British Embassy (Tehran)

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

No. I always say that all options remain on the table, but I always make it clear, as did the previous Government, that we are not advocating military action against Iran. Our position is the same as that of the previous British Government—the hon. Gentleman was a Foreign Office Minister in that Government—and the same as that of France, Germany and the United States. It is a united international position, and we continue to adhere to the one to which he subscribed.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The Foreign Secretary is absolutely right to condemn the sacking of our embassy, which can only serve to inflame tensions generally. Given recent remarks by Israel, and the fact that there was no smoking gun from the recent International Atomic Energy Agency report, will he do what he can to restrain Israel from conducting any form of military strike, which would be catastrophic for the region? If Iran has set its mind on nuclear weapons, it will not be scared away, and if it has not, a military strike will encourage it.

[Mr Hague]

Clearly, from what I have said, we are not advocating a military strike by anybody. I have often said in the past that although the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran would be a calamity for the world, it is quite possible that military action against Iran would be calamitous. I absolutely stand by that.

I do not think that my hon. Friend should dismiss so lightly the IAEA report, which referred to the agency’s serious concerns regarding credible evidence about the military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme. My hon. Friend should weigh that a little more heavily.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The hon. Lady is right to raise the issue. The Iranian Parliament voted on Sunday to downgrade relations with the United Kingdom. As she says, the further decision of the Guardian Council is awaited. I have made it clear that if they go ahead with that, we will respond robustly. We will do so in consultation with our European Union partners. There is no Iranian ambassador currently here in London. The embassy is headed by a chargé so we are not able to respond exactly in kind, but we will respond in other ways and we will do so robustly.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Given that the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report provides no concrete evidence of a nuclear weapons programme—there is no smoking gun—does the Foreign Secretary accept that implied threats of military force could be counter-productive in that they could rally the people behind the hard-liners and drive whatever programme there is further underground?

[Mr Hague]

To be clear, the IAEA report of earlier in November speaks of its serious concerns at credible information about Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, so we should be clear about that. As my hon. Friend knows, we are not advocating military action. We are pursuing a twin-track approach of being open to meaningful negotiations but increasing the peaceful and legitimate pressure on Iran through sanctions, and we will continue with that approach.

National Referendum on the European Union

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 24th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Nuttall]

I am sure that the Prime Minister has many important duties to attend to.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. The key point is that what this country joined was, in essence, a free trade area, and that since that time we have seen the continual salami-slicing of our sovereignty and the British people have still not yet been consulted on that change. The Government may talk about referendum locks, but that is tilting at windmills, given that no treaty is on the horizon and that key competences and powers are being transferred in the meantime. It is time to consult the people.

[Mr Nuttall]

The European Union Act 2011 deals with the future, but this motion deals with where we are today. People already feel that too many powers have been passed on. At a time when people pick up their phones and spend their own money voting week in, week out to keep their favourite contestants on programmes such as “Strictly Come Dancing” and “The X Factor”, many will be baffled as to why the Government and all those who oppose this motion seem keen to prevent them from having their chance to vote on Britain’s future relationship with the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

But I will give way one more time, to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron).

[Mr Baron]

No one doubts my right hon. Friend’s Euroscepticism, but, despite all the talk of reclaiming powers, week in, week out competences and powers are being transferred to Brussels under the very noses of the British people. That is why there is growing frustration in the country, and that is why people want a say on whether they become part of this ever-closer political union.

[Mr Hague]

I do not agree with my hon. Friend that that is what is happening day by day, or week by week. In foreign affairs, for example, we are absolutely clear, and all our embassies and posts throughout the world are clear, that we will not permit any competence creep following on from the Lisbon treaty.

My first reason is the same as the first one given earlier by the Prime Minister. The deficits of recent years, and the slowness of growth in all western economies, make this a difficult and uncertain time for many individuals and firms. The eurozone is clearly in crisis, and to pile on that uncertainty the further uncertainty of a referendum on leaving the European Union, when half the foreign direct investment into Britain comes from the rest of the European Union, and half our exports go out to the rest of the European Union, would not be a responsible action for Her Majesty’s Government to take. It would not help anyone looking for a job. It would not help any business trying to expand. It would mean that for a time, we, the leading advocates of removing barriers to trade in Europe and the rest of the world, would lack the authority to do so. It would mean that as we advocate closer trading links between the EU and the countries of north Africa as they emerge from their revolutions, helping to solidify tremendous potential advances in human freedom and prosperity, we would stand back from that. That is not the right way to respond to this dramatic year of uncertainty and change.

