Piracy (Somalia)

Richard Ottaway Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), who has been dragged back at short notice, for reasons beyond his control, but it is to the benefit of the House that he is here today.

May I raise a point of order, Mr Sheridan? This is a debate on the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which I chair, about piracy off the coast of Somalia. One of the key recommendations was that the guidance for the use of private armed guards on British ships be revised. In its response, the Foreign Office said that the guidance would be coming out in April. Then we were advised that it was coming out in May. I have no quarrel about that, because it is important to get it right. I was informed at 2.25 pm today that the guidance was published at 11 am this morning and we do not have copies of it. We have not seen it. No effort was made to get it to us at 11 am. Would it be appropriate to adjourn for 10 minutes while the guidance is made available, so that we can have a quick look at it?

[Jim Sheridan (in the Chair)]

Unfortunately, we have to proceed with the business of the House. It is extremely discourteous of the Department to treat the Select Committee as it has done and I am sure that the appropriate people will be aware of exactly what has happened. However, I am unclear how that can be remedied at this late stage. Does the Minister wish to say something?

[Jim Sheridan (in the Chair)]

Will the absence of the information impact in any way on the debate?

[Richard Ottaway]

I appreciate the Minister’s explanation. I gather that the delay was due to the need for clearance by another Department. However, a large section of my speech relating to this matter and posing questions is now, frankly, academic.

[Jim Sheridan (in the Chair)]

Unfortunately, I am advised that we have to keep going. I can only apologise.

[Richard Ottaway]

Thank you for addressing the point, Mr Sheridan.

The tenth report of the Foreign Affairs Committee is about piracy off the coast of Somalia, a major problem that costs industry and the world economy billions of dollars and threatens lives. The Indian ocean has become a no-go area for small vessels and is dangerous for large ones. The causes of the problem are many. First, at the heart of it is the fact that, despite the introduction of military forces and private armed guards, still the majority of vessels are unarmed. Secondly, there is a willingness to pay ransoms—a controversial point to which I will return. Thirdly, there are too few naval forces. Fourthly, the pirates are able to operate with relative impunity inside Somalia.

The United Kingdom Government are well aware of the problem and are taking a leading role and, although the Committee makes constructive criticisms of that role, we congratulate them on the steps that they are taking. Concerted international action is needed. The number of prosecutions has increased, but 90% of those detained are released. There is greater use of armed guards and we have regulation and guidance for armed guards. Vessels have been following best management practices. There are issues to do with tracing financial flows: the Committee’s opinion is that financial flows can be tracked—some of the most sophisticated equipment for that purpose is available in this country—and that more can be done in this regard. The Committee believes that there should be at least one UK vessel permanently on station. Of course, we have to support development in Somalia. I shall deal with those points in turn.

The UK is a big player in the world shipping industry, and our part of it is based just a mile or two up the road from here. Shipping and its management comprises 1.8% of gross domestic product. Piracy poses a threat to the UK’s economy and the security of British assets transiting through the area. Some 40% of world trade moves through the region of the Indian ocean, around the horn of Africa, into the Red sea. The danger zone now stretches over to the coast of the Indian ocean. Much of the cargo is insured here in the UK. The total cost of addressing the threat to Britain, the assets and the industry is believed to be in the region of $8 billion to $12 billion per annum.

Attacks on vessels in the Indian ocean have decreased in the last quarter. In the first quarter of 2011 there were 102 attacks, 16 of them successful, whereas this year there were only 43 attacks and only nine were successful. That downward trend is welcome. To give an idea of the sums involved, in 2011, ransoms amounted to $135 million. The opinion of some observers and witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee was that some of that money is going to al-Shabaab, which it is believed has connections with al-Qaeda.

Since piracy started in the region, some 3,500 crew members and officers have been taken captive and been held, and in the last four years 62 have been killed. Currently, 12 vessels are held and 178 hostages are still in captivity. That the figure is lower than it was reflects a welcome trend, but it is important to state that the level of detention remains unacceptable. It must not be believed that we have been successful and this situation must not become the status quo.

