John Downey

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I am not sure whether I can use nice words, but I shall do my best to answer the hon. Lady’s question honestly. Had the scheme operated in the way that was intended, then I have to say that I do not think there was any prospect of anyone, relatives or otherwise, being denied justice in relation to anybody who received such a letter. But that is on the basis that the scheme operated properly. It is quite clear that in this case it did not operate properly because Mr Downey should not have been sent this letter. We will have to wait and see whether this is some wider failure, which applies elsewhere, but certainly from the information that I was given when I looked into this matter at the outset, there was a system in place to try to ensure that every nook and corner was looked at before such letters were sent.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

However it is presented, the recipients of these letters are above the law. That is what this court decision has made clear. Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that a balanced approach will therefore be taken as regards former soldiers serving in Northern Ireland? We have heard that the authorities are already advertising for witnesses in the case of Bloody Sunday. Will he also answer one question that has not been answered so far? Who in the Government authorised these letters?

[The Attorney-General]

I disagree that the letters placed the recipients above the law.

[Mr Baron]

That is what the court has decided.

[The Attorney-General]

No; it has not decided that the letters placed people above the law. If the letters had been correctly sent to recipients against whom there was no evidence at the time on which criminal proceedings could be brought against them if they returned to the jurisdiction, they had no possibility of putting them above the law, and as I mentioned, the letters leave open the possibility that if evidence were to come to light implicating such individuals, they could still be prosecuted. The difficulty in the case of Mr Downey was that the evidence against him was already available at the time the letter was sent, which is why he should not have been sent the letter.

I am not in a position to comment on the position of former soldiers. I simply make the point that the general rules and principles of the rule of law apply, irrespective of who may or may not have committed an offence. But in any event, my own direct responsibilities do not extend to the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland.

Those are the two points I would wish to make, but I reiterate that these letters did not amount to an amnesty.

Points of Order

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I do not often raise points of order, as you know, but I seek your guidance briefly. We have just had an urgent question in which the Attorney-General was asked directly who first authorised those letters, but we have not yet had an answer. How best could we go about gaining one?

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

rose—

Voting by Prisoners

Debate between John Baron and Dominic Grieve

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I must make progress; otherwise I will not be able to do what I principally came here to do.

I want to deal with the point about the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case. The Grand Chamber declined, properly, to provide any detailed guidance on how to make our current regime compatible with the convention. It also made it clear that special weight should be given to the role of the domestic policy maker. Despite the difficulties that the House might face, we have a real opportunity, through debate, to shape the dialogue with the Court if we focus on the key issues.

I will now deal with the main legal issues on prisoner voting. I will set out the main points raised by the main judgments, because it might make the debate more difficult if the House does not have them in mind. I shall first outline the key points in the Hirst judgment, which dates back to October 2005. The Court took the view that it was well established that article 3 of protocol 1 to the convention, to which we are signatories, guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election. The Court considered that to be a right, not a privilege. It also considered that that principle was important in ensuring an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. It therefore felt that departure from the principle of universal suffrage risked undermining the democratic validity of the elected legislature and the laws that it promulgates. That might not have exercised us very much here, but in the context of the many east European states that have joined the European convention it is probably right to say that those are really serious, material considerations.

In the view of the Court, prisoners continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the convention. I do not think that either my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn disagree with that. The Court’s reasoning, with which I appreciate many hon. Members disagree, is that, in view of the fact that the convention does not allow prisoners to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or to have restrictions placed on their freedom of expression or freedom to practise their religion, a restriction on their right to vote should have the aim only of

“preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.

The Court also recognised that the participating states had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on such restrictions, but that that was not an unlimited discretion. It felt that the restriction should be proportionate and—this is the nub of the issue—that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 imposed a blanket ban, which was seen as being so indiscriminate as to fall outside the acceptable margin of appreciation.

[Mr Baron]

The central questions are whether the interpretation of the treaty that we signed has gone beyond what the original treaty contained, and who, thereafter, has the right to make a decision on the matter. Should it be this Parliament or an unelected European institution that makes such decisions? The clear evidence is that it should be this House, and that the interpretation has gone beyond the terms of the original treaty. That is what this vote is about today.

[The Attorney-General]

I appreciate that that is what my hon. Friend and many others believe the issue for debate to be. I recognise that it is going to be a major topic for debate this afternoon, but, if he will forgive me, I will suggest that hon. Members might also wish to focus on why they consider the current ban, or some variant of it, to be reasonable and proportionate in our own national context. It was the absence of debate on that issue that appeared to make the Court take the view that our ban was indiscriminate—