Draft Markets in Financial Instruments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThe Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Markets in Financial Instruments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018.
May I say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma? The Treasury has been undertaking a programme of legislation to ensure that if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period, there continues to be a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the UK. The Treasury is laying before Parliament statutory instruments under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to deliver that, and several of them have already been debated in this place, and in the House of Lords. The SI being debated today is part of that programme. It was debated in the House of Lords on 28 November.
The regulations address legal deficiencies in the EU markets in financial instruments regulation and its accompanying directive; in the UK legislation implementing the directive; in other related domestic financial services legislation; and in EU delegated regulations. I will refer to those collectively as MiFID II. The instrument is extremely important for the financial services sector, as without it, essential components of financial services legislation would become inoperable, should the UK leave the EU without a deal. The approach taken in the legislation aligns with that of other SIs being laid before Parliament under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018: it provides continuity by maintaining existing legislation at the point of exit, but amending deficiencies where necessary and introducing transitional provisions to ensure that it works effectively in a no-deal context.
MiFID II is a significant set of EU legislation that regulates the buying, selling and organised trading of shares, bonds and more complex financial instruments. It governs the practices of investment firms, exchanges and portfolio managers among others, and came into effect across the EU on 3 January 2018. One feature of MiFID II is that it requires buyers and sellers on financial markets to disclose data, such as price and volume information for their trades, to bring transparency to the process of price formation in financial markets.
Exemptions from those requirements are available in several cases, and formulae are used to calculate whether a trade may fall under an exemption. They are generally specified by reference to a proportion of pan-EU trading data. However, in a no-deal scenario, the UK may no longer have access to the pan-EU data that the European Securities and Markets Authority uses to calculate the appropriate thresholds. Calculating those thresholds at a UK-only level may create different thresholds in the UK and the EU. That may create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and market disruption.
The instrument therefore grants the Financial Conduct Authority new flexibilities and a set of temporary powers, which will last for a period of up to a maximum of four years from exit day, to address certain operational difficulties that the FCA may face after exit. The powers will allow the FCA some controlled flexibility over how the MiFID II transparency regime is operated. The FCA’s temporary powers are required because the FCA will not be immediately ready on exit day to operate the transparency regime independently. One challenge facing the FCA is that it does not at present collect all the data that it will require to operate the transparency system on exit day. The FCA will need time to build appropriate IT systems to collect the data required to operate the transparency regime.
The FCA will also need to consider market movements in the immediate aftermath of the UK’s exit from the EU before it can estimate an equilibrium on which to base certain adjustments to the UK’s transparency regime. Accordingly, the FCA’s powers will include the ability to freeze certain pre-exit-day transparency calibrations, so that they have continued binding effect on exit day and for a period thereafter, until such time as the FCA can collect and produce its own data.
The FCA will also have temporary powers to suspend certain transparency provisions during the transitional period. For instance, it will have the power to stop the dark trading of shares, to ensure that such dark trading does not unduly harm price formation in UK markets. To be clear, the intention in granting the temporary powers is to enable the FCA to operate the transparency regime in the UK from exit day and beyond.
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)
I am sorry, but I have not read the regulations, so the Minister may be able to help me. Do they also provide the FCA with the additional skills and resources it will need to undertake that rigorous and important role?
John Glen
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to draw attention to the significant resources that will be required. The FCA has been in conversation with my officials in the Treasury, and we are reassured that it is in a position to do the work, and that it can do so under the provisions of the levy that it has.
Sir Greg Knight (East Yorkshire) (Con)
Will the Minister confirm, for the avoidance of all doubt, that all the powers in the regulations are temporary and time-limited, and that the powers do not give rise to the right to increase taxation?
Mr Sam Gyimah (East Surrey) (Con)
If the powers are temporary, it would be helpful to know what kind of regime we would have in the long term in the event of a no deal, and whether that would still make us competitive in this area.
John Glen
This SI onshores the existing MiFID II regime under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Circumstances that the Government do not wish for—no deal—would clearly necessitate additional legislation in the next Session. I am working with officials to develop that legislation, so that we would maintain the most competitive regime possible in a no-deal situation, but that falls without the scope of this statutory instrument.
John Glen
In a no-deal situation, there will be a variety of scenarios with respect to the nature of our relationship with the EU; the calibration of our long-term competitive regime for financial services would depend on the calibration of that relationship, and legislation would be brought forward in the light of that.
I will make progress. To be clear, the intention in granting these temporary powers is to enable the FCA to operate the transparency regime in the UK from exit day and beyond, and to maintain existing outcomes, as far as that is reasonably possible. The 2018 Act does not empower the Government to make non-deficiency-related policy changes to EU legislation. If the Treasury is satisfied that the FCA is ready to undertake its transparency functions, the four-year transitional period may be ended earlier by the Treasury by the issue of a direction that must be laid before both Houses and published.