The peak from which we are coming down was reached in autumn 2011. I think the reason why the trend is now downward is that the self-defence mechanisms are beginning to make progress. The implementation of best management practices is clearly having a serious effect. It is too soon to see if this is a long-term trend, but it is promising. For the benefit of the House, I should say that best management practices involve self-protecting measures, including careful manoeuvring of ships, having safe rooms on ships and using detection equipment. I commend the industry on the implementation of these practices, as does the Committee, and on the results that this is achieving.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does not this highlight a further problem, which is that it is not so much the cargo or the vessel but the crew that is the main financial inducement? All the measures the hon. Gentleman has mentioned apply to the large multinational, well organised modern fleets, but many smaller operators with smaller vessels are becoming more vulnerable. Those measures, welcome though they are, can therefore only be regarded as part of a package, because they deal with only part of the problem.

[Richard Ottaway]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. For small vessels the region is, in truth, a complete no-go area. For the piracy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the prize was the cargo, and the crew walked the plank or went over the sides, but that has changed; now, the crew are equally valuable. That attitude of the pirates is causing the problem. That is not to say that the cargo is not still important—shipowners are paying substantial sums to get their cargo out—but as we see particularly when yacht crews are held, in international terms the yacht is worth nothing while the owners still have a high value.

The Government initially resisted the establishment of private armed security guards on board British vessels. When the Minister gave evidence to us during our inquiry, the Government’s position was that armed guards would not be welcome. However, the Prime Minister announced in October or November last year that we will now put armed security guards on board British vessels, and that view is echoed by the International Maritime Organisation. The Committee welcomes the U-turn.

The operation of a private armed guard on board a British vessel is subject to British law—the law of the flag applies on board any vessel. The Government published interim guidance, at the heart of which was a policy based on the Crown Prosecution Service policy of lawful self-defence. We were critical of that, because the CPS guidance was not written with piracy in mind. Indeed, it states:

“If a…firearm…was used…this may tip the balance in favour of prosecution.”

To me and to the Committee, that seemed to be off-loading responsibility for the use of armed guards on to shipowners. The simple question we posed in our report was: if armed guards on board a ship see an armed skiff approaching, can they open fire? That is the test. The initial interim guidance contained little to help make a judgment on the use of force.

In the Government response, as I pointed out in my point of order, clarification was promised by April 2012, which then became May, then June. I have no idea why there was a delay, but I like to think that it was because international co-ordination and consultation with the IMO were necessary. Indeed, earlier this year, at the invitation of the Department for Transport, I attended a particularly constructive piracy conference at the IMO. What is important, however, is that the UK plays a leading role in the establishment of any guidance, and that is why I regret the new guidance not being available for us to see, because we cannot really comment. We are in limbo—the guidance is out but we are unable to comment on it today. The UK should be playing a leading role, but the issue is current. I want to ask the Government whether they have been happy with the use of armed guards on ships from implementation up to now. How many applications have been received to establish armed guards on board a ship?

The House might be interested to know about the Italian ship Enrique Lexie, which was carrying two Italian marines on board. Though the facts are in dispute, there was an exchange of armed fire with small vessels and two fishermen were killed. For reasons that are not clear, the Italian vessel then went into an Indian port and the marines were arrested amid a dispute about whether the incident took place in international or territorial waters. The matter is unresolved, but the incident highlights the importance of the need for clear guidance and international agreement on the use of force.

We can see how easily diplomatic incidents can occur in the absence of proper guidance or internationally agreed standards. That is mainly because so many factors are involved in international waters, such as a British ship with a foreign crew going into another country’s waters; several jurisdictions are in play. I was interested to read that the IMO has called for an international standard for the use of armed guards, so I shall read the newly published guidance with interest to see whether such a standard has been established. I hope that a Minister might be able to summarise the guidance when he makes his contribution to the debate.

[Jim Sheridan (in the Chair)]

Order. I have every sympathy with the hon. Gentleman and his predicament, but I am reliably informed that document is winging its way towards us and should reach us in the next 10 minutes or so. At the end of the debate, he will certainly have the opportunity to sum up, by which time he might have had a chance to read the document, as will other Members. I am sure that my co-Chair will be sympathetic to his position as well.

[Richard Ottaway]

That is very helpful, Mr Sheridan, and I am grateful to all those involved in expediting the availability of the guidance.

To conclude on armed guards, I hope that UK rules can influence the international debate, to the benefit of everyone concerned.

Another issue that we identified is that there are no regulations on the movement of weapons, and in that part of the world, a lot of weapons are moving around. We clearly need to have a regime for such movements, and I welcome the UK’s introduction of a revised licensing regime in February this year, although that does not tackle the difficulty of floating armouries. Believe it or not, some ships out there will lend guns to ships that enter the danger zone and get them back when they leave. All that is outside the control of any organisation, and an international approach to that difficulty would be appropriate.

