Piracy (Somalia)

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Richard Ottaway]

Thank you for addressing the point, Mr Sheridan.

The tenth report of the Foreign Affairs Committee is about piracy off the coast of Somalia, a major problem that costs industry and the world economy billions of dollars and threatens lives. The Indian ocean has become a no-go area for small vessels and is dangerous for large ones. The causes of the problem are many. First, at the heart of it is the fact that, despite the introduction of military forces and private armed guards, still the majority of vessels are unarmed. Secondly, there is a willingness to pay ransoms—a controversial point to which I will return. Thirdly, there are too few naval forces. Fourthly, the pirates are able to operate with relative impunity inside Somalia.

The United Kingdom Government are well aware of the problem and are taking a leading role and, although the Committee makes constructive criticisms of that role, we congratulate them on the steps that they are taking. Concerted international action is needed. The number of prosecutions has increased, but 90% of those detained are released. There is greater use of armed guards and we have regulation and guidance for armed guards. Vessels have been following best management practices. There are issues to do with tracing financial flows: the Committee’s opinion is that financial flows can be tracked—some of the most sophisticated equipment for that purpose is available in this country—and that more can be done in this regard. The Committee believes that there should be at least one UK vessel permanently on station. Of course, we have to support development in Somalia. I shall deal with those points in turn.

The UK is a big player in the world shipping industry, and our part of it is based just a mile or two up the road from here. Shipping and its management comprises 1.8% of gross domestic product. Piracy poses a threat to the UK’s economy and the security of British assets transiting through the area. Some 40% of world trade moves through the region of the Indian ocean, around the horn of Africa, into the Red sea. The danger zone now stretches over to the coast of the Indian ocean. Much of the cargo is insured here in the UK. The total cost of addressing the threat to Britain, the assets and the industry is believed to be in the region of $8 billion to $12 billion per annum.

Attacks on vessels in the Indian ocean have decreased in the last quarter. In the first quarter of 2011 there were 102 attacks, 16 of them successful, whereas this year there were only 43 attacks and only nine were successful. That downward trend is welcome. To give an idea of the sums involved, in 2011, ransoms amounted to $135 million. The opinion of some observers and witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee was that some of that money is going to al-Shabaab, which it is believed has connections with al-Qaeda.

Since piracy started in the region, some 3,500 crew members and officers have been taken captive and been held, and in the last four years 62 have been killed. Currently, 12 vessels are held and 178 hostages are still in captivity. That the figure is lower than it was reflects a welcome trend, but it is important to state that the level of detention remains unacceptable. It must not be believed that we have been successful and this situation must not become the status quo.

The peak from which we are coming down was reached in autumn 2011. I think the reason why the trend is now downward is that the self-defence mechanisms are beginning to make progress. The implementation of best management practices is clearly having a serious effect. It is too soon to see if this is a long-term trend, but it is promising. For the benefit of the House, I should say that best management practices involve self-protecting measures, including careful manoeuvring of ships, having safe rooms on ships and using detection equipment. I commend the industry on the implementation of these practices, as does the Committee, and on the results that this is achieving.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does not this highlight a further problem, which is that it is not so much the cargo or the vessel but the crew that is the main financial inducement? All the measures the hon. Gentleman has mentioned apply to the large multinational, well organised modern fleets, but many smaller operators with smaller vessels are becoming more vulnerable. Those measures, welcome though they are, can therefore only be regarded as part of a package, because they deal with only part of the problem.

[Richard Ottaway]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. For small vessels the region is, in truth, a complete no-go area. For the piracy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the prize was the cargo, and the crew walked the plank or went over the sides, but that has changed; now, the crew are equally valuable. That attitude of the pirates is causing the problem. That is not to say that the cargo is not still important—shipowners are paying substantial sums to get their cargo out—but as we see particularly when yacht crews are held, in international terms the yacht is worth nothing while the owners still have a high value.

The Government initially resisted the establishment of private armed security guards on board British vessels. When the Minister gave evidence to us during our inquiry, the Government’s position was that armed guards would not be welcome. However, the Prime Minister announced in October or November last year that we will now put armed security guards on board British vessels, and that view is echoed by the International Maritime Organisation. The Committee welcomes the U-turn.

The operation of a private armed guard on board a British vessel is subject to British law—the law of the flag applies on board any vessel. The Government published interim guidance, at the heart of which was a policy based on the Crown Prosecution Service policy of lawful self-defence. We were critical of that, because the CPS guidance was not written with piracy in mind. Indeed, it states:

“If a…firearm…was used…this may tip the balance in favour of prosecution.”

