Telecommunications (Security) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateEarl of Erroll
Main Page: Earl of Erroll (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl of Erroll's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I apologise to my colleagues that I was not able to speak at Second Reading. I am quite clear, as I suspect we all are, that the security of the UK’s telecoms infrastructure is vital. Sadly, we come pretty late to the scene. The expansion of 5G and full-fibre broadband should have happened years ago, so this is not before time.
I read economics at Cambridge and looked at a number of aspects of economic expansion there, particularly in relation to business sectors. It is all very well saying that we will try to prevent the supply chain to the UK network being dependent on a limited number of suppliers. That may be a good idea in theory, but I just reflect that we have a national grid which is every bit as important as 5G; we have one or two aircraft manufacturers, and we have a couple of shipyards, so I just wonder whether there are a whole lot of suppliers out there for the telecoms world—there will be others who are better qualified than me to judge that. However, it is clear that we need to identify areas of risk, and Huawei is clearly one of them.
I would just ask a couple of simple questions. The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, mentioned Five Eyes. Is there a co-ordinating structure for Five Eyes in relation to this particular structure? If so, where is it based, what is our contribution to it and who exactly is doing it?
Some of our colleagues may have read the recent trading standards report that has just come out—I read it only last evening. A massive number of scams is happening at this point in time and we are dealing with the trouble they cause.
Amendment 20 refers to
“a specified country or … sources connected with a specified country, including by ownership or investment”.
I have worked overseas, including in a fair number of countries in south Asia such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, so I ask: who on the ground will actually be doing the work? Quite frankly, I know of nobody in any of our high commissions capable of doing that sort of analysis. Do we have a floating investigatory system? How are we going to judge the evidence properly?
On Amendment 27, we need to take care, clearly, but we must recognise that there may be a valid opportunity in a company that has upset the host Government. You and I would not know the situation, but we should be aware of that fact.
I am a bit sceptical about the security check. I made a freedom of information inquiry—it was nothing to do with telecoms—and, at the end of the day, the reason given for not producing all the evidence following my FoI request was the security of the country. It was never explained in words of one syllable—or indeed in any syllables at all—what aspect of my inquiry would affect the security of the UK. I would like to know this from the Minister: are we relying on Five Eyes or are we relying on Ofcom? Who is it specifically that will be doing this analysis?
My Lords, I want to say a few words on this. It is highly relevant that we keep a close eye, but on all vendors, including the ones that may seem okay at any given moment—the world keeps changing. I am not an apologist for, and nor do I wish to promote, China in any way whatever, but it happens to be there and it happens to have ripped off a lot of Cisco stuff a few years back and improved it. The Japanese did this to our cars, many years ago—nothing changes.
The real problem is that we do not manufacture this sort of stuff here; some of it is manufactured in Europe, and of course we are no longer part of that, but does that matter anyway? We are reliant for the supply of all this electronic equipment, and the components—such as chips, which I mention specifically —on China and many other places. The Americans also rely on China to manufacture components which they then put in their equipment. We had a security compromise a few years ago, when compromised components were put into some Cisco equipment. It is more complex than trying to ban one company or one country. But there are not many alternatives for us here, and that is the real problem. We need to get some home-grown stuff going and we need to get it done very quickly if we want to be really secure.
What are we going to do about it? The thing that worries me is that you cannot assume that your allies are always your friends in everything. We have to be particularly careful of being dragged into a trade war under the cover of security or defence—and this does happen. The cost of this whole thing is not so much that Huawei will try to cause us problems in some way unknown if we remove it from our system completely; there is the other side of it. If its technology is working and is better, and we can make sure in various ways that we are secure against what Huawei might do, its technology might get us to where we need to be in an internet world a lot quicker. I notice that we have already delayed quite substantially the rollout of broadband everywhere and 5G—everything seems to be stalling because of these rows, which to me are trade rows.
I fully understand the points of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about supporting regimes that are doing appalling things around the world. The trouble is that there are an awful lot of them. Take the situation he mentioned, to do with cameras. It is actually the software that does the facial recognition, not the camera; it is purely a bit of hardware that takes a very good, high-quality photograph, and there are many alternatives to it. Who is supplying that facial recognition software? That is where I would really target, and I would bet it is China. If there are bits that are useful to us, we need to use them. We need to stay in the world and we need to get ahead. We are not ahead and we are going to drop behind more and more.