The naval response has been better than expected—possibly damned with faint praise—but the truth of the matter is that the Indian ocean is not safe, and to have a 30-minute response throughout the ocean would require the deployment of 80 warships at any given moment, which will clearly not happen. The strategic defence review under way in this country can only heighten the impact on the availability of British ships for deployment, but the UK could have a role to play in providing leadership in operations—we have a good record—perhaps with other countries supplying the ships. As reported by the Ministry of Defence, however, last month HMS Westminster foiled three attacks. Can one of the Ministers present tell us what happened to the suspects from those incidents? Were they detained, released or fended off with no detentions? As I understand it, there have certainly been no prosecutions.

What is needed is international co-ordination. We have the successful UN contact group on piracy and recently—established in February this year—the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre in the Seychelles. The centre has to be welcome. It will co-ordinate information on ransoms and target the kingpins in the piracy world.

On the naval response, one of the unexpected side effects is how the international operations have been getting on quite well with one another. We considered a recommendation on whether they should be co-ordinated by a single organisation, but we reached the conclusion that there were bigger fish to fry, rather than having that sort of upheaval at the moment. We have Russian, Chinese, Indian, British and NATO ships there, and given the lack of a big umbrella organisation, the close co-ordination is very welcome.

Turning to convictions, it is difficult to obtain evidence in such situations. Our Committee recommended that more effort should be made, perhaps with the use of video links for witnesses. There are difficulties with various national laws because piracy is a crime in some countries but not others. Implementing such proposals can be expensive for poorer countries.

To date, no suspect has been brought back to the UK for prosecution. We have transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and I welcome the new agreement with Mauritius, as I hope that it will result in more prosecutions of suspects. Will the Minister who responds on the memorandum of understanding with Mauritius indicate the conditions that suspects are held in and whether that is monitored. I wish the Government well with implementation of the memorandum of understanding, which sounds to our Committee to be a pragmatic solution. However, if it fails, I hope that the Minister involved will note that the French are now engaged in their second trial of suspects.

[Mr Spellar]

Will the hon. Gentleman, and later a Minister, clarify the position on bringing captured pirates back to the UK for trial, given the real risk of applications for leave to remain? Is it not better—this is why the Mauritius agreement is so welcome—to support efforts in the region?

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[Richard Ottaway]

I cannot go to our precise conclusion quickly, but we believe that it would be a good idea if there were prosecutions in this country, if only to demonstrate that we mean business. The important thing is that there are prosecutions, and if a memorandum of understanding is working effectively, it is a pragmatic solution.

Turning to ransoms, I said earlier that $135 million was paid last year, and in our judgment the Government have been slow to track the flow of money. It might be an effective means of countering piracy if the flow of money were tracked. An international taskforce on ransoms has been established recently, but it is controversial because it attempts to prevent payment of ransoms. It is worth noting that the Chamber of Shipping has expressed concern that the international policy and that of the UK is to try to prevent the payment of ransoms.

The Foreign Affairs Committee is worried about that. In our view, the only way to recover vessels is to pay ransoms, which is particularly appropriate when the use of force is ruled out. In all honesty, there is no other way for shipowners to recover their property. The position can be likened to a mugging of a man in the street. If he were subject to a violent attack, no one would tell him not to pay anything because it will only encourage more muggers. I invite the Government to take a hard look at the matter and to say whether Government policy is unchanged.

British hostages have been taken as victims of piracy, and the Committee welcomes the release of Judith Tebbutt. We did not refer to her in our report because she was still in captivity while we were drafting it, and we concluded that it would be too sensitive to comment. We are delighted that she has been released. We understand that there are prosecutions in Kenya and that a ransom was paid. I would be interested to know from a Minister whether that payment was tracked and whether a prosecution is expected. We also took evidence from the Chandlers, and we are delighted to hear that only last week they set off to continue their voyage around the world, but I am reliably informed that they will avoid the Indian ocean.

At heart, the solution to the problem lies not offshore, but onshore in Somalia. There is no easy solution for that troubled country. African Union troops are clearly making progress. We have had two excellent conferences on Somalia. One was here in the United Kingdom in February, which I believe is producing results, and I congratulate the Foreign Office on putting it on. The other was in May in Istanbul, Turkey, at which I gather serious progress was made. The Department for International Development is putting in £83 million, of which £6 million will go on counter-piracy.