To me and to the Committee, that seemed to be off-loading responsibility for the use of armed guards on to shipowners. The simple question we posed in our report was: if armed guards on board a ship see an armed skiff approaching, can they open fire? That is the test. The initial interim guidance contained little to help make a judgment on the use of force.

In the Government response, as I pointed out in my point of order, clarification was promised by April 2012, which then became May, then June. I have no idea why there was a delay, but I like to think that it was because international co-ordination and consultation with the IMO were necessary. Indeed, earlier this year, at the invitation of the Department for Transport, I attended a particularly constructive piracy conference at the IMO. What is important, however, is that the UK plays a leading role in the establishment of any guidance, and that is why I regret the new guidance not being available for us to see, because we cannot really comment. We are in limbo—the guidance is out but we are unable to comment on it today. The UK should be playing a leading role, but the issue is current. I want to ask the Government whether they have been happy with the use of armed guards on ships from implementation up to now. How many applications have been received to establish armed guards on board a ship?

The House might be interested to know about the Italian ship Enrique Lexie, which was carrying two Italian marines on board. Though the facts are in dispute, there was an exchange of armed fire with small vessels and two fishermen were killed. For reasons that are not clear, the Italian vessel then went into an Indian port and the marines were arrested amid a dispute about whether the incident took place in international or territorial waters. The matter is unresolved, but the incident highlights the importance of the need for clear guidance and international agreement on the use of force.

We can see how easily diplomatic incidents can occur in the absence of proper guidance or internationally agreed standards. That is mainly because so many factors are involved in international waters, such as a British ship with a foreign crew going into another country’s waters; several jurisdictions are in play. I was interested to read that the IMO has called for an international standard for the use of armed guards, so I shall read the newly published guidance with interest to see whether such a standard has been established. I hope that a Minister might be able to summarise the guidance when he makes his contribution to the debate.

[Richard Ottaway]

That is very helpful, Mr Sheridan, and I am grateful to all those involved in expediting the availability of the guidance.

To conclude on armed guards, I hope that UK rules can influence the international debate, to the benefit of everyone concerned.

Another issue that we identified is that there are no regulations on the movement of weapons, and in that part of the world, a lot of weapons are moving around. We clearly need to have a regime for such movements, and I welcome the UK’s introduction of a revised licensing regime in February this year, although that does not tackle the difficulty of floating armouries. Believe it or not, some ships out there will lend guns to ships that enter the danger zone and get them back when they leave. All that is outside the control of any organisation, and an international approach to that difficulty would be appropriate.

The naval response has been better than expected—possibly damned with faint praise—but the truth of the matter is that the Indian ocean is not safe, and to have a 30-minute response throughout the ocean would require the deployment of 80 warships at any given moment, which will clearly not happen. The strategic defence review under way in this country can only heighten the impact on the availability of British ships for deployment, but the UK could have a role to play in providing leadership in operations—we have a good record—perhaps with other countries supplying the ships. As reported by the Ministry of Defence, however, last month HMS Westminster foiled three attacks. Can one of the Ministers present tell us what happened to the suspects from those incidents? Were they detained, released or fended off with no detentions? As I understand it, there have certainly been no prosecutions.

What is needed is international co-ordination. We have the successful UN contact group on piracy and recently—established in February this year—the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre in the Seychelles. The centre has to be welcome. It will co-ordinate information on ransoms and target the kingpins in the piracy world.

On the naval response, one of the unexpected side effects is how the international operations have been getting on quite well with one another. We considered a recommendation on whether they should be co-ordinated by a single organisation, but we reached the conclusion that there were bigger fish to fry, rather than having that sort of upheaval at the moment. We have Russian, Chinese, Indian, British and NATO ships there, and given the lack of a big umbrella organisation, the close co-ordination is very welcome.

Turning to convictions, it is difficult to obtain evidence in such situations. Our Committee recommended that more effort should be made, perhaps with the use of video links for witnesses. There are difficulties with various national laws because piracy is a crime in some countries but not others. Implementing such proposals can be expensive for poorer countries.

To date, no suspect has been brought back to the UK for prosecution. We have transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and I welcome the new agreement with Mauritius, as I hope that it will result in more prosecutions of suspects. Will the Minister who responds on the memorandum of understanding with Mauritius indicate the conditions that suspects are held in and whether that is monitored. I wish the Government well with implementation of the memorandum of understanding, which sounds to our Committee to be a pragmatic solution. However, if it fails, I hope that the Minister involved will note that the French are now engaged in their second trial of suspects.