The other difficult thing about picking a fight with China is that, if we are really going to go net zero and start going all electric in the next few years, lithium supplies and processing are from China. There is already a shortage of chips and other things in the automotive industry; I am sorry, but we are reliant on an intertwined global supply chain which stretches all over the place. We must be very careful about singling out one country, but we are—and that is why the amendment is useful. We must have something that says that we are keeping a proper eye on the whole lot of them.
My Lords, I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on this matter. The Bill is meant to be about security, not about “anything”. I have seen this happen with other legislation—that it suddenly becomes convenient to take something never intended for another purpose and, because it is very broadly worded, use it to beat some company or someone over the head over something completely unrelated. I am afraid that I agree that the Bill needs to be tightened up and brought down to security issues, not just “anything”.
For starters, a powerful, predominant supplier of routing equipment in the IP network would be a security risk. If anyone relies too much on one supplier—and they may unfortunately be pushed in that direction—it becomes a security risk, and we may have to close down some providers: “Oh dear, that’s our network finished”. That would be stupid. We are going to be anti certain companies. Companies get based or controlled elsewhere as takeovers happen internationally, so I see a certain amount of difficulty with this if it is very wide.
I come to what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said. The reason we lost our manufacturing, of course, was that BT selected Huawei as the preferred supplier of the 21st-century network rewrite in 2005. That is the point at which we closed down our capability, effectively being blackmailed by America to get rid of Huawei while potentially blackmailed by Huawei, which could get too much control. We need to look at these strategic decisions where private companies that used to be government suddenly make companies that affect UK security. I have never been happy about that.
My Lords, in response to the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, I say that it is also a huge issue when you have, essentially, a near-monopolistic private sector supplier, which makes any decision completely catastrophic for the under-bidder. I am speaking not to that but to Amendments 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones pointed out, bear my name. He set out a very clear rationale for these amendments, which back up the concerns of the Constitution Committee and, indeed, some suppliers. Rather than reiterate those, I beg noble Lords’ indulgence to illustrate the point, inviting them to join me in a thought experiment. They need not worry—it is not going to hurt and I will not be pushing them into a Petri dish or anything like that. I simply ask your Lordships to imagine things the other way around: imagine that the Telecommunications (Security) Bill did indeed include the words currently proposed by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and myself, words that clearly identify that the focus of the Bill should be on the security of telecoms.
I ask noble Lords to continue to use their imagination that it was my noble friend and I who were proposing changes to include the words that are currently there; in other words, imagine that we were proposing to take the word “security” from this imaginary Bill and turn it into “anything”. Broadening the cover, as we have heard, would broaden the problem around any interruption very widely. I do not know but I dare say that, if we tried to do that, the Public Bill Office would have something to say, pointing to the Long Title of the Bill, which is:
“To make provision about the security of public electronic communications networks and public electronic communications services”
—in other words, security. Were we to try to take that word out and put in “anything”, I dare say the PBO would not allow us to do so.
If we did however slip it past the PBO, I guarantee that the Minister of the day would tell us that this would subvert the Bill’s intention and would take away the Bill’s focus from security to some of the imaginary things that the noble Lord opposite suggested—or, indeed, a digger backing into a green box somewhere in Kent. This is not the “Telecoms (Mishaps) Bill” but the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. These simple and modest amendments focus the Bill on its stated objective.
My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, does not like my analogy of flying. I just remind him of a recent series of Boeing airliners that crashed with a huge loss of life when the security of flying was overridden by a piece of machinery. I stick by my analogy but I will not progress that any further in relation to these amendments.
The Bill says clearly:
“publish the code; and … lay a copy of the code before Parliament.”
However, it does not allow Parliament by right to debate that code and any amendments that come. This is a fast-moving market, as we all know. New opportunities have come up that will have a security dimension to them. There will be new developments, I hope, from our own technical universities so there must be some provision for the expertise that both the House of Commons and the House of Lords have within them to debate. Those of us who have been in Parliament for a few decades know that quite often there are unusual people who have a particular niche that they know something about. That is the benefit of the experience of Parliament.