We treat the subject very seriously. Our report is important.

[Jim Fitzpatrick (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)]

I apologise for not having had the chance to read the Select Committee’s report, but I look forward to doing so. I take it that the hon. Gentleman did not have an opportunity during the Committee’s examination of the evidence to speak to welfare organisations such as the Mission to Seafarers and Apostleship of the Sea, which have dealt with some of the hostages before, during and afterwards.

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[Richard Ottaway]

The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to see that we took written evidence from seafarers, and we quote some of it in our report.

In conclusion, I look forward to hearing how colleagues view this difficult subject.

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[Martin Horwood]

No. I think that paying is profoundly irresponsible. There are even more extreme cases than that of an employer. It is difficult to tell someone whose loved one has been kidnapped—it would be difficult for me if one of my loved ones had been kidnapped—and other members of the family, “You should not pay.” That is a terribly difficult thing to say to someone, face to face. However, in the bigger picture, people are kidnapped because other people have paid ransoms, which paid for the boats and mother-ships and the lifestyle of the pirates that makes future ransoms, kidnaps and piracy much more likely. We must try to disrupt that business model. Trying to find a simple military solution is only half the answer. I am afraid that I think that the Government’s instinct is right.

[Richard Ottaway]

What does the hon. Gentleman think would have happened to Judith Tebbutt and Mr and Mrs Chandler if no ransoms had been paid?

[Martin Horwood]

As I said, it is a horrendously difficult thing to say to an individual family or a company, “You should not pay,” but Governments must consider the larger picture and the fact that ransoms fuel the whole situation and that every payment of a ransom supports future piracy.

[Richard Ottaway]

To use the illustration of a mugger, does the hon. Gentleman think that the best advice to give a mugging victim is, “Don’t hand over your wallet, because that will stop mugging in the future.”?

[Martin Horwood]

That is the police advice—[Interruption.] The police advice is to co-operate, I know, but that is where someone is at imminent risk themselves. The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling set out the situation: it is a balance of risk and reward. The Government and the international community are addressing the risk element, because they are stepping up self-defence measures, and there is greater international co-ordination and increasing provision of private armed security forces and armed guards. The risk element is therefore increasing slightly, but the rewards are stupendous—hundreds of millions of dollars—and we must try to reduce the rewards or the economic model behind piracy will thrive.

I am afraid that this situation is the classic philosophical prisoner’s dilemma, where the individual action may be difficult to take, but the result on a larger scale is clear. Saferworld says clearly in its briefing, from its research on the ground in Somalia, that the continued payment of ransoms fuels and exacerbates the problem. We want to tackle those things and want people to be safer.

The hon. Member for Falkirk (Eric Joyce) asked what would happen to British ships in that situation and whether British hostages would be more at risk. I suspect that Somali pirates are quite good business men and can spot a red ensign, a white ensign or whichever British flag happens to be flying. If Britain acquired a reputation for not paying ransoms, it would balance out the risks and rewards of attacking a British vessel and they might think that it would be better to attack somebody else’s.

The principle has been established in other fields. It used to be more common practice for ransoms and payments to be made when hostages were taken in international terrorist situations, such as airfields. There was a concerted international drive to stop any hostage payments being made in those situations, and that form of terrorism has largely disappeared. It has sadly been replaced by many others. It is critical that we disrupt the business model of piracy. That was not the only issue that I was going to address; I will move quickly on.

On the military front, the moves towards international co-ordination are good. I note the existence of the European naval force. We ought to agree between these four walls not to tell the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) about it. It is very effective, and a British operational commander is in place. The rejection of the catch-and-release approach was rightly highlighted by the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is important that that approach is abandoned, so increasing the risk that pirates face. We need more effective action to prosecute, using every available international or national legal jurisdiction that we can find. The British Government are taking a lead in that.

The report highlighted other issues, rightly including the disappointing progress to date in tracking financial flows—tens of millions of pounds are being trafficked. The Government and, indeed, the international community have been slow to provide ways to track it down and disrupt the flow. It is an important step in disrupting the pirates’ business model. It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s view.

