(4 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames wanted to speak to these two amendments but is unable to be here today, for which he apologises.
In Committee, the Government’s position, which was entirely sympathetic in principle—the noble Earl is rarely unsympathetic—was that the Law Commission is going to consider this in any event, so we should wait for it to do so before pressing the matter further. However, my noble friend says that that is not good enough. There is no reason for a further report before proceeding with the provision of free legal representation and advice for rape victims. If we wait for the Law Commission then there will have to be a further consultation, but that is not necessary—Liberal Democrats do not say that consultations are not necessary lightly—and then there has to be the process of producing a report and then, finally, a Bill. All in all, that is a long delay on an issue on which the principle is uncomplicated and, in any event, conceded. We support these two amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and, in her absence, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for Amendments 77 and 78, which, as we have heard, seek to require the development of proposals for schemes to give victims of rape access to free independent legal advice and representation.
I agree that it is extremely important that victims are aware of their rights and confident in those rights, particularly when preparing for trial and when requests for their personal information are made. While it would be novel to provide access to free legal advice and representation for just one type of crime, we recognise that, if there is one category of people who are especially vulnerable, it is victims of rape and sexual offences. We also recognise that victims of these crimes are more likely to receive requests for sensitive personal information as part of an investigation, and that there are calls for independent legal advice to help victims with that situation as well.
That is why the Bill tackles the problem in a different way, by introducing measures designed to minimise requests for information, as my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy explained in the previous group of amendments. Through the Bill we are placing a new statutory duty on the police to request third-party material relating to victims only when necessary, proportionate and relevant to a reasonable line of inquiry. Following the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Bertin, which the Government have accepted, there will also be a requirement that the Requests for Victim Information code of practice must state that the police and other law enforcement agencies should start an investigation with the presumption that requests for counselling notes are not necessary or proportionate.
My noble friend’s amendments also mandate that counselling notes can be requested by police only if they are likely to have “substantial probative value” to a reasonable line of inquiry. This higher threshold will ensure that police are not routinely requesting counselling notes and that the privacy of these victims is respected.
As I have said, we do not want to create a hierarchy of support by granting government-funded legal advice to victims of just one type of crime. Alongside that, there are some complex and sensitive considerations regarding the introduction of independent legal advice for such victims. In particular, we have to be mindful of the role of the victim as a witness in proceedings and avoid anything that might have an unintended impact on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This concern emerged very explicitly from the pilot scheme run in the north of England. I direct that point particularly to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Marks; we need to take account of the findings from that pilot, which expressed those concerns. A subsidiary but still important point is to consider the potential impact on timeliness as a result of another process being inserted into the system. That was another concern that arose in the pilot.
These are all far-reaching considerations which, I suggest, require expert input before any statutory measures are considered. The Law Commission’s review will consider all these factors, including—the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, may like to note—the impact of existing schemes in other jurisdictions. When it publishes its report later this year, its findings and recommendations on independent legal advice will provide us with the robust evidence base that we will need should we wish to go forward and develop the sort of policy proposals that the amendment points us towards. Therefore, it is right for us to wait for those findings.
There is a further point of principle which I ought to flag: it really is not appropriate to place a duty on the Secretary of State in primary legislation to develop policy, especially without any specification of what such proposals should entail and who is responsible for implementing them once they have been developed. Once again, it is much better that we await the Law Commission’s recommendations.
I know how important this issue is to noble Lords opposite, but I hope that I have given the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, sufficient pause as regards his original intention to divide the House. There are some good reasons why the amendments should not be pressed, which I hope I have been able persuade him of. I therefore very much hope that he will withdraw Amendment 77 and not move Amendment 78.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 30 and 31. These amendments are in my name and that of my noble friend. Amendments 29 and 30 seek to understand what is meant by “lawful authority”. In Clause 6(2)—I am not making any concessions about the points made on the first group of amendments this afternoon—it is a defence to prove that a person had “good reason” or “lawful authority” for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place. Obviously, lawful authority is not the same as good reason, otherwise it would not have to be provided for—although one would have thought that lawful authority would be good reason. But what is lawful authority? Where does the authority come from? Who gives it? How does one apply for it? Is it a consequence of some other arrangement that is in place? Amendment 29 applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Amendment 30 to Scotland, but they make the same point.