I agree with the noble Lord that it ought to be done on the affirmative procedure. I sat in the chair for five years during the passage of all the Maastricht and other Bills and there are certain areas where it is absolutely crucial that it should be done by affirmative resolution. Therefore I certainly support that dimension.
My Lords, I can see that it might be useful to avoid scrutiny sometimes when we have to finesse difficult issues—say, balancing effectiveness and public perception of certain other issues, or whatever. We can also end up with an awful lot of SIs in front of both Houses and everyone feeling rather swamped and bored by them and no one really doing anything about them. The trouble is that we get more and more wide-ranging powers in Bills, and this is a particular example of it. The more we do that, the more careful we have to be about the secondary legislation, because that is where the devil resides and that is where the real control is. We have just passed something that enables a takeover by the Executive. In some cases that may be a good thing; in others it could be very dangerous. To be honest, because of the huge, general issues in these Bills, I now come down in favour of the affirmative procedure. We are going to have to scrutinise it.
My Lords, harmony is breaking out across the Room, with the possible exception of the Minister. I will not reiterate my noble friend’s well-put argument but I refer the Minister—I am sure she has already read it—to the impact assessment. I am increasingly of the opinion that the single most useful document that comes with the publishing of a Bill is not the Explanatory Notes but the impact assessment. The department is to be congratulated on the quality of the one produced in this case.
Page 30 of the impact assessment covers the monetised and non-monetised costs of this. At the front of the assessment there is a number. However, point 6.1 says:
“This impact assessment makes an estimation of the costs and benefits of the options”.
It says it brings together “a number of sources” and notes that there are “limitations to the analysis”. The first is the
“lack of robust and specific data”—
that is a fairly serious limitation—
“for example on UK telecoms market size and the size of specific sub-markets”.
Therefore, the number on the front is based simply on—obviously, well-intentioned—estimates of the telecoms market. Furthermore, the costs are quantified based on equipment costs. They are not based on the friction of running a network under the constraints of this Bill, which is itself a glaring error in how one looks at the cost of this Bill in terms of impact.
It is not just about the cost and replacement of equipment—it is about the draft regulations to which my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones referred. They cover all aspects of the operation of the networks in this country. We are looking at a situation in which, if the Minister so chose, the regulations could be made and implemented such that the Minister ran the networks by remote control from the department. That is why these safeguards, parliamentary scrutiny and the affirmative process are an important safeguard to prevent attention—not, I am sure, from this Minister or this Secretary of State, who I am sure can be trusted with these regulations, but we do not know who will follow or what their intentions will be.
As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, wisely said, to hand over these powers without simultaneously taking significant powers of scrutiny of the statutory instruments that will inevitably follow is the wrong way in which to pass a Bill in your Lordships’ House. For these reasons, along with the huge uncertainty of the cost of what we are doing here, I commend my noble friend’s amendments.
My Lords, I hope I am demonstrating the agility of which the Minister is so fond. As I said earlier in respect of the judicial commissioner, these amendments provide a ready-made mechanism for oversight concerning the proportionality and appropriateness of any measures in the regulations and codes. Taken together, Amendments 9 and 19, would require the Secretary of State to take into account the advice of the technical advisory board—and insert a new clause after Clause 14—and that of a judicial commissioner appointed under the 2016 Act. We have gone a little further in specifying the make-up of the technical advisory board, but we are clearly on the same page as the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, with her Amendment 8.
My Lords, I want to speak on this issue as I remember mentioning it at Second Reading. There is a person for whom I have huge respect, Dr Louise Bennett, whose extensive knowledge and sagacity I first ran into when we were talking about ID cards years ago and the whole problem of digital identity and privacy over the internet. If you really want to know about such things, read her work: she has produced a lot of work on this. I think a technical advisory board is essential: these are complex issues. The Minister said that the matters subject to regulation will be technical. I do not see how we can do this without a good technical advisory board, and it is good if we have some view of who goes on it, because it is too easy for these things to disappear off and no one thinks about them. We will keep needing cutting-edge advice and not have groupthink, and these matters are very tricky.