[Mr Spellar]

Will the hon. Gentleman, and later a Minister, clarify the position on bringing captured pirates back to the UK for trial, given the real risk of applications for leave to remain? Is it not better—this is why the Mauritius agreement is so welcome—to support efforts in the region?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and his colleagues on their report. The detailed work that has been undertaken and the drawing together of a number of difficult issues show the value of Select Committees. One does not necessarily have to agree with every line of the conclusion. We just need to see the thread of the work that enables a debate to take place, and I am pleased that it was acknowledged in the Government response.

Would you indulge me for a minute, Mr Sheridan, so that I can pay tribute to Lord Peter Archer of Sandwell who died today? He was my predecessor in the Warley constituency. He served for some 26 years in the House of Commons and 20 years in the House of Lords and made a considerable contribution to both Houses and to his own constituency. If there was anyone to whom the phrase, “A fine Christian gentleman” applied, it was Peter Archer. He was a man of formidable intellect. His father was a toolmaker in Tipton. Peter rose to high levels in the law, but never forgot his roots. He always served his constituency well. In some ways, he was a hard act to follow; his reputation as a Member of Parliament in the constituency stood very high, and I only hope that I have matched up to his standards in that regard. I am sure that the feelings of Members here who knew him will go to his wife and family.

I am pleased to see two Ministers here today. Let me briefly damage their careers by saying that they have played a proactive role in dealing with this issue. If some other Departments had been as forward leaning, we would have made progress, and today’s problems are an indication of that. I hope that we will improve the rate of our response to this evolving situation.

As the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) mentioned, the problem began off the Somali coast. Then we saw it moving along the coast of Aden. Indian Ministers are extremely concerned about how close the problem is getting to India. We have seen the movement from skiffs to mother-ships, the involvement of spotters in ports and allegations of intelligence gathering elsewhere. We are now seeing imitation tactics in the Gulf of Guinea, and I have heard reports, which I have not validated, of similar problems off the coast of South America. We have seen changes in the levels and manner of response.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) talked about Britain taking a lead, which is absolutely appropriate. A major part of our naval doctrine is to secure the world’s sea lanes not only for British vessels but for the world’s vessels. Maintaining free passage of vessels throughout the world is an important contribution and is core to our basic philosophy and our national interest. [Interruption.] I was wondering how long I would have to speak before the documents arrived. One hears a distant trumpet blowing over the horizon as the cavalry appears. I hope that the Minister will indicate whether that basic philosophy is still a doctrinal priority for the Ministry of Defence, our armed forces and the British Government.

Secondly, we have talked quite extensively about the impact on world trade, the amount of money that is being paid, the impact on the willingness of seafarers to go through these routes, the rise in insurance premiums and the potential risk to supply chain management for many countries. The effects of the tsunami in Japan and the floods in Thailand were felt right across Europe. Much of the British car industry and other industries experienced disruption in the supply of component parts because of those particular events. If the passage into the Suez canal became too unsafe for seafarers to risk using it, the additional journey would cause not only extra costs but considerable disruption for British industry.

We should not underestimate the impact of piracy on the countries in-region. I remember talking to the Kenyan Government about cruises. Cruise terminals are big business, providing a considerable amount of employment in many parts of the world. Up to about the middle of last year, the number of cruise ships visiting Kenya went down from about 60 to one—interestingly that one was from Saga, which shows the redoubtable spirit of British pensioners. We can imagine the impact on many workers in Mombasa and indeed on the tourist industry there. In the future, therefore, cruise liners and the yachting business will be affected, which will have a considerable impact. We have talked about development, but such an impact creates the conditions for further instability. That should concern us greatly.

It is fair to say that throughout the current epidemic of Somali coast piracy the Government have tended towards finding the right solutions but they have not necessarily always moved at the requisite pace. One of the images that we must get away from is that of the Somali pirates as mindless hooligans. I am not talking about the expendables who, for an extra few per cent, will want to be the first ones on to the vessel. I am talking about the people who are behind them—the people who organise the schemes and who are involved in the organisation of the money. The amount of money that we are talking about requires considerably sophisticated organisation, including the spotting of targets. We have seen the evolution of tactics; as we have managed to move, so too the pirates’ tactics have changed. That is not surprising.

