(1 week, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberIndeed, you will chastise me if I do not stick to my chronology precisely, Madam Deputy Speaker.
As the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) said, there is some confusion about the character of mitigation. We certainly know that nothing has been provided in respect of mitigation or about the reaction to the flags about Mandelson’s associations with senior figures in foreign states or his personal circumstances, yet Sir Oliver Robbins gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in April—its Chair has made this clear—in which he said that clearance could be approved if
“risks identified as of highest concern…could be managed and/or mitigated.”
Such mitigations were meant to have been noted in an email from Ian Collard, the Foreign Office head of security, noting the decision to grant Mandelson’s clearance. According to Sir Oliver Robbins, that email recorded
“the ways in which we would manage”
Mandelson’s clearance and “the mitigations”. Sir Oliver Robbins’s claim was supported by the top official in charge of gathering the Humble Address material, Cat Little. She told MPs that she had seen an email that
“sets out the decision to grant DV and some mitigations.”
There was certainly a stated need to manage the risks associated with Peter Mandelson’s appointment and an acknowledgment that that might be done through some process of mitigation, but we have heard no more. It may be that no detailed mitigation plan was drawn up. It is perfectly possible that that might have happened, for the very reason that these risks were so great that they could not have been mitigated. However, even if that were the case, surely there would have been box notes or communications in emails making all that clear between the Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office, between UKSV and the Cabinet Office, and between Ministers and officials, yet we have seen nothing.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, in addition to the concern he has expressed that there is no evidence of mitigations being put in place, there is a concern that there was not much time to do those mitigations between the point at which UKSV recommendations were received and the decision by the Foreign Office to grant vetting? There really was not much time for mitigations, as well as very little evidence that they were provided.
That is true. Indeed, that might have been reflected in some of the messages that I have suggested to the Department that it might, even at this late stage, make available to our Committee—perhaps that is the most sensible thing given the terms of the Humble Address—and subsequently, in a redacted form, more widely. Even if it were true that because of the pace of the appointment, a full plan could not be drawn up, I find it inconceivable and—I would go as far as to say—unbelievable that there were no communications of any kind associated with the measures referred to by Sir Olly Robbins and Ian Collard.
(9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWill my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I am extremely grateful to the former Attorney General for giving way. He is right to say that the matter could have been—and still could be, as I think he will also want to confirm—brought to our Committee. If, even at this late juncture, an overture were made to our Committee—clearly, it would have to be discussed at Committee—it would be perfectly possible for the Government to set out in those terms the advice they received that legitimises the position that they have taken.
My right hon. Friend makes a good point. Although all our hearings are held within closed doors, he is right that until that happens, our door is open. There is an opportunity for the Minister, if he wishes to take it, to make that proposal.
Let me come back to the point that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) made. His rejoinder and the rejoinders of his colleagues and Ministers have always been the same throughout this debate. They say, “The last Government began negotiations on this, so clearly the last Government accept the same logic that we accept.” That simply will not do. As Ministers and the Back Benchers behind them have been very keen to point out, the last Government had 11 rounds of negotiation on this question. If they had chosen to do the deal that this Government have done, they had ample opportunity to do it, but they did not. That can only be because they did not believe it was the right deal to do.
This Government are undoubtedly enthusiastic about getting swift resolution of disputes—it seems that they apply the same principles to labour disputes—but settling a negotiation fast is really very easy if we give the person with whom we are negotiating everything they want. What Mauritius wanted out of this negotiation was sovereignty over the entire Chagos archipelago, and that is what this Government have given them. I am afraid that we really cannot award any points for the fact that this Government have managed to resolve this issue more swiftly. The fact that the Government of which some of us Conservative Members were part did not resolve it that quickly is perhaps because they were not prepared to give ground on that particular issue.
We need an explanation of why the Government feel it is necessary to do this deal. We need an explanation on what precisely the legal jeopardy they face is and what its origin is, and we need to know what the binding legal judgment they fear is. Frankly, without those explanations, this House should not be asked to agree to this Bill or this treaty.
(1 year ago)
Commons ChamberI understand the hon. Lady’s point and I have seen her amendments on the subject, which are very sensible. We need to think about the way in which the panel process will actually unfold. If we believe that this is an important safeguard, as, I think, is a common view, we need to do everything we can to make sure that it is an effective one. Like the hon. Lady’s amendments, my amendment 47 seeks to remedy the problem by ensuring that the assisted dying commissioner notifies anyone they think may have relevant evidence to give so that they can give it. That evidence may, of course, not change the panel’s decision, but in some of the most troubling cases it will, and the opportunity for the panel to consider that evidence, when the stakes are so high, must surely be provided for.
I accept that what I am proposing is an infringement of the privacy of the person wishing to die—it is a fetter on their ability to choose to die without informing their family or friends as they may wish—but the Bill is all about balancing the rights of a person to die as they wish with, on the other hand, our duty to protect the vulnerable from abuse. That is exactly why the stages through which a person must go in order to be assisted to die are in this Bill, including obtaining the grant of a certificate from a panel. To be of value, as I say, that must surely add new protections to the other stages.
We were assured that one of the key safeguards in the Bill’s original incarnation was a legal test. That process—had it been retained, of course—would have enabled the collection of evidence in the very way that my right hon. and learned Friend is describing. It is partly because the safeguards have been weakened that we have the dilemma that his amendments seek to deal with.
I understand my right hon. Friend’s point, but I am not sure I entirely agree with him. I think some of the procedural problems I am describing would have existed even with the previous iteration of the Bill, but certainly they are there in its current iteration. At this Report stage, I am seeking to fix the problem that arises from the difficulty for the three qualified individuals who will constitute these panels to express a considered judgment. If we are to have added value in the panel stage of this process, we surely have to enable the panel to make good judgments. Good judgments come from the capacity to assess all the relevant evidence. The Bill, as it stands, makes it very hard for the panel to have access to all that evidence in every case, but perhaps especially in those cases where the additional safeguard is most needed.