Does my hon. Friend agree that much of what we sadly saw at the vigil at Clapham common was a consequence of sloppily drafted covid regulations, which were given so little scrutiny by this House, let alone being understood by the police, whom we compel to enforce them?
I thank my hon. Friend, because had I had five minutes in which to speak and that was exactly the case I was going to make. What he says was proven in our inquiry. Sadly, the time allowed today permits me to give only one example of concern on these new public order powers. Clause 55 provides powers to deal with non-violent serious disruption. First, that should be stated in the Bill, not in secondary legislation. Furthermore, I am concerned that it will provide excessive powers to prevent non-violent disruption to business, in circumstances where the business concerned may not be the focus of the protest. Again, this shifts the ground towards making a presumption of illegality. In practice, working out to what extent a business can be disrupted will only make the job of the police tougher, not easier, and it will certainly make it more political in nature.
For instance, if protest that has until now been kept away from residential areas will also be removed from business areas, where does it go? Presumably, it will go to a place where it cannot be heard, but, as has been said, noise and disruption are integral to protest. As many commentators have pointed out, in practice, the police will increasingly be put under pressure from businesses to impose conditions, and they will be put under pressure from demonstrators, who will then go ahead in any case, as they did at Clapham common and in Bristol.
This clause could well undermine public confidence in the police and reduce public safety. That is why our inquiry recommended the production of guidance to help both police and organisers to understand their respective powers and obligations—that is what is in new clause 85. More fundamentally, we also need to question whether it is still appropriate that police both condition protest and enforce their own conditions. To that end, I am drawn to having something like the Northern Ireland Parades Commission, which has power to place conditions on public processions, thus leaving the police with the enforcement role that they know how to do so well.
The Home Affairs Committee has considered many different aspects of this Bill and these amendments at different times and in different ways, but given the time I will focus on just a small number of areas.
I particularly want to address new clause 69, in my name. Its purpose is to get justice for victims of domestic abuse who are being timed out and take action against perpetrators who are being let off the hook. Many domestic abuse cases are prosecuted as common assault in a magistrates court where police and prosecutors may say that the threshold for the Crown court is not met. In these cases, there is a time limit on justice—most victims are not aware of this—of six months from the offence, even though in domestic abuse cases it may take many months, for good reason, for victims to feel able to go to the police. They may still be in an abusive relationship. They may be afraid. They may not be safe. They may have children and be worried about how to leave or where they will go. It may take them time to get the support that they feel they need to be able to talk to the police. There are so many reasons that are, in themselves, the essence of continuing crimes of domestic abuse. That is why the new clause increases the time limit so that there can be six months for the police to deal with the case from the point of reporting, rather than from the point of the offence itself.
Somebody I have talked to told me her story. She was assaulted while she was pregnant. She went to A&E but did not, at that stage, want to talk about what had happened. However, when the abuse continued after the baby was born, she left and gathered her courage to talk to the police, who started an investigation but before long told her that she had passed a time limit she never even knew existed and her ex would not be charged. There are many more such victims of domestic abuse who, for serious and obvious reasons, do not report it immediately, and the perpetrators go on to be free to commit more crimes.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
There are clearly data privacy and human rights issues bound up with facial recognition technology, which I admit will be very useful for solving crimes. However, technology moves on quickly, and it is my understanding that bodily recognition is already being developed, in which faces will not actually count as the cameras will look at people’s movement. Are we not just behind the curve on all this? As a Parliament, should we not be looking to put in place a framework that will envelop all the new technologies as they move on, rather than being one step behind? I think we should be doing a little bit more, proactively.
My hon. Friend raises an extremely important and useful point. He is quite right that the acceleration of technology needs to be embraced by the House in a way that perhaps it has not been in the past. Both he and I stood on a manifesto that contained a commitment to the enabling of technology in a strict and controlled legal framework, and we will be thinking about that over the next few months. Some years ago, I came across a company that was working on online financial security. It had a system that identified someone not only from their password when they entered it, but from the way in which that person typed their password, because apparently the way we type is very characteristic. Those are the sorts of technologies we can deploy to great effect, but with democratic control.