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[Mr Alexander]

Just let me answer the question. The economics were not right to enter the euro; the economics are not right to enter the euro; and we do not envisage circumstances in which the economics will be right to enter the euro in the foreseeable future.

Let me offer Government Members a further argument about how they should vote this evening:

“What most people want in this country, I believe, is not actually to leave the European Union, but to reform the European Union”.

Those were not my words but the words of their own Prime Minister. And what of the Prime Minister’s real influence in Europe, about which we have heard something this afternoon? It is true that European leaders have been arguing for months, but President Sarkozy’s comments last night, which seem to have engendered pride among Conservative Members, confirmed that about the only thing that European leaders can agree upon is how unconvincing they find the stance of the British Prime Minister. Let me share with the House the President’s words. He said:

“We’re sick of you criticising us and telling us what to do. You say you hate the euro…and now you want to interfere in our meetings”.

When I read that, I thought for a moment that the President had joined the 1922 committee. The President, European leaders and even 1922 committee members are unconvinced by the position that the Prime Minister has adopted.

The Prime Minister boasts to the House that he will have a leading role when European leaders gather at lunch on Wednesday, but on last night’s performance, he will be lucky to get a bread roll from them. The Prime Minister’s isolation results directly from the sad truth that in recent weeks, the Government have spent more time negotiating with their Back Benchers than they have spent negotiating with European partners.

[Mr Baron]

May I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman is creating an Aunt Sally by talking about the economics of the EU? This debate is about whether we give a say to the British people by having a referendum on the future direction of the EU. Why will he not accept that there is disillusionment about ever-closer political union, and that this debate is not about free trade and access to EU markets?

[Mr Alexander]

First, the hon. Gentleman could have directed that question at the Foreign Secretary. Secondly, it is in the character of the EU that it is not open to the UK to say, “We will involve ourselves exclusively in economic and trade matters,” because we need to secure the support of other European partners for such changes. I accept that there is a concern among the British public in relation to Europe. My answer to that concern is not to leave Europe, but to reform it. In that way at least, I agree with Conservative Front Benchers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

No, I am sorry, that is not the case because present Conservative policy is about sharing sovereignty in certain areas where it is overwhelmingly in our national interest. When we consider what the real options are, the real debate is not whether we should be in Europe or out of Europe, but what kind of European Union we are prepared to be members of.

The assumption of this debate and many other debates is that one side or the other will win. We will either have an even closer union or the European Union will ultimately implode. That might be what will happen if the European Union does not use its own common sense and look to see whether there is a third route.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Not at this moment, if my hon. Friend will allow me.

There is a third route and we are already partly along that way—that is, an à la carte Europe, where each member state decides what degree of integration it is prepared to accept in view of its own national history, rather like France being a semi-detached member of NATO for 30 years because it believed it to be in the French interest, and NATO did not collapse as a consequence.

I say that we are already part of the way there, because at present, of the 27 member states, only 17 are members of the eurozone. Ten states are not, some because they do not want to be, and some because they could not join even if they wanted to. We are not part of Schengen, nor are the Irish. The neutral countries such as Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland have never been fully involved in defence co-operation because of their neutrality.

The problem at present is not that there is not an element of à la carte, but that there is a fiction in the European Union that that is purely temporary—that it is a transition and that we are all going to the same destination and the debate is merely about how long it will take us to get there. No, that is not the case. What we need is a European Union that respects the rights both of those who have a legitimate desire, in terms of their own national interest, for closer integration, and of those of us who do not choose to go that way. That has to be argued and negotiated, sometimes on the basis of considerable acrimony.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I, for one, shall be supporting tonight’s motion for one simple but important reason: the very nature of our relationship with the EU has fundamentally changed since we joined it in 1975, yet the British people have not been consulted on that change. Instead, they have consistently been denied a say. Perhaps tonight, we have an opportunity to put that right.

