Health and Care Bill (Fifth sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsTuesday 14th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Health and Care Act 2022 View all Health and Care Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 September 2021 - (14 Sep 2021)
Justin Madders
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mrs Murray, and to serve on the Bill Committee.
The amendment was moved in my name and that of my hon. Friends. The Minister whom I shadow is helpful—we will see how helpful during the course of proceedings—and we start in a spirit of optimism. I am grateful for the support of my colleagues on the Opposition Benches who, between them, contribute some relevant and highly knowledgeable experience. They are all passionate, as we all are, about the national health service and the care system, which are the subject of the legislation.
With your indulgence, Mrs Murray, I take this opportunity to make a few short points about the general context of the legislation. First, this is an important Bill. It could easily have been two or three pieces of separate legislation, so it requires proper consideration. We have a concern about whether enough time has been allocated to deal with everything in the detail that we would like, but we will do our best to get through it. We intend to make our contributions short but relevant and, we hope, persuasive.
Secondly, we share the apparent desire of the Government to repeal the worst aspects of the disastrous Lansley Act. Many of our amendments will be directed at trying to ensure that, in doing so, the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater. Thirdly and finally, as stated by the chair of the British Medical Association in the evidence sessions last week, we remain of the view that the Bill is the wrong Bill at the wrong time.
The amendment seeks to define the composition of the board of NHS England to align better with what we see as the new requirements set out elsewhere in the Bill. In looking at the issue of who should be on the board, we all ought to agree that it should not be open only to the friends and relatives of Ministers. Board members in our view should be subject to more independent assessment of their value and must pass at least some fit and proper test to avoid obvious conflicts of interest.
The amendment would ensure that the key influences on the board come from public health, local government, the patients themselves and the staff, without whom the NHS does not exist. At this point, I take the opportunity to place on the record, as I often do, Labour Members’ thanks to those in the NHS who have been so magnificent, not just over the past couple of years but over many years. They deliver a service that is rightly a source of great national pride. They deserve a seat at the table, as do patients. The Bill does not do enough to amplify the patients’ voice. We will be discussing a number of amendments over the coming weeks by which we will hope to change that.
We also need to look at what NHS England mark 4 will be required to do if the Bill becomes an Act. Other parts of the Bill deal with the powers and duties of this new version of NHS England, originally the NHS Commissioning Board. It is, in many ways, the pinnacle of the reversal of the Lansley position. The new NHS England does not bear much resemblance to what was envisaged under the Health and Social Care Act 2012. That is a good start, but one aspect of the Lansley view—that the NHS requires some degree of operational independence—has been shown to have some merit. Every clock is right at least twice a day, and we have found the one piece of the 2012 Act that proved to be correct. We will discuss some amendments later on to limit the power of Ministers to interfere with those who we believe should be operationally independent.
The new NHS England is pretty much in place anyway, as a result of the actions of those managing the NHS over the last few years. They desperately and very innovatively at times tried to find ways to circumvent the edicts of the 2012 Act, while Ministers looked on passively. It has been an unusual and interesting passage of time in the history of the NHS. We have seen legislation simply ignored and Ministers have allowed that to happen. It is little wonder, given the experiences of the 2012 Act, that many of the NHS witnesses we heard from said they wanted as little prescription as possible. They have had their fill of prescription. We would differ, I think, on the level of prescription necessary in the Bill.
New NHS England will be an amalgamation of the old NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority. It will commission some specialist services. It will be the regulator, regulating a market that no longer exists. It will performance manage both commissioning by the integrated care boards, which, for the purpose of brevity, we will refer to as ICBs, and the provision of services by trusts and foundation trusts. I am afraid that how that wide range of responsibilities sits with the role of the Department is as vague as ever. The ability of Ministers and others to interfere and micromanage depends on whether the rest of the Bill survives in its current form.
Above all, the board oversees the operational running of the NHS, shaped by the mandate, which gives the direction of travel. Perhaps the most crucial policy change is that new NHS England sits at the top of the system, based on the integrated care boards as the major commissioner of services. That means who sits on the board is highly relevant.
The explanatory notes and the Government pronouncements about the new integrated bodies strongly assert that the role is to drive the reintegration of the NHS, repairing the worst of the fragmentation caused by Lansley and, I hope, once and for all, ending the obsession with marketisation, which has been shown to be a failure. We need board members on NHS England who might be seen to be more in tune with the new philosophy of partnerships and collaboration—not markets and competition, not business leaders, hedge fund managers, marketing experts.
In the new world, we want the NHS to be bound by its core principles—comprehensive, universal, free and funded from general taxation. That is a topic that we may touch on later; it may also be discussed in other business of the House today. What should be valued in board members is that they have some record of commitment to those principles. They should have some claim to be aligned to the new values, which favour a stronger role for patients; the public to have influence; a view that the NHS is contributing to reducing inequalities, as well as improving wellbeing; and the greater alignment of NHS services with local government.
The current make-up of the board is, put simply, the chair plus five other non-executives, all appointed by the Secretary of State, and then of course the appropriate executive directors. This amendment deals only with the non-executive directors. Given the huge importance of the NHS, it is appropriate that the chair and at least some of the non-executive directors are appointed by the Secretary of State. We will concede that. In another world, perhaps they could be elected in their own right, but we will not be travelling down that road on this occasion. However, we cannot ignore some of the headlines over the last 18 months and the huge media coverage of quite blatant abuse of patronage in appointments in the NHS more generally in recent years. Cronyism, I am afraid to say, has become a default position, and we think that has to be challenged.
To be fair to past Ministers, the NHS itself can also appoint people for the wrong reasons, moving out disgraced leaders if they go quietly, only for them to re-emerge somewhere else in the system. If the NHS is an organisation—it is a stretch to use that term after the mess created by the 2012 Act—appointments should accord with the highest standards of fairness, and inclusion is notably absent, so let us change the approach. Let us set the tone from the very top and enshrine in law the kind of people whom we as a Parliament would like to see—not, of course, specifying individuals but setting out in general terms some of the main interest groups that contribute towards the NHS and that we think should be at the very top table.
The amendment therefore seeks to give some direction to the Secretary of State in making these appointments and to ensure that at least one non-executive director is put on the board through a genuinely independent process and is not simply placed there by the Secretary of State. The kind of representative appointments that we set out in the amendment should, in our opinion, really be the standard. We would hope to see a similar standard adopted for the ICBs. We should appoint people who can really contribute to the future, with direct experience across the board in terms of the integration that the Bill seeks to achieve. The amendment also sets out how the Secretary of State must appoint suitable people and be able to justify their appointments against some sort of standards.
I hope that the Minister will at least acknowledge that some of the recent questionable behaviour around appointments needs to be addressed. No doubt he will refute the allegation of cronyism, but he cannot deny that there is at least a very strong perception that that is what has happened with some appointments.
In conclusion, I draw attention to how the NHS has already, effectively, blatantly put up two fingers to this Committee and anything we might decide, because it has already decided for itself how it will appoint people to roles within the new integrated care boards and has appointed some already, with the remaining positions, as we have seen from newspaper headlines, up for advertisement. That does not actually do us any favours, because Parliament has not decided that that is what we want to do, but we will see whether we get to that point later. That is all I have to say on the amendment.
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I fear—predict—that there will be occasions when the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, and I may not be entirely of the same mind, but it is a pleasure, as always, to serve opposite him on this Committee, because I know that even where we may disagree, the debate will be measured and reasonable. I will address the amendment tabled by the shadow Minister and, in the same speech, clause 1 and schedule 1 stand part if that is appropriate and in order.
As has been the practice on numerous occasions in these Committees, I will start by expressing a view shared by all members of this Committee. It has already been expressed by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, and we join with him in expressing our gratitude to those who work in our NHS and in care services and—as he and I have often said in this place—all those, including in local government, who work in this space and have done amazing work over the past year and a half particularly.
As ever, the hon. Gentleman picked his example carefully in citing some of the witnesses whom we heard in oral evidence. As he will know, the overwhelming majority—possibly with only two exceptions—stated that this was the right Bill at the right time, albeit they may have picked up on particular clauses or elements. They did state that this was the right time for this legislation.
As the shadow Minister has set out, amendment 18 in his name and those of his hon. Friends seeks to make changes to the make-up of the board of NHS England, the provisions for which are currently set out in schedule A1 of the National Health Service Act 2006. It also outlines conditions that should be met in relation to the appointment process. I share his view that it is vital that robust governance arrangements are in place for overseeing public appointments. It will not surprise him that I refute his assertion that in the case of NHS England board appointments there is a so-called cronyism or a suggestion that any of those people are appointed on anything other than merit. However, I believe that those strong and robust governance arrangements are already in place for managing appointments to the board of NHS England. Those appointed already are deemed to be fit and proper people to hold those appointments.
The existing provisions, which the shadow Minister alluded to, setting out the membership of the NHS England board in the National Health Service Act 2006, provide the flexibility required for the fully merged NHS England to lead our more integrated health and care system. The clauses we will be addressing this morning in this part of the Bill reflect the evolution of NHS England and NHS Improvement and what has happened on the ground since they were originally formed. With this, we seek to create a legislative framework that catches up with where they are and is permissive, rather than prescriptive. That is something else the hon. Gentleman and other members of the Committee will have seen from the evidence sessions. Witnesses were clear that the Bill struck the right balance between permissive and prescriptive.
As we look to continue the fight against the covid-19 pandemic and, in parallel, prepare for the recovery of our health and care system, it is imperative that the most suitably experienced and knowledgeable candidates are appointed to the Board. I know the shadow Minister will share that sentiment. Unlike appointments to integrated care boards, the appointment of the chair and non-executive members of NHS England are rightfully public appointments made by the Secretary of State and managed in line with the governance code for public appointments and regulated already by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The appointments are made on merit in a fair, open and transparent manner and in line with that governance code. They also require due regard to ensuring they properly reflect the populations they serve, including a balance of skills and backgrounds, supporting the Government agenda of promoting more diverse public sector organisations and board appointments.
The role of non-executives on public bodies includes helping set the strategic direction for the organisation, ensuring the organisation meets the highest standards of good governance and holding the executive to account for day-to-day business delivery. They come from a variety of backgrounds and bring a valuable range of skills and experience to a board position. It is important to note that they are not routinely or normally appointed to be representative of a particular sector or group. They are on the board in their own right and their independence in that context is paramount.
All public appointees are expected to uphold the standards of conduct set out in the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s seven principles of public life, as included in the code of conduct for board members of public bodies, and they must adhere to that. The code sets out clearly and openly the standards expected from those who serve on the boards of UK public bodies and includes a clear process for managing any conflicts of interest. The Commissioner for Public Appointments regulates those appointments to ensure they are upholding the values of that Government code and works with Government to encourage candidates from a diverse range of backgrounds to consider applying for such public appointments.
Finally, while I share the shadow Minister’s view that it is hugely important to have diverse representation on the board of NHS England and to ensure that diverse voices and viewpoints are reflected, the duty under section 13H of the 2006 Act already requires NHS England to actively
“promote the involvement of patients, and their carers and representatives”
without the specific need for a named non-executive patient representative. It is clear that comprehensive processes and codes are already in place to regulate public appointments such as those we are discussing in the context of clause 1 and amendment 18, as well as schedule 1, including on diversity, conflicts of interest and conduct in office. I emphasise once again that the role of non-executive members is not that of representing a specific or particular sector, which could be at odds with the independent and broad approach they are required to bring to the role.
I now move specifically and briefly to clause 1, which changes the legal name of the NHS Commissioning Board to NHS England, and also to schedule 1, which contains consequential amendments where the changes will take effect in another Act. Since 2013, the NHS Commissioning Board has been operating under the name NHS England, and I think it is fair to say that that is how all of us in this room, and the public, know it, rather than by the slightly clumsy name of NHS Commissioning Board. This move reflects what the public already regard as the body’s name. The organisation, including the new functions provided to it by the Bill, will continue to operate under the name NHS England; this clause aligns the legal and technical name with the operational and publicly used name for clarity, and updates associated primary legislation.
Karin Smyth (Bristol South) (Lab)
I support the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. The Government would be wise to take note of the proposal. As my hon. Friend said, many hours, days and weeks have been spent by not only Members of Parliament, but expensive lawyers and lots of concerned constituents across the country, arguing—as I have often thought myself at times—a slightly nuanced point, which is lost on people. I have absolutely been persuaded, however, that it is important to restore that duty. If the Government are rightly binning the Lansley Act, the amendment is an obvious one to consider and accept, as it puts the duty absolutely beyond doubt.
Running throughout the Bill, as we will discuss over the next few days and weeks, is a real problem of clarity and accountability. We should not let the Bill out of this place while it leaves that lack of clarity on duties, responsibilities and accountability for the NHS to decide, along with local government. There is a balance between permissiveness and diktat, and starting with clear duties on the Secretary of State would help. Later, we will discuss how the Government seem to want to give the Secretary of State enormous power to interfere in the most minute aspects of healthcare in our constituencies, something that concerns a great many people, organisations and the NHS itself.
If the Government are serious about rehabilitating themselves as the supporter of the NHS following the Lansley Act, an amendment to clarify that absolutely central role would be a wise thing to accept.
Edward Argar
Amendments 36 and 37 and new clauses 20 and 21 are in the name of the shadow Minister and his colleagues. I do not believe that what is being proposed reflects the reality of the role of the Secretary of State or what it should be, which is a strategic oversight role with the ability to intervene when necessary to ensure accountability. The hon. Gentleman might correct me, but I think he cited Mr Lock, who said that there was no substantial change in practice. That goes to the heart of why I am unpersuaded by the amendments.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, the idea that the Secretary of State himself provides services has not reflected the reality of the structure of the NHS for many years, not least since 2003-04 with the introduction by the Labour party when in government of foundation trusts as independent entities in the health system. That purchaser-provider split, long established in the NHS and retained in the Bill, allows some of the health services in England to be provided by those such as NHS foundation trusts, which are legally distinct from the Secretary of State.
In the years since those changes, and as the many vigorous debates in Parliament since and during the passage of the 2012 legislation have demonstrated, there has rightly been no loss in the strong sense of governmental accountability for the NHS felt by Governments of all parties and by parliamentarians. As the proposers of this group of amendments have themselves been among the most eloquent and capable colleagues in holding Ministers and Government to account for the NHS, I find it slightly strange that they feel that their amendment is necessary.
At the time of the 2012 Act, as the shadow Minister alluded to, there was a great deal of debate in the other place on the value or otherwise of this wording. Eventually, the noble Lords concluded that it was better for the law to reflect the reality of the modern NHS. However, it remains the case that the Secretary of State has a firm duty to continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service in practice. He does this through setting the strategic direction and his oversight of NHS England and the other national bodies of the NHS, and in the future, subject to debates in this place—I do not want to prejudge what the Committee and the House may determine on those clauses—through the extra lever of the proposed power of direction. At all times, he remains responsible to Parliament for the provision of the health service in England.
NHS England also has a duty to arrange for the provision of services for the purpose of the health service in England and a concurrent duty to promote a comprehensive health service. Integrated care boards will, subject to parliamentary approval of the Bill, also have functions in relation to arranging the provision of services.
I understand the point that Opposition Members are seeking to make with the amendment, but it is entirely unnecessary as law. The Secretary of State has the duty to promote the competence of the health service in practice. He is accountable to Parliament for the comprehensive health service, and I believe that local NHS leaders and NHS England are best placed to know what is needed to serve individual communities.
This goes to the heart of what I suspect will come up a number of times in our debates in this Committee, which is the extent to which the legislation should be prescriptive, or permissive and flexible. I suspect the shadow Minister and I will disagree on where the balance should lie, in a number of areas. We believe that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance.
The shadow Minister talked about flexibility in redefining the boundaries of what the NHS does. Throughout the history of the NHS, there have been tweaks along those lines. The Labour party introduced charges for glasses and dentures; the Conservative party introduced charges for prescriptions shortly afterwards; the Labour party abolished them, and then reintroduced them two years later. I use those examples because I think we should be wary about being overly prescriptive in primary legislation.
Clause 2 makes a number of amendments to the power allowing the Secretary of State to require NHS England to commission certain prescribed services. It ensures that the Secretary of State can still require NHS England to commission specialised services and facilities, but recognises that aspects of the commissioning might be carried out by other NHS bodies through joint or delegated working arrangements or by directing integrated care boards to provide those services.
Specialist services are commissioned to support people with a range of complex and rare conditions. Those services could involve the treatment of patients with rare cancers, genetic disorders, and complex medical or surgical conditions, for example. As such, it is right that NHS England has overall responsibility for the services and can decide whether they might be better delivered through joint or delegated working arrangements or through directions to ICBs—I am happy to adopt the shadow Minister’s suggested shorthand, otherwise we will be taking a very long time repeating the same words on multiple occasions.
The clause also removes the requirement of the Secretary of State to consider the financial implications for CCGs—to be replaced with ICBs—when requiring NHS England to commission certain services. The change focuses the decision about categorisation of specialised services on the complexity and impact of the service and the ability of ICBs to support commissioning services for their populations, reflecting the fact that ICBs are significantly larger than CCGs and, correspondingly, so are their financial resources. In some circumstances, NHS England may request that a service is no longer nominated as a specialised service or facility—that could be used, for example, as the technology improves and it becomes more appropriate for it to be commissioned by an ICB instead. The clause inserts a new provision in the NHS Act 2006 which requires the Secretary of State to provide reasons for any refusal to requests from NHS England to revoke provisions requiring NHS England to commission specialised services.
I therefore encourage the shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.
Justin Madders
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, not least the promotion he inadvertently gave me by referring to me as shadow Secretary of State. We should have a Division on that, should we not? I understand what the Minister is saying, but our aim with this amendment is to reflect the new reality. No one has really got to the bottom of why the wording came out in 2012, but we are clearly moving back into a pre-Lansley era and the end of the marketisation, so we should go back to the previous wording. In terms of the services and duties in our new clause 21, I do not think the Minister said he disagreed that any of them should be provided. I am trying to do him a favour here and help him to avoid the Bill being bogged down in the Lords. If it comes back in ping-pong, we will quote the relevant new clause and say, “This is something that could have been avoided.”
I understand that the Minister does not want to be too prescriptive. He is right that the Bill will centre largely on the right balance between permissiveness and prescriptiveness, and we will no doubt have disagreements on that. I have tried to be helpful to him, but he does not want to accept that assistance on this occasion, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
NHS England mandate
Karin Smyth
I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. The mandate is important. It is awaited by clinicians and managers in the health service as it affects how they are to operate in the forthcoming year. Often guidance arrives the week before Christmas, as I remember from my time in the NHS, so we were starting to plan for the very short term, which really is unhelpful. It is a regular statement intent, and it is a way in which the public can see what is happening or is due to happen to their services.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston quoted from the King’s Fund’s written evidence, which mentioned the
“multiple plans and strategies in each ICS”
and the need for a “more ‘local’ place level”. As we heard in our evidence sessions, this is already a very confused picture, and one that we are going to try to navigate our way through. Although I do think that there should be greater permissiveness, so long as it is accountable at local level, the mandate gives us a degree of accountability at national level, on the Government’s intent, published in their stated aims, and that gives the general public and taxpayer confidence.
On our amendment about 18 weeks, that target was often criticised as not being clinically referenced. It was brought in after the then Conservative Government talked about an 18-month target being highly ambitious for people waiting to be seen clinically—some of us are old enough to remember those dreadful days, to which we have returned. Now, we could argue whether 18 weeks was the right number, but it was something that drove up standards of care, and it meant that the NHS said to the taxpayer, “We accept that you deserve a better standard of care and treatment, and it is completely unacceptable to be on a waiting list for 18 months to two years”—it was often longer. It focused minds, drove service redesign and made clinicians go back over their lists, because if someone has come on to a list two and a half years earlier, many things would have happened and, sadly, in many instances that person would have died.
By supporting our amendment, the Government would show that they are ambitious for the NHS and the people it serves. If the Minister is not prepared to support that 18-week commitment, what is acceptable to the Government? We and all our constituents know that waiting lists were rising out of control before the pandemic, and that the target had not been met for several years. Clearly the pandemic has exacerbated the situation, but let us be clear that targets not being met was a pre-pandemic problem.