The Foreign Affairs Committee is a little inclined always to want Britain to be the country taking the lead. These are global problems. Likewise, it insists that Britain plays the leading role in the naval operation. Although Britain is an important naval power, perhaps given our financial situation and the fact that it is a global problem affecting global business and threatening the lives of nationals of all countries, it is not absolutely necessary to have at least one British naval vessel on operation all the time. This must be done through international co-ordination.

On the prosecution of pirates when they are visible, the report says:

“Gathering evidence to secure a successful prosecution for piracy is clearly challenging, but when pirates are observed in boats with guns, ladders and even hostages, it beggars belief that they cannot be prosecuted.”

That is exactly right. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on progress on the international front.

I think that the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling was a little uncharitable in his comments on the use of force by private armed security forces. The UK legal situation is pretty clear. The Library briefing quotes an international law firm called Ince and Co., which says that

“the use of force in deterring or preventing what is a criminal act”

is justified. It continues:

“In the UK…lethal force is normally only allowed where there is serious and imminent threat to life. The decision to use lethal force must be reasonable and the force used proportionate.”

Further clarification on the exact definitions and terms will be obviously welcome whenever it arrives through the door today, and Government are working to provide that. Ince and Co. goes on to make the point that rules on the use of force need to be internationally agreed and as standardised as possible. That is required internationally. The IMO ought to be taking a lead, but it is possibly the slowest organisation in the world at doing almost anything.

In deference to other Members, because we were distracted, I will move swiftly to a conclusion. It is imperative to tackle the situation on the ground and provide different economic models. We should use the example of Somaliland positively to look at fisheries and try to present an alternative way of providing prosperity in the longer term for the people of Somalia, so that this appalling trade does still not offer the attractions that it does now.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Henry Bellingham)]

It has been a great pleasure to listen to this wide-ranging, rich and varied debate. I pay particular tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), for his work. As we stated in our response to the report, we are grateful to the Committee for examining this important subject in such detail. Obviously, we entirely accept that there is still a lot to do.

We welcome many of the Committee’s conclusions. We recognise the important contribution that the inquiry has made and we will continue a close dialogue and discussion. As the Committee has noted in its report, piracy is not new but a type of criminality that has existed for many centuries. Indeed, as the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning), who is the Minister with responsibility for shipping, pointed out, it has been going on since about 2000 BC. However, the recent evolution of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa has had a big impact both on the region and worldwide.

In this globalised world in which millions rely on the 23,000 ships that sail through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean each year, the impact of Somali-based piracy is felt here and throughout the global economy. The World Bank has estimated that the total cost to the world economy, through extra costs placed on shipping and higher insurance premiums, is about $7 billion.

The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) mentioned the impact on Mombasa. Recently, I visited Mombasa and saw the situation for myself. We had a seminar on board HMS Westminster, where many of those representing the tourism and hospitality industry made the point that no cruise ships visit Mombasa now. The right hon. Gentleman gave the correct figures, but he might have pointed out that the one ship that visited Mombasa last year came under pirate attack.

The cost of piracy is huge. Of UK gross domestic product, £10.7 billion comes from the shipping industry. Since 2008, Somali pirates have hijacked about 175 vessels, taken 3,000 seafarers captive and received more than £200 million in ransom payments. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South pointed out, the crisis peaked in autumn 2011. We cannot be complacent, but it is important to note that, although the tempo of attacks has not changed, the number of attacks resisted has greatly increased, so much so that only seven vessels and 214 hostages are currently under pirate control. Those figures come from research by EUNAVFOR—the European Union Naval Force Somalia.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Warley that it is essential that the UK continues to take a leading role in the international community and that the international community continues to work closely together to tackle and end the threat of attack by pirates. It is rarely the case that UK nationals are affected by such attacks, but one of the first duties of a Government is to protect our citizens. As my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South said, the Committee looked carefully at the handling of the case of Paul and Rachel Chandler, who suffered a terrible ordeal. I spoke to Rachel Chandler after her release, and I know how horrendous the experience was. As we set out in our response, we will continue to work on all the options available to us to ensure that those behind their ordeal are brought to justice. We have also conducted a full review of the handling of their case to see what lessons can be learned, including on the need to ensure that the early engagement offered by the UK mission responsible for co-ordinating our response on the ground is actually provided. The results of that review are annexed to our response. The Government are committed to providing the best possible support to those who fall victim to piracy and their families, tailored, of course, to the families’ wishes.