Between Amendments 8 and 9, I could not decide between taking “the utmost” and “full” account; there is a neat little difference in the wording. Otherwise, the point about laying it out properly is important. The other thing, which slightly goes back to our previous debate, is that we get into the whole problem of what are regulations, what is guidance, what are guidelines and what is a code of practice and the different legal stance of those different things. We have to be careful about using them as if they were interchangeable. Regulations will often give rise to a code of practice, breach of which is not necessarily an offence, but they can be linked back to a primary Act offence. We should not bandy those words around interchangeably; they are different. We need a technical advisory board and, between these amendments, we should do something about it.
My Lords, in its evidence to the Bill in the Commons, BT said:
“we believe greater clarity is needed on OFCOM’s planned approach, with safeguards introduced in the Bill to ensure operator burdens are proportionate.”
Amendment 10 seeks to ensure that codes of practice are necessary and proportionate.
As regards Ofcom’s new powers to ensure compliance with security duties as set out in new Section 105M, how will these relate to Ofcom’s existing powers and duties under Sections 3 and 6 of the Communications Act 2003? Will this duty and the new powers Ofcom is being given still be subject to good regulatory practice so that, for example, it still must have regard to the principles of transparency, accountability, proportionality and consistency and not impose unnecessary burdens? How will this fit in with the statement to be made by Ofcom under new Section 105Y?
Amendments 16, 17 and 21 to Clauses 5, 6 and 19, in my name and that of my nobble friend Lord Fox, seek to ensure that the new powers for Ofcom introduced in the Bill are subject to requirements in the 2003 Act regarding carrying out and reviewing its functions. I was pleased that in her letter to noble Lords after Second Reading, the Minister explicitly said:
“When carrying out its security functions, Ofcom will remain bound by its general duties under Section 3 of the Communications Act 2003 as it is now. Section 3(3) provides a duty on Ofcom to have regard to the need for transparency, accountability and proportionality when carrying out its functions. Ofcom will also be bound by its duty under Section 6 of the Communications Act 2003 to review the burden of its regulation on public telecoms providers. If Ofcom fails to carry out its security functions in line with these duties, then it is likely to be subject to legal challenge.”
I very much appreciate those words, which are a very clear interpretation of the existing Act and the duties of Ofcom and the responsibilities it has in the way that it carries them out. Will the Minister repeat that assurance today?
My Lords, I want to say a few words on this because the key words “undue burden” stand out. It is very important that we do not put too many burdens, particularly unnecessary ones, on companies. In particular—and this is something that I have often looked at because I have done a lot of work with innovative and growing companies—you must not let large corporations stifle innovation. There is an attitude among them that regulations are for your enemies; they are a very good way of stopping up-and-coming competition. I have also noticed that departments tend to consult the companies which have significant market presence already and see them as being the people who know all about it. However, that does not take account of what is up and coming. The other thing is that they often have people on secondment from them or people who have retired from the companies and gone into the departments, so there can be some interesting biases within. With those few warnings, I think the whole undue burden issue is more important than people might think.
The undue burden point touched on by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is really important. On a previous group I spoke about regulatory friction and the fact that this has not been costed into the impact assessment. Clearly, regulatory friction is harder for smaller companies to deal with than larger companies. I think that is the point that the noble Earl was making. It is one that I would also join up.
We should also not confuse lots of regulations with security. The whole point about people who wish to subvert security is that they understand the regulations and go round them. Indeed, sometimes regulations are a guidebook for security, in a sense, because they show the map around which you seek to find the chinks.
The point in the impact assessment about making the networks value security is right. On that, I completely agree with the Government. I am not sure that some of the measures in the Bill actually do that; what they do is create a regulatory load without necessarily adding value. Some of the measures that we spoke of in the last group of amendments, as well as in this, are about stripping this down to where value is added rather than simply more regulation being loaded up.