We hear utterances from the Government in the newspapers about what they think about the targets—“nonsensical” is what the Secretary of State said at the weekend. The targets were put in place to give people confidence that their taxes were funding a service that they could hold to account in some degree, and it drove some positive behaviour. It will take a massive effort to get waiting lists down, so what discussions has the Minister had with clinicians and managers about the loss of targets? Why would he not support putting that target back in the Bill? The long waiting lists are miserable for everyone concerned. They need to be published. We need to let people know what they can expect from our service. I strongly urge the Minister to accept the amendment, or at least its intent. If he is not prepared to do so, what does he think is an acceptable length of time for people to be on a waiting list?
Edward Argar
The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston is having a good day; I promoted him to shadow Secretary of State and I think the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire made him a member of the Privy Council, so he is doing well this morning. Although we may resist many of his amendments, I take the point that he did not table them from a partisan perspective but genuinely approached them with sincerity. He mentioned that on a previous occasion the Bill Committee had to be run twice. Fond of him as I am, I think both of us would prefer not to have to do this twice together.
Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)
To encourage the Minister to accept the amendment, I point out that addressing health inequalities would coincide with the Government’s stated aim of levelling up, so there is a happy coincidence there that might persuade him. Health inequalities are reflected geographically, and large parts of the country clearly suffer from them more than others. That pertains to England, but were I standing in the Senedd in Cardiff, I would say the same about Wales. That is slightly off the point, but there we are.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the shadow Minister and all other hon. Members who have spoken for the expertise that they bring to this debate. It is one of the quirks of this House that lawyers are hon. and learned Members and members of the armed forces are hon. and gallant Members, but we do not have an equivalent for those who serve in the medical profession. Perhaps we should think about that.
I am very grateful to hon. Members for bringing this debate to the Committee by tabling these amendments, which relate to the important issue of health inequalities, in the context of the new triple aim duty set out in the Bill. Even though we may not reach the same conclusions about the best way to do it, it is right that we debate this crucial issue in Committee.
With your consent, Mrs Murray, and that of the Committee, I will start in reverse order with new clause 13, and then work my way through the amendments of the hon. Member for Nottingham North. The new clause would place an additional duty on the Secretary of State to produce a report setting targets on the improvement of the physical and mental health of the population and the reduction of health inequalities.
I appreciate and understand the intention behind the hon. Gentleman’s new clause. He is right: health is the nation’s greatest asset. Preventing ill health, improving people’s health and wellbeing, and tackling long-standing inequalities are all fundamental to the economic and social strength of our country. However, the creation of a new statutory duty to set the type of target identified in the new clause is not necessary, in the light of the existing duties on the Secretary of State around improving public health and seeking to reduce health inequalities, as provided for in the 2006 Act. I may not agree with everything in it, but I pay tribute, where it is due, to the Labour party. Labour Members will hear a number of references to what is in that Act and to the retention of what is in that Act in many areas.
Of course, ICBs, too, have duties to have regard to the need to reduce health inequalities whenever they are exercising their functions, to promote integration where it would reduce health inequalities and to set out how they will tackle health inequalities in their plans.
I hope I can reassure members of the Committee that the Government are already taking strong action in these areas and that there are already a number of targets relating to improving the population’s health that cannot be met without addressing those underlying inequalities. For example—I know that this is something that the hon. Member for Nottingham North feels very strongly about—we cannot achieve our existing commitment to a smoke-free generation by 2030 if we do not address as a priority the needs of those people and populations with the greatest levels of need and help people to give up smoking. He is right, and this involves the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds. I suspect that when we reach the latter parts of this legislation that are about public health more specifically, this issue may feature, rightly, in the Committee’s discussions again.
To support our strategy to improve the population’s health and reduce health inequalities, at the beginning of October we will launch the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities within the Department. We have also announced that we will create a cross-Government ministerial group with a remit specifically to identify and tackle the wider determinants of poor health. Our broader focus on levelling up, to which the hon. Gentleman alluded, recognises the wide range of factors such as good jobs, homes and local environments in which we can take pride, alongside a range of other factors, that all support and interact with our physical and mental health.
In contrast, I fear that the new clause, although I can see its intent, could make it more difficult for us to swiftly focus on ensuring that such inequalities are identified and acted on. Had we a fixed, five yearly set of targets to work towards, I fear that it would introduce more rigidity, rather than the agility and flexibility that we seek in meeting the changing assessments of what underlying health inequalities must be tackled as a priority. I hope that I can persuade members of the Committee, although perhaps not all of them, that a five-year fixed plan is potentially inflexible and is not necessary in the context of this legislation.
I turn now to the amendments that relate to the duty known as the triple aim. Amendments 21, 23 and 25 would add a fourth limb of tackling health inequalities for NHS England, ICBs and NHS trusts. As I have stressed, we do recognise the importance of tackling health inequalities, but again, we do not feel that the amendments, however well intentioned, are necessary. As we have discussed, there are existing statutory duties on bodies in this area, many of which relate specifically to health inequalities. NHS England and ICBs will have to have regard to such duties alongside the limbs of the triple aim. NHS England will also have to consider such duties when it produces the guidance on the triple aim.
The triple aim is compatible with and conducive to addressing health inequalities and furthering the delivery of these duties. Indeed, tackling health inequalities is a theme that runs throughout the duties. Having organisations consider the wider effects of their decisions will, we believe, encourage greater collaboration and engagement with communities on how best to meet their needs, which in turn will assist with tackling health inequalities nationally, but also flexibly at a local level.
The triple aim duty requires consideration of the health and wellbeing of the people of England. As the shadow Minister alluded to, that would also include consideration of the health and wellbeing of those who are not accessing health services. Similarly, it is a key element of the second limb of the triple aim—the improvement of the quality of services—to consider those areas where services are in most need of improvement. We expect guidance from NHS England to make clear how bodies can discharge the triple aim duty in a way that is fully commensurate with the reduction of health inequalities.
Edward Argar
The clause places a new requirement on NHS England to consult and involve carers and representatives of those individuals to whom health services are provided when exercising its commissioning functions. NHS England is currently required to involve and consult individuals to whom healthcare is provided when carrying out its commissioning functions; the clause extends that existing requirement to consulting with their carers and representatives as well. We want to ensure that we have a health and care system that is accountable and responsive to the people who rely on it.
The clause recognises the immensely important role that carers and representatives play in supporting our health and care system, and ensures that our legislation remains in step with current practice within that system. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee and hope that all Members feel able to support it.
Justin Madders
I am sure we are all excited to get this one passed—I am certainly not going to oppose it. However, I have a couple of questions of clarification.
Health and Care Bill (Sixth sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsTuesday 14th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Health and Care Act 2022 View all Health and Care Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 September 2021 - (14 Sep 2021)
Justin Madders (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Elliott.
We were left on a cliffhanger before lunch. I was about to ask the Minister some questions. He might have preferred the advantage of having two and a half hours in between to think of an answer, but I am sure he will cope. Actually, it is a fairly straightforward question, so I hope for a fairly straightforward answer.
The clause refers to carers and their representatives. Will the Minister clarify who that is? Is that carers’ groups or, for example, someone who might hold power of attorney? That is really the only comment I wanted to make on clause 5.
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott, I think for the first time in Committee.
To answer the shadow Minister briefly, I certainly envisage that the clause encompasses those with power of attorney, because in effect and in law they are the legal representatives of individuals who do not always have capacity to speak for themselves. In that context, I also hope that we will see carers’ organisations, as well as others who do not necessarily have power of attorney but act as advocates or representatives for individuals, having their views heard and taken into consideration. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman some reassurance.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Support and assistance by NHS England
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause confers a power to provide assistance and support to NHS foundation trusts, NHS trusts and other persons providing services as part of the health service in England to work to secure continuous improvement in the quality of the provision of such health services and their financial sustainability. That new power replaces a range of existing support functions sitting with NHS England and the NHS Trust Development Authority. In particular, it replaces the function of the NHS Trust Development Authority to take steps to assist health service providers as conferred by directions. It also replaces the existing power of NHS England to support clinical commissioning groups and primary care providers, which enables NHS England to provide direct financial support to integrated care boards and providers within the scope of the provisions, and to provide other support and assistance to all those bodies exercising functions within or part of the health service.
The clause is an example of the positive improvement that the merger of NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority will bring to the health service. It will allow NHS England to take such steps as it sees as necessary to identify and address areas of concern early, while also providing support to leadership and guidance where required to shape the services that are delivered for the greatest benefit of patients. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Justin Madders
The Opposition will not oppose the clause, but I have one or two queries that we hope the Minister will be able to answer. Obviously, it is a broad power. I assume that the reference in proposed new section 13YA(1)(a) to “person” relates not just to individuals. Perhaps the Minister will expand on what that is meant to cover.
Also, specifically, at proposed new subsection (3), on integrated care boards and the provision of financial assistance, as we remember from the evidence sessions, there was not a great deal of clarity about the costs that NHS England anticipated might be incurred as a result of the legislation. Will the Minister assist us by providing some estimates of that, as well as whether the powers under clause 6, including the financial assistance, are subject to any limits or reporting requirements back to the Secretary of State, and whether Parliament would have a role in that at any point?
Proposed new subsection (2) talks about providing
“employees or any other resources of NHS England.”
The Minister said that “employees” could include secondees. I think it is clear from the guidance that certain roles on the ICB should not have any, for want of a better description, conflicts of interest or hold any other roles within the wider NHS. I want to make sure that the Minister is clear that that requirement is not going to cause us any difficulties.
Edward Argar
I am grateful, as ever, to the shadow Minister for his succinct questions. I will try to address them all in turn. He referenced the term “person” in proposed new subsection (1). It is a legal definition. In the context of the services provided—I mentioned primary care—it could be a GP practice. Having gone through the drafting with officials, my understanding is that it is a legal term and does not alter what is currently possible.
I may take the questions slightly out of order, and I hope he will forgive me. On proposed new subsection (2), I think he was referring to subsequent new clauses and amendments he has tabled around ICBs, who the suitable persons to sit on them are and the management of conflicts of interest. I suggest to him that, given the amendments he has tabled, the most appropriate time to discuss those issues would be in the context of how we do or do not further refine the definitions around memberships of ICBs. The Committee will reach that on Thursday, I suspect. On reporting and transparency, I entirely share his view and reassure him that I expect transparency to play a key role when public moneys are spent this way.
Finally, on proposed new subsection (3) and the cost to the NHS and the Exchequer, no specific limits are stated in the legislation, but, obviously, any assistance provided would need to meet the purpose set out in the Bill and be transparently awarded. I hope that gives him some reassurance, but I am always happy to revert to him if he wishes to follow up on any detail—either now or in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Exercise of functions relating to provision of services
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
I am getting my exercise today in bouncing up and down in my seat. Clause 7 enables NHS England to direct one or more integrated care boards to exercise certain NHS England functions and to fund the exercise of those functions. This relates to NHS England functions such as the commissioning of specialised services, health services in justice settings and armed forces settings, primary medical services, dental services, primary ophthalmic services, pharmaceutical services, and any of the Secretary of State’s public health functions that are exercisable by NHS England on his behalf. In future the intention is that ICBs be responsible for the majority of health service commissioning in England. This approach will ensure that decisions about services are made closer to the patient and in line with local population needs, enabling greater integration in the way that services are arranged and delivered.
Clause 7 ensures that NHS England has the appropriate powers to make sure we achieve our policy objective, by allowing flexibility for ICBs to take on these additional commissioning responsibilities as delegated functions from NHS England. We intend that this can be used by NHS England to delegate primary care functions while ICBs mature, before we transfer them fully to ICBs at the appropriate time using clause 16 and schedule 3, which we will debate in due course. This will allow NHS England to keep a closer watch on how ICBs are discharging these functions, and managing the transition, before they are fully delegated to and embedded in ICBs.
The Secretary of State will have the ability to make regulations under this clause, meaning that, where appropriate, certain conditions or limitations can be placed on NHS England’s power to direct ICBs, including the ability to prescribe functions that the power does not apply to at all. Any directions issued by NHS England under this clause must be published. I know that the transparency point is one that the shadow Minister has raised on a number of occasions, so I reassure him that they must be published ensuring that such directions are made transparently, and that responsibilities between NHS England and ICBs are clearly set out.
This clause is essential to give NHS England the flexibility, and the appropriate mechanisms, to delegate the commissioning of these services when the time is right to do so. Therefore, I commend it to the Committee.
Justin Madders
We will not be opposing this clause. Clearly, as the Minister has set out, it is necessary to enable the functioning of the health service.
I have one question about the powers under proposed new subsection 13YB(4), which are effectively prohibitions on the ICBs from delegating arrangements further. Will the Minister set out what circumstances are envisaged, if any, where this power may be necessary? There will obviously be delegations, not only to the services listed there, but to place-based organisations. In that situation, what does the Minister see the role of the ICBs as? Will it be the ICB itself that delivers those functions, or will it be another body?
Edward Argar
The hon. Lady is absolutely right about the importance of trying to join up different primary care services and the commissioning arrangements. There has been, under Governments of all complexions, a fragmentation in that, with some services commissioned nationally and others locally, and the Bill gives us an opportunity to create a more coherent, place-based commissioning approach.
On the specific point the shadow Minister asked about proposed new subsection (4) and the
“direction under subsection (1) to include provision prohibiting or restricting the integrated care board from making delegation arrangements in relation to a function that is exercisable by it by virtue of the direction”,
my understanding is that it is a pragmatic clause, basically limiting the ability to sub-delegate further. We would envisage this being a consensual and collaborative approach between us and NHS England in the region, and of course the Government would be guided by NHS England.
In the nature of having to make regulations in this House to do it, the wording reflects the fact that it will be the Government laying those regulations, but we would envisage that being guided and led by the NHS. As the hon. Member for Bristol South rightly said, the NHS region will often be the best place to advise on the readiness or otherwise of different ICBs at different stages in the process.
Karin Smyth
Would somebody be able to appeal to the Secretary of State if they disagreed with that delegation, for example?
Edward Argar
My understanding is that there is no formal right of appeal in this context. I suspect that dispute resolution and formal rights of appeal is something we will come back to in other contexts.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Preparation of consolidated accounts for providers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
Clause 8 places a duty on NHS England to prepare, in respect of each financial year, a set of accounts that consolidate the annual accounts of English NHS trusts and foundation trusts. The transparency of financial reporting across NHS providers will be diminished without this provision, as the consolidated provider accounts collate the financial reporting of all NHS trusts and foundation trusts to give an NHS provider position that is laid before Parliament, and has been since the 2017-18 financial year.
In addition, NHS England has a duty to provide a copy of the consolidated accounts to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General, and a duty to lay copies of the consolidated accounts and the related report before Parliament. To ensure adequate financial scrutiny, the Secretary of State has the power to give directions to NHS England on the principles and methods to be applied in preparing the accounts and their content and form, and can direct that the accounts must be accompanied by any reports or information deemed necessary. The Comptroller and Auditor General must, as their responsibilities stand currently, examine, certify and report on the consolidated accounts and send copies of the report to the Secretary of State and to NHS England.
The provisions set out in this clause not only provide continuity to the system but place in law strong levels of oversight relating to both NHS trusts and foundation trusts. That ensures the transparency that we would all wish to see and the robustness of the process and procedures governing financial health at a local level. This clause is an important way of ensuring NHS England discharges its responsibilities as system regulator in delivering appropriate and adequate stewardship of the health system and, ultimately, public money.
Justin Madders
Again, we will not oppose the clause, but I have a query about the powers under proposed new section 65Z4(4), particularly in the context of what the Secretary of State said at the weekend about targets being a lot of form-filling and nonsense. It seems rather odd to give himself powers to direct trusts to provide any reports or information that he requires when, clearly, the Secretary of State gets all sorts of information and reports from the NHS at the moment. Could the Minister say what he is not receiving at the moment that he thinks the powers will allow him to ask for?
Edward Argar
I consider proposed new subsection (4) to be purely pragmatic, as there will be circumstances with individual trusts and situations where clarifications to accounts or data may be required. Therefore, it is prudent to give the Secretary of State the power to ask for further clarification. He will be accountable to Parliament for how the money is spent, so it is entirely appropriate that he has explicit power, given by Parliament, to ask for information over and above the de minimis specified in the Bill, to ensure he can be completely transparent with Members and the public more broadly.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Funding for service integration
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
Currently, one of the objectives of the Government’s mandate to NHS England—a process we discussed in Committee this morning—is that an amount of the annual sum paid to NHS England must be used for service integration. In practice, that must be contributed to the better care fund. The better care fund is the national policy driving forward the integration of health and social care in England. However, as we have discussed, other provisions set out in clause 3 will remove the requirement for a mandate to be published every year. As a result, the mandate will no longer be an appropriate vehicle for setting an annual ring fence for service integration. Therefore, the clause will put in place a new power to allow the Secretary of State to direct NHS England to ring-fence an amount of its annual allotment for health and social care integration through the better care fund, to continue the work of that fund and to direct it on how that amount should be used.
The change will have no impact on the operational policy intent of the better care fund; the provision will simply ensure the better care fund can continue to be set annually, notwithstanding changes to the mandate, which will not be made annually in the future, should this legislation be passed. The better care fund has enabled and improved co-operation between health and social care partners at local level. It is therefore important for it to continue. This clause ensures that that will happen, regardless of proposed changes to the mandate.
Further minor amendments are made to NHS England’s corresponding power to enable it to require that an amount of the sum paid each year to an integrated care board be used for service integration. That power exists currently in relation to clinical commissioning groups, and the amendment seeks to ensure that the better care fund continues to operate effectively once ICBs are established.
Justin Madders
Again, I will not detain the Committee for long: I just have a question for the Minister. The more we get into the Bill, the less permissive it appears to be. I have no doubt that will still be used by the Minister in defence against various amendments we will move later today. Given that we have been told that the role of ICBs is to direct health systems in their local areas, it is not at all clear what the situation is if the powers under this clause require them to set aside a certain amount of money for service integration, but doing so would mean a reduction in service elsewhere in the system. How would that dispute be resolved? Who would have the final say?
Edward Argar
As I made clear in my remarks, the clause does not so much direct ICBs specifically; it is primarily about setting aside an amount of the annual sum paid to NHS England to go to the better care fund, which is then allocated. This technical change will have no impact on the operation or policy intention of the BCF, and it should not have an impact on ICBs’ ability to operate. The intention is simply to make sure that as we move away from an annual mandate with an annual financial settlement for the BCF, we can still set an annual amount to go to the BCF so that it can continue its work, and for that to then be allocated to systems.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Payments in respect of quality
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause removes the Secretary of State’s powers to make regulations about payments by NHS England to CCGs in respect of quality. We are not abolishing quality payments, but in future they will be made to integrated care boards rather than CCGs—hence the change. However, the current clause conflicts with clause 37—General power to direct NHS England—which provides the Secretary of State with broad powers to give directions to NHS England. Clause 10 removes the power to make regulations setting out the principles or other matters that NHS England must consider in assessing any facts in relation to payments to a clinical commissioning group. However, clause 37 will allow the Secretary of State to use the general power to direct NHS England if required, including in relation to quality account. That will give additional flexibility to shape quality payments in order to better incentivise quality, reflecting our priorities and changing circumstances.
I reassure the Committee—I am not sure whether the shadow Minister will take the reassurance, but he may do—that there is no intention to use these powers frequently, but they will ensure that we have a robust legislative framework that is flexible and responsive enough to support the health and care system in future, in the event that such powers are needed. If Ministers were to direct NHS England in this area, they would be required to do so in writing, ensuring that the direction is in the public interest, and to publish that direction. That will ensure transparency, so that Ministers can be held to account. I suspect that we might return more broadly to that underpinning principle when we come to debate further clauses relating to it in the coming days. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Secondments to NHS England
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
I have only a couple more of these clauses before the shadow Minister will have his turn with a few amendments.