It is a great shame that all three political leaders are whipping this vote in the way that they are. Some of the arguments that have been used to try to defeat the motion are illustrative. There has been no shortage of red herrings and Aunt Sallies as to why we cannot have a referendum on our future relationship with the EU. The first is about economics. A long line of speakers have talked about how important Europe is to us economically and how things would get so much worse if we left the EU. However, the debate on the motion is not about that; it is about whether we give the British people a say about the nature of our relationship with the EU. That argument is therefore a red herring. Indeed, the fact that our balance of trade with Europe is negative weakens it even further.

We have had the red herring about timings: “This is not the right time.” However, I cannot remember when, in the last 36 years, it has been the right time. We have consistently been told, “This is not the right time.” I would turn that on its head and say that, with Europe in a state of flux, this might be a good time to renegotiate our relationship. I find it strange that, once again, the line is: “This is not a very good time.”

[Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the right time to have a referendum was on the Lisbon treaty, which was in all three parties’ 2005 manifestos? Frankly, I would have enjoyed campaigning for a no vote to that treaty, rather than watching the previous Prime Minister surreptitiously go down to Lisbon and sign it virtually in secret.

[Mr Baron]

I am sure that the majority in the House can agree with that view.

Let us look at some of the other red herrings that have been discussed this evening. There is the argument that if the motion was passed and we had a referendum, that would somehow weaken the Foreign Secretary’s hand. I completely disagree with that. A Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister going to negotiate would be emboldened by knowing that the voice of the British people had indicated the direction of travel and how they wanted the relationship to progress.

Then we have had the argument that says, “Why bother with the motion? We’ve already got an à la carte Europe”—that is, people are already opting in and out of this and that, and so on. However, that argument does not stand up either, for the simple reason that what is happening, under the very noses of the British people, is that our sovereignty is being salami-sliced, week in, week out. We may talk about a referendum lock on future treaty changes, but to a certain extent that is tilting at windmills, for the simple reason that there is no treaty on the horizon; rather, what is happening, week in, week out, is that key competences and powers are being transferred over to Brussels. One example is in criminal justice, with the European investigation order.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

That is a valuable point. Is it not the case that legislation regularly comes forward within the extensive competences that the European Union already enjoys? The European Union is occupying ground and legislating in matters that should be the preserve of this House.

[Mr Baron]

Absolutely, and my hon. Friend is well placed to see that for himself, sitting as he does on the European Scrutiny Committee. Key competences and powers are transferred across to Brussels almost daily, yet the political leaders in this place seem not to recognise that fact.

The political elites across Europe—not just here—should understand the growing frustration with the current situation. We joined what was essentially a free trade area; it has turned more and more into political union. People do not like that. They want to be consulted, but they will be denied that freedom of choice if Members in this Chamber defeat the motion this evening. That, in my view, has to be wrong.

The time to put it right is now. This is the motion that some of us have long believed is right and that was going to happen, but because of U-turns and deliberations by party leaders we have been denied this say. The political elite need to understand that at the end of the day they must answer to their electorate. They cannot justify ignoring the electorate when there has been so much fundamental change in our relationship with the EU. I would urge hon. Members—particularly those who may still be undecided—to support the motion this evening, if only in the name of democracy.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), as we have similar views on this issue.

As those Committee colleagues who are here will know, I voted against this report. It will come as no surprise to the majority of Members present that I come to this afternoon’s debate as a sceptic about our mission generally. Having cautioned against our deployment in Afghanistan and voted against the Government’s continued policy—in the one opportunity that we had to debate and vote on the issue, last year—I remain deeply worried about our progress generally. To reflect briefly on the past, our intervention defied all the lessons of history. We fundamentally underestimated the task and we under-resourced it accordingly. We have been playing catch-up every since. Having served as a platoon commander in South Armagh during the 1980s, I have no doubt that the mission suffered in particular from low troop density levels. We have suffered as a result.

