(5 years, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesIn a no-deal situation, there will be a variety of scenarios with respect to the nature of our relationship with the EU; the calibration of our long-term competitive regime for financial services would depend on the calibration of that relationship, and legislation would be brought forward in the light of that.
I will make progress. To be clear, the intention in granting these temporary powers is to enable the FCA to operate the transparency regime in the UK from exit day and beyond, and to maintain existing outcomes, as far as that is reasonably possible. The 2018 Act does not empower the Government to make non-deficiency-related policy changes to EU legislation. If the Treasury is satisfied that the FCA is ready to undertake its transparency functions, the four-year transitional period may be ended earlier by the Treasury by the issue of a direction that must be laid before both Houses and published.
Some longer-term flexibility will also be given to the FCA to reflect the fact that it may not have access to pan-EU trading data after exit, and therefore may need to use reliable trading data from other countries when calculating certain transparency thresholds.
Given the extensive nature of the measure, could the Minister outline what further resources he has made available to the FCA to deal with this? Is there some sort of impact assessment of the FCA’s capability?
We have been working closely with the FCA for several months since the SI was published on 5 October. The FCA has discretion to increase its levy if it needs additional resources. That is not something it has communicated to us up to this point, but we have an active, ongoing weekly dialogue. That is a matter for it to bring forward in due course if necessary.
The report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Sub-Committee B, which was published on 1 November, focused primarily on the transparency regime. It mentioned the adequacy of resourcing for the FCA to carry out its new responsibilities—an issue that has already been raised. The Treasury has been working closely with the FCA to deliver the programme of legislation. It is clearly important that the regulators be adequately resourced to deal with the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. I reiterate that I have full confidence that the FCA has the expertise required to run an effective transparency regime in the UK, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations with the EU.
The FCA will also publish a statement of policy about how the temporary powers will be used before exit day. That statement of policy and any subsequent changes to it will come into effect only if the Treasury does not raise an objection to it on specified grounds. The Treasury may object to an FCA statement if it would potentially prejudice an international agreement that the UK hoped to reach, or if the Treasury believes that it may lead to a breach in international obligations. In a no-deal scenario, it is important that the Treasury is able to manage negotiations with international partners effectively. This objection mechanism is a sensible way of ensuring that.
Parliament will, of course, be able to scrutinise and question Treasury Ministers and the FCA further on their approach to the temporary powers—for example, through the Select Committee system—as Parliament does now. The SLSC report also noted that it would have been helpful if the FCA’s policy statement on the use of these powers had been made available to the House before this debate. That has not been possible, given the time the FCA needs to consider the drafting of such a statement. However, the FCA has provided assurance that a statement of policy will be ready at least four weeks before exit if the UK leaves the EU without a deal.
I turn to the other issues in this instrument. Currently, certain regulatory functions under MiFID II are carried out by EU authorities—principally, the European Commission and the European Securities and Markets Authority. The Commission and ESMA will, naturally, have no mandate to carry out these functions once the UK leaves the EU. Therefore, this instrument transfers the functions of the Commission to the Treasury and ESMA’s functions to the FCA and the Bank of England. It also transfers responsibility for making binding technical standards that specify the detailed regulations that firms must abide by from ESMA to the FCA, the Bank of England or the Prudential Regulation Authority. That is consistent with the approach set out in the Financial Regulators’ Powers (Technical Standards etc.) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018, which were debated in this House on 10 October 2018.
This instrument also deletes provisions in retained EU law that would become redundant when the UK leaves the EU, such as requirements regarding automatic recognition of an action by an EU body, and other references to EU bodies and EU member states. In line with the Government’s overall approach, this instrument removes obligations on UK authorities to co-operate and share information with European economic area authorities, although this does not preclude UK authorities from co-operating and sharing information with EEA authorities on a discretionary basis.
Another important set of revisions concerns the treatment of third-country regimes. Under MiFID II, certain elements of a third country’s regulatory and supervisory regime may be deemed by the European Commission to be equivalent to the requirements of MiFID. For example, under MiFID II, trading in certain instruments must take place on recognised markets. If a third country is deemed equivalent for that purpose, MiFID II allows trading to take place on those third-country markets. To ensure that the MiFID II equivalence regimes can continue to operate effectively in the UK after exit, the Treasury will take on the European Commission’s function of making equivalence decisions for third country regimes. Existing Commission equivalence decisions are also incorporated into UK law so they will continue to apply to those third countries.