Secondments can be an extremely useful way of bringing key expertise and resource into an organisation at short notice. We have seen the benefits of such a flexible approach in a number of organisations, including NHS England, and particularly during the pandemic. The clause builds on the practical importance of secondments and makes it clear how they can be used by NHS England, by amending schedule A1 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which sets out the constitution and membership of NHS England.
The Bill has given us an opportunity to provide NHS England with powers to appoint secondees across the organisation and use them in the same way as its own employees, and it allows secondees from specified NHS bodies and health arm’s length bodies to be appointed to NHS England’s board. The power to allow employees from specified NHS bodies to be seconded to NHS England and appointed to its board will allow those individuals to exercise NHS England’s functions on the board’s behalf, in the same way as other board members.
As we continue the fight against the covid-19 pandemic and, in parallel, prepare for the recovery of our health and care system, it is imperative that NHS England has access to the most suitably experienced and knowledgeable candidates for executive roles, and that those holding the roles be part of the important decisions that the system will face. The clause will assist NHS England in doing just that.
The clause also includes a regulation-making power, allowing the Secretary of State to make it clear that a reference to an employee of NHS England in the context of the National Health Service Act 2006 should include people seconded to NHS England, should that be considered appropriate in future. That power will ensure that the legislation assesses the continued effect of operation of secondment arrangements throughout NHS England. Any regulations—again, I hope that this offers some reassurance to the Opposition Front Bench—made under that power would be subject to the affirmative procedure in the House, so I commend the clause to the Committee.
Justin Madders
I will not repeat my earlier comments about secondees and ICBs, because we will pick that up later. In our evidence sessions, the role of the healthcare safety investigation body and its independence from NHS England was raised. Is the Minister comfortable that that role will not be compromised in any way by the requirements of the clause?
Edward Argar
I assume—and the hon. Gentleman will probably shake or nod his head—that in this context he is referring both to the Care Quality Commission and HSIB—[Interruption.] Yes, I am reassured and confident that the provisions in clause 11 will not impact negatively in any way on the ability of either safety organisation to conduct inspections and do the work that we envisage them doing. In the case of HSIB, we may return to that when we discuss the relevant clauses. I believe that what is proposed remains consistent with their specific roles, responsibilities and obligations and what we are seeking to achieve for patient safety.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Role of integrated care boards
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause replaces section 1l of the National Health Service Act 2006, which sets out the general function of clinical commissioning groups, with new section 1l, which sets out the general function of integrated care boards. It provides, in a similar way to CCGs, that ICBs have the function of arranging for the provision of services for the purposes of the health service in England. As a result, ICBs will now be the new commissioner responsible for the majority of health service commissioning in England. Later clauses will set out the details of the services that ICBs are responsible for commissioning, but we intend that they should include those currently commissioned by CCGs and some that are commissioned by NHS England, as we discussed in relation to a previous clause, such as primary care, dentistry, pharmacy and optometry services.
The clause is crucial to establish ICBs as the new key commissioners for the NHS in England in future. Our proposals bring together leadership across the health and care system, and without the clause ICBs will simply not have a clear purpose. It seeks to manage effectively in legislation the smooth transition from CCGs to ICBs, and I commend it to the Committee.
Justin Madders
Obviously, we will spend time this afternoon discussing ICBs, so I will not discuss this clause in particular. I will draw attention to proposed new section 14Z26, especially the proposals in subsections (2) and (3) for integrated care boards, which effectively allow clinical commissioning groups to determine their own processes to consult on ICBs. We do not think that the consultation process has been adequate—indeed, it has been non-existent in some situations—but we will probably return to the question of ICB geography later in this sitting.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Establishment of integrated care boards
Edward Argar
I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions on the amendment. I may disappoint the shadow Minister—I will not accept it. I hope he will let me address why and deal with some of the questions that have been raised.
The amendment would place a requirement on NHS England to consult relevant NHS trusts, foundation trusts, trade unions, patient representatives and local authorities before revoking or varying an ICB’s establishment order. We consider it unnecessary, because under clause 13, proposed new section 14Z25, NHS England is already required to consult any integrated care board that is likely to be affected before varying or revoking an integrated care board’s establishment order. Given that each ICB will have a strategic view of the health service and population needs in its area, and given that ICBs will have members from different NHS trusts and local authorities, we consider that they remain the best-placed bodies to bring those views together to reflect opinion on what is an appropriate boundary or establishment area.
Section 13Q of the NHS Act 2006 already places a duty on NHS England to involve and consult the public in the planning of commissioning arrangements, including in respect of any planned changes to commissioning arrangements. That includes, for example, if NHS England plans to change the range of health services available to the public or the manner in which they are delivered. That ensures the voices of residents and patients—those who access care and support—as well as their carers are properly embedded in decision making.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the requirement in clause 13, proposed new section 14Z26, for CCGs to consult any person they consider as appropriate on the first ICB constitution. That constitution will also be required to set out the process for making further amendments to the constitution.
Turning to the points raised by the shadow Minister and other hon. Members, the boundaries on which we are seeing the footprint put forward at the moment effectively reflect the evolution of STP and ICS boundaries to this point. They reflect local authority boundaries. By and large, the majority of ICS boundaries reflect one or more upper-tier local authorities. That was the criteria set by the Secretary of State. There are some exceptions, which I will turn to in a moment. I will also turn to the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury.
As the shadow Minister will be aware, the previous Secretary of State set out a process where he wanted a presumption in favour of coterminosity—the shadow Minister appeared to be supportive of that—unless there were exceptional circumstances in a particular area that justified an exception being made. The principle of coterminosity is something that was argued against, in some cases, by Opposition Members—not Front Bench spokespeople, as far as I am aware, but Back-Bench Members of Parliament—and by some Government Members, in respect of where there should be specific exceptions.
The process, which was touched on, was entirely consultative. Local authorities were fully involved in those discussions. The local NHS was fully involved in the discussions. There were also what could be referred to as cosy fireside meetings, involving Members from across the House, reflecting their right as Members of Parliament representing their communities to write to and engage with Ministers, to reflect their views. There was a multi-layered approach, with the local NHS and local authorities working together to come up with recommendations, and then Members of Parliament having the right, as all Members do, to lobby Ministers and put forward their perspective on behalf of their constituents. The approach was transparent, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury alluded to. We published a written ministerial statement, setting out for the House what had been decided, and we showed the flexibility and pragmatism that I think those consulted would wish to see.
In the areas where exceptions were made—the east of England areas and Frimley—contrary to what the hon. Member for Bristol South said, these are some of the most exceptionally high-performing ICS areas. That is one of the reasons why we decided not to go for coterminosity, because those systems are working well, with established relationships with local authorities, acute trusts and primary care. We took the view that we should not disrupt something that is working well—if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. That will not stop it being reviewed in future, should the local system feel that that would be appropriate. That was a pragmatic approach to the issue.
My hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury raised the issue of Cheshire and Merseyside ICS—I know that this will also be of interest to the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, given the geography of his constituency. The ICS did meet the coterminosity test of one or more upper-tier authorities being coterminous, but I know that hon. Members on both sides of the House have raised concerns about its size and about the differences between Cheshire and Merseyside proper, and between different parts of the area, and suggested whether it should more appropriately be split into a larger number of smaller coterminous ICSs.
In a sense, the reason that split did not take place goes exactly to the heart of what the shadow Minister was saying, which is our determination to engage widely, consult local authorities and the local NHS, and come up with a set of rigorously tested proposals. This was—for want of a better way of putting it—a late addition to the work being done earlier this year, because it was already coterminous and the commission was to look at things that were non-coterminous. However, in the light of representations made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury and others, the Secretary of State was clear that it should be reviewed.
Two years was deemed an appropriate time in which to do that review, to allow that consultation with Members and others, and so that it did not straddle—subject to the passage of this legislation—the establishment of ICSs just at the time they were coming into being, and we could do that preparatory work properly. I can give my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury the assurance that this is a genuine and rigorous review process. When I emerge from this Committee room, perhaps I may, with Members on both sides of the Committee, discuss further what that looks like and how that might most effectively be carried out.
What that process has shown up, however, is that there is rarely a 100% consensus from all local authority partners and the local NHS on exactly what the right solution is where there is not coterminosity and we are moving towards it. That is why I am cautious about some of the language that has been used thus far, which essentially appeared to imply that we would have to have consensus, and that one part or other of the system would have, if not a veto, a right to put the brakes on changes. Were we to go down that route, I fear that, given different perspectives in different local authorities and areas, we would run the risk of paralysing any possibility of change. I think the right balance needs to be struck.
Karin Smyth
I hear what the Minister is saying, but on that basis—I think this is fundamental to all of this—why would we have local authorities or unitary authorities making any sorts of decisions? That is how local people exercise their democratic will. Bringing forward proposals in order to persuade sometimes results in a bit of stasis, but ultimately someone has to decide and break the deadlock, and the concern, as we come to some of the other amendments, is about how one does that. Local people should be able to have that in a transparent way.
Edward Argar
The approach that we have adopted thus far, which I believe is appropriate, is that we have that with local authorities and the NHS, but ultimately it is the Secretary of State who balances those in the case of these boundaries, and he is accountable to this House, so that strikes an appropriate balance. In the case of the East of England areas, certainly, we did have a very strong divergence of views as to what the right boundaries would be. It would be wrong if either local authorities or the NHS had the right to say, “No, it’s this.” That is where we have to have those views put forward together so that they can be considered in the round.
On the final point that the hon. Member for Bristol South made—I may have missed some points, but this is an important one that I want to put on the record—she is absolutely right to highlight the value of the work done by managers and administrators, or whatever title is used to describe them, sometimes pejoratively by some commenting on this matter. She is absolutely right about the value of their work. There is an analogy that I use all the time, with a much-hackneyed quote that Members will know: John F. Kennedy going to NASA, shaking the hand of the janitor and saying, “Thank you for putting a man on the moon.” What sits behind that goes to the heart of what the hon. Lady was saying. The NHS is a team. Without effective managers, people who can engage, and people who can manage budgets and ensure financial transparency and accountability, and without planning and people who make sure that patients are called and appointments are rescheduled, those on the clinical front line, if she will allow me to put it this way, would not be as effective at doing their job. It is not an effective use of a clinician’s time to ring up a patient to rearrange an appointment. Similarly, it would not be an appropriate use of the time of a highly skilled manager or administrator to be performing some other task. We have got to make sure that we have the right people in the right places, with the right skills.
The final point I would like to make again goes back to a point that the hon. Member for Bristol South made, about accountability. I think it was Amanda Pritchard, chief executive of the NHS—forgive me if it was Mark Cubbon, the chief operating officer—who highlighted, in asking who was accountable, that the ICB is an NHS body, working in partnership with the local authority, that is accountable for the funds it spends, which are voted on by Parliament. That is why it has an NHS official and there are routes of accountability up through the NHS to NHS England, and ultimately to the Secretary of State and this House. That is the structure of the NHS that has evolved over the past 70-plus years. I think that the hon. Lady sought—quite rightly—to press and challenge me on whether we think that evolution is the right approach, or whether we need to take a step back and challenge some of those assumptions. She is right to do that, but in this context, which involves the management of public money, the structures and accountabilities are correct.
I am sorry to disappoint the shadow Minister, as I fear that we will not be able to support his amendment. I hope he will not press it to a vote and that I have gone some way towards addressing the points made, particularly with regard to ICS boundaries and processes followed.
Justin Madders
We have had a fairly wide-ranging and useful debate. A number of issues have arisen that we will return to as the Committee makes progress. I am disappointed that the hon. Member for Eddisbury could not come on board; perhaps I should not have made my little dig about barristers this morning, otherwise he might have been more inclined to support us. I noted the sympathy he expressed and I think he articulated very well his knowledge of the geography of the area and why there are concerns locally about proper accountability in such a large area.
The irony of the whole debate, of course, is that we are discussing the Bill today, but before we have even got to the end, we know that the Cheshire and Merseyside ICS may not survive two years. Before the Bill has even become an Act, some of its constituent parts may be reorganised in future. We will see what happens on that, and I look forward to engaging with the Minister in that process.
Let us not forget that the genesis of what is before us was the STPs. How were they put together? I think local NHS leaders were sent a missive about three days before Christmas to say, “Can you give us an idea of what you think the most optimal design of your local NHS would be? By the way, we would like the response back by the end of January.” As we know, the NHS is traditionally extremely busy at that time of year, and Christmas is hardly a good time to be engaging with the wider public sector or indeed the community, but that was where the genesis was, and that is where the Cheshire and Merseyside STP and now ICS came from. It would be interesting to know how many of the 42 areas have changed since that original geography back in, I think, 2017—perhaps even 2016. It was clearly then, as it still is, a creature of the NHS, not the communities it represents.
Justin Madders
I thank the SNP spokesperson for her intervention. That is undoubtedly a risk. It is possible we end up with two or three areas out of that review. I hate to think it would get any bigger.
In terms of what people think is their relevant community, Merseyside has a metro Mayor now with very clearly defined geography, and Cheshire is a different area. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South said, people do not take to the streets with banners saying, “Save our CCG!” I suspect the majority of people do not even know what a CCG is or the area that it is meant to cover. I suspect even fewer people know what an ICS is and what area it covers. That will definitely have to change if we are to have a truly integrated health and social care system.
The point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol South about the defensive culture at times, alluded to by Sir Robert Francis, is a valid one. We may touch on that in the HSSIB elements of the Bill later on. She was asking the right questions—how can the board be challenged, and who is it accountable to? Those are points we will have to come back to, because there is, to our mind, a clear democratic deficit in the way these bodies have been structured.
Finally, the Minister referred to his guiding principle of coterminosity except in exceptional circumstances. Cheshire and Merseyside is coterminous, it is just coterminous for more than one local authority—and some pretty big ones at that—so I do not necessarily think that coterminosity is the answer.
The Minister referred to proposed new sections 14Z25 and 26 in regard to the duties to consult with members of the ICB. Some of the people named in amendment 49 might not actually be on the ICB, because they are not included in the legislation at the moment. We will come to our amendment on that in due course, and we might be able to change that. In proposed new sections 14Z26, CCGs must
“consult any persons they consider it appropriate to consult”.
That could be everyone and no one. I do not intend to press this to a vote, but I hope the Minister has taken on board several points that will lead to an improved process in the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Edward Argar
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 13, page 9, line 44, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 10 and insert—
“(1) NHS England may, in connection with the abolition of a clinical commissioning group under section 14Z27, make a scheme for the transfer of the group’s property, rights or liabilities to NHS England or an integrated care board.
(2) NHS England may, in connection with the establishment of an integrated care board, make a scheme for the transfer of property, rights or liabilities to the board from—
(a) NHS England,
(b) an NHS trust established under section 25, an NHS foundation trust, or
(c) a Special Health Authority established under section 28.
(2A) NHS England may, in connection with the variation of the constitution of an integrated care board or the abolition of an integrated care board, make a scheme for the transfer of the board’s property, rights or liabilities to NHS England or an integrated care board.
(2B) The reference in subsection (2A) to the variation of the constitution of an integrated care board is to its variation by order under section 14Z25 or under provision included in its constitution by virtue of paragraph 14 of Schedule 1B.”
This amendment adds a power for NHS England to transfer property, rights and liabilities (including rights and liabilities relating to a contract of employment) from certain NHS bodies to an integrated care board on its establishment: see new subsection (2). In consequence, new subsections (1), (2A) and (2B) restructure material currently in subsections (1) and (2).
Edward Argar
Both the amendments are technical ones. Amendment 10 amends proposed new section 14Z28 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which provides NHS England with the power to make transfer schemes to transfer property, rights and liabilities in connection with the establishment of, abolition of or change in the constitution of ICBs or the abolition of CCGs. The amendment widens the power to make transfer schemes when establishing integrated care boards, so that transfer schemes may include transfers from NHS England, English NHS trusts or foundation trusts, or English special health authorities.
We are widening the scope of those schemes to reflect further work done by NHS England, which has noted that a small number of people currently working in those bodies may need to transfer into ICBs. It is of practical importance for NHS England to be able to make transfer schemes that will ensure a smooth transition when ICBs are established, and for all the staff who may be transferring to newly established ICBs to be fully protected by such schemes.
For all but the most senior staff transferred from elsewhere in the NHS, I assure the Committee that NHS England’s employment commitment to continuity of terms and conditions, even if not required by law, will apply fully. That commitment is designed to provide stability and remove uncertainty during the transition. It is also possible for NHS England to use the schemes to transfer property and liabilities currently held by those bodies to ICBs on their establishment, although again we expect that to be rare in practice.
Proposed new subsections (1), (2A) and (2B) in the amendment restructure material in proposed new subsections (1) and (2) of the clause as drafted. That simply reflects the technical legal redrafting. The amendment therefore does not change the bodies that can be covered in transfer schemes relating to the abolition of CCGs or ICBs, or the variation of the constitution of an ICB. Those bodies continue to be CCGs, ICBs and NHS England.
Amendment 11 is consequential upon amendment 10 and is also simply a technical change. They are technical, but important amendments to ensure—and to be clear—that staff rights, liabilities and properties are in the right places in the NHS when we introduce ICBs into the system, and that the right protections are in place.
Amendment 10 agreed to.
Amendment made: 11, in clause 13, page 10, line 13, after “(1)” insert “or (2A)”.—(Edward Argar.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 10.
Justin Madders
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 13, page 11, line 10, at end insert—
“Accountability
14Z28A Reporting: duties on integrated care boards and the Secretary of State
(1) Integrated care boards must report annually to the Secretary of State on their actions and policies and the outcomes for patients of the services they commission.
(2) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report each year on the actions and policies of integrated care boards and the outcomes for patients of the services they commission and must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(3) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than one month after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”
It is a pleasure to move the amendment in my name and that of my hon. Friends. The heading is “Accountability” and, as I am sure the Minister will have picked up by now, we think that accountability needs to be turbo-charged in the Bill. The new commissioning bodies, the ICBs, are directly accountable to NHS England and therefore on to the Secretary of State. That was explained by Amanda Pritchard when she gave evidence last week. Each year, the ICB has to prepare a report on how it has discharged its functions and specialist duties under the various headings—improvements in quality, public involvement and so on. It has to report under lots of headings. One has to wonder how it will be able to pick priorities from all that, but that is a matter for the ICB.
ICBs must also publish their plans. The NHS, in the form of NHS England, will then assess the performance of each ICB against how it discharges its functions. Presumably, that will be at least in part with reference to those plans.
The amendment, in essence, would add the accountability of the Secretary of State to what we would describe as a fairly cumbersome but necessary regime of performance management. The slant of the reporting in the amendment is less steeped in the kind of bureaucratic tick-boxing that we understand that the Secretary of State is not a fan of, and what has to be reported is outcomes to patients--perhaps, the thing that matters most.
In the recent comparative survey by the Commonwealth Fund, the NHS lost its top slot and went down to No. 4. It was close, but not close enough. Despite usually coming top, it does badly on one of the key metrics that goes into the assessment—patient outcomes. We do well on ease of access but not so well on outcomes, which is a sad reflection. The amendment makes outcomes a priority over other factors. While the ICBs may have much to say on the day-to-day running of the NHS in the area, the ultimate responsibility for the whole system lies with the Secretary of State, even though on a day-to-day basis it may be NHS England that does the real leg work of performance management. In its new integrated form, NHS England performance manages various trusts and foundation trusts. It also runs the failure regimes for them if needed.
Ways of managing providers are well developed, but most of the skills necessary to monitor whole system performance have been lost to some extent, as management capacity in commissioners has been nibbled away. That brings me to the current weakness in holding providers to account on outcomes. Payment by results was a euphemism, as the results did not matter: the process was the determining factor. Reports on outcomes, as with on patient satisfaction, are absolutely necessary. If any system is to be taken seriously, it must seek to improve. ICBs should not see this as added bureaucracy: they should see it as reporting vital elements of healthcare. I draw particular attention to the reference in proposed new subsection (1), which refers to outcomes specifically, because we do not believe that gets as much prominence as it should.