My criticism is not levelled at the troops. We all know that they have done everything that could have been asked of them. They and we can be proud of what they have achieved. Rather, my criticism is levelled at the US and UK Governments, who have failed because they have not recognised two fundamental distinctions, which even at this late stage could salvage something positive from this otherwise sorry affair. First, we have failed to distinguish between the key objective of keeping al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan and the four main goals on which that objective is said to depend. Those goals include the achievement of a stable and secure Afghanistan. In fact, the key objective and the attainment of those goals have become confused to the extent that the goals have become ends in themselves. This has given rise to mission creep and loss of focus. The talk of nation building, women’s rights and human rights are but three examples. In effect, we have become missionaries instead of focusing on the mission.

In my view, this confusion permeates the report. For example, the report assesses progress against each of the so-called goals instead of focusing on the key objective. We go into great detail in the report about what we are doing on women’s rights and human rights, for example. The goals are a means to an end, however, not the end in itself. Our main mission in Afghanistan is not to build a better country but to defeat al-Qaeda, and our losing sight of that fact has cost us dearly. That is why I voted against the report, having tried unsuccessfully to make a series of amendments. We are not in Afghanistan to build a better country; we are there to defeat al-Qaeda.

This confusion of purpose has gone to the top of Government. When the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) was Prime Minister, he claimed that our troops were in Afghanistan to protect the citizens of London from terrorism, yet in almost the same sentence he threatened President Karzai with troop withdrawal if he did not end the corruption in his Government. That clearly illustrated the confusion, and I pointed out to the right hon. Gentleman in Prime Minister’s questions back in 2008 that those two statements did not fit well together.

Last year, the coalition Government gave a deadline of 2015 for troop withdrawal. Again, that is inconsistent. If our commitment is conditions-based—in other words, if it is to defeat al-Qaeda—one cannot logically place a deadline on it. Yet the Government have made it clear that all combat troops will be withdrawn by the due date, regardless of the situation on the ground. It is therefore little wonder that Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers have admitted that their communications strategy needs to be reviewed, as it appears that Joe Public has still not got the message. Someone should perhaps ask why, after 10 years, the message is somewhat confused. Could it be that the mission itself is incoherent? If that is the case, there is little point in shooting the messenger.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of any evidence whatever that the streets of London have been made safer by our presence in Afghanistan? Or does he believe that our involvement has caused radicalisation and perhaps made London a more dangerous place, and that we need to look to our foreign policy if we want to make ourselves secure?

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman raises a serious point. I certainly think that our recent aggressive interventions have radicalised parts of the Muslim world against us—a fact that I think was confirmed by a former head of MI5 in giving evidence. I certainly do not think that our involvement has helped our situation, and I see no concrete evidence that the situation has improved in regard to the threat on the streets of London. If I am wrong about that, I am sure that the Minister will correct me.

The bottom line is that there is confusion of purpose, and the first distinction that we are failing to make is that between achieving the objective and the four main goals.

The second distinction that the Government are failing to explore rigorously is that between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The relationship is complex and not well understood. There is no shortage of evidence—some was submitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee—to suggest that the Taliban would not necessarily allow al-Qaeda back into the country if the Taliban were to regain control of certain regions. They know that, ultimately, al-Qaeda led to their downfall. Indeed, US intelligence sources suggest that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda fighters and certainly no al-Qaeda bases are left in the country. To all intents and purposes, we have achieved our mission some time ago—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Select Committee, made well. We all know that the Taliban are not a homogeneous group, but there are fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—yet the threats from al-Qaeda and the Taliban have become conflated and almost synonymous.

[Mr Spellar]

Given the distinctions that the hon. Gentleman is making, why does he think the Taliban allowed al-Qaeda to establish themselves and a base in Afghanistan?

[Mr Baron]

The bottom line is that there are various factions of the Taliban, but the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is very complex and not well understood. I could return the question and ask: how is it that, given that the fundamental differences between the two are clear, we are failing to explore them? At the end of the day, peace is not made with friends but with enemies. We have got to initiate talks.

These two distinctions—the distinction between the key objective and the four main goals, and the distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—are very important. If we are trying to build a more stable and secure Afghanistan and make it a better country, we will in all probability have to beat the Taliban. If, on the other hand, we are just trying to make sure that Afghanistan is free of al-Qaeda, we might not have to defeat the Taliban. That shows the importance of the two distinctions. What they lead one on to believe is the need for the Americans and the British to open meaningful and non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore common ground.