Amendment 31 makes a very small point, but I have discovered over the years that sometimes small points are worth making. Under Clause 6(3) one can show that one had the corrosive substance for “use at work”. My amendment would substitute for those words “the purposes of work”, thereby distinguishing in my mind the purpose and the place. These days “work” is very often used to designate the place. Technically, that might be a bit lax, but it is what people say: “I’m going to work”. They do not mean, “I’m going to put in a good day’s effort”; they mean, “I’m going to my place of work”. The Minister may say that “for use at work” implies “purpose”, but one might take something to use at a place where there is no legitimate reason for using it. I beg to move—and I wish Hansard could record the look on the Minister’s face.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments address the defences available if someone is charged with an offence of possessing a corrosive substance in a public place. As I understand her, these amendments are intended to probe what would constitute lawful authority to be in possession of a corrosive substance in a public place. She then went on to comment on the phrase “for use at work”.
On the lawful authority issue, let me give your Lordships one example. Under the Poisons Act 1972 there is a licensing regime for regulated substances such that a Home Office licence is required to import, acquire, possess or use a regulated substance. Both nitric acid at above 3% concentration and sulfuric acid at above 15% concentration are regulated substances. Therefore, there may be circumstances where a Home Office licence holder has purchased a corrosive product containing one of these substances and is transporting it from A to B. This would be a scenario where the defence of lawful authority might come into play.
However, for the majority of cases, a person would need to rely on the defence of having good reason—unless, of course, they were a tradesperson and had purchased the corrosive for use at work. This brings me to Amendment 31, about how we have framed the defence for tradespeople and businesses. The reference to “for use at work” replicates the terminology used in existing knife legislation. The existing defences in relation to the possession of an offensive weapon in a public place are well understood by the police and various trades and businesses, and we are not aware of any issues in the operation of them in relation to the possession of knives.
While I can see the intention behind the amendment, I will need to think about what the noble Baroness has said—but I am not convinced that it is necessary or in practice achieves any significantly different result. I am also concerned that having a different defence in place for possession of corrosives, compared with that for knives, would or could cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate the law. So I hope that, at least for now, I have been able to provide sufficient clarification to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw these amendments—although, as I have said, I promise that I will read carefully in Hansard what she said.
Before the noble Lord responds, first, will there be an opportunity for Parliament to consider the arrangements for testing when they are pretty much complete? I am sure it will be of interest. Secondly, are skin and eyes similarly sensitive? Or do we risk not outlawing a substance that might damage the eyes but would not damage the skin?
In answer to the second question, my understanding—on advice—is no. A substance capable of burning the skin by corrosion would also be capable of doing severe damage to the eye, and the other way round. We do not think we are excluding any substance by accident in defining corrosive substances in this way. On the noble Baroness’s first question, as I understand it, the approval of the testing kit will not be subject to any formal parliamentary procedure, but I am sure the noble Baroness is capable of finding ways to tease out relevant information from the Home Office at the appropriate time.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and the Government for pursuing the point. I looked at this for some time and came to the view that the words “reasonably be expected” were the best that one could provide to cover circumstances that cannot be listed in detail. Indeed, I confess that having complained throughout the Bill’s progress that I did not want to rely on the CPS tests, the police’s common sense and all the rest of it, I will do so on this one. I thank him.
However, I want to raise another point and I hope the Minister is aware of it—I emailed the Bill team about it yesterday. I am happy with the drafting amendments, which are to do with regulations, but given the supplementary delegated powers memo, I thought that I should pursue the issue of peacebuilding as a reasonable excuse. The paragraph of the memorandum dealing with “reasonable excuse defence” gives,
“purposes of a peacebuilding nature”,
as a possible example of a purpose that can be referred to as a reasonable excuse. I referred to peacebuilding at the previous stage, on 3 December, and the noble Earl said:
“I entirely accept the importance of peacebuilding activity … the government amendment does not preclude a person advancing this or any other category of reasonable excuse. I am of the view that legitimate peacebuilding activity could very well be a reasonable excuse”—[Official Report, 3/12/18; col. 860]—
but that it was up to a jury.