Leaving aside the desire to produce the right reports for the Secretary of State, there is also an issue about how to make ICBs more accountable to their communities—we will touch on that later. Giving them sight of a nice glossy annual NHS report will not be very enlightening, and it will not help communities understand what has been done on their behalf, even if they recognise the NHS as part of their community.
Edward Argar
It is a pleasure to rise to respond. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, is now having to do a lot of bobbing up and down with his amendments, and I am grateful to him for tabling this one. I fear he will not be entirely surprised that we cannot accept it, but I will try to explain to him at least why, and why I urge him not to push it to a vote, although obviously he will be the judge of that.
The amendment, as the shadow Minister has set out, would place new requirements on integrated care boards to report annually directly to the Secretary of State on their actions, and a duty on the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual report for Parliament specifically on the actions of the ICBs. It would also require a Minister of the Crown to propose a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report no later than one month following its being laid in Parliament.
We entirely agree with the shadow Minister that there should be strong lines of democratic accountability from ICBs to Parliament. I hope I can give him at least some reassurance that the Bill already provides for much of the transparency and accountability that he is understandably seeking. The provisions in the Bill will create clear lines of accountability for ICBs to NHS England; they will be accountable through NHS England to national Government and ultimately, therefore, to both Houses of Parliament.
Proposed new section 14Z26 of the National Health Service Act 2006 already places a duty on ICBs to prepare an annual report explaining how the ICB has discharged its duties, particularly in relation to its activities to improve the quality of services, reduce health inequalities and have regard to the effect of its decisions on, and its involvement with, the public.
The report must also explain how the ICB has exercised its functions in accordance with its proposed forward plan and capital resource plan, as well as the steps it has taken to implement any joint health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England will also have the ability to give directions to ICBs concerning the form and content of the annual report, meaning that it could stipulate further reporting requirements for ICBs as necessary where information might be lacking. The report must be provided to NHS England and must be published
I hope the Committee will agree that that is already a comprehensive reporting requirement. Further, under proposed new section 14Z57, NHS England is also required to undertake annual performance assessments to review how each individual ICB has discharged its functions, including how it has delivered on its statutory duties. The Secretary of State will have the power to issue statutory guidance concerning performance assessments, meaning that national Government will be able to influence the methods and requirements of assessment if necessary. Again, NHS England must publish the results of each performance assessment, meaning that the public will have open access to information concerning the performance of their ICBs.
I hope the Committee will agree that the Bill therefore already provides much of the transparency and accountability that the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston is asking for, and that further duplicative reporting requirements would risk creating new and unnecessary bureaucracy. In respect of the ability of the House to scrutinise, he knows, and Opposition Members know, that they have many opportunities to table debates on a wide array of subjects. He and his colleagues have held me and other Ministers to account, not only in these Committee Rooms but on the Floor of the House in recent months, on a whole array of subjects. With the information I have set out that will already be published, for not only the House but the wider public to read, absorb and consider, there is scope for the hon. Gentleman or any other hon. Member to table a debate in which such reports can be considered if they so wish. I believe that that provides for sufficient transparency and accountability, and I encourage the shadow Minister not to press the amendment.
Justin Madders
I understand what the Minister is saying. We still say there is not enough emphasis on outcomes and accountability to Parliament, but, as he has pointed out, there are other avenues that we can use to pursue those matters. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause, as we have touched on in the various discussions on amendments already, inserts new chapter A3 into the NHS Act 2006, which contains a number of duties and functions in relation to the new integrated care boards. A new duty is conferred on NHS England to ensure that ICBs cover England and details the required process for establishing the ICBs.
The clause also makes provision for abolishing clinical commissioning groups, transferring staff, property and liabilities to ICBs, requiring the constitutions of ICBs to be published and requiring ICBs to make arrangements for managing conflict of interest effectively. The clause is essential for delivering on one of the core objectives of the Bill—creating statutory ICBs as a means to take an ambitious, collaborative approach to planning and delivering integrated health and care services in England. The clause will establish a smooth transition from CCGs to ICBs, providing clarity and consistency for patients as we move to these new arrangements, as well as creating continuity of employment for NHS staff.
Karin Smyth
I hope the Minister will address my earlier comments about the policy direction of primary and community care being front and centre in the last 15-odd years. This is a very different beast. I think that has perhaps not come out in the debate. These are very different bodies, and I wonder how he will make sure that the majority of patient contacts and the majority of the work that is done in the health service is not lost in the new organisations.
Edward Argar
I hope that I can reassure the hon. Lady. Although these organisations move beyond the CCG model to be much more collaborative, with more partnership working with local authorities and others, and the genesis of the new model is to bring those two parts together, there is no intent for, and I do not believe the practical consequence of this would be, a diminution in the voice of and the need to pay heed to primary care. She is absolutely right. For the vast majority of our constituents, the front door to the NHS is primary care services. The majority of their appointments, their consultations and their engagement is with primary care services. That voice is hugely important. I see that continuing to be front and centre.
The Bill brings together a range of other NHS system providers and the local authority. We may come back to the point when we discuss further amendments. I emphasise what we heard in the evidence sessions, which is that the membership requirements are de minimis. There can be increased numbers of voices for primary care on these boards, as Dame Gill Morgan mentioned in the way she is managing Gloucestershire. That may not fully satisfy the hon. Lady, but I hope I can reassure her that I am in the same place as her in recognising the importance of primary care and that the expertise that has grown up in understanding local communities is vital in framing a system that works effectively.
In requiring ICBs to maintain and publish registers of the interests of their members and employees—I expect we will return to this point in the future, in a different guise—the clause is an essential part of guaranteeing the integrity of each ICB’s decision-making processes. It will ensure that any potential conflicts of interest are declared promptly by individuals and managed effectively. As a result, the public will be able to trust that decisions are made in a fair, transparent manner, in the best interest of the ICB’s local population. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Integrated care boards: constitution etc
Justin Madders
I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 2, page 119, line 18, at end insert—
“(c) the process by which any proposed changes to the policies of the clinical commissioning groups within the area for which the integrated care board is established will be consulted upon and agreed.”
This amendment would require ICBs to be clear about how they would make changes in clinical policies and established models of care that have already been established and are applicable to patients in the area for which the integrated care board takes responsibility.
We are certainly getting a good workout this afternoon, Ms Elliott—hopefully the Minister will now be able to catch his breath.
As the hon. Member for Eddisbury suggested earlier, we have seen a rapid reduction in the number of CCGs in Cheshire and Merseyside—there are now nine, but there were more than that not so long ago—and it is one of the biggest ICSs, if not the biggest, in the country. I am not going to take the Committee through the angst on that again, but even with sensible coterminous boundaries, quite a lot of ICSs will have more than one progenitor CCG.
Under the old regime, every CCG had its own plans, policies, care pathways and models of care. For example, many had different rules about gluten-free products being available on prescription, and most Members will be acutely aware of the manifest unfairness of the postcode lottery for IVF treatment. The number of cycles people were entitled to and how old they had to be to access treatment all depended very much on where in the country they lived. It is tempting to say that, rather than having all that variation, we should just level up—the Government’s catchphrase of the day—but that of course will not always be possible, and there will be variations in CCG policy that we cannot easily equate into one optimum outcome or standard, so how do we go about moving the many into the one?
The amendment would add a requirement that, in drawing up the initial constitution CCGs, which of course should be aware of the issues, make a start on place-based approaches, but there is an important job to do on harmonisation at the outset, and that is important for patients and the public. It will be contentious. We can all imagine the outrage if something that is offered in one CCG but not another is then removed from everyone in the process of forming an ICB. These are possible changes that we will see over the next 12 to 18 months, and they will be a real test of how responsive and engaged ICBs are in their local communities. We may indeed see people holding banners with ICBs on them if things are not handled well.
In the amendment, we say that the process of harmonisation or variation should be arrived at only after proper consultation. That fits in with the duty, which we have talked about already, on harmonisation, public involvement and consultation. It also highlights a gap in the specification for the job of producing the initial constitution for each ICB, which is given to the relevant CCG. As I have pointed out, it is very much up to them to decide who they consider it appropriate to consult. We want a much stronger and clearer commitment to consultation on changes that might affect patient care on the face of the Bill.
Edward Argar
As ever, I am grateful to the shadow Minister for tabling the amendment in order to air this issue in Committee. I fear that I may have to disappoint him once again; it seems I am getting into a habit, although perhaps at some point I will suddenly surprise him.
We agree that it is right that there is appropriate consultation when making decisions about commissioning policies and care. The shadow Minister set out very clearly, as he always does, some of the reasons for that. I hope that I can give him some reassurance that the Bill already provides for much of what he is seeking in terms of outcomes. In clause 19, new section 14Z44 of the National Health Service Act 2006 already places a duty on integrated care boards to involve and consult the public in respect of the planning of commissioning arrangements, including on any planned changes. That would include, for example, plans by an ICB to change the range of health services available to the public or the manner in which they are delivered. This will ensure that the voices of residents, patients and those who access care and support, as well as their carers and representatives, are properly embedded in ICB decision making.
Schedule 2, which concerns the constitutions of integrated care boards, states that ICB constitutions must specify how the ICB plans to exercise its functions, including the duty to involve and consult the public. ICB constitutions must, moreover, specify the arrangements that the ICB will make to ensure transparency in that decision making. NHS England will ensure that they are appropriate and include the relevant provisions.
Under clause 13, and new section 14Z25 of the National Health Service Act 2006, NHS England will need to approve the constitution and make an establishment order for the ICB. In that respect, new section 14Z26 goes on to make it clear that NHS England can reject a proposed constitution if it is inappropriate. I hope that that offers some reassurance to the shadow Minister, and helps underline our commitment to ICBs being as transparent and as involving of patients and the public as possible. I encourage him not to press his amendment.
Justin Madders
In light of what the Minister has said, we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Karin Smyth
I will speak mainly to amendments 31 and 50. The case for an elected chair of an ICB is very strong. As my hon. Friend said, if we accept the need for an elected police and fire commissioner, why not for health? The amounts of money we are talking about and the influence on people’s daily life dwarf those even of my local council. That is what people on the boards will be responsible for. Social care is still provided through a democratically accountable local authority, so why not healthcare?
We are moving towards the NHS budget overall accounting for up to 40% of general Government spend—that is what we are looking at for the next few years. It seems to go against the grain of everything else—elected Mayors, devolution and so on—for Conservative Members to allow that quantity of Government funding from the taxpayer to be out in communities without any kind of more local democratic control. There would also be a lot more confidence that the days of crony contracts favouring friends, families and donors had been well and truly left behind were there independent heads of the ICBs. I do not know if the Secretary of State has as many close friends as the last one, but letting him make the appointments is not something that Conservative Members will want to defend.
We should therefore be electing a local health commissioner. The amendment reasonably allows a two-year period for the organisations to get established—they have enough to do at the moment—but it would then start to take away some of the problems that the Government will get into with their proposals for the integrated care board chairs. On the make-up of the boards, too, the Bill is a good opportunity, should they wish to take it, for the Government to move away from the terrible scenarios of the past few years in particular. That argument was made cogently this morning by the Minister himself, in terms of NHS England having non-executive directors, people of independence and so on as part of its board, and it can well and truly be made about these new local bodies.
We do not need to go back to the 1990s, when trusts were first invented. Friends and families were put on to those bodies, which were stuffed with worthies, with business people favoured over local people with strong links to the community. Surely we can learn from the past 20-odd years and from the past couple of years in particular. Place is central to what the Government are trying to achieve and is the general policy direction of the Minister’s Department and many others, so it has to mean something and it has to be accountable.
We will come later to some of my amendments on a good governance commission, for which I hope to gain Government support; on having fit and proper tests for people to be scrutinised as suitable to come on to the boards; and, without wanting to throw back to the past, on bringing people in from the community to make the ICBs reflect their local community. In all seriousness, in our sad political situation, most ICBs will be headed up not by people are particularly sympathetic to Labour, so this is not a partisan point. It is, as the Minister started to say about NHS England itself this morning, about having people with the right qualifications—some clinical, some not. Let us have some clear criteria for how we want the boards to be governed and the sorts of people we want on them.
As I said earlier, the Government have got themselves into a real mess with accountability and with how much work the Secretary of State is doing, given how much is put on his desk—this sort of circular NHS accountability thing—so the amendments are trying to offer the Government a way through that follows their general policy direction. That was raised by NHS Providers in its written evidence
“to make crystal clear the relationship between trusts and ICBs, and how the statutory accountabilities of trusts, foundation trusts and ICBs align. There also needs to be clarity within the legislation on how the roles and responsibilities of the current NHS England and NHS Improvement…regions, ICBs, ICPs, trusts, foundation trusts, health and wellbeing boards…places, provider collaboratives, neighbourhoods and primary care networks…will all fit together.”
We would all like to understand how that works, even those of us who follow such things.
I am not suggesting that an all-powerful elected chair will get that, but at least that skilled person bringing together the multiplicity of organisations, groups and people for the local community would be a figurehead who needs to understand and grapple with the issues. The chairs would need to be trusted and highly skilled. In that way, there can be further accountability back up the national system, either through NHS England or the Minister. Let us take all that away from the Secretary of State’s desk—he is going to be a terribly busy man over the next few years. Let us help him out.
The Government should support this and similar amendments to try to bring local accountability much more to the fore. That, in turn, would allow local people, who are expected to spend huge quantities of their taxes on health—increasingly so over the next few years—to be very clear about what the money funds, what they get for their money and how they can hold people accountable.
Edward Argar
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston, said that his amendments would give me two years to work through this, if necessary. I am grateful for his confidence in my longevity in this post—only time will tell.
I am grateful for the opportunity to address amendments 31, 50, 51 and 52, which were tabled by the shadow Minister. I fear that I may not surprise him on this set of amendments. Under the Bill as drafted, the chair of the integrated care board will be appointed by NHS England, as he and other Members have highlighted. It is therefore rather disingenuous to suggest that friends and cronies will be appointed. This is an NHS England appointment, with approval from the Secretary of State. I am not quite sure what is being suggested about those at NHS England, but I suspect it is rather unfair.
The chair will be appointed by NHS England, with approval from the Secretary of State. That reflects the fact that the ICB is accountable to NHS England and, through it, to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, this House. That goes to the heart of the comments made by the hon. Member for Bristol South on the balance to be struck between having local flexibility and accountability, and recognising that this is a national health service and the way in which it has evolved. The accountability mechanisms are also national to reflect that.
In answer to the hon. Lady’s questioning, the chief executive of the NHS, Amanda Pritchard, said very clearly of the ICBs:
“In the proposed future structure, they would be accountable to a combined NHS England and NHS Improvement structure. At the moment, we operate that through seven regions, and then through to the national NHSEI executive. We are, in turn, accountable to Parliament.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 20, Q21.]
Amanda Pritchard was very clear that it is the integrated care board that carries that national statutory responsibility on behalf of the NHS, hence why we have structured the accountability requirements as we have.
That chain of accountability has been at the heart of the NHS since its inception. There is a difference, which I know all Members recognise, between the DNA—for want of a better way of putting it—of social care provision, which has evolved through the link to local authorities, and the NHS, which has a more vertical, national structure. That goes to the heart of the different DNA of those two complementary—vitally complementary—parts of the system. We have to remember that history.
That is reflected in the clear belief, which is shared across both sides of the House, that in various ways the Secretary of State is ultimately accountable to this House and, through that, to the public for the performance of the NHS. It is therefore only right that once NHS England has made the appointment, the Secretary of State, who is ultimately accountable, should give final approval for the appointment of the chair. It is an important role in the ICB, as I am sure all Members would agree, and it is right and proper that the Secretary of State ensures that the appointment is appropriate. That is why, I fear, we cannot accept amendment 50, which would remove that mechanism.
At this point, it might be helpful to address the shadow Minister’s point about councillors. We need to draw a distinction between their role on ICPs and on ICBs. ICBs are the NHS accountable body for the spending of public money. As is already the case, the NHS is clear that it does not approve of dual accountability, so when someone is directly accountable for the spending of NHS money, they are required to have that as their role and to not have multiple roles. That applies to the chair and the chief exec, as is consistent with current practice. I discussed that at some length with the chief executive of the NHS when she was chief operating officer. Quite rightly, given my background and the shadow Minister’s, I sought her guidance and that is the conclusion we reached.
Amendment 31 suggests that the chair of the ICB should be appointed via local elections. That brings in a new element to the accountability relationship, which, again, could give rise to the perception of conflicting accountability routes, given that the genesis of how the NHS is currently structured has been as a national health service. The amendment risks introducing a degree of tension into that relationship. Given the importance, as the hon. Member for Bristol South rightly said, of having the right, highly skilled and able people in all these roles, it is appropriate that the mechanism we propose seeks to balance local knowledge and national accountability.
The shadow Minister or perhaps the hon. Member for Bristol South—forgive me if it was—asked what happens if there is discord within an ICB or challenges to the authority, capacity or capability of an individual chair. Essentially, we come down to the constitution of the ICB. Paragraph 8 of schedule 2 sets out how that would work, and NHS England will be producing guidance. Ultimately, NHS England will have the power to remove a chair should issues arise that necessitate that, but there will be further guidance on how that would work and what thresholds there might be.
The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston raised an important point: what is the mechanism in the hopefully unlikely event that that should occur? Chairs are subject to normal recruitment processes, and NHS England’s approach to appointments has been to work with the existing ICSs, including both NHS providers and local authorities, to ensure that the chairs appointed are high quality, credible and have the confidence of their local systems. Similarly, to ensure democratic involvement, ICBs have strong duties in relation to public and patient involvement, and local authorities must appoint, by right, a representative to the ICB.
Before I turn to amendments 51 and 52, the hon. Gentleman raised some challenge about the design document, its status and whether it appeared to prejudge the House’s deliberations. I want to reassure him: the key word in terms of that document is that it is in “draft” form—it is not formalised, and it is not the final document, because he is right. However, it does allows the non-statutory ICSs to be given a degree of guidance to continue their evolution, rather than all work stopping while we deliberate. Should the House pass the legislation that means ICSs become statutory, that document would have greater force. However, we are not seeking to pre-empt or pre-judge the will of the House. In fact, even with that caveat, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that we did not publish the document in draft until after Second Reading. That recognised again that we wanted the House to have a say on the principles before we even published documents in draft form and that we are cognisant of the need to show respect to the House’s democratic processes.
Amendment 51 would mandate that NHS England consult with the board before appointing a chair, and amendment 52 would require the chair to consult with both the board and the integrated care partnership before appointing a chief executive. We fully accept the importance of both the chair and the chief executive having credibility among system leaders and the population they serve. That is why NHS England is working closely with local authorities, NHS bodies and others in the appointment process.
The Bill, at its heart—again, we will come to the question of balance—aims to strip out needless bureaucracy by removing processes that we believe add little in terms of ensuring high-quality or safe care and that could get in the way of collaborative, smooth decision making. The amendment to formally require consultation on the appointment of the chief executive would create an unnecessary formal requirement, as well as potentially duplicative work, given that we would anticipate this happening informally anyway, and having due regard to that.
We believe that the approach taken in the Bill ensures both patients and the public have a strong voice on ICBs while also ensuring that the accountability arrangements set out by the chief executive in her oral evidence are maintained upwards as well, to the House and the Secretary of State. I therefore ask the shadow Minister to consider not pressing all his amendments to a vote.
Dr Whitford
I, too, rise to support the amendment. This is probably one of the most important amendments so far. In the witness discussion, we came back time and again to which voices would be on the ICB and would be able to influence. I agree that, with all the talk of parity of esteem, it seems incredible that there would not be a voice representing the importance of mental health on the board. Similarly, with the talk of moving to population health and wellbeing, there is a need for directors of public health to agree policy and to feed in information about the underlying health inequalities, life expectancy and so on in the local population. Not to have a social care voice when what the Government say is that they are trying to integrate the NHS with social care seems quite bizarre.