Similarly, the Government are committed to continuing to take a leading role in the international community, including through the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We continue to lead the working group responsible for naval co-ordination and regional capacity-building activity, working with our partners to minimise duplication and encourage the widest possible participation by the international community. An unprecedented number of nations have engaged in the international naval response in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean—sharing information, co-ordinating operations and remaining steadfast in the face of the challenge.

As I think two speakers today pointed out, an encouraging dimension of that activity is the number of non-aligned countries taking part, including China and Russia, for example. We have Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Open Shield and the Combined Maritime Task Force. We welcome that, and we will continue to lead from the front by providing the operational commander for EUNAVFOR and the headquarters at Northwood of both the EU and the NATO operations for the duration of their mandates. To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Warley, this is indeed a key defence strategy. I share his belief that one of the most important responsibilities and duties of the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy is the protection of British interests, but not only from a little Englander perspective. When there are threats further afield, where we have the resources and platforms from which to tackle them, we will do so. That is why the Royal Navy has been prominent in providing vessels for the operations.

In Kenya, I had the chance to visit HMS Westminster when she was moored in Mombasa on a courtesy visit, and to be briefed by the captain on the operations that his forces had carried out. I can inform the House they had indeed intercepted three separate groups of pirates and were able to capture a lot of equipment—in fact, a skiff captured from the pirates was on board. Unfortunately, not enough evidence was available to guarantee a successful prosecution in those cases. One of the most important points to remember is that it is not only a question of having enough evidence to prosecute. Until now, we have taken a robust line on whether the evidence would stand up in court, but one of the drivers has been lack of detention and prosecution facilities in the region. I shall return to that in a moment, because we have made substantial progress.

Naval forces continue to have a positive impact. The recent action by EUNAVFOR to target onshore pirate logistics dumps was a welcome step forward in the evolving rules of engagement of our naval forces in the region. It was a further demonstration that those behind piracy cannot act with impunity at sea or on land. It was also a good example of how the EU is delivering concrete results in the implementation of a common security and defence policy. The action was short and sharp—I understand that it took seconds rather than minutes in terms of the firepower used—but it did substantial damage and took out a large amount of equipment. That sent a strong signal. On the other hand, there is no question of any logistics dumps being targeted unless there is sufficient intelligence—obviously, aerial photography and satellite intelligence are needed. As the right hon. Member for Warley pointed out, it is important that all countries engaged in the operations use their assets to the maximum possible advantage so that we can pool information. Indeed, that is what is happening. I very much hope that that action sent an extremely strong signal that there is nowhere for these people to hide. Although we will be very cautious to avoid loss of life or injury to people, when we can target assets onshore, we will.

The Committee has recognised the role that the industry can and does play in protecting vessels against pirate attacks, and the success of the self-protection measures in reducing ships’ vulnerability to attack. We continue to encourage the shipping industry to maximise adherence to best management practice, and welcome the high level of compliance that we see among the UK flagged fleet. I pay tribute to the work done with the shipping industry by my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister. As soon as he came into office, he made it clear to the industry that part of the solution lay in its hands and that it really had to drive forward best management practice and ensure that it was used absolutely uniformly. The statistics show that of ships that have been successfully attacked by pirates, very few have been those that adhered to best management practice, and none had private armed security personnel on board. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his work in pushing that agenda.

Following the Government’s announcement last autumn that we would allow the use of privately contracted armed guards on board UK flagged vessels, the Committee looked carefully at the issue. As the Chairman of the Committee pointed out, the Department for Transport published before Christmas last year interim guidance for UK flagged vessels on the use of armed guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional circumstances. The guidance included a section on the use of force in the case of an attack. Since then, we have revised the guidance on the rules on use of force.

The revised guidance was published this morning, and I apologise to the Committee and the House for its not being made available earlier. That it was not published sooner is due to the fact that a substantial amount of extra work involving the devolved Administrations was needed, as was final sign-off from the Ministry of Justice. It was not for want of my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister pushing the matter very hard indeed. I am sorry that we did not let the Chairman and members of the Committee have a copy of the revised guidelines when they were made available at 11 o’clock this morning. There are lessons to be learned from that. I wonder whether it will be possible, perhaps in Government time, to have a further short debate specifically on the revised guidelines.

The revision published this morning provides greater clarity on what UK law says on the use of force. As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) pointed out, the starting point must be our current common and statute law, which is pretty clear about what one can and cannot do. Obviously, companies must seek independent legal advice as necessary when developing the rules on use of force.