The debate continued and, as the House is aware, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which we supported, was agreed on a Division. Therefore, the point rather floated away. Essentially, I hope the noble Earl can commit the Government today to considering adding peacebuilding when the Bill goes back to the Commons. It seems, from correspondence I have received since I emailed the Bill team, that peacebuilding may or may not be what is understood to be a humanitarian activity. There is a particular concern that—given that this is not something that we talk about and define every day—juries may be puzzled as to what it is and not understand its value. I am not sure whether that is a fair comment. However, it has been described to me as being “complementary to humanitarian aid” and covers a large range of activities, including mediation, support to the local community, justice and reconciliation, psychosocial support and research in the area. The Government have been considering this matter. It would complete the provisions in this area if it could be referred to specifically when the Bill is enacted.
My Lords, I support very strongly indeed what has just been said. Having spent much of my life working with humanitarian agencies, I know that the importance of what has been said cannot be overemphasised. We must not slip into an attitude in which relief, when things have gone badly wrong, may be interminable and highly costly, apart from anything else. There is a real need in hot situations to be working at prevention.
In broad government statements we get very reassuring remarks about the importance of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The humanitarian agencies frequently find themselves involved in this and I think with all possible clarity that that is valid. They should not just be tolerated, they should be supported by the Government and others. That is significant because anything that either intentionally or unintentionally detracts from the commitment in that area would be very unfortunate.
My Lords, I am doubly grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I am sympathetic to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but only up to a certain point. Given that this is Third Reading, our starting point has to be that any further amendments to the Bill should be limited to those that are absolutely necessary to improve the drafting of the Bill in the light of the amendment agreed by the House at Report. I am not persuaded that adding to the list of exemptions from the offence properly falls within the category of amendments that we should now be contemplating at this late stage of the Bill, either today or when the Bill returns to the Commons to consider the Lords amendments.
However, I can assure the noble Baroness that the Government will keep the list of exempted purposes under review. The Bill now helpfully includes a power by regulations—a Henry VIII power to all intents and purposes—to add to the list of exempted purposes should it be appropriate to do so in the light of experience of operating the new offence. I am sure that officials in the Home Office will closely scrutinise the use of this power and will work with their colleagues in the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to determine if peacebuilding could usefully be added to the list of exempted reasons in the future.
But I need to make clear to all noble Lords that this is a nicety. In the absence of such an exemption the Government are clear that entering and remaining in a designated area for the purpose of engaging in peacebuilding would constitute a reasonable excuse. We have that all-encompassing provision, as the noble Baroness is aware, in the Bill. There is a problem associated with any approach that has within it a list of some kind, which is why we started out with a very short list indeed. Through our debates we persuaded ourselves that it would be helpful to augment the very short list that the Government started off with, but we have to ask ourselves where we stop.
I hope what I have said has offered some assurance to the noble Baroness and she understands that, while it would not be appropriate to add peacebuilding to the list of exemptions at the moment, that will not preclude us doing so in the future, should there be an operational imperative.
My Lords, to be rather blunt it is always frustrating when procedure gets in the way of substance. I ask the Minister to ensure that Home Office officials appreciate that “in the light of experience” should not just be what may happen when someone comes back and says, “I have been working on peacebuilding in Syria”. It is also about deterring NGOs from going into conflict or post-conflict areas to work on peacebuilding. That could be a consequence we do not want to see from the offence we have created in the Bill.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, especially for the supportive comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, but also for the very helpful remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I shall endeavour to cover all questions that have been put.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked a drafting question. She asked where paragraph (a) will actually fall in the text. I can tell her that paragraph (a) will begin with the words after line 40 on page 2, so I hope that it will run in the broad way rather than the narrow way in which she hoped it would.