The NHS and social care are both services delivered by people for people and having both the workforce and staff voice, and the patient voice, is therefore important. On the staff voice, the “Learning from Scotland’s NHS” report from the Nuffield Trust highlights that the success of both the Scottish patient safety programme and the Scottish quality improvement standards was driven by the fact that frontline staff were involved as drivers, champions and developers from the word go. These programmes have been able to run over years, building on experience that is then shared with other sectors and specialities. It is important to get this part of the Bill right, or else priority will not be given to integration, population health or wellbeing. Of all the things that have been discussed so far in Committee, and through the witness statements, this amendment is one of the most important.
Edward Argar
This is an important amendment because it goes to the heart of the debate we have been having about permissive versus prescriptive, and where the appropriate balance is. I suspect we slightly disagree on that—perhaps a little less than one might suppose—but I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, for bringing this amendment forward. It gives us the opportunity to start getting into that permissive versus prescriptive debate. At the outset he raised the recent announcement by the Prime Minister about integration; it will not surprise him when I say that I believe this creates the foundations of that integration, on which we can continue to build in the coming years.
In respect of the specifics of the amendment, schedule 2 sets out minimum membership of the integrated care board. That is the key element here. It will need to include members nominated by trusts, foundation trusts, persons who provide primary medical services in the ICB area and local authorities. As we heard in the witness sessions, this is very much de minimis—it is not what will happen; it is the baseline, above which each system can go if it wishes to reflect local needs and priorities. We have heard the quote from Dame Gill Morgan about how she is approaching it, but we have also heard from Richard Murray of the King’s Fund, who said:
“You could easily criticise the degree of permissiveness; you could criticise the degree of direction in there. The question should be, ‘Can anyone come up with a better one?’ We have not been able to do so, so I think it is a balance well drawn.”––[Official Report, Health and Social Care Public Bill Committee, 09 September 2021; c. 127, Q173.]
I appreciate that shadow Ministers may take a different view because they feel they have come up with a better balance. However, I highlight that evidence before I go into my answer.
Dr Whitford
Obviously, Dame Gill Morgan is quoted as saying that no one could evenly remotely think of setting up an ICS without primary care voices—and these other voices. Are all interim ICSs that have developed so far following the same model as she is? Is this totally intuitive, and therefore to be relied on, or should it actually be laid down? The voices listed in this amendment are central.
Edward Argar
The hon. Lady and I have spoken about “Learning from Scotland’s NHS” before; as she will know, we are not dogmatic and are always happy to learn from Scotland’s NHS—as, I am sure, it is happy to learn from England’s NHS. That is to the benefit of everyone, and I am very grateful to her for inviting me on Second Reading to come and visit Scotland and see it on the ground, which I hope to do.
The reality is that the ICSs at the moment, on a non-statutory footing, are at different stages of development, different stages of evolution and reflect different approaches. One of the things we are seeking to do here is to put a non-restrictive degree of prescription around this—if that is possible—to get a degree of consistency, but not to be too prescriptive.
Dame Gill Morgan leads one of the more developed ICSs. I do not think what she is saying would be unrepresentative of the attitudes and approaches adopted by ICSs more broadly. I should say ICBs, as the hon. Member for Bristol South rightly highlighted the importance of reflecting careful use of the terminology in the evidence sessions—she caught my eye, and I have corrected myself now. I think we strike the appropriate balance here, and I suspect we will see ICBs going further in their membership, but that flexibility is able to reflect local circumstances.
Edward Timpson
I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Minister could assist the Committee with a question on the evidence given by Louise Patten from the ICS Network, who said that, on top of the five mandated board positions in the Bill,
“a further five will be in the mandated guidance from NHS England.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 9 September 2021; c. 134, Q186.]
Is that something that the Minister has been sighted on? If so, do we know what those positions are? I fear that the hon. Member for Nottingham North might have to start to move to a substitutes bench to get enough people around the table, based on his amendment.
Edward Argar
I am pleased that I do not see any signs of the hon. Member for Nottingham North moving to the substitutes bench any time soon. However, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. I do not want to pre-empt the detail of the guidance, but, as Louise Patten said, the whole purpose of this is to provide the ability to further supplement what is on the face of the legislation with guidance that the ICBs will have regard to.
Justin Madders
Perhaps the Minister can help me. When I read the guidance, I understood that it meant that there would be at least 10 individuals on any ICB. Does the Minister think that is the correct number?
Edward Argar
The key focus for this amendment is what the legislation sets out in this clause, and that is the five positions—that is what we want to specify on the face of the legislation. I will come to the detailed guidance, but first I will go through a few of the remarks from the hon. Member for Nottingham North in support of his amendment.
At the heart of the issue is our desire for the provisions of the Bill not to be too prescriptive regarding the membership requirement, beyond that proposed statutory minimum. The guidance is a different matter from what is in the actual legislation; we want the statute to specify that de minimis. We believe that it gives the right approach and balance, having key voices and local flexibility to add voices—including those the hon. Member has proposed, but others as well—and that it reflects the evidence given by Martin Marshall, who said that the boards have to be kept to a workable size to be able to make decisions effectively. Again, that is permissive.
I come back to the point that local ICBs can appoint more members, should they wish to do so. They can go significantly beyond the legislative minimum requirements if they so choose. Therefore, we do not believe that prescribing further membership is necessary. Of course, schedule 2 states that ICBs will need to publish details of their membership in their constitutions. Under clause 13, proposed new section 14Z25 of the National Health Service Act 2006, NHS England will need to approve the constitution proposed by each ICB. Again, we come back to that approval process.
Justin Madders
Of course, the evidence from the Gloucestershire ICS was that of course those individuals—some of whom are included in our amendment—would be on the ICB. From our perspective, it is clear that all the individuals we have named are critical players in any local health system. Could the Minister set out which of those included in our list, if any, he does not think would be appropriate to sit on an ICB?
Edward Argar
I think that all add value, but equally, in some circumstances, we see different local arrangements; in some localities, some people fulfil more than one role or sit in different places.
The hon. Gentleman asked me to cover his specific point about the guidance before I conclude: the guidance will not prescribe additional roles in the same way that legislation prescribes or mandates, but it does seek to set out best practice, highlighting what would be deemed to be best practice—drawing on experiences such as Dame Gill’s, I suspect. We would expect that ICBs would pay due heed to that guidance, alongside their de minimis legal and statutory obligations.
If in time, when those ICBs are up and running, it becomes clear that that approach needs strengthening and that we need to add further requirements, regulation-making powers in schedule 2 will allow the Secretary of State to do so at a later point. We believe that it is right to start at this de minimis point in the Bill. It reflects our view, which I have articulated throughout, that we must not attempt to over-legislate at this stage on the composition of ICBs, letting them evolve as effective local entities, to reflect local needs. It may not fully reassure the hon. Gentleman, but there is a mechanism whereby further changes could be made in future, although we do not believe that will be necessary.
The amendment takes a different approach, which is essentially more prescriptive and less permissive. I do not dispute the sincerity of that approach, but it comes down to a matter of where we feel the appropriate balance should be struck. I fear that, although the shadow Minister and I are quite close to one another in our region of the east midlands, we are slightly more distant in respect of the amendment, but I am grateful to him for affording the Committee the ability to debate a key point of principle in the approach to the Bill.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire for her contribution and for sponsoring our amendment. She spoke about the way staff have not only improved patient safety and the quality improvement programmes, but made them stand the test of time. We are sometimes in danger—the Bill is a good example—of building things that do not stand the test of time and keep being changed, and she went through all the various situations. If we pass any test, it should be that one. The amendment is certainly one way of improving our chances on that.
I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, too. I understand the de minimis point, but I still cannot envisage a scenario in which we would not want a mental health rep on the board. I live in undoubtedly the best place in England—in Nottingham—but we still have mental health problems and need mental health leaders. If we need mental health reps, and we certainly do, I think that everybody probably does.
The Minister’s response did not quite address the point about balance. The balance of the five members is four NHS and one non-NHS. The whole business maxim is no mergers, only takeovers. If the provision is really about integration and partners coming together on an equal footing to improve the population’s health, everything that we have heard so far does not fit with that. What we have heard so far is about organising this round with the terms of reference that NHS England wants, and if local communities and local authorities wish to be part of that and know their role within it, that is absolutely fine. I think we should aspire to do better, so I will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dr Whitford
Although this was described as an evolutionary piece of legislation that would not involve a lot of upheaval for the NHS, it actually does. It is a significant piece of legislation, but it represents a missed opportunity to go back to a unified public NHS with integrated care bodies as the main structure. They are responsible for spending billions of pounds of public money, but the system will still be a transactional one based on a purchaser-provider split and tariffs. We will talk further about how can inhibit development.
If we are to have a purchaser-provider split, we have to have a split. We cannot get away from the conflict of interest inherent in having private providers who seek contracts to deliver care sitting on the very board that makes those decisions, or on the partnership board that will develop the strategy. That is a conflict of interest. It should be resolved, and the amendment should be supported.
Edward Argar
With your indulgence, Ms Elliott, I will turn to amendment 33 first. Integrated care boards will be NHS bodies, whose membership consists, at a minimum, of individuals appointed by NHS providers, providers of GP services and local authorities that coincide with the ICB. Any perceived risk of privatisation through the ICB membership provisions is, I believe, entirely unfounded—and, I feel bound to add, potentially unfair to the many public servants in the NHS who work for ICBs. Although service provision—I emphasise the word “provision”—by the independent and voluntary sectors has been, and continues to be, an important and valuable feature of this country’s healthcare system under successive Governments of all political complexions, it was never the intention for independent providers, as corporate entities, to sit on integrated care boards, nor for an individual to be appointed there to be a representative of such an interest in any capacity.
People must therefore be assured that the work of integrated care boards is driven by health outcomes, not by profits, and I am sure that there will be a consensus on that principle across this Committee. That is why there are already safeguards in place to ensure that the interests of the public and the NHS are always put first. The ICB chair has the power to veto members of the board if they are unsuitable, and NHSE has the power to issue guidance to ICBs in relation to appointments as part of its general guidance-making power. That sits alongside the robust requirements on ICBs to manage conflicts of interests, and NHSE’s wider duty to issue guidance to ICBs.
I turn to amendment 30, which seeks to exclude individuals whose GP practice holds an alternative provider medical services contract from being made a member of an ICB. APMS contractors include some private and third-sector organisations, but also some GP partnerships. These contractors include, for example, social enterprises and partnerships that provide services to homeless people and asylum seekers. This amendment would potentially prevent some individuals from being on ICBs, on the basis of the type of NHS GP contract that their practice holds.
I do appreciate the intent behind the amendments, namely the desire to avoid the appearance, and potentially even the risk, of privatisation and conflicts of interest. However, the effect would be to limit the ability of primary medical service providers to appoint an ICB member who might best meet the requirements of the local population, by reducing the diversity of GPs who could be appointed. While I can understand the intent behind them, I fear that these amendments do not do what they seek to do, and they would have unintended consequences. I will turn to those shortly.
We recognise that the involvement of the private sector, in all its forms, in ICBs is a matter of significant concern to Members in the House, and we are keen to put the point beyond doubt. However, having taken appropriate advice, I am afraid that that these amendments would not cover a number of scenarios—for example, lobbyists for private providers, or those with a strong ideological commitment to the private sector—and they would therefore not be watertight
As it stands, these amendments may well not offer the robust assurance that perhaps hon. Members intended. Therefore—this is where I may surprise the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston—to put this matter beyond doubt, we propose to bring forward a Government amendment on Report to protect the independence of ICBs by preventing individuals with significant interests in private healthcare from sitting on them.
As hon. Members will know from their attempts to draft these amendments, avoiding unintended consequences is not a simple matter. If appropriate, I would be happy to engage with either the hon. Member for Nottingham North or the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston in advance of Report. We may not reach a consensus, but, as they both know, I am always happy to have a conversation with them.
The Government are firmly committed to the founding principles of the NHS. We recognise the importance of its values, and the public service ethos that animates it. It is by no means our intention to allow private sector providers to influence, or to make, decisions on spending on the commissioning board—the ICB—and the spending of public money. The Bill does not allow that, but we will look to see whether we can find a way to put that unfounded fear to bed once and for all with an appropriately worded amendment that does not have unintended consequences.
Although I appreciate that much the same motive underpins amendment 27, it is worth considering why the integrated care board and the integrated care partnership are different bodies. The decision to create integrated care partnerships came from discussions with a number of stakeholders who revealed a strong case for the creation of a committee to consider strategically not only the health needs but the broader social care and public health needs of a population. It is not a body like the ICP, as we have heard, which will be directly accountable for the spending of NHS monies.
We therefore do not intend to specify membership for the ICP in the Bill, as we want local areas to be able to appoint members as they think appropriate. To support that, we have recently been working with NHS England and the Local Government Association to publish an ICP engagement document setting out the role of integrated care partnerships and supporting local authorities, integrated care boards and other key stakeholders to consider what arrangements might work best in their areas.
We would expect members of the ICP to be drawn from a very wide variety of sources and backgrounds, including the health and wellbeing boards within the system; partner organisations with an interest in health and care, such as Healthwatch; and potentially voluntary and independent sector partners and social care providers at that level, as well as organisations with wider interests in local priorities, such as housing providers.
To exclude independent providers from both the ICB and the ICP would, I fear, risk severely reducing the extent to which all parts of the broader health and care ecosystem could be drawn upon in the ICP context. It would exclude valuable expertise and would, for example, prevent social care providers who provide a small amount of domiciliary care to the NHS from sitting on the ICP. Furthermore, the ICP will not make commissioning decisions or enter into contractual arrangements that are binding, or make decisions about who gets funding allocations. Those are functions conferred on the ICB, hence the distinction that I make.
I therefore believe that membership of individuals from independent providers on the ICP does not present a conflict of interest in the way that hon. Members have asserted, certainly in the context of the ICB. I suspect that we may debate that further in the coming weeks, but taken with the ICB and the comments that I have made, we believe that this provides the right balance between recognising the distinctive accountabilities and responsibilities of the NHS, local authorities and other partners, and strongly encouraging areas to go further in developing joint working.
I hope that what I have said provides some reassurance to Opposition Members, and that they will be willing—I see them nodding—to engage with me to see whether we might find a greater degree of consensus. I should also say that I will obviously speak to the Scottish National party spokesperson on this as well, as I have done throughout. I addressed my remarks to the shadow Minister, but of course I extend that offer to her. I hope that on that basis, the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman will consider withdrawing the amendment.
Alex Norris
If the Bill is about collaboration, we ought to model that here. Given that very gracious offer, I am very happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Covid-19 Vaccine Damage Bill
Edward Argar Excerpts(3 years, 2 months ago)
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Sir Christopher Chope
That is exactly my point and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for summarising it so succinctly and accurately. That is where the Government come into this. Unfortunately, I know that the Minister will not have much time, if any, in which to expand on this issue today. I hope that he will be willing to arrange for me to be able to come along with one or two colleagues to talk to Ministers about this very important issues.
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
I hope I can give my hon. Friend the reassurance that I, or perhaps more appropriately the relevant Minister, will be happy to meet him to discuss this legislation.
Sir Christopher Chope
I am most grateful for that. There is some doubt as to who the relevant Minister is. When I put down questions on this subject, I am told that it is the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions to deal with the vaccine damage Act. From that Department I have received information about the number of applications that have been made up until the middle of July. Up until 23 June, there had been 154 applications—obviously, there are many, many more now—but there are only four people in that Department dealing with all vaccine damage applications, so no decisions have been made and there is no indication as to when any decisions will be forthcoming.
Kettering General Hospital
Edward Argar Excerpts(3 years, 2 months ago)
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The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) for his speech. It is almost two years to the hour since I was appointed by the Prime Minister to this job, having just by a few days beaten your record in doing this job, Madam Deputy Speaker. He was one of the first colleagues in this House to raise an issue with me, so it is appropriate that he is raising this with me again today. I join him in paying tribute to all at his local hospital for the work they have done in the past year and a half, and for the work they continue to do and have done before the pandemic for his constituents and many others. Equally, I join him in paying tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), whose constituents are also served by this hospital, and of my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), who, sadly, cannot be here today but who has been equally vociferous in campaigning on behalf of his constituents.
Before I turn to the main points that my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering raised, I will answer his fifth question now. He is right to say that I am probably overdue another visit to Kettering. Although in a private capacity I passed through it recently, that is as nothing compared with visiting with him, as the local Member of Parliament. So I am happy to see whether we can find a date to do that, as it would be a pleasure. He is, of course, nothing if not constant and courteously persistent on behalf of his constituents. He rightly highlighted the context of this: the challenges faced by the accident and emergency department at Kettering, with it being congested and facing increasing demand from development in the area, and with the pressures it is feeling. He also highlighted that the solution, or the best way forward for his constituents and for this hospital, is not just the urgent treatment hub that he secured the £46 million-worth of funding for, but for us to look at this hospital in the round to see what needs to be done more broadly in the services and infrastructure available there to meet the changing needs of his constituents and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Wellingborough and for Corby.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering for rightly highlighting the track record of investment in Kettering under this Government: the write-off of £167 million-worth of debt; the £350 million allocated, with £25 million to £30 million for HIP2; and the £46 million investment in the urgent treatment centre. He should be proud that his campaigning helped secure that for his constituents. He touched on a key element of this: given the subsequent allocation of the £350 million-worth, there are benefits to be had from understanding the project as a whole, rather than simply looking at one thing as one pot and one as another. This is in no way a criticism of Her Majesty’s Treasury or of any other Department, as I would never dream of doing such a thing, but often in government individual pots of money and individual projects are looked at as exactly that, rather than taking a step back and looking at the synergistic opportunities that could be achieved by looking at things as a whole.
I turn now to my hon. Friend’s specific questions, which I am sure he would wish me to answer. I will do so in order not to run out of time and then I will perhaps say a little more. He asked about the ability to combine the £46 million with the £350 million, and the flexibility to do that. He will know that he and I, and my officials, have had conversations with his hospital trust’s chief executive, Simon Weldon—I join my hon. Friend in paying tribute to him for the work he does. We wrote to him on 16 June to confirm that the urgent care hub and the HIP2 scheme would be able to be brought together as part of the wider development at the Kettering General Hospital site. The urgent care hub and the new hospital that is to be built share, as my hon. Friend said, a common set of enabling works that are being factored into the new hospital development. So I hope that gives some reassurance on his first and second questions as to whether the two could be brought together as a single project. As I said, we wrote to the hospital chief executive on 16 June. There is the opportunity to use that provision, rather than purely for the urgent treatment hub, as the enabling works are part of a broader scheme. I know that conversations continue about the mechanics of that, but in principle it appears a sensible approach.
Mr Hollobone
I thank the Minister for those encouraging remarks, May I draw his attention to the good work being done by Natalie Forrest in the national hospital rebuilding programme? She has developed a good relationship with Kettering General Hospital, and has been extremely supportive in getting the hospital rebuild delivered.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. This is a challenging programme, and each of the 40 hospitals and their respective representative Members of Parliament argue their case hard, as do their chief executives. He is right to highlight the work of Natalie Forrest, the senior responsible officer for this project, in managing expectations and working collaboratively and openly with hospital trusts—including that of my hon. Friend—to try to achieve the right outcome for the taxpayer and the Exchequer, and for his constituents and others around the country.
Mr Bone
I know this looks like a constituency debate, but is it not actually a litmus test for the new policy? The announcement of £36 billion and a new tax to be put into the health service is great, if we get the outcomes right. As I consider how to vote on Tuesday, it would be helpful if I knew that this programme had been agreed for Kettering General Hospital.
Edward Argar
My hon. Friend tempts me to stray not only into the territory of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor but, possibly even more dangerously, into the territory of my right hon. Friend the Government Chief Whip. As ever, he makes his point courteously but firmly.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kettering posed two remaining questions. If there are delays in the profiling of other projects, would we be willing to consider whether there was an opportunity to move unspent money in a financial year to Kettering, or to other projects that could move ahead? I have spoken with Natalie Forrest, and we are keen to have that flexibility. He asked about a request for further money—this refers to my hon. Friend’s third question, and is the one area where I will have slightly to defer to ongoing discussions and the spending review. As he will appreciate, although £3.7 billion has already been allocated, the overall programme will be more than that across the 40 hospitals. That is subject to the spending review, and as he will appreciate, the Treasury sets annual caps on how much can be drawn down in order to manage public expenditure. To answer my hon. Friend’s fourth question, that is where, if we have an underspend against allocations in year, we will have in mind those projects that are ready and willing to go a bit faster if they are able. I take his representations in that respect as a request for his hospital to be considered in that category.