Some longer-term flexibility will also be given to the FCA to reflect the fact that it may not have access to pan-EU trading data after exit, and therefore may need to use reliable trading data from other countries when calculating certain transparency thresholds.
Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)
Given the extensive nature of the measure, could the Minister outline what further resources he has made available to the FCA to deal with this? Is there some sort of impact assessment of the FCA’s capability?
John Glen
We have been working closely with the FCA for several months since the SI was published on 5 October. The FCA has discretion to increase its levy if it needs additional resources. That is not something it has communicated to us up to this point, but we have an active, ongoing weekly dialogue. That is a matter for it to bring forward in due course if necessary.
The report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Sub-Committee B, which was published on 1 November, focused primarily on the transparency regime. It mentioned the adequacy of resourcing for the FCA to carry out its new responsibilities—an issue that has already been raised. The Treasury has been working closely with the FCA to deliver the programme of legislation. It is clearly important that the regulators be adequately resourced to deal with the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. I reiterate that I have full confidence that the FCA has the expertise required to run an effective transparency regime in the UK, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations with the EU.
The FCA will also publish a statement of policy about how the temporary powers will be used before exit day. That statement of policy and any subsequent changes to it will come into effect only if the Treasury does not raise an objection to it on specified grounds. The Treasury may object to an FCA statement if it would potentially prejudice an international agreement that the UK hoped to reach, or if the Treasury believes that it may lead to a breach in international obligations. In a no-deal scenario, it is important that the Treasury is able to manage negotiations with international partners effectively. This objection mechanism is a sensible way of ensuring that.
Parliament will, of course, be able to scrutinise and question Treasury Ministers and the FCA further on their approach to the temporary powers—for example, through the Select Committee system—as Parliament does now. The SLSC report also noted that it would have been helpful if the FCA’s policy statement on the use of these powers had been made available to the House before this debate. That has not been possible, given the time the FCA needs to consider the drafting of such a statement. However, the FCA has provided assurance that a statement of policy will be ready at least four weeks before exit if the UK leaves the EU without a deal.
I turn to the other issues in this instrument. Currently, certain regulatory functions under MiFID II are carried out by EU authorities—principally, the European Commission and the European Securities and Markets Authority. The Commission and ESMA will, naturally, have no mandate to carry out these functions once the UK leaves the EU. Therefore, this instrument transfers the functions of the Commission to the Treasury and ESMA’s functions to the FCA and the Bank of England. It also transfers responsibility for making binding technical standards that specify the detailed regulations that firms must abide by from ESMA to the FCA, the Bank of England or the Prudential Regulation Authority. That is consistent with the approach set out in the Financial Regulators’ Powers (Technical Standards etc.) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018, which were debated in this House on 10 October 2018.
This instrument also deletes provisions in retained EU law that would become redundant when the UK leaves the EU, such as requirements regarding automatic recognition of an action by an EU body, and other references to EU bodies and EU member states. In line with the Government’s overall approach, this instrument removes obligations on UK authorities to co-operate and share information with European economic area authorities, although this does not preclude UK authorities from co-operating and sharing information with EEA authorities on a discretionary basis.
Another important set of revisions concerns the treatment of third-country regimes. Under MiFID II, certain elements of a third country’s regulatory and supervisory regime may be deemed by the European Commission to be equivalent to the requirements of MiFID. For example, under MiFID II, trading in certain instruments must take place on recognised markets. If a third country is deemed equivalent for that purpose, MiFID II allows trading to take place on those third-country markets. To ensure that the MiFID II equivalence regimes can continue to operate effectively in the UK after exit, the Treasury will take on the European Commission’s function of making equivalence decisions for third country regimes. Existing Commission equivalence decisions are also incorporated into UK law so they will continue to apply to those third countries.
Debbie Abrahams
I extend my earlier question to the capability in the Treasury. Are there sufficient skills and resources in the Treasury to undertake its new and additional roles?
John Glen
Absolutely. I can confirm that those skills exist. New equivalence decisions issued by the Treasury will be laid before Parliament and will be scrutinisable.
To provide as much certainty to business as possible, the Government have introduced a temporary permissions regime, as set out in the EEA Passport Rights (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018, which were made on 6 November. That will enable relevant EEA firms operating in the UK through a passport to continue their activities in the UK for a limited period after exit day, and will allow them to apply for UK authorisation, or transfer business to a UK entity, as necessary.
This instrument makes special provisions for EEA firms that intend to operate in the UK under the temporary permissions regime by ensuring that they will not be deemed in breach of the UK’s MiFID II rules if they can demonstrate that they comply with corresponding provisions in the EU’s MiFID II rules. This is necessary because, in the absence of such provisions, legal conflicts could arise that may impede the activities of firms operating under the temporary permissions regime in the UK in certain areas, and that may require them to comply with duplicative regulations.