In the revised rules we go into a lot more detail, making it clear, for example, that it is

“illegal to use force for retaliation or revenge.”

That might be perfectly obvious, but the guidance continues:

“If the threat ceases, the defences of self defence, defence of another…no longer apply”,

and if a private security detachment

“believes a threat is imminent, it is not necessary for them to wait for the aggressor to strike the first blow before using reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves”.

Again, that is clear. It is part of a graduated response. Earlier today, I was talking to experts in the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence, and they believe that we have struck a much better balance. We make a lot more information available. For example, we make it clear that if

“armed guards sighted a pirate skiff”—

a skiff that might be equipped to undertake acts of piracy—

“but there was nothing to indicate that the skiff was actively undertaking an act of piracy, it would be illegal for armed guards to use force against them.”

However, that would not, of course, preclude firing warning shots. All the evidence is that the pirates are cowards. They value their lives—they are not suicide merchants—and the indications are that when warning shots are fired they scarper off pretty quickly.

We have made it clear, and I say again to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South that this is work in progress. The revised guidelines are an important step forward in response to his Committee’s work. We will listen to what people in the industry say about the revised guidelines, and we will obviously listen to what the Committee says, and if we need to make further amendments, my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister has made it clear that he will do so.

[Richard Ottaway]

The Minister has gone right to the heart of the changes to the guidelines, and has pointed out that paragraph 8.13 states that if armed guards sight a skiff but there is nothing to indicate that it is actively undertaking an act of piracy it will be illegal for armed guards to use force. Can he confirm the corollary that if there is evidence, that is effectively a green light to use force in retaliation and self-defence?

[Mr Bellingham]

Yes, indeed. It is about a graduated response, and about the members of the armed detachment using their intelligence. If they believe that they or the vessel they are protecting is threatened, they can of course use force. They would probably start by firing a warning shot. If the skiff then disappeared, all well and good, but if it came closer and it was obvious that there were weapons on board, it is perfectly clear from the revised guidelines that the armed guards would not have to wait until a shot was fired at them or in their direction. We go a long way to giving the clarification that is need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Ottaway]

I am grateful to the Minister for the very detailed response that the subject deserves.

I will not detain the Chamber for long. I have three quick points. The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) intervened to ask about the Committee’s position on prosecution policy. I happily confirm that the Committee’s position is as I, and the Minister, set out. It is preferable for a prosecution to be successfully dealt with locally, otherwise it should come back to the United Kingdom.

We have had interesting divisions on ransoms. The truth of the matter is that there is no answer; both arguments are right. There is merit in both sides of the argument. Frankly, it is better to focus on preventing capture than on paying a ransom. There is a difference between corporate interest and the private interest of the yachtsman.

I will conclude with some comments on the guidance. I am grateful to the Department for Transport for providing the guidance during the debate. I have had a brief chance to look at it. There are clearly substantial changes, which are welcome. The Minister is right to say that it is not as much as we were calling for. It is probably best to say that in the preparation of our report, we have had legal advice and I will run the guidance past our lawyers. I recognise, however, that there are important changes. I also note that the Crown Prosecution Service guidance is still incorporated. I suspect that there is no alternative, because that is the law of Britain. Perhaps therein lies the problem—if we are to have a separate law out in the Indian ocean, it would require primary legislation that may not currently be in the coalition’s plan.

The guidance has also thrown up an interesting distinction in devolved law, distinguishing Scottish law and the law of England and Wales. I am not quite sure exactly which applies when the red duster is flying on a ship. However, it is interesting to note, under footnote 15 of paragraph 8.10, that the use of lethal force in Scotland will only be justified in defence of life, or by a victim resisting rape. That is quite a high bar.

[Mike Penning]

I am very proud to represent the red duster for the UK; this is not a devolved matter. If someone is on a British-registered red duster ship, UK law prevails over international law.

[Richard Ottaway]

I am grateful for that intervention, which begs a question about the need for a footnote about distinguishing Scottish law and the law of England and Wales. [Interruption.] That is very interesting; piracy off Scotland will have to be investigated.

Clearly, a lot of questions need to be considered, and the Committee will do that. The Minister’s suggestion that we have a further short debate on this subject is constructive. It may not be inappropriate for the Shipping Minister to debate it, but I leave that to others to decide.

Mr Brady, I am very grateful to you for chairing the debate, which has been particularly constructive.

Question put and agreed to.