In the few minutes before you call me to order at the end of the sitting, Madam Deputy Speaker, let me return briefly to the ongoing conversation with Simon Weldon and the hospital trust. As a result of the letter we sent and the willingness to be flexible about using the money for enabling works more broadly to maximise benefits from a synergistic scheme, the urgent care hub will now be part of that first stage, obviously utilising the expertise of the hospital trust to see how the money can be spent most effectively .
In conclusion, I once again pay a fulsome tribute to my hon. Friend and his work to support the redevelopment of Kettering General Hospital. As I suspect his constituents know—certainly his election results demonstrate they do—they are extremely lucky to have such a persistent, hardworking and passionate Member of Parliament representing them in this place, as indeed are the residents of Wellingborough and Corby. At times my hon. Friends perhaps leave a few scars on the backs of Ministers on behalf of their constituents, but that is what this House and our representative democracy are here for.
I am delighted we have managed to make progress in addressing the alignment of the urgent care hub and new hospital programme funding streams. I look forward to continuing to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering to ensure that this ambitious and innovative approach to building new hospitals—a common national approach—is a success, not only in Kettering but across the country. I particularly look forward to visiting my hon. Friend in Kettering, and perhaps in another two years we can hold a debate to celebrate the scheme’s significant progress on the ground.
Question put and agreed to.
Health and Care Bill (Third sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsThursday 9th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
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The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
Q
To both of you, do you think that now is the right time? I know that Chand has answered that, but this second part might apply to him: if it is not, when is the right time?
Sara Gorton: We were strong opponents of the 2012 legislation, so, in our view, the right time to do this would have been to not put that legislation through. However, we have been waiting for this batch of changes for some time. It has been evident, from 2013-14, and certainly since the “Five Year Forward View” was published, that what we were doing was having a structural workaround with people tacitly agreeing to almost ignore legislation. That is just not acceptable in the system.
Certainly, for my members who have been moved into new arm’s length bodies, moved around those bodies, and are now subject to another change, they want the security of knowing who is going to be employing them this time next year. In our view, the changes, both to the competition and procurement regime, and to clarifying how the new bodies will operate and what powers they will have, cannot wait. There are lots of other aspects that, as you can see from our briefing, we suggest could wait for future debate.
Dr Chaand Nagpaul: I want to be clear: we do not support the status quo. There is a pressing need to repeal much of the 2012 Act. However, I cannot overestimate how much the pandemic has affected us. We have not been able to be engaged, so it has to be asked: why do we need the Bill at this moment in time, when we are all absolutely overwhelmed? We know that any reorganisation of the health service means that people get distracted from their core work. The process of reorganisation takes human resource time. We have not been able to engage with this as we should, so we do not think that this is the right time.
The right time would be decided by two factors: first, when we are through the worst of what we are going through at the moment, and secondly, when the legitimate concerns we have are addressed, and there are the amendments that we would like to see. This Bill can shape the future of our health service. Get the right Bill, at the right time.
Edward Argar
Q
Dr Chaand Nagpaul: I am afraid I will have to let you know later, as I do not, off the top of my head, know exactly what those Bills contained.
Edward Argar
Q
Dr Chaand Nagpaul: First, the rules at the moment do not factor in that the NHS provides, in addition to the service, a complete, full body of care for patients. The same money would go on a hip replacement in the private sector. Secondly, there is the training element that I mentioned earlier. Thirdly, no acute NHS trust can walk away after two years—it is there to provide care to its population—but Serco was able to walk away after two years. We have many examples of private companies that have ended their GP contracts. Serco left an out-of-hours contract in Cornwall; that does not happen in the NHS. My local hospital has been there for as long as I can remember—it cannot walk away. The NHS provides accountability and duty, but more importantly, it is actually cost-effective. The staff have national terms and conditions; they provide huge amounts of good will and work above their contracts. It just makes sense to be resourcing our NHS.
Every time you take a contract away from the NHS, it is defunding the local system. We want taxpayers’ money to bolster an NHS that is co-ordinated, because we also want changes in the legislative requirements for foundation trusts and other NHS bodies to collaborate.
Edward Argar
Q
Sara Gorton: What the legislation sets out is a proposal for system working. Therefore, having something that disrupts that system is potentially counterproductive. I strongly support putting the NHS first—the NHS default—into the provider selection regime that is listed in clause 68.
Justin Madders
On a point of order, Mrs Murray. On the Minister’s question to the BMA witness about previous Acts that the BMA may have endorsed, that would clearly be out of scope as evidence. I would not want Dr Nagpaul to waste time researching an answer that the Committee could not take into account.
Edward Argar
Further to that point of order, Mrs Murray. Would it help if I set out the context in which I believe that question relates directly to the content of the Bill? Much of what is discussed in the Bill relates to previous legislation that has grown up over time; understanding which pieces of legislation the BMA supports will help us to better understand the evidence it has put forward on this legislation, and its context.
The Chair
Mr Madders, I think that the Minister has taken on board your point of order and paid attention to it. Thank you, Minister.
As there are no further questions, because we are out of time, I thank our witnesses very much for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Martin Marshall, Pat Cullen and Professor Helen Stokes-Lampard gave evidence.
Edward Argar
Q
Welcome and thank you very much for your evidence this morning and your frank answers to the questions posed. I want to ask a question in the context of what a number of you have raised about the different voices and the extent to which they need to be represented at the different decision-making levels of the new structure. We heard from previous witnesses, for example in the context of public health voices also, about the value that they add. The principle behind this legislation is that it is permissive rather than prescriptive. Therefore it is possible to have a lot more voices; there is only a de minimis level specified as prescribed. What is your view as to whether the appropriate balance between permissive and prescriptive has been struck in the Bill? If you think it has not been, where do you think the balance between permissive and prescriptive has been missed? Shall we start with Pat and then work our way along?
Pat Cullen: I have said very clearly that I believe the nurse needs to be represented at the board, and that needs to be an executive director of nursing. That needs to be prescriptive; it is not good enough to have it placed within mandatory guidance, it needs to be within the Bill. That is a red line for our nurses, and it will remain a red line, and we will be putting it forward as a red line.
Professor Helen Stokes-Lampard: I am going to be slightly subtler with what I say about this. I think the legislation, as drafted at the moment, is very enabling, and the implementation of it is where the great improvement in how we deliver care will come. I do think it is permissive, and I do think that it is enabling, and I completely understand my colleague’s desire to include specific words relating to nurses, GPs and whoever. What is vital for me is that the clinical voice is loud, clear, and can be influential. That is about implementation, culture and behaviour at a local level. Once we have the words for the final legislation, it is a question of how on earth we deliver it and support people to do it well, and how we learn from the best practice that is out there. That would be my—and our—view.
Professor Martin Marshall: In my 30 years as a GP, I cannot think of a single piece of legislation that has directly changed my practice on the ground. What I can see is the extent that legislation sets a tone and a culture within which clinical care is provided. I think this Bill is appropriately permissive, but, given the variation in all the challenges that we have identified, it needs to be permissive with really good oversight to ensure that the consequences of implementation do not lead to dramatic variation across the country.
Edward Argar
Q
Going back to Pat’s evidence, but also to all of you: we have heard in our evidence today, and we heard it on Tuesday, a lot of different, vital parts of the system arguing the case for why they should be represented in a prescriptive way. Equally, we will have others arguing that a committee beyond a certain size becomes less effective. In terms of numbers, we have set a minimum. You are entirely entitled to say that you do not have a view on this, but how would you see the balance being struck between different groups making the case for representation, but, equally, having an effectively sized decision-making body? We will start with Martin, and then work backwards.
Professor Martin Marshall: I am glad to say that I do not have a view, but I do think that the boards should be small in order to be effective. They need to listen to advisory groups and sub-boards below them; it is the structures below the board level that will really make the difference.
Professor Helen Stokes-Lampard: Formally, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges does not have a view. Personally, I have chaired boards from as few as five people, through to boards of 70 people, all of which can be hugely effective if managed well. However, the larger the board gets, the tighter the management has to be, because it is harder to get voices heard and for everyone to feel represented. Essentially, I am saying the same as Martin: smaller boards are generally more effective at getting through the agenda, but there has to be a high degree of trust in those that are actually on the board, and strong lines to sub-groups, for them to function with maximum effectiveness.
Pat Cullen: The board needs to comprise the right people. It is not about numbers; it needs to have the right people with clinical focus and patient care driving the outcomes for patients, and it needs to make sure that it does not develop a financially focused agenda. As director of nursing I have been there too many times: the table loses focus on the patient’s voice and needs. There needs to be a clinical focus and the right people at the table.
The Chair
Thank you very much. As there are no further questions, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will meet again at 2 o’clock this afternoon to take further evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Maggie Throup.)
Health and Care Bill (Fourth sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsThursday 9th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Health and Care Act 2022 View all Health and Care Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 9 September 2021 - (9 Sep 2021)
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
Q
Nigel Edwards: I think we have shared our anxieties about the reconfiguration and direction powers. In terms of what this does to the organisational architecture, it seems to me to strike the right balance between permissive and directive.
Nick Timmins: I would echo that. I have major reservations about the new powers of direction and, I think, major reservations if you build in reconfiguration service changes. The good thing about this—it has been the good thing about the development of the integrated care system so far—is that it is quite flexible. That is unusual in the NHS’s history: we tend to come up with very prescriptive solutions for what the system should look like everywhere, when in practice the circumstances are different, so I think the balance is pretty good.
Richard Murray: You could easily criticise the degree of permissiveness; you could criticise the degree of direction in there. The question should be, “Can anyone come up with a better one?” We have not been able to do so, so I think it is a balance well drawn. Of course, a lot will then rest on the behaviours that are shown after the Bill is through—whether people live up to that kind of core belief around that permissiveness and the freedoms that have been given.
The Chair
We have time to squeeze in one very quick one, if anyone has something else to ask.
Alex Norris
Q
Louise Patten: It is both/and.
Edward Argar
Q
Dame Gill Morgan: Yes, I think you have got the balance, and that is the joy of working with a Bill team. I think the balance is right. You have tried not to be prescriptive and tie our hands, but you have been clear in the sense of setting a direction and focus that we will all take into account, so you do not have to tell us things to make the NHS do it. We do it because we pick up the runes.
On the issues that we would be more concerned about, I personally am concerned about the ability of the Secretary of State to call in changes. In part that is because the one thing I think the NHS has learnt in the time that I was out and came back is how to do relatively good consultations. We have just finished a massive consultation. Patients have gone with us. The local communities have gone with us, mostly. We have had citizens juries and all sorts of things to reach a consensus about the direction of travel. The worst thing in the world would be that people say, “There is no point in engaging in those mechanisms locally because, at the end of the day, we will just complain to the Secretary of State and it will not happen.” If that becomes the way people manage that part of the Bill, it will take us backwards, not forwards, in terms of proper citizen engagement.
Louise Patten: On balance, it is about the Secretary of State’s powers of reconfiguration, and NHS leaders in general are concerned about that. It is not so much about the Secretary of State having an early understanding of the reconfigurations or the intent, but about the fact that that decision could be taken at a point where all the evidence is not ready to be properly considered.
Building on Gill’s point, patients and the public would be very frustrated if they felt that they had not had an opportunity to be answered, so we are asking, if not for the clause to be removed, for at least the clinical case for change to be considered from the ICB. Coming back to clinical decisions about clinical services, we want that accountability to local communities, not just up to Whitehall, and some transparency about why the decision was made, and on what basis and information it was taken.
Edward Argar
Q
Dame Gill Morgan: I think you are absolutely right: de minimis. What I have argued throughout is that if the centre, if you and then NHS England, which issues guidance, are clear about the principle that we have a proper engagement mechanism with our local authorities and citizens, they need to ask us how we are doing that, and to ensure that our constitution meets that. There are plenty of checks to ensure that it happens without you telling us that we have to have this, this and this.
In our case, we will have mental health and social care around the table, not because we are told to but because we could not imagine how we could do our work at a local level without having those people feeling that they are full partners and sitting around the table. There is a set of concerns about having local government involved in making decisions about the expenditure of large amounts of NHS money. I do not care; they are the local people who need to be involved in the decision making. Actually, if they see the deliberations and challenge first hand we will get better-aligned budgets. At the end of the day, that is to everybody’s benefit.
Louise Patten: There are already five mandated board positions in the legislation. A further five will be in the mandated guidance from NHS England. We are up to 10 already. I think the most important thing here is: where do you stop? There is a risk that there is a perception of two tiers—that those who have a mandated position on the board are of more importance than others. That flies in the face of partnership working.
Edward Argar
Q
Dame Gill Morgan: My view is that we are where we are and we need to progress. Going backwards would be a problem, but actually I am a bit more positive than that. Covid has demonstrated to people that if they think innovatively, out of the box and in partnership ways they can get solutions that are quicker than they would have been before, so in the system as a whole there is a recognition that partnership has offered more. We will all retrench as the world moves on from where we are, but there is real learning from covid on which we can capitalise. Many systems have done reviews of what worked and why, looking for the silver linings in that learning. I think the Bill goes with the analyses that have come out.
Louise Patten: At the NHS Confederation, we have that sort of umbrella view. We must not forget that, on collaboration and integration, people have been working to this for some time. There are some great examples of it, and this legislation moves that opportunity to really accelerate it. People recognise that it is a tight timescale, but they are absolutely committed to doing it.
Justin Madders
Q
Andy Bell: This is incredibly difficult. We have some very ambitious plans now—the NHS long-term plan ambitions for mental health. There is, quite rightly, an awful lot of money going into that, because we have a very big gap in our ability to meet people’s needs. The only way that is going to succeed is if we have a very significant expansion in the mental health workforce.
We need to remember that that workforce is not just what people think it is. It is obviously nursing and obviously psychiatry, but it is also social work—a lot of really important mental health provision is in local government under social care. We need to think about the importance of advocacy and the importance of peer support, the importance of employment and housing rights workers, who we know make a big difference to people’s lives. There is also the key role of the voluntary sector in providing forms of support that may not come under traditional clinical headings, but none the less make a huge impact in people’s lives. We need to build the workforce.
The Bill gives some steps forward and summary assurances. In some ways, it is not quite the right place to be dealing with this. This is about whether the various parts of the system—the health education system, the NHS itself and its partners in local government—have the resources and the right ways to encourage people to come and work in mental health. It would be great to see the kind of recruitment campaigns we have had for the NHS as a whole to really help bridge that very big gap in the mental health workforce. At the moment, I think the Bill is probably neutral on it. It would be good to see some stronger assurances, at the very least holding the Secretary of State to account for how they are achieving the workforce ambitions set out in the long-term plan and future policies that will have to come.
Edward Argar
Q
Building on what you have already said about the legislation, what would you identify as the opportunities of the legislation, if properly implemented or interpreted in the right way, for furthering that linkage and that joined-up mental health provision? Obviously, that goes beyond local council services and the NHS. There are a whole wraparound series of services that impact on someone’s mental health. What do you see as the opportunities in the legislation that we either need to draw out further or at least not lose sight of?
Andy Bell: This is about building real, sustainable, long-term partnerships. One of the things I know colleagues in the NHS and local government find very frustrating is that they just find a way of working with each other and then the legislation changes again and they have to start all over, so it is about having a system that actually works and stays working, that builds on the best of what is there already. I think there is some frustration in places where they spent a long time building relationships between clinical commissioning groups and local authority colleagues, sometimes with jointly employed staff, and now they have to start all over again because we are moving to a different thing. That will be immensely frustrating for many folk.
If we take the principle that this is about integrating care and equal partnerships between different players, including the voluntary and community sector, and if we give that time to work, we will enable partnerships to form with a clear voice for people—for example, in the case of mental health, for people living with mental health difficulties—so that decisions are being made with and in partnership with the people who use them rather than remotely by professional experts on their own.
Collaboration is incredibly important too. One thing we really welcome about the Bill is that it is moving us away from a system of competing providers to providers working collaboratively—literally, in providing collaboratives. There is a slight risk that all the power will be vested in one organisation and there will not be that check and balance between commissioner and provider. But some of the early provider collaboratives working in children’s mental health services that we have looked at have made really huge strides really quickly to reduce, for example, the number of children forced to go to hospital outside their local area in a mental health crisis. They have come together, looked at what support is needed for children in a crisis and put community services, in particular, in place to achieve that.
One further thing that will be important is that there is some positive provision in the Bill to ensure that ICBs—I think it is ICBs, yes, it is—have to take into account inequalities in access and outcomes. That is great, but there is not that requirement to pay attention to inequalities in health and to go out and identify which groups of people are experiencing health inequalities and what the system can do to deal with that upstream rather than waiting for people to need formal healthcare. That would be the other part that would really help in the Bill—to build on some of the positive noises and moves in the right direction in collaborating at the level of prevention and on the things that determine our health as well as in the provision of services when things have reached a point where people need care.
Edward Argar
Q
Ed Hammond: Broadly speaking, yes, that is fair. My central point would be that those structures and the opportunity that local government has through this Bill for more direct and active involvement in health and care decision making are good, but there still needs to be that separate independent source of accountability that we feel sits properly at a local level with democratically elected local councillors who have powers through health scrutiny committees to talk to local people about their needs. That needs to be there and needs to be strengthened. In respect of the Secretary of State powers I was talking about, my worry would be that we would see ICBs and ICPs looking over their shoulder at what the Secretary of State might want to do rather than looking down to local communities to understand where local need lies, with decision making being led somewhat by what people think national priorities should be.
Part of the solution to that problem is the things we have proposed around, for example, requiring the Secretary of State to consult with local scrutiny committees before exercising those powers, having the powers for local scrutiny committees formally to escalate things to the Secretary of State to act on, and what we have suggested for more effective joint scrutiny by multiple councils of the ICB at system level as well. Those are all part of that strength and accountability framework. It is about saying, “Okay, we have involved local government in decision making through the ICPs and through continuing the health and wellbeing process, but in doing so we also have to enhance and build on our existing health scrutiny arrangements.” As things stand, the Bill removes elements of those by removing the power of referral. It is about having a balance of accountability arrangements and ensuring that that strong external accountability continues.
The Chair
We had better leave it there. We are out of time. I thank you, Andy and Ed, for your evidence today.
Examination of Witness
Sir Robert Francis QC gave evidence.
Alex Norris
Q
We will move on to something else that you said in your written evidence. On Tuesday, we had a very good conversation about data, but the whole thing was about quantitative data. In your written evidence, you talk about qualitative data, and it is very easy for us, as Members of Parliament, to conceive of the importance of that, as it is something that we routinely draw on. With your insight from leading Healthwatch, how can we develop systems that properly trap that, use that and prioritise that just as much as the quantitative data?
Sir Robert Francis: Technically, these days, that is no problem at all. You will not expect me to explain that to you, but the qualitative data—comments from the friends and family test, or similar things—is easily mined these days. You can develop a view of the sentiment that comes through it, and you can then dig down more closely into specifics if you need to. That information is extremely valuable to Healthwatch in determining what people think about a particular subject or services, and we feel that there should be a recognition that that data, in that form, should be capable of being shared with a statutory body like Healthwatch, and possibly others.
We also think that—I am sure others might agree—while quantitative data is extremely important, it is informed by qualitative data. The personal impact—good or bad—of things that happen in the service are best described by the people who have received that service. If you just look at figures—I am afraid that this was a problem at Mid Staffs—you lose a great deal, and the trigger for change and improvement is lost.
Edward Argar
Q
We sought with this Bill to be permissive rather than prescriptive; behaviours, and how things work on the ground, are often as, if not more, important than the framework. Notwithstanding your on-the-record comments about Healthwatch participation in ICB levels as a formal member, what else would you draw out as opportunities within the framework to build on patient participation and accountability to those who pay for, and use, the service? Are there other opportunities, that, with a small tweak either in guidance or in the Bill, we could seize more effectively?