This provision will apply only to certain provisions of MiFID II during the temporary permissions regime, and only where the EEA MiFID II requirement has equivalent effect to the UK MiFID II requirement. This instrument will also put in place transitional arrangements for data reporting service providers, which are entities that report details of transactions to regulators and publish information under the transparency regime.
Finally, under the transaction reporting regime in MiFID II, investment firms are required to submit a report to their national regulatory authorities following the execution of a trade. Those transaction reports are used by regulators to detect and prevent market abuse. UK branches of EEA firms do not send reports to the FCA, but rather send them to their home regulator, which can then share them between EU regulators. As we will no longer be part of that system, the draft regulations will require UK branches of EEA firms to report to the FCA, in the same way that UK branches of non-EEA firms are required to do. In addition, this instrument provides that firms must continue to report on trades in financial instruments admitted to trading, or traded, on trading venues in the UK and in the EU. That will maintain the existing scope for the monitoring of markets by the FCA and will minimise disruption and adjustment costs for firms.
The Treasury has been working closely with the FCA, the Bank of England and industry bodies—representing large and small firms—in the drafting of these regulations. The Treasury published the instrument in draft, along with an explanatory policy note, on 5 October 2018 to maximise transparency to Parliament, industry and the public, ahead of laying it before Parliament. Regulators and industry bodies have generally been supportive of the provisions in this SI.
To conclude, the Government believe that it is necessary to ensure that MiFID II continues to function appropriately if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I hope that colleagues will join me in supporting the draft regulations. I commend them to the Committee.
John Glen
I listened carefully to the Opposition’s remarks, and I will try hard to give a thorough response. Before I get into the detail, it is important to set out clearly that this programme of 70 SIs is about ensuring that if there is an outcome that the Government do not want—no deal—we have a comprehensive regime in place; that is something that we are determined to deliver across financial services.
I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde and others said about where the debate should take place. I acknowledge that this is complex legislation, but the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments say that it is within our powers to conduct the process in this way, in this place. I recognise that that is disputed, but all I can do is draw attention to the Joint Committee’s judgment.
I will need to write to the hon. Gentleman on the issue of inducement, but the point of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act is to maintain the standards that applied while we were in the EU. I reiterate that business decisions are not in my gift as Economic Secretary, but all SIs are approved on the Floor of the House.
A point was made about Keeling schedules. The Treasury will not produce Keeling schedules for anything else. This is undeniably complex legislation. We will produce Keeling schedules in a number of instances. They are internal documents that have not been sufficiently validated for publication, but Parliament decided when it passed the European Union (Withdrawal) Act that powers could be used in that way to prepare us for exit.
On the transitional period being four years, it took approximately four years to develop the detail of the current transparency system and to put in place the systems needed to operate it. The calibration of the current regime is based on EU data. If, in the circumstances following the UK’s exit from the EU, it is not possible or desirable to use such data, the regime will need to be recalibrated to ensure that it achieves its intended effects. That will involve changes to the binding technical standards, the FCA developing the necessary IT infrastructure to operate the regime, and industry having adequate time to implement changes, hence the length of time.
The experience of implementing the current regime taught us that it is necessary to take the time to get things right, rather than rushing complicated policy and operational challenges through. However, the Treasury can end the transitional period at an earlier date if it considers those processes to have been completed, and that the FCA has the ability to run the MiFID II transparency regime before the end of the four-year period.
A point was made about the transitional regime reducing the transparency of trading within the UK, given the FCA’s powers to suspend certain transparency obligations, such as those applying to non-equities. The FCA has the power to suspend specified transparency obligations in respect of certain instruments during the transitional period. For instance, the FCA may suspend pre and post-trading transparency obligations in respect of bonds and structured finance products during the transitional period. It can use those powers only where that would advance the FCA’s integrity objective—and there are other constraints on its use of the powers. It is not intended or envisaged that the FCA would use those powers to effect a general or long-term suspension of transparency requirements in the UK; it would use them to match a suspension of those requirements in the EU. Without those powers, a suspension in the EU could create regulatory arbitrage between the UK and the EU—something that we wish to avoid.
I acknowledge the points made by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central about the costs of regulatory and IT processes and the number of institutions affected—3,300 in the UK and 1,650 in the EEA. Of course, the assessment sets out the one-off costs and the ongoing costs. I accept that it would be preferable not do have to do this, but I point out that those sums would be divided over a quite large number of institutions.
As to the appropriateness of delegation, essentially the decision is made on the appropriate functional expertise. The FCA and the Treasury worked very closely leading up to the publication on 5 October. Firms are supportive, and they seek the continuity and orderly market functioning that are imperative for the City and the economy. I accept overall that the process is not perfect, but we have undertaken it in good faith, to establish a functioning regime in a no-deal situation.
I hope that that answers the questions that have been raised. The Government believe that the regulations are necessary, and I hope that the Committee will support them.
Question put.