Earl of Lytton
Main Page: Earl of Lytton (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Grocott, who is absolutely right. Let me give an example. In many of the shire counties there may well be a combined authority around the leading city of the county, together with its neighbours. There may or may not be, as part of the individual bespoke package, an elected mayor. Let us assume that the authority agrees and negotiates an elected mayor for the city and the adjacent authorities. That would mean that the rest of the county is not in such a system, although there will still be the county council, of course. In the mayoral authority the police powers would come to the mayor, but unfortunately for the rest of, say, Norfolk, the police headquarters and all the resources are in the city, along with all the senior superintendents. All of the police functions spill out from the city, but the heart and the head of the police service has just been moved out of the territory of the police and crime commissioner, who will be left to look after a scattering of marginal, rural districts with no resources, no buildings and no senior staff. I simply do not see how this is even faintly possible.
My Lords, having not spoken on the Bill before, I must declare a few interests as a former president of the National Association of Local Councils, a vice-president of the LGA and a practising chartered surveyor with urban interests of all sorts. Apart from apologising for my lack of involvement in the earlier stages through a clash of diaries, my reason for intervening is to remind noble Lords that the Committee on Standards in Public Life will shortly produce a report on the subject of police accountability. I suspect that part of it will look at the role and efficacy of police and crime commissioners. Before the Minister responds, she might like to bear in mind that that particular issue is in play.
Your Lordships would not expect a comment from these Benches that is unequivocally in favour of the normal democratic processes for deciding the best way of governing accountability. I always think of my late father’s nostrum that vox populi is not necessarily vox Dei—he was a man of great religious conviction—and I think that the saying may possibly apply here. I am not convinced that mixing these two functions together is necessarily a great idea. It may be, but I do not see that it is guaranteed to be so.
At the moment, I suspect that we have a growing problem that boils down to the question of who has oversight of the regulator. That is an issue where powers are extensive and largely not subject to any sort of external oversight. They gradually accrue to themselves things that perhaps should not be accrued. There is a natural tendency—it is a tendency in human nature and I do not apportion blame for that—to try to exclude those who might loosely be termed the prying eyes of external forces. The question is one of accountability: how it sits with elected mayors, who are elected on a rather different template, and how it actually keeps the two functions separate. I would hesitate to suggest that it would be appropriate for the hard-nosed commercial thrust used by the elected mayor of one of these great metropolitan combined authorities to be applied to dealing with the police. I do not think the two are quite at one.
I thought that I should flag up those points—particularly the Committee on Standards in Public Life which, as your Lordships will know, is under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Bew. I think that its deliberations and its report will throw some light on this whole question of accountability.
My Lords, I had concluded, perhaps wrongly, that we would not see very many combined authority mayors in any great hurry. Since the deal that will be negotiated in order for there to be a mayor of a combined authority and a transfer of powers is a complicated matter, and since this is an enabling Bill to enable those deals to take place, the question of whether the commissioner’s authority is passed to the mayor will be one of the subjects of negotiation when the deal is being struck. If a combined authority—let me take the north-east—decided that it would like to see whether it could negotiate “yes” to become a mayoral combined authority but “no” to taking over the powers of the police commissioner, it would not be outside the bounds of negotiation. Some of what we are discussing comes to the point at which one would say, “Surely if a mayor is to take over the powers of the police and crime commissioner, it should happen from the start”. It should not be something which, as the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, suggested, could be done at any time in the future; it should be part of the deal.
One problem we have in debating the Bill in Committee is that from our point of view it is starting from the wrong end. It is starting from local authorities putting up their suggestions as to how their area of the country might be better governed as a matter of local government. This is not where we usually find ourselves. We are usually in the position of saying, “This is what will happen and you will obey the rules”. That is not the situation here, for better or for worse. Certainly for my part I am trying to think through as carefully as I can the implications of this change in direction. They are very complicated but I hope that we will find a way of supporting the endeavour for the devolution of much more power to local authorities.
It has been said several times in our proceedings that the problem may then become a fiscal one: where is the money coming from? I am certainly very conscious of the fact that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Perhaps I could suggest that if this whole system becomes successful in one or two places, maybe some fiscal changes will follow upon that success.