Sir Robert Francis: I suspect that there is something around reporting, particularly with the oversight of quality, inequalities and matters of that nature, which would be of assistance. I agree that flexibility of engagement is really important, and Healthwatch claims no monopoly over this. I see it taking place in guidance. If the emphasis is to change culture to one where the service is being responsive to people’s needs, as opposed to providing them with what the service thinks they need, there could be greater emphasis in the Bill on ensuring there is a strategic plan for engagement. There could be more emphasis on how the ICS is going to engage with local people and communities, and an actual requirement that it provides comprehensible information to the community about how people should be able to communicate with it. I know they sound like matters of detail, but if there is an obligation to make such things clear, it does not prevent flexibility, but it does oblige organisations to actually do it—and mean it. There will be lots of other ideas, I am sure.
Edward Argar
Q
Sir Robert Francis: In relation to a decision of whether information should be capable of being used in legal proceedings, there is no better qualified person than a High Court judge—so, absolutely. My advocating that there should be some qualification in relation to the family does not mean, in any way, that I suggest they should then be able to use that for litigation or other purposes. Indeed, some of the conditions you might impose on them in order for them to get the information are that they do not do those sort of things. There will be areas where it can be said that it is too sensitive for that. Of course, there may need to be a balancing of people’s rights of privacy. It is really about ensuring that families feel that they are not being excluded or that something is being hidden from them. We need to build trust. I do not think that that decision needs to be taken by a High Court judge, because it is not about legal proceedings; it is about something really quite private.
The Chair
Thank you, Sir Robert.
Examination of Witnesses
Stephen Chandler and Gerry Nosowska gave evidence.
Jo Churchill
Q
Gerry Nosowska: Prevention is always undermined by the resources moving into urgent and acute needs. In practice, social workers are not able to do therapeutic, restorative support work that they would be able to if they had the time to spend with people who need that. There is a fundamental resource issue that the Bill does not address directly, but it may help with the potential for pooling resources. Again, people in the community do not care whether it is a health or social care resource. If there is a need emerging that can be responded to, and preventive work can be done, it should happen without health and social care arguing about exactly whose purse it comes out of.
There are some really successful examples of reablement and preventing avoidable hospital admissions. We know it is possible. Scarcity does breed competition rather than collaboration, so that is something to think about. As for what the Bill might also do, the partnership strategy ought to have a very strong preventive element to it, and that needs to be dug down into locally—into particular communities, neighbourhoods and streets. That is where you really need lived experiences. I have a question about the regard that the integrated care board would have to that, and the potential for a wonderful, collaborative partnership strategy around prevention to be disregarded because of an acute need. I was listening to Robert Francis, and I think his suggestion that there be a written explanation to a local community if that happens is very good.
Edward Argar
Q
I will turn to Stephen first and then to Gerry. We have sought to be permissive rather than prescriptive in this Bill. Have we struck broadly the right balance, or are there areas where it might need to be tweaked, either in legislation or in guidance?
Stephen Chandler: Your director colleague was absolutely right. I think that you have got the balance right in relation to permissiveness. I worry that the guidance does not prescribe directly how we should develop that culture, but having worked as long as I have, I realise that you cannot prescribe how relationships are formed and how cultures work. You have to create the conditions for success. Some of those conditions are in the Bill. I have talked about some of them in relation to the pooling, the boards and the assurance methodology. What has to be absolutely clear—and I am hearing it clearly, so it is not that I have not heard it—is the importance of seeing this as a vehicle for meaningful change to people’s lives, not a restructuring of health and social care. Rather, this is a vehicle for improving the lives of people in communities and systems, and for allowing health and social care professionals to maximise their individual abilities for that collective good. In a way, there is a duty on me as a leader in the system to create that culture and environment.
You have not gone into the area of assurance, but for me it is really important that when assurance looks at a system, it looks at the leadership and how that leadership translates the freedom, the permissiveness, but also the accountability, clearly. The feedback I am hearing from our members is, “We favour the permissive approach that is taken in this.” We would not say that the tolerance should be changed one way or the other.
Edward Argar
Gerry?
Gerry Nosowska: Apologies, I think I lost my connection for a moment, so I might repeat some of the things that Stephen said. On the balance between permissive and rigid, we have an interest in the consistency of opportunity and outcomes for members of the population. Areas face different challenges, so it is important that locally there is flexibility around how those challenges are met. What will hold those models together are the principles of ensuring transparency around decision making; the involvement of lived experience and clinical expertise in both social care and health; and real local accountability. Certainly, more local community decision making, planning and work, and less centralisation, is much more in tune with responding to the lived needs of people and their day-to-day priorities.
The Chair
May I thank our witnesses for their evidence? That brings today’s oral evidence sessions to a close. The Committee will meet again on Tuesday in Committee Room 14, with Mr Peter Bone in the Chair.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Maggie Throup.)
Health and Care Bill (First sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsTuesday 7th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Health and Care Act 2022 View all Health and Care Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 September 2021 - (7 Sep 2021)
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
Q
Dr Navina Evans: I will start with the opportunities. We in HEE are really pleased to see that workforce is prioritised in the way that it has been. For us, that means that there is an expectation and an understanding of the need to tackle complex issues of future workforce planning, and that is hugely important. We can do it; it is a difficult task, but through collaboration and bringing people together, it is something that we simply must do, so that we can have more and different, and we can be really future-focused and progressive in the way that we deliver health and care. It is all down to our workforce. So that is the huge opportunity, as we see it.
There are risks. For us, one risk is that too much bureaucracy and added layers of hoops will get in the way, and the other risk is that we have to work hard to make sure that we address culture and collaboration to make this truly successful.
Danny Mortimer: The opportunity, we believe—along with colleagues across the health service—is in clause 33, going further and deeper there in terms of the assessment of need, as well as an assessment or a description of process. Clearly, what legislation cannot do is set out the kinds of behaviours that make that a well-informed and inclusive process. To reassure the Committee, though, what I do see is that the way of working we experienced during the development of this Bill, the way of working we are experiencing with Dr Evans in terms of the process she is leading at the moment—the long-term framework—is inclusive. It is trying to bring different voices in. Difficult decisions may well need to be made about prioritisation, and we understand that, but that is much easier to do and much easier to understand if it is based in that kind of process and behaviour. However, clearly, that is one of the risks.
As I have already said, we have had an increasingly centralised healthcare system over these last few years, and that is also one of the risks. If we stifle the local leadership and local innovation, and if we do not seek that local input in terms of how the development of local services needs to inform, in particular, the long-term planning for workforce, then that is a real risk for the legislation.
Edward Argar
Q
Dr Navina Evans: We in HEE think this is absolutely the right time to be doing this. We are at a moment where we have a lot of learning from what we have been through this last year. We have a real opportunity where many different pieces around innovation and improvement are coming together, and we have learned a lot from our previous experience of delivering the Health and Care Bill. For us, we think that this is absolutely the right moment to be doing this work.
Danny Mortimer: We would agree. NHS Confederation members were clear about the need for this approach before the pandemic, and I think that is even more pressing because of the pandemic. Actually, given the announcements that the Prime Minister is expected to make later today, it reinforces that need to better integrate health and social care, so the timing is very good.
The Chair
Thank you, Minister. As there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will now move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Amanda Pritchard and Mark Cubbon gave evidence.
The Chair
Before I call the Minister, I remind Members that there will be a hard stop at 11.25 am. If witnesses could keep their answers as brief as possible, it would be much appreciated.
Edward Argar
Q
If I recall correctly, your predecessor, now Lord Stevens, says that about 85% of provisions in the Bill were things that the NHS asked for in its 2019 consultation. Do you recognise that figure, and how would you characterise the approach that has been adopted to the development of the Bill?
Amanda Pritchard: Thank you. I would struggle to give an exact percentage, but the Bill certainly contains widely supported proposals for integrated care. We have been working very closely with our stakeholders, colleagues across the system, you and others to ensure, as far as possible, the same approach to consultation, listening and hearing. You cannot please everybody all the time, but we want to reflect what feels genuinely like a consensus view about what will best help the NHS deliver on all the challenges we have discussed. That is reflected in the Bill, so thank you for that. As it goes through Parliament, we very much want to continue to see that spirit of joint working, consensus building and engagement, so that when it hopefully becomes legislation in April ’22, it lands with all the support that I think it currently has.
Edward Argar
Q
Amanda Pritchard: As I said, I genuinely think that our experience across covid has strengthened the argument for moving to legislation now, because our way of working in the past two years has been characterised by integration and partnership, and that is how the NHS and partners need and want to work—now and as we head into next year, facing that set of challenges that people are so very committed to continuing to tackle together. Yes, Minister, I think this is an important Bill. The integration agenda is not the whole answer, but it is an important component of it, and the sooner it comes, the better.
Edward Argar
Q
Mark Cubbon: All I would say is that collaboration and partnership work is a key feature of our response to covid. It is ever more critical, in the light of the question of how we will approach our recovery. Fantastic working has been enabled locally through necessity; now, we hear from the whole service that we want to build on that. We look forward to the future with that in mind; the Bill allows us to do that.
The Chair
As there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning sitting. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in this room to take further evidence.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Maggie Throup.)
Health and Care Bill (Second sitting)
Edward Argar ExcerptsTuesday 7th September 2021
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Health and Care Act 2022 View all Health and Care Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 September 2021 - (7 Sep 2021)
Karin Smyth
Q
Simon Madden: Forgive me, but I will take full advantage of the fact that I was not there and have not seen the statement that the Prime Minister made. A feature of our plans set out in the data strategy—not so much in terms of the Bill itself—is for each integrated care system to have a basic shared care record, so that throughout their whole health and care journey a patient or citizen does not have to do simple things like repeat test results or repeat their prescriptions, and so that their care journey between health and social care, with provisions for safeguarding and safeguarding information, is seamless.
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
I will ask a couple of questions, if I may, Mr McCabe, and then perhaps the hon. Member for Nottingham North can come back in if we have time. Moving away from what has been explored by colleagues so far on the extremely important protections around data sharing and data use, can you set out how the changes set out in the Bill relate to and will help you deliver the data strategy that you have in place?
Simon Madden: It is important to set out that these provisions alone, while they do much within the Bill, must be seen in the context of that wider data strategy. They support our ambitions, and the integration and collaboration that is described in the Bill will be a huge enabler for the ambitions set out in the strategy itself.
The provisions themselves focus to some extent on tidying things up and providing a degree of clarification. I mentioned the provisions for clarifying NHS Digital powers: currently, there is sometimes confusion around what data NHS Digital can share and in what circumstances it can share it. Sometimes, that leads to problems when data may need to be shared for very good reasons—for justifiable reasons—but NHS Digital is sometimes not convinced that it has the legal power to be able to share the data. This puts beyond doubt its ability to share data appropriately.
Another provision is on information standards. We are making a provision in the Bill to mandate standards for the storage and collection of data. That is important to ensure that data can flow between different IT systems and organisational boundaries in the health and care system. That will then help individual patients and improve health outcomes. We want to ensure that providers of health and care services purchase only technology that adheres to that set of standards, so that we have that interoperability, and those improved outcomes for patients, through that mandation of information standards.
We have also put in clauses around sharing anonymous health and care information, which help to essentially set a duty to share anonymous information when it is legally permitted to do so. One of the lessons that we have learned over the pandemic has been that, although it is perfectly permissible for data to be shared—it is legally permissible to do so—the shift from “can” to “should” has a great impact within the system.
Our invoking of the control of patient information regulations under existing legislation, to enable that sharing of data and to say, “You should share data in these circumstances,” has significantly helped the free flow of data safely and securely within the health system. That has had an impact on patient care. I think that the duty to share anonymous data will help to put on a more permanent footing some of those provisions that we have seen during the pandemic.
Edward Argar
Q
Simon Madden: I think it is a fair reflection, to a certain degree. I think that the thing that we must always be conscious of, particularly in the field of data and technology, is that we see advances but legislation often does not keep up with those advances. It is about ensuring that everyone understands their responsibilities—not just that the public understands the responsibilities of organisations that are safeguarding data, but that those organisations themselves have the right powers to be able to share data safely and securely. I think it is evolutionary in that sense, but it is also about making sure that the provisions in the Bill are keeping pace with the development of technology and how data is used in the real, modern world.
Alex Norris
Q
Simon Madden: I should perhaps caveat my previous comments by saying that they very much are, in our mind; it is all about health data. The focal point for us at the moment, which we are working through with Ministers, is the formulation of the final version of the data strategy. Of course, the legislative provisions are within the data strategy. It is very much the case that the publication of that document, I think, is the right moment for that reset where we have more intensified engagement with the public and we really step up the narrative around how health data is used. As one of your colleagues said, the real detail comes in regulations, if there are any regulations around that; and of course there would need to be consultation before the regulations were put in place.
Justin Madders
Q
Matthew Taylor: Yes, unfortunately that is our understanding, and we think that it would be a retrograde step. It is not a power that I would want if I were a Secretary of State and I wanted to focus on strategic policy questions. I would not have advised the Secretary of State to want those powers.
Our view would be that we should remove the extension of the Secretary of State’s power entirely, but, failing that, we should put some guard rails on in relation to hearing the views of local health overview and scrutiny committees, getting local clinical advice on what is best and having a public interest test that should be passed. If those guard rails were in place, we could cope with this.
What we do not want is a chilling effect on the capacity of local leaders to make the decisions that they need to make to use their resources effectively. The third element of the triple mandate is the effective use of resources, and that involves making decisions at a whole variety of levels around how you configure services. If you feel you are going to go through that process and potentially engage local populations in difficult conversations, and then at the end of the day a local MP, for whatever reason, is going to kibosh that by appealing to the Secretary of State, why would you embark on the process in the first place? That is why, while we are very supportive of the Bill, as you have heard from both Saffron and me, we do think that the powers of reconfiguration are the Achilles heel. I appeal to you to recognise that that is unnecessary and goes against the spirit of the Bill.
Saffron Cordery: I wholeheartedly support what Matthew says, and it speaks to a point I made earlier about adding to existing structures in a way that really is not necessary. I notice that you have representatives from the Local Government Association as witnesses later on. I am pretty sure that they will have some strong views about what these measures do for the powers of local health overview and scrutiny committees, because they already have the power to refer to the Secretary of State should they need that to happen. The powers that are currently in place are a really effective way of doing it. People getting something past a local health overview and scrutiny committee is a really important hurdle for any service change. It is already well respected, well used and very effective. This is one of those elements that at best is redundant and at worst is going to create a lot of work and a lot of unnecessary tension and friction where we already have challenge.
Edward Argar
Q
Saffron Cordery: As we see a change in the system, obviously the nature of how we have procured services in the past does have to change. It is obviously a complex area, but one of the things that we really need to look at is the effectiveness of the current contracting regime, which for certain parts of the provider sector in particular is incredibly burdensome. If you sit in a mental health or a community trust, you are subject to a whole host of retendering, which can have a potentially far-reaching impact on your trust’s sustainability or the future operation of key services. For many bits of the system, that will be very important.
The procurement regime is fundamental. It underpins how this will operate. We need to make sure that the elements of fairness are upheld and that it does not disproportionately put a burden on any one part of the system in particular.
Edward Argar
Matthew?
Matthew Taylor: I agree with that. It is important to remember that one of the goals of the Bill is to reduce the weight of bureaucracy in the system. If we can reduce the weight of bureaucracy as it applies to procurement, that is only a good thing.
Edward Argar
Q
Matthew Taylor: Of course, one of the most challenging questions in all parts of central Government is to get that balance right. The one point that I want to make is about the nature of system leadership. If you lead an organisation—I lead an organisation—the parameters of what you do are reasonably well defined and you lead that organisation as best you can, and you can be regulated as an organisation in relation to its objectives. The thing about system leadership is that it involves developing a concrete and specific account of how you want to add value in a particular local circumstance—how is it that, working as a system, you will make a difference?
By looking towards population health and engaging local people, that proposition will vary from place to place. It is important that, when we look at how systems work, we allow them to develop a value proposition that is specific to their local circumstances and their local needs. That is why, for example, we would be very resistant to any kind of Ofsted inspection regime for systems, because systems are not the same as hospitals or as schools; they are very different and their aspirations will be very different.
When you look at the Bill, the reality of central-local relations is that rules are set out in legislation, but then there is the custom and practice of how Departments and other bodies actually work. Sadly and inevitably, the drift of custom and practice tends to be towards centralisation. That is why it is important to avoid things in the Bill that create an opening—this is why we can have our concerns about reconfiguration—which can get ever wider and thus undermine the key principles that lie at the heart of the Bill. So we are happy with the intentions of the Bill, but we are worried that there are certain elements of it and certain elements that might be involved in the operationalising of it that could undermine its intentions.
Edward Argar
Thank you. Saffron?
Saffron Cordery: I go back to a point that I made earlier in this session, which is that this balance between permissiveness and prescriptiveness is critical. The August 2019 agreement, when all the stakeholders came together to look at how we might legislate for an integrated care system that got that balance right, I think is there. You have to remember that what sits around a set of proposals will have a massive impact on it, so the Secretary of State’s powers as we have seen them, and the operating environment overall, will have an impact on how these proposals will be implemented, and how effectively they will be implemented.
We cannot forget covid in this. We cannot forget the extreme financial pressures that we are seeing. We cannot forget demand. We cannot forget an incredibly tired workforce. That is not going to change any time soon; that is going to be for the next few years, so we are implementing something against that backdrop. But if we go back to the slightly lighter touch of the August 2019 proposals, we will probably get to a place that would hit the spot, as it were. I reiterate that we support collaboration in systems and the direction of travel.
The Chair
Given the time, we will leave it there. I thank our witnesses, Saffron Cordery and Matthew Taylor.
Examination of Witnesses
Ian Trenholm and Keith Conradi gave evidence.
Edward Argar
Q
You will have heard in the evidence just before, Mr Trenholm, the comments by Matthew Taylor about the difference between assessing a system versus a provision. How do you see how the CQC would square that circle, because he highlighted the very different approaches and his reservations about some of that? How do you see that issue being resolved, or what would you like to see in that space?
Ian Trenholm: If I compare one large hospital with another large hospital as a comparison in terms of what we do now, one would argue that they are quite different enterprises, differently run and serving different communities. There are some common themes, but equally there are some differences. We built a methodology that was able to be applied to both of those very separate entities and to provide a common rating at the end of it.
I would see a version of that at a system level: there would be things that we would want to see that would be common and necessary— decent quality governance, for example—as well as a lot of things that many of you were raising as questions and concerns. But equally we want to see some evidence that the partnership board was cognisant of its local community and it was genuinely delivering a suite of services that its local community genuinely wanted and that was consistent with the needs of that community.
Over the next 18 months or so, we will be building our methodology in collaboration with the people who are also building the ICS boards and frameworks. I am hopeful that we can get to a point where we have a methodology that gives you, as parliamentarians, and local people the assurance that things are working well locally. However, it is not just about what is not working, but about looking for really good practice and looking to accelerate that. Previous people have made the point that doing things differently often leads to good practice and innovation, so how can we help accelerate that innovation through the work that we do. That is broadly how I see it working.
Edward Argar
Q
Keith Conradi: Absolutely.
Edward Argar
Q
Keith Conradi: I certainly think so. My previous experience in aviation is that we had a similar space, and only the High Court could overturn or order disclosure. It was used on a handful of occasions, and it produced very interesting debate. The balancing test—testing whether the benefits of the disclosure outweighed the adverse reaction that there might be to future investigations—was well argued in each of the cases. I think that is the appropriate place to do it.
Edward Argar
Q
Ian Trenholm: We do work at the moment in terms of registering and regulating individual providers, and we do that right across the country, so we have a picture of health and social care right across England. Part of the Bill will give us enhanced powers looking at the way in which individual systems and individual ICSs work. Our view is, if you like, a broad and moderately shallow view, whereas I think Keith’s team do more in the way of specific investigations. I am sure Keith can talk to that.