The last words of line 40 read,
“in which at the time”
and the next line starts, “of the person’s action”. As I said, I identified two places in line 40 where paragraph (a) might be inserted. It is a drafting point but also a point of substance, because where paragraph (a) starts actually affects the whole of the point. Can the Minister give a little more assistance?
My Lords, perhaps if my noble friend the Minister is not absolutely certain on this point we could return to it at Third Reading to clarify the drafting amendment.
My Lords, I was not as precise as I should have been. The words after,
“(but are not limited to) those in which”,
will become paragraph (a). So it will read,
“(but are not limited to) those in which (a) at the time of the person’s action or possession, the person did not know”,
et cetera. Paragraph (b) will follow after line 44. I hope that that clarifies the point.
My noble friend Lord Lothian asked a series of very reasonable questions about the meaning of the words “journalist” and “academic”. The distinction between journalism that constitutes a reasonable excuse and that which does not, for the purpose of this offence, will inevitably be highly fact-specific. As several noble Lords commented in earlier debates on the Bill, it is just not possible to provide in advance an exhaustive definition of a journalist or of a legitimate journalist. This is something that we are clear needs to be determined by a jury in particular cases on the basis of all the evidence. We have made it clear that our amendment adds an indicative list of categories of reasonable excuse and does not provide either an exhaustive list or an absolute exemption. It is important to remember that juries will retain their existing discretion to decide whether a particular excuse is reasonable on a case-by-case basis. The same logic would apply to the meaning of the word “academic”. The category of person that my noble friend described might or might not be considered by a jury to be an academic: it would depend on the facts of the case. The jury might consider that there was still a reasonable excuse for a particular individual. I hope that that is helpful.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation because it answers my point and deals with my amendment. I am sorry to have been tedious and to have consolidated my reputation for pedantry—the noble Lord, Lord Harris, says that is impossible—but I think it was a substantive point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 25. Clause 6 will add a number of further terrorism offences to the list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, to which extraterritorial jurisdiction, or ETJ, applies. This means that individuals can be prosecuted in UK courts for conduct that took place outside the UK which would have been unlawful under an offence listed at Section 17 had it taken place here. This will ensure that UK courts are able to prosecute terrorist fighters who travel to or return to the UK having joined terrorist groups and become involved in conflicts or other terrorist activity overseas. It will also ensure that we are able to prosecute people who base themselves overseas and seek to radicalise people in the UK.
In relation to this latter category of radicalisers, Section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 contains the offence of displaying in a public place an item of clothing or other article, such as a flag, in circumstances which arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. As a result of Clause 2 it will also contain, at new subsection (1A), the offence of publishing an image of such an article in the same circumstances. As currently drafted, the effect of Clause 6 is that a person could potentially be prosecuted under Section 13 in the UK, having displayed while in another country the flag of a terrorist organisation that is proscribed in the UK but not in that country. This is something about which the Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised concerns, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled amendments on behalf of the JCHR in Committee which would have removed the Section 13 offence from the ETJ provisions entirely, or alternatively would have limited ETJ in relation to Section 13 to UK nationals and residents only.
These amendments return to issues on which we have had extensive and helpful debates. I have set out very clearly and at some length the Government’s position on why this power is needed, but it is worth reminding ourselves of two key points. First, we have seen modern terrorist groups, such as Daesh, use slick and effective online propaganda, including activity covered by the Section 12 and 13 offences, which has been aimed at radicalising people in the UK, building support for terrorist organisations and ideology, and encouraging terrorist attacks in the name of such organisations. This activity is not currently within the jurisdiction of the UK courts where it occurs in another country, but as we have seen in the Syrian context, it can give rise to a very real and immediate threat within the UK. For this reason it is imperative that we extend ETJ to these offences, and that we do so in an effective and workable way which does not unduly limit the ability of UK courts to deal with serious terrorist activity. This is the effect of Clause 6.