[Thomas Docherty]

It is certainly the understanding of the Defence Committee that our role is to place the Afghan national security forces on a footing where they can deal with security. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that it is not about beating the Taliban, as the mission goal is to get the ANSF to a point where they can take control of their country.

[Mr Baron]

In an ideal world I would agree with the hon. Gentleman, but the report makes it clear that there are severe doubts about the ability of the Afghan national security forces to take over once we leave, despite all the money and the training that have gone in. The fact that the ANSF could not protect UN personnel in areas that had been handed over and were deemed to be safe illustrates the problem that we face. There is not a uniform view on this matter, as it is worthy of note that there are severe reservations about whether the Afghan security forces will be in a position to take on that role, come the deadline.

Suggestions have been made that preliminary talks have taken place. This is welcome news. The delisting from UN sanctions of 18 former senior members of the Taliban is perhaps part of that process. However, I have concerns about the substantive nature of these talks. Until very recently, the American view has been that America will talk to the Taliban only if they lay down their arms and accept the constitution. Frankly, that is living in a dream world. The Taliban will not be beaten and they will not lay down their arms.

History suggests—we could look at counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, for example—that not one of the preconditions for a successful counter-insurgency campaign exists in Afghanistan. There is no control of the borders; the troop density levels are insufficient; we do not have the support of the majority of the population; and we certainly do not have a credible Government in place. Not one of the preconditions exists. The Taliban are not going to lay down their arms and simply walk away, particularly now that we have declared our hand with the deadlines.

I believe that the time has come for the British Government to press the Americans to have non-conditional talks with the Taliban. That is crucial. Just holding preliminary talks will get us nowhere. They have to be non-conditional. We need to remind the Americans that it is possible to talk and fight at the same time, as we proved in Northern Ireland. However, it was the very nature of those talks—the fact that they were unconditional—which played such a key role in bringing the IRA into the peace process. The American wish to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda sever all contact must be part of a settlement, rather than a precondition. I believe that the decapitation strikes on the Taliban leadership should end, because there must be a degree of trust in the negotiations. If the last 10 years have shown us anything, they have shown us the Taliban’s ability to replace one generation of leaders with another.

Given the cost to the United States in blood and treasure, this will not be easy for US politicians. There will be those in the Democratic party who will think about human rights, women’s rights and so forth, and there will be those in the Republican party who will not want to talk to terrorists. At the end of the day, however, holding unconditional talks is the only way forward. Our brave soldiers can only buy time; now it is time for the US politicians to step up to the plate.

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[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

For other reasons, the right hon. Gentleman might be right, but we are not going to get bogged down because there will be a withdrawal of NATO forces. The Russians have said publicly, through the Foreign Minister, that a premature NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a disaster, so they are obviously concerned about the power vacuum that could result.

I believe that the real concern—this goes back to the struggles that there have been over Afghanistan for 150 to 200 years—is about Afghanistan’s future status. Of course the Russians and the Chinese will not wish to see Afghanistan as some American client state—why should they?—but there is no need for that to happen. It should not happen, and it must not be allowed to happen. Equally, Afghanistan will not be strong enough to defend itself without maximum international regional support from its neighbours—not just Russia and China, but India, Pakistan and Iran, all of which have an interest in the situation, and all of which could live with a truly neutral Afghanistan that was not the client state of any of the big powers.

We must not see the withdrawal of combat forces as the end of international military involvement. I hope that it will be, but there has to be a fall-back position if a terrorist threat re-emerges. The real solution is a combination of a treaty arrangement with the Afghan Government combined with an international status for Afghanistan, which the Afghan Government would welcome; they have already said that they would be interested in and attracted by such a proposal. That would give the kind of political and military security that ought to give confidence.

[Mr Baron]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the best way of achieving progress in talks with the Taliban is to make those talks unconditional?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not have any privileged information, but I am pretty certain that they already are. Whatever the formal public position, there is no doubt that talks are going on and that Americans have been involved in discussions with the Taliban. I bet that they were not simply discussing what the agenda would be or what preconditions would apply. It is a slow steady process, and I am sure that it has begun. It should have begun some time ago, and I hope that it leads to progress, but we cannot assume that it will do so. Even with the best will on our part, there is no certainty that the Taliban will wish to co-operate. They may think that they can win without such an agreement, so we have to have a structure in place, both internationally and among western countries, that takes into account all the possibilities, including the Taliban not being willing to co-operate.