One of the great pleasures of speaking after my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is that he normally says everything better than I would. He simply asked the Minister to repeat what was in the letter and to endorse the 2003 Act. I hope that he is able to grant his wish.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 14 and 15. I wanted to say on the last group of amendments that I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about regulation. It is entirely possible for regulation to provide certainty, to stimulate innovation and, in the context of this Bill, to ensure that we have the right framework for our providers to ensure that our security is not compromised. So there is certainly no negativity in that respect towards regulation; the question is whether it is appropriate in the circumstances and not unduly burdensome for those subject to it. That is why the question of parliamentary oversight, which has been mentioned throughout this afternoon, continues to be important, and I think that it will come up again in the next group.
This amendment is on rather a different area. I have quite a lot of sympathy with Amendment 13 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, but this is more nuanced than the Bill provides for. I want to quote again from the evidence of BT to the Bill Committee in the Commons. It said:
“We agree with the requirements on operators to support the users of their networks in preventing or mitigating the impact of a potential security compromise … In certain cases”—
and this is a sort of “however”—
“the security of the network may be put at greater risk if potential risks are communicated to stakeholders, providing malicious actors with additional information on potential vulnerabilities in the network that they may seek to exploit. We therefore believe that the Bill should explicitly consider such scenarios and not place obligations on communications providers to inform users of risks whereby doing so it will increase the likelihood of that risk crystallising.”
That is where our first amendment is going. BT further stated that
“the Bill also confers powers on OFCOM to inform others of a security compromise or risk of a compromise, such as the Secretary of State or network users. We understand the intention of the Bill in this regard and support the principle. We believe that this would be most effective when done in conjunction with the operator in question to ensure there is clarity and agreement, where possible, on the timing, audience and messaging of such information provision. This would also ensure that this does not cut across any other obligations that an operator may have, such as market disclosures. The Bill currently does not require OFCOM to consult with the operator prior to informing third parties of a security compromise (or risk of one).”
I think these are fair points. The Government must have an answer before Ofcom is faced with that set of issues. In this light, Amendments 13 and 15 make further provision about the duty to inform users of a risk of security compromise and specify that duties to inform others of “significant risks” of security compromises must be proportionate and not in themselves increase security risks.
My Lords, I put my name down to speak to this because the problem with putting a fixed time period on having to report security breaches is that it very much depends on what the breach is. We mentioned patches earlier. If it is a vulnerability in the software—or it may be the hardware—which requires a patch to be released, you must have the time to produce it and test it as fully as possible. You do not want the hackers out there to know what the vulnerability is until you can roll out the answer to it. That is what zero-day attacks are based on. Equally—the noble Baroness is absolutely correct here—you do not want this stuff swept under a carpet to sit there unused for years. Could our technical advisory board give advice at an incident level, or something like that?
My Lords, this is an interesting and nuanced—to coin a word we used earlier—debate. I am probably the only person here who has had to deal with a national security issue that impacted a consumer brand in real time on television. I must say that 30 days was not an option—30 minutes was not an option. Picking up on the point of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, the time is entirely dependent on the nature of the crisis or security breach. My fear is that 30 days becomes a target rather than an injunction.
I think the point here is “no burial”. I assure colleagues and others in this Room that our amendments do not intend to bury the issue either, but to introduce some equivocation in the event that not announcing something makes things more secure than announcing them. The point of this is not to protect the reputation or otherwise of the network, but to protect consumers and the integrity and security of the network. That is the decision Ofcom would need to make. That would be its call. Its default position would be that it needs to be communicated to consumers as quickly as is sensible, unless there is a reason not to communicate it, and it would be up to the network providers to put their position forward. However, there are definitely times when it should not be communicated. At the moment the Bill seems rather unequivocal in its approach.
My Lords, we know how it is when you are on a roll. This reminds me that it is very unusual for somebody to have the opportunity to get in before the noble Lord, Lord Fox, draws breath, as the Chair did. “Very impressive footwork,” I thought to myself.
There has been a common theme this afternoon of a lack of oversight over aspects of this Bill in many respects—in particular, the regulations and codes. This lack of oversight is compounded by the fact that, under Clause 13, any appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal cannot take account of the merits of a case against the Secretary of State. The rationale for this, as the Constitution Committee says,
“is unclear and is not justified in the Explanatory Notes.”