What we need to see is Departments working together and not just individually. We were discussing the issue of armed guards and what are sometimes the problems of Government co-ordination, including in real time, as well as the other work we have to do. I fully understand the frustrations that sometimes arise from working through the IMO. We must also co-operate with other countries, and I join colleagues in paying tribute to the naval patrol; it is a very good example of international co-operation. We must get partners to work together and we have to recognise that time is of the essence. We cannot always be playing catch-up. I am not saying that military solutions are the sole solution; they are not. However, we must see a step change in operational tempo.

[Mr Graham Brady in the Chair]

In some cases, the response reminds me very much of when we were dealing with the foot and mouth epidemic in 2001. The civil servants in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food were working extremely hard to deal with it, but it was only when we changed the operational tempo, by bringing in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, that we managed to deal with the spread of a virus that was outrunning our ability to handle it. The ability to focus on the outcome rather than the process is crucial. It is very important that we get that message across. Indeed, the Committee alludes to it in paragraph 63 of its report, which says that the Government must

“respond flexibly to changes in the pirates’ tactics.”

That is extremely important in this context.

The Government should also look much further at the issue of the pirate bases on land. The Minister and indeed other colleagues who have spoken to those of our forces that have been involved in dealing with the pirates, particularly the Royal Marines, know of their frustration at the restrictions they face when they see the pirates at the start of the piracy season—when the sea conditions become more favourable—assembling all their equipment on the beach, ready to launch an operation. Our forces are hugely frustrated at their inability to go in and destroy that equipment and disrupt the pirates’ operations. Would that solve piracy entirely? No. Would it change the balance of trade and disrupt the pirates’ operations? Absolutely certainly. It appears that there has been some evolution of doctrine in that regard; I merely say that it demonstrates the point, because it took far too long and therefore enabled the cycle of piracy to continue.

I realise that the Minister will be under some constraints in this regard, but can he give some indication as to how we could evolve our approach with international partners, for example on developing air surveillance? I appreciate that the area is very substantial, but I also appreciate that, for instance, the US is developing considerable military resources in the region, particularly in Djibouti and Yemen. Can the Minister say to what extent we will be able to utilise those resources to get a better picture of the pirates’ operations in the area?

I now come to the very thorny issue of ransoms. There has been a spirited debate between colleagues today and I fully understand why—it is inevitable. A number of us will have received representations from the shipping industry, and indeed from the trade union representing seafarers. Very properly—I do not say that in any disparaging way—they have outlined their duty of care to their members, including seafarers. However, I wonder if there is any doctrinal difference between paying ransoms for seafarers, kidnapping and hostage-taking. The same broad strand runs all the way through, namely that a company—absolutely understandably and rightly—is most importantly concerned with its duty of care to the welfare of its employees, the seafarers; there are some commercial aspects, but that is the most important consideration.

However, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham rightly said—my praising a Liberal Democrat makes this a historic day—the problem is that when someone pays a ransom, they put at risk the next vessel that goes through that region. Is it easy? Of course it is not. A Government that have traditionally taken a very hard line on hostage-taking—the Government of Israel—recently came to an agreement regarding an exchange of hostages for prisoners in Israeli jails. I do not underestimate the difficulty of the issue. Rarely do I regret losing office, and I must say that I do not envy Ministers involved in these sorts of decisions, when there is no self-evidently right decision to make.

Nevertheless, there needs to be a consistent level of policy. Regarding hostages and kidnappings, British Governments of all parties have had a long-standing consistent policy of not paying ransoms, for the reasons that I have outlined. We have done that even though the Governments of some other countries have taken a different stance. I recognise the difficulty; it is not a completely open and shut case. Equally, however, we have to recognise the good faith of those who have to make those decisions.

There is still considerable truth in the Kipling line that the problem with paying the Dane-geld is that you never stop paying the Dane. I fully acknowledge those who say, “Look, if a member of my family was involved or taken hostage, I would want to pay, or I would want the Government to make the concession.” But Governments have to look at the issue in a different light.

I therefore very much welcome the report, Mr Sheridan— [Interruption.] Sorry; Mr Brady. What more would one expect from the chairman of the 1922 Committee than the ability seamlessly to slip into the situation? The report is very welcome, because it provides a proper balance. As I have said, I congratulate the Ministers on their work on different aspects of this subject. My main point is that we need to ensure that we react to the changes—there will be further changes in tactics and problems—to improve the operational tempo and to speed up the pace of decision making. That might even mean that colleagues have the chance to read one or two words of the new guidance. I am sure that the Ministers will convey back the concerns raised in the debate.