Africa and the Middle East

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, we are fully in favour of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. I am trying not to say too much about this, as this is a statement on north Africa and the middle east. We will, no doubt, return to Afghanistan on other occasions. Yes, we believe in a political settlement and in a political surge, as Secretary Clinton put it, as well as a military surge in Afghanistan. It is important that we do not jump to the conclusion that the attack on the Inter-Continental hotel shows that what we are doing in Afghanistan is not working; it is designed to give us that impression, and we should not fall for that. It is a terrorist tactic designed to induce that state of mind in western capitals. In reality, a huge amount is being achieved, and we should remember that.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

In what appears to be the most protracted assassination attempt in history, does the Foreign Secretary believe that the targeting of Gaddafi’s Winnebago and family homes continues to fall within the remit of UN resolution 1973, and if so why?

[Mr Hague]

I disagree with my hon. Friend’s view of the Libya campaign. He must remember that what we are doing has probably saved thousands of lives in Benghazi and Misrata. To characterise the campaign as an assassination campaign is wrong. The Defence Secretary and I have made clear our position on targeting—we do not go into the details of targets. Our targeting depends on the behaviour of those involved, and it has included the command systems of the Gaddafi regime. In my hon. Friend’s description, I do not recognise the actual NATO campaign.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which underlines the need to bring stability to Afghanistan in the future so that those who wish to be in the country can have their homes and livelihoods there. I will certainly give attention to his point.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Given that the Taliban will not be beaten and that the situation does not seem to be getting any better, despite the surge, may I press on the Foreign Secretary again the need for the Americans to open meaningful, non-conditional talks with the Taliban, because the Americans need to realise that, as we proved in Northern Ireland, it is possible to talk and fight at the same time?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I think that point is well understood. In her speech of 18 February, Secretary Clinton called for a political surge alongside the military surge. That is very much in line with our country’s approach, so that is of course the case. At the same time, another thing that is changing, for which my hon. Friend should give credit, is the huge expansion and intensive training of the Afghan national security forces. That bodes well for the longer term.

Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is quite right. The fact that we are acting on a United Nations resolution made an enormous difference to the scale of the vote in this House in favour of the action we have taken and, of course, to the maintenance of international support. The UN Secretary-General attended the London conference that I hosted at the end of March and a meeting of the contact group. The UN continues to be represented at those contract groups. The UN special envoy, Mr al-Khatib, visited Tripoli yesterday, and we are waiting to hear what he found on that visit. The UN remains fully engaged and has offered to lead the stabilisation effort that will follow the conflict in Libya; support across the UN for the implementation of the resolutions remains very strong.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

There is evidence that NATO’s insistence that Gaddafi be removed is prolonging the civil war, and that civilian casualties are mounting as a result. Would the Foreign Secretary consider asking a third party—someone independent, such as Kofi Annan—to mediate, without preconditions, for the purpose of a desperately needed ceasefire, if this is after all an intervention based on humanitarian need?

[Mr Hague]

The United Nations envoy to whom I referred is such a third party, and he has just been to Tripoli. Other third parties have made efforts as well, some of them on the basis suggested by my hon. Friend. A high-level African Union delegation visited Tripoli, without the insistence that the Libyan opposition and we have on the departure of Gaddafi, but that did not lead to a successful mediation. Indeed, however one looks at it, it is impossible to see a peaceful or viable future for Libya without the departure of Gaddafi.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Certainly, I have had discussions with Secretary Clinton and representatives of many other nations about the smuggling of arms or mercenaries into Libya by land routes. That is under discussion. I do not have anything to announce today about it, but clearly where such things are taking place, they are in breach of UN Security Council resolutions, so we reserve the right to take action. We have made representations to neighbouring countries in connection with these matters, and we will certainly continue to pursue them.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

What evidence can the Foreign Secretary disclose showing that the target of the missile strike that killed three of Gaddafi’s grandchildren was a command and control centre, and was being used for military purposes?