I will quote the Explanatory Notes in full. Clause 13 provides that, in appeals against relevant “security-related” Ofcom decisions, the Competition Appeal Tribunal is to apply ordinary “judicial review principles”, notwithstanding any retained case law or retained general principle of “EU law”—by that they of course mean retained EU law. This means that the tribunal should not “adopt a modified approach” to proceedings, as required under retained EU law, which provides that the “merits of the case” must be “duly taken in account”.
Therefore, this provision disapplies aspects of the ongoing effect and supremacy of retained EU law, as permitted by Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The rationale for reducing the powers of the tribunal in respect of security matters is unclear and not justified in the Explanatory Notes. The House may wish to ask the Government to justify reducing the powers of the Competition Appeal Tribunal in respect of appeals under Clause 13. That is the motive behind this clause stand part debate.
The most authoritative judgment to date about the current standard of review is the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s TalkTalk Telecom Group plc and Vodafone Ltd v Office of Communications case. This addresses, inter alia, the standard of review on an appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal under Section 192 of the Communications Act. The judgment of Peter Freeman QC provides a good analysis of the context and history of the changes to the standard of review. I make no apology for quoting it at some length:
“Of particular relevance to how the Tribunal should approach this appeal are Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive and section 194A of the 2003 Act, as amended by the DEA17 … Article 4(1) provides: ‘Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or services who is affected by a decision of a national regulatory authority has the right of appeal against the decision to an appeal body that is independent of the parties involved. This body, which may be a court, shall have the appropriate expertise available to it to enable it to carry out its functions. Member States”—
this is the key bit—
“shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an effective appeal mechanism…’ … Section 194A provides: ‘The Tribunal must decide the appeal, by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal, by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.’ … The combined effect of these provisions is to require the Tribunal to apply the same principles as would apply in a judicial review case but also to ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account so that there is an effective appeal.”
At paragraph 139, the judgment concludes:
“Given that Article 4(1) continues to apply, it would appear that, in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s view in BT v Ofcom and the High Court’s view in Hutchison 3G, as set out helpfully by the Tribunal in the recent Virgin Media judgment, we should continue, as before, to scrutinise the Decision for procedural unfairness, illegality and unreasonableness but, in addition, we should form our own assessment of whether the Decision was ‘wrong’ after considering the merits of the case.”
“Article 4(1)” refers to the now-repealed framework directive. It should now be read as referring to Article 31(1) of the European Electronic Communications Code—the EECC. The transposition deadline of the EECC was just before the end of the transition period and iseb;normal;j therefore currently binding as part of retained EU law. The wording of the EECC is almost exactly the same as the framework directive in respect of appeals.
That is what will continue to apply across the remainder of the Communications Act for other appeals under Section 192 but is being changed by Clause 13 of the Bill, which amends Section 194A of the Communications Act in respect of security provisions. This is a very significant change to the appeals procedure in security cases. There is a single bald paragraph in the Explanatory Notes, no justification is given—as the Constitution Committee says—and neither is there any evidence of why it is necessary. What evidence does the Minister in fact have of the need to make this major change in respect of security decisions made by Ofcom? I beg to move.
My Lords, I saw this and thought that I really did not understand why the Government were doing it. I saw what the Constitution Committee had said and realised that it did not understand why it was needed. I cannot believe that you can have a proper appeal if you ignore the merits of the case. I probably have an overdeveloped sense of justice and I think that to have an appeal where you are not allowed to present half the case or whatever is not a proper appeal. In fact, what you find is that the system can use procedural things to run rings around people who have a very justifiable complaint about something. I did not like the look of it and I entirely agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said.
My Lords, I am not going to attempt to outlawyer my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. I may not be a lawyer, but I am suspicious or, indeed, perhaps ultra-suspicious. What is the department seeking to avoid by removing what would seem to be natural justice from this process? What are the Government seeking to protect themselves from in advance? Who are they frightened of?
I do not think I know the answers to these questions, but I know that there is someone or something there that the department is seeking to avoid in advance. For those reasons, we should be extraordinarily suspicious, just as suspicious as I am. I ask the Minister: what is the justification? What are the Government scared of?