Keith Conradi: I would characterise the relationship as a healthy tension. We make very few recommendations to the CQC, but the vast majority of recommendations we make will, we hope, have an impact on the work that is going on across the system. The ideal people to have a look and see whether that is having an effect will be the CQC, from time to time, as it comes across things that have changed as a result of what we have done. I think the relationship works very well, in that respect.
Edward Argar
Q
Back in the day, I served as a councillor and cabinet member for public health, adult social care and health, and worked very closely with my then local PCT, which probably shows you my vintage. One of the things that I found was that the structures were important, but the relationships and how it worked on the ground, and the ability to be flexible and build up the trust between the two organisations was more effective in getting better outcomes. We have heard from previous witnesses about the importance of local flexibility to adapt to local work arrangements and conditions. Do you think we are striking the right balance between being permissive in allowing that flexibility and not being too prescriptive, or do we need to go a little more in a different direction?
Professor Maggie Rae: In my experience, with the way that the ICS has been set up, we very much hope that we will not start from scratch again, because those organisations have been working on this agenda for quite some time. I think there would be cries of horror if we said, “We are going to throw out the work you’ve already done.” Many of them have been on this journey for a while, and the leaders in those systems have indeed made some good progress. I think it is a delicate balance.
I will not repeat the points I have already made about strengthening the links to public health and making sure that is not forgotten. We will have 600 public health people going back into the NHS, but we very specifically have not changed the legislation that put directors of public health in England into local government. Of course, directors of public health in the three devolved nations are currently in the NHS. If you do not give people flexibility, you run the risk of your system not working. If we ensure that the framework and assurance process are right, the legislation takes us part of the way, but we want some checks and balances in relation to those freedoms, to make sure that there is a basic minimum standard across the country. If you have an ICS that is not working with its local authority, that is not a level where the ICS should be signed off. The ICS should be asked to go and demonstrate the commitment that the flexibility has allowed them. There is a statement in the framework that was released a couple of months ago, which said that the directors of public health will have an official role on both boards. I found that a pretty good statement to have, but it is only a statement that is effective if there is some assurance that that can be delivered on, and there need to be some checks and balances in order to make sure that those kinds of things are not ignored. Because of the variety—some ICSs cater for 2 million or 3 million people, and some for 1 million—you need the flexibility. If you want them to own and deal with the problems of their population, having a little bit of flexibility is the right approach, provided that the minimum standards are met across the whole country.
Edward Argar
Q
Cllr James Jamieson: From a legislative perspective, largely yes. I reiterate the point that I have made a couple of times already: the statutory and non-statutory guidelines will be critical in this area. We need to get them right and ensure that there is real embedded consultation. There are a couple of things that we are concerned about. I have not mentioned them yet, so I will use this opportunity to do so. One is the increase in the powers of the Secretary of State to call in NHS reconfiguration proposals and so forth, and the risk that that would undermine the existing local government influence, overview and scrutiny, so we would ask for a change to schedule 6 of the Bill in order to ensure that there is consultation at a local level before those powers are enacted.
The second area—it is probably not what you are asking about, but it is important that we raise it—is assurance around social care. It is good to have assurance around social care, but we need to make sure that that assurance is proportionate and is in context. Bearing in mind how stretched social care is from a financial perspective, it would be unreasonable to expect social care to do more than its budget allows it to do. In the same way, social care is also very dependent on the performance of the NHS, community care and so forth. We have some concerns around that assurance framework, which needs some work.
Edward Argar
Thank you, both. Mr McCabe, I am conscious of time and our programme motion, so I will pause there.
The Chair
Thank you, Minister. I thank both our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Eluned Morgan, Lyn Summers and Mari Williams gave evidence.
Alex Norris
Q
Eluned Morgan: This is in relation to nursing. We have a law on safe staffing levels in nursing. Not only has it been implemented, but it has been extended since we brought in that Bill. It is something that the Royal College of Nursing is hugely appreciative of, and something that we are keeping an eye on. It has made a difference to patient safety, and we in the Welsh Government take it very seriously.
Edward Argar
Q
I want to pick up on something that colleagues have touched on and which you have highlighted around the model of integration in Wales—the unitary model, for want of a better way of putting it. I acknowledge that you said it was early days, but I would like to get a sense of how you feel that model is delivering a national system but allowing local flexibility, and of the extent to which it is delivering, even in its early days, improved health outcomes for patients in Wales. As we look at ICSs and closer working between local authorities and the NHS in England, it may be instructive for us to learn from your experience, even if it is not a direct parallel, and from what you are seeing, even in these early days.
Eluned Morgan: We had a parliamentary review that looked at our NHS and care system, and went into a lot of detail about what we could change. A lot of it was about the need to integrate—[Inaudible.] What we have done as a result is take an interim step towards better integration. We not only set up the legislative framework for that, but put significant funding into driving these health and care systems to work together. We had an integrated care fund and a transformation fund. We found that both the health service and the care service really liked the new approach. They really have engaged. We have kind of allowed a thousand flowers to bloom here, and there have been some really innovative ideas and work. How do we get people out of hospital quicker? How do we drive that change? There have been some great examples.
What we are still struggling with, if I am honest, is that we are still finding difficulty getting both the health service and the care service to understand that what they have changed and what works well now needs to be mainstreamed. There cannot be additional funding forever. The purpose of that additional funding was to give the confidence to do it in the mainstream. We are finding that they have pocketed that money, saying, “This is great. Can we have more, please?” We have tried to make it clear to them that that was never the idea. The idea was for them to have that transformation funding to drive change.
That is our next challenge, and that is what we are working on now, but there are ways of doing that. Clearly, this is a difficult time to be doing it, but some health boards are frankly being driven into closer working relationships, because there are so many examples of delayed transfer of care given the infrastructure at the local government level. Do not forget that in Wales we have not seen anything like the cuts that have happened in England, but even we are feeling the pressure in quite a significant way, and we are having some real issues in relation to recruitment to the care workforce in particular. That is the biggest challenge for us at the moment.
Edward Argar
Q
Eluned Morgan: It has been quite interesting. With care, for example, we have found that a lot of competition was going, such as between the independent care providers and the local authority—they were poaching from each other. All of that was damaging to the public purse and to the provision that we could give. Now we are in the process of developing an all-Wales framework within which people who want to provide care in Wales will work. That is what we are working on—a new legislative framework that will provide the infrastructure and give the minimal standards that they will have to meet. It is also making sure that we are driving quality through the system.
Edward Argar
Q
Eluned Morgan: What is difficult is that we started this process pre-pandemic but, clearly, with the pandemic we are in a very different situation. It is difficult to say what the model would look like in normal times, because we have had 18 months of something very different. It is hard for us to assess that evidence in the light of our circumstances at the moment, if I am honest.
The Chair
No one else? As there are no further questions, I thank you, Minister Morgan, and your officials for the evidence that you have provided today.
Eluned Morgan: Diolch yn fawr.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Maggie Throup.)
Integrated Care Systems
Edward Argar Excerpts(3 years, 4 months ago)
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The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
Earlier this year, Ministers asked NHS England to set out options for boundary alignment in integrated care systems in specific geographies where upper-tier local authorities currently have to work across more than one ICS footprint and to assess the impact of changes to deliver alignment in each case. Over the last six months NHS England has worked with stakeholders to develop advice and analysis for each of the affected areas to inform the final decision.
This work has now concluded, with advice provided to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. This statement sets out the final decision that has been taken for the areas in scope of the review:
East of England
Frimley
Bassetlaw
Glossop
West Birmingham
North Northamptonshire
This work has been underpinned by the principle that coterminous boundaries deliver clear benefits in integration between local authorities and NHS organisations. As approaches to integrated care develop it is crucial that we have a system that helps support closer working both across NHS organisations and between the NHS and local government.
On the ground, coterminous boundaries can also improve joined-up decision making on delivery of services for patients. Improved alignment can allow areas to build joint care models around a wide variety of services including children’s and adult social care services, public health, as well as community and mental health services which are often also aligned along local authority footprints.
There has therefore been a strong presumption of moving towards coterminosity, save for in exceptional circumstances where there were strong reasons for not doing so.
NHS England regional teams have conducted robust engagement activity with local stakeholder organisations to develop analysis of the risks, mitigations and benefits for any options for coterminous boundaries in the affected areas. This engagement has included roundtables with local NHS organisations, including the ICS’s themselves as well as providers, commissioners and local authorities.
The Department of Health and Social Care has engaged at ministerial level with parliamentarians as well as national organisations such as NHS Providers and the Local Government Association to ensure their views were reflected in the final advice to the Secretary of State and they had an opportunity to feed into the development of this work.
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care’s decision process has involved careful consideration of a wide range of issues, perspectives and interests and a careful weighing up of risks and benefits, outlined in the analysis provided by NHS England for each area as well as having regard to his legal duties.
These have been considered on an case-by-case basis for each area and where NHS England has made a recommendation based on broad (not universal) local consensus, including a recommendation to retain the status quo, the Secretary of State has listened and has accepted these recommendations. There was not a broad local consensus for three of the areas within this review and as such no recommendations were made by NHS England. In these areas a balanced judgement was taken, weighing up the risks and benefits of a change in boundaries and having regard to his legal duties by the Secretary of State.
Following this review, the Secretary of State has concluded:
East of England—this area is considered an appropriate exemption to the principle of coterminosity. No changes will be made to the existing boundaries.
Frimley—this area is considered an appropriate exemption from the principle of coterminosity. No changes will be made to existing boundaries.
Glossop—The decision has been taken to move the area of Glossop from Greater Manchester ICS into Derbyshire ICS.
Bassetlaw—The decision has been taken to move the area of Bassetlaw from South Yorkshire and Bassetlaw ICS into Nottingham and Nottinghamshire ICS thus delivering coterminous boundaries for the area.
West Birmingham—The decision has been taken to move west Birmingham from the Black Country and West Birmingham ICS into Birmingham and Solihull ICS thus delivering coterminous boundaries for the area.
North Northamptonshire—The decision has been taken to move the Lakeside Healthcare GP practice into Northamptonshire ICS and retain the Wansford and Kings Cliffe GP practice in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough ICS. This moves the region much closer to coterminous boundaries and reflects specific local considerations.
Local areas may still wish to keep under review how their boundaries are working in the light of any new legislative framework. Therefore, this decision does not preclude the important work many systems undertake naturally to ensure they have a system and boundaries that best suit local needs. We have already heard such requests from local stakeholders around Cheshire and Merseyside ICS, as such the Secretary of State has also announced his intention to review this system. The Secretary of State also intends to review the areas of Cumbria and North Yorkshire, as we are now aware, they will remain non-coterminous following the conclusion of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government’s unitarisation process. These reviews will take place in two years, following the implementation, subject to parliamentary passage, of the Health and Care Bill.
Full details of these decisions and the decision process will be published on the Department of Health and Social Care section on the gov.uk website shortly.
[HCWS248]
Draft Medical Devices (Northern Ireland Protocol) Regulations 2021
Edward Argar Excerpts(3 years, 4 months ago)
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The Chair
Before we begin, I remind hon. Members to observe social distancing and sit only in places that are clearly marked—I think this is the last time we are saying this; it will not apply from Monday. I also remind Members that Mr Speaker has stated that masks should be worn in Committee. That does not apply to me because I might have to say something at any second. Our colleagues in Hansard would be most appreciative if you emailed your speeches to hansardnotes@ parliament.uk. I call the Minister to move the motion.
The Minister for Health (Edward Argar)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Medical Devices (Northern Ireland Protocol) Regulations 2021.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq.
Today we are debating an instrument that is necessary to maintain the regulatory landscape for medical devices in Northern Ireland following a change in European Union law. It reflects the recent application of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices in Northern Ireland, which applies to all general medical devices, but not to in vitro diagnostic medical devices. For simplicity, I will hereafter refer to the EU medical devices regulation. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that this instrument does not itself cause the EU medical devices regulation to apply within Northern Ireland. That legislation took automatic effect in Northern Ireland on 26 May this year under the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol.
Through this instrument, the Government deliver their commitment to the pragmatic implementation of the protocol by introducing provisions that minimise the impact of the EU medical devices regulation on economic operators and the public in Northern Ireland. The EU medical devices regulation contains some areas where states have the discretion to make their own policy choices. This instrument therefore legislates in those policy areas, and where possible seeks to align the position in Northern Ireland with that in Great Britain. The Medical Devices Regulations 2002—hereafter referred to as the 2002 regulations—will continue to be the relevant regulations for in vitro diagnostics devices in Northern Ireland. They will operate alongside the EU medical devices regulation itself and this instrument on the regulation of general medical devices.
The instrument achieves the Government’s commitment to align Northern Ireland with Great Britain where permitted in four areas. First, it implements national adjustments for Northern Ireland in areas where the EU medical devices regulation grants member states the ability to make national policy decisions. This has been done in a way that will align with policies in place in Great Britain. Secondly, it sets out the fee structures that keep fees charged by the Government aligned with those applied in Great Britain. Thirdly, the instrument sets out the enforcement regime for activity and violations under the EU medical devices regulation in Northern Ireland. Finally, it makes an amendment to existing regulations so that they take account of the application of the EU medical devices regulation in Northern Ireland.
Several aspects of this instrument are, as will become apparent, technical. I therefore might not be able to address all the elements in detail in the time that we have available. I will, however, provide the Committee with details on the most important provisions. I will first set out the provisions that the instrument makes to change default positions under the EU medical devices regulation where permitted.
Re-manufacturing single-use devices, which the EU refers to as reprocessing, is currently permitted in the UK as long as the re-manufacturer adheres to strict requirements. The EU medical devices regulation does not permit re-manufacturing, but grants member states the ability to make national allowances, which this instrument also does for Northern Ireland. That means that the re-manufacturing of single-use devices can continue to take place in Northern Ireland as it does in Great Britain as long as all requirements of the EU medical devices regulation are adhered to.
The instrument also introduces provisions so that the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency can continue to require the registration of custom-made devices. That means that a range of devices such as, for example, dental appliances or orthopaedic moulds must be registered before being placed on the Northern Ireland market, as is currently the case in Great Britain.
The instrument also ensures continued alignment between Great Britain and Northern Ireland so that the safety of participants continues to be protected in clinical investigations. It does so by maintaining the MHRA’s ability to authorise clinical investigations for all risk classes of medical devices before they can commence. It also upholds the requirement for custom-made-device clinical investigations to be subject to MHRA assessment.
As well as these provisions, which amend the default positions of the EU medical device regulation where permitted, this instrument also sets out the fees that the MHRA may charge for activity under the EU medical device regulation in Northern Ireland to continue covering the costs associated with certain aspects of the regulation of medical devices. All fees outlined in this instrument are identical to those charged for similar services in Great Britain under the 2002 regulations, thereby maintaining alignment.
The Government are maintaining identical fees as part of our commitment to ensure that, where possible, there are no disadvantages to economic operators in Northern Ireland as a result of the protocol. To that end, no new fees are introduced in this instrument for any new requirements under the EU medical device regulation.
The enforcement provisions introduced in this instrument provide the Secretary of State with enforcement powers to ensure that patient safety is prioritised and high standards are maintained for the people of Northern Ireland. It does so by creating a specific offence that relates to breaches of certain provisions of this instrument and of the EU medical devices regulation; by amending the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015; and by granting the MHRA and district councils in Northern Ireland inspection powers and powers to serve enforcement notices for breaches of the EU medical device regulation within Northern Ireland. These powers allow the MHRA to respond to concerns and to constantly deliver improvements to patient safety.
Finally, the instrument includes technical amendments to other legislation, including the 2002 regulations, to reflect the application of the EU medical device regulation within Northern Ireland. In doing so, it ensures that the regulatory landscape operates effectively in Northern Ireland.
I should put on the record that I am grateful for the continued collaborative approach of officials in the Northern Ireland Executive, who have been kept informed of and engaged with the progress of this instrument. I also inform the House that, due to the very technical nature of this instrument, it has not met the threshold for an impact assessment and therefore one is not provided.
By introducing this instrument we are upholding the Government’s commitment to minimise the impact of the Northern Ireland protocol on the activities of the public and economic operators in Northern Ireland. The pandemic has shown that public health considerations are more important than ever, and by introducing this instrument we are taking steps to ensure that the UK’s exceptional standards of safety continue to be maintained within Northern Ireland.
I commend the instrument to the Committee.
Edward Argar
As ever, I am grateful to the shadow Minister—not only for adopting a typically sensible and pragmatic approach to these issues, but for his kind, if perhaps slightly inaccurate words, about my greying hair and my ageing.
The regulations are particularly about allowing the Government to meet their commitment to implement the Northern Ireland protocol, and doing so in a pragmatic way to minimise the impact on the activities of the public and, indeed, operators in Northern Ireland. We believe they do this while—quite rightly, as the hon. Gentleman said—maintaining the highest standards of patient safety for the people of Northern Ireland, as we would expect right across the United Kingdom.
One of the shadow Minister’s key themes was regulatory divergence and differences. As a Government, we are committed to adopting a pragmatic approach to regulatory divergence, seeking to minimise impacts wherever possible. He will have seen, from what I said just now, that the changes contained in this instrument are essential to delivering on that by providing, where possible, consistency and continuity between regulations in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, where of course we are not constrained by the EU medical devices regulation.
The shadow Minister raised a specific point about the scrutiny of CE and UK(NI) marks. As an experienced Member of Parliament, he will know that there will be many opportunities for the Opposition to table debates on these issues, either in the main Chamber or in Westminster Hall. If they wished to do so, Ministers—probably me—would be delighted to continue our touring double act on issues relating to the implementation of the trade and co-operation agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol.
The shadow Minister also talked about conversations and engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, industry and others. That engagement continues on a wide range of topics relating to the Northern Ireland protocol and, more broadly, the implementation of the TCA, including continuity of supply and how industry is finding the implementation of the protocol. Not only have fora been hosted within the Department across the broad range of industry suppliers and the bodies representing them, at which we discuss these issues and seek out their views, but in the case of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Executive, as I mentioned, we are very grateful for the collaborative working at an official level on these regulations and on other aspects of the implementation of the protocol. I have regular—at the moment, almost monthly—virtual meetings with my opposite number, Robin Swann, the Minister of Health in Northern Ireland. We discuss a range of topics, and as one would expect, the implementation of the protocol and measures such as these are among them so that we ensure as smooth an implementation and a result for the people of Northern Ireland as possible.
The shadow Minister mentioned the Northern Ireland protocol more broadly, and his views on the Government’s approach to it. It has always been the case throughout history that once international treaties and agreements are reached, tweaks are made to ensure they can be practically implemented on the ground. That is nothing new. It is true of treaties throughout history, and that is what we continue to work with our colleagues in Northern Ireland and the Commission to address.
Turning briefly to possible areas of regulatory divergence—I know this area has interested the shadow Minister in other debates on regulations—as I said, the instrument generally retains all the requirements of the directives it repealed, and indeed adds some additional ones to ensure consistency with GB. Those include additional rules for the designation of notified bodies, additional control and monitoring requirements for competent authorities, and additional clarifications of the roles of different economic operators. The EU medical devices regulation reclassifies some devices and has a wider scope than the directives. That includes devices for sterilising other medical devices and certain devices with no evident intended medical purpose, which is annex XVI of that regulation. A new unique device identification system is also introduced to enhance traceability and post-market activities related to safety. Additional requirements are also introduced for the publication of information on devices and clinical and performance studies relating to their conformity, and the new European database for medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices—which I think the shadow Minister mentioned, and which I will come on to in a second. EUDAMED is also introduced to make data available in increased quantity and quality.
The UK will shortly consult on the future of the Great Britain medical devices regulations, which will benefit patient safety and access. That work on the future GB regulatory regime will explore any risks around regulatory divergence between GB and NI in that context. I hope that addresses the shadow Minister’s concerns, but I can reassure him that there will be opportunities for this issue to be debated and discussed—more broadly in the House, but probably in Committees such as this—when we get to that point.
I hope I have dealt with at least the majority of the shadow Minister’s points, but if there are any others he wishes to raise, he knows that he is always welcome to write to me. With that, I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.