However, I have considered and reflected carefully on the points raised previously by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on behalf of the JCHR, and by other noble Lords, about the breadth of Clause 6 as currently drafted, and I have recognised the strength of feeling on this issue. While I remain of the view that the safeguards I outlined in Committee will ensure that the power is used in a proportionate way, I accept that this has not provided sufficient assurance to your Lordships. I have therefore concluded that the extension of ETJ to the Section 12 and 13 proscription offences should be limited to cases where the individual is a UK national or resident, in line with the amendment proposed in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Amendments 24 and 25 in my noble friend’s name deliver this. Although the noble Baroness’s earlier amendment focused on Section 13, the same principle arises in relation to Section 12 of the 2000 Act, which criminalises invitations of support for a proscribed organisation, and as a result of Clause 2 will also cover reckless statements of support. The government amendments therefore extend this limitation to both Sections 12 and 13. This will ensure that it will still be possible to prosecute in the UK courts a person who has travelled from the UK to join a terrorist organisation, and who has become involved in propaganda on behalf of the organisation while they are overseas. But it will exclude the type of case about which the noble Baroness has raised concerns, where a foreign national acts in support of an organisation which is not proscribed in his or her country—for example, if a Lebanese national living in Lebanon displays a flag associated with the military wing of Hezbollah or invites support for that wing of the organisation. These amendments will put beyond doubt that such a person will not be liable to be arrested or prosecuted should they subsequently travel to the UK.
I hope that these are welcome amendments and will answer the concerns that have been raised by a number of your Lordships. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am indeed very grateful for the Government’s amendments and their consideration of the points that have been made in Committee as well as by the committee, and at previous stages. They are very significant indeed. Amendment 26 is attributed to the Government on the groupings list but I will put that right. It would provide that, in connection with what we dealt with earlier today, the offences under paragraphs (ca) and (cb) will be relevant only where the actions are an offence in the country where they took place.
In Committee the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who was very careful to be neutral about this, cautioned the Committee to take care:
“The Bill risks criminalising a citizen of another country for doing something that is not unlawful in that country … there may be minor matters, in relative terms, which we criminalise here but are not unlawful by the laws of a different country. We need to be careful not to extend the criminal law further than it should go”.—[Official Report, 31/10/18; col. 1368.]
The government amendments have indeed dealt with one aspect—the “who”, if I can put it that way—but not with the “what”.
My Lords, the JCHR proposed a number of amendments on the subject of biometrics for the last stage. The Minister gave a long reply, quoting the Biometrics Commissioner’s support for bringing the periods for retention of data for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line with arrests under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. At that stage, it seemed to me that this did not go to the question of oversight by the commissioner, and I still do not think that has really been dealt with.
I confess that I had to go by way of Beachy Head and along the byways of PACE to arrive at Amendment 30, so I am well prepared for criticisms of the drafting. However, it is intended to ensure that the retention of biometric data for a terrorism offence has consent from the commissioner. I am entirely open to a different way of achieving that end, but I am certain in my own mind that, whatever the basis of arrest, the retention of data should require this consent. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has made clear, this amendment returns to one of the issues raised in the reports on the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights: the rules governing the retention of biometric data in national security cases. I am sorry that the noble Baroness remains unpersuaded by my previous response. I will do my best to be more persuasive today.
Without going over too much ground, it may be helpful if I briefly reiterate that Schedule 2 amends the laws that govern the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for national security purposes. The intention of these provisions is to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that the retention of DNA and fingerprints continues to be proportionate and subject to appropriate safeguards. Schedule 2 delivers this and, importantly, it retains proportionate safeguards, including regular case-by-case review and the robust independent oversight provided by the Biometrics Commissioner.
The noble Baroness’s amendment would amend paragraph 2 of Schedule 2, which harmonises the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000. Paragraph 2 does so by providing for biometric data to be retained for an automatic period of three years when an individual is arrested under PACE for a qualifying terrorist offence.
As the noble Baroness is aware, currently an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. But the same automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE. Rather, in that case, ongoing retention for national security purposes would require the police to make a national security determination with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention were solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally.
Our position on this is that having two different retention regimes in such cases is quite simply anomalous. The Bill will provide for a more consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism by providing for the same retention period in otherwise identical terrorism cases regardless of the power of arrest used. This is a proportionate and logical change.
The noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the two retention regimes would persist. Particularly against the backdrop of the heightened threat picture we face today, I am clear that it is important that the police are not deprived of information that could prove vital to keeping the public safe. That is what underlies a lot of what we seek without removing, as I emphasised earlier, the safeguards that are in place.
As noble Lords would expect, we consulted the Biometrics Commissioner on this provision. He is clear that he supports the measure, and I quoted his words last time. The noble Baroness’s amendment would have the effect not of modifying or improving this aspect of Schedule 2 but of effectively nullifying the provision and preserving the current anomaly. That disparity is not sustainable and I see no good reason for continuing it.
I sense that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness in what I have said, but I hope that she can at least see the logic of the Government’s position and perhaps, on reflection, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I think we want the same thing, but I confess that I do not understand how the Government have got here. The noble Earl did indeed quote the commissioner last time, but it seemed to me that that was on a different point. Perhaps I may check this. I think he is saying that the oversight through an NSD is equivalent to the oversight applied by PACE. I do not know whether he is able to answer that, but I am finding it difficult to understand how they are in fact exactly equivalent in the way that he is telling the House.
The strict answer to the question put by the noble Baroness is that the two Acts provide for different kinds of retention regimes, one where it is automatic for three years under certain conditions and the other where the Biometrics Commissioner has to give his permission; namely, under PACE. The point I was making was that that applies in cases which are otherwise identical and that it is simply anomalous to have that difference. The Biometrics Commissioner has actually said that it would be,
“a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences in line”.
If he is relaxed about it, I cannot see that we should not be either.
I have the Official Report of when the noble Earl quoted that last time, and it seemed to me then that that was about the retention period, not quite about the role of the commissioner. I do not think that we are going to make further progress and at this time of night it would be inappropriate for me to labour the point. It may be my fault for failing to follow the details. As I say, I have had to go by way of Beachy Head to get to the amendment that I put down. I beg leave to withdraw it.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment and I understand both her concern and that of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, I stress, as the Government did in their response to the Joint Committee’s first report on the Bill, that this measure to enable biometric data to be retained when an individual is arrested under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—for a qualifying terrorist offence is both proportionate and necessary to help protect the public.
Schedule 2 contains amendments to the laws governing the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for counterterrorism purposes. This is a complex area of law, and it may assist the Committee if I first spend a short while explaining the current position. The relevant statutory framework was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which established the principle that the biometric data of people who have not been convicted of any offence should no longer be kept indefinitely. This means that for the vast majority of people who are arrested and whose fingerprints and DNA are taken by the police, that biometric data will be promptly deleted if they are not convicted. This system is overseen by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, currently Professor Paul Wiles.
When passing the 2012 Act, Parliament recognised that it would be irresponsible, and would put the public at risk, to make this a blanket requirement in every case, regardless of the risk the individual might pose. So it made limited and tightly circumscribed provision for biometrics to be retained for limited periods in certain circumstances in the absence of a conviction. For example, if a person is arrested using the general power of arrest in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and is charged with a qualifying sexual, violent or terrorist offence, but is not ultimately convicted, it was recognised that there may be a range of reasons why they were not convicted and that they could still pose a risk of harm to the public, despite the discontinuance of the case.
In these circumstances it would be inappropriate, and indeed complacent, to ignore this risk to public safety and to require the police to immediately and automatically delete the individual’s DNA profile and fingerprints once a case is discontinued or the suspect is acquitted. The 2012 Act in these circumstances provides for a clearly limited three-year retention period before the data must be deleted. Similarly, if a person is arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist under the Terrorism Act 2000, whether or not they are subsequently charged, there is also a three-year retention period. This means that the police are better able to identify whether the individual is involved in terrorism, or other activity that poses a threat to the public, during that period. But it also means that the individual’s biometrics will not simply be held indefinitely.
In counterterrorism cases a person’s biometric data can be retained beyond the point when it would otherwise have to be deleted only if the chief officer of police of the area in which the material was taken personally considers that this is necessary for national security purposes. In these circumstances he or she can make a