[Mr Hague]

I do not believe that it would be right to disclose evidence regarding each separate military operation, for obvious operational and security reasons. It would make those operations more difficult to conduct, if we felt we had to disclose evidence about them.

Escape of Taliban Prisoners

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Alistair Burt]

I am grateful for the tone and the nature of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, which mirror almost exactly the questions that we in the Department are asking. It is barely a day after the event, and the answers to his questions lie a little way in the future, but in fairness I must deal with them.

It is indeed crucial to find out who has escaped. Record keeping is not such that we can be supplied with a list immediately. It is a matter of huge concern to us to find out exactly who escaped, and their positions in the seniority of the Taliban. Estimates of who has been recaptured already vary. There are some estimates as low as 25 and others as high as 60, but we do not know. Again, it is just too early to find out, but we need to do that. The investigation into what happened will cover not only what has changed as a result of events but, as I indicated to my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), what might be done in the future to make these places more secure.

The right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) made extremely good points about intelligence gathering. Again, we have not yet had the reports on what might have been picked up, but plainly it was not accurate enough to enable the escape to be prevented, or on threat levels to us, but those are at the top of our agenda.

What the incident demonstrates clearly is that in the process of working with Afghan authorities in the essential job that they do—taking responsibility for their own country, its security, its prison system and its justice system—it is vital for our engagement and the engagement of others to continue. Kandahar, the area concerned, is not the direct responsibility of the United Kingdom. Another nation is responsible for the provincial reconstruction team working with the authorities there, including the prison authorities.

Of course the incident is a huge setback, but it demonstrates why we continue to need to be engaged as much as any reason to say no, there should be no further engagement. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will join me, and the rest of the House, in saying that the work must continue and lessons must be learned every time there is an incident in order to prevent it from happening again, but ultimately Afghanistan must be responsible for its own security under a proper political process initiated by the Afghans themselves and supported by the international community.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

This event will come as a heavy blow to our armed forces just as the fighting season begins. The handover of operations to Afghan security forces is integral to our exit strategy, yet it seems that they are incapable of even guarding the Taliban, let alone taking them on in the field. Although it is early, what lessons can be learned from this in terms of our eventual exit strategy?

[Alistair Burt]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for understanding the essential nature of Afghanistan’s involvement in its own security. The lessons are blindingly obvious to all of us. Whatever security was in place there was inappropriate. The methods to detect what might be going on in terms of any potential escape were clearly inadequate, but we need to know a lot more before we can make definitive judgments and, more importantly, work out what needs to be done in the future. It is essential for the process to continue.

The Afghan security authorities and the Afghan Ministry of Justice are responsible for other installations elsewhere in Afghanistan that have not been subject to similar incidents. To draw from one incident the conclusion that none of them are working anywhere in the country would therefore not be appropriate or correct, which is why some provinces are moving towards transition, as was announced by the President just over a month ago.

Middle East and North Africa

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Attempts at mediation by other countries so far have run into the problem of Colonel Gaddafi’s refusal to depart. Without that departure, it is hard to see a solution being arrived at in Libya. That is the difficulty. We have agreed in the contact group that it is primarily for the UN special envoy, Mr Khatib, to take forward the work of trying to search for a political settlement—that is absolutely what the UN special envoy is for. We have in no way lost sight of that aim, but it will require a genuine ceasefire, which seems also to require the departure of Colonel Gaddafi. The hon. Gentleman speaks of a blood-soaked result to what we have been doing, but there really would have been a blood-soaked result had we done nothing five weeks ago, allowing Benghazi to be overrun, thousands of people to be killed and tens of thousands to be driven towards the border. That would have been a blood-soaked result, and I think that was the policy that the hon. Gentleman favoured.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The debate and vote on Libya was couched very much in terms of humanitarian aid, but it has since become clear, from the rejection of the African Union peace proposals and from the joint statement, that Britain, the US and France will accept nothing less than Gaddafi’s removal. Will the Foreign Secretary sanction a further debate and vote on this issue in Government time?

[Mr Hague]

No. Of course, I will make statements to the House whenever possible and I am in no way resistant to long debates about the matter, but I do not think the Government’s policy has changed in any material way that requires a fresh vote in the House of Commons. We are absolutely within the United Nations resolutions and within the policy we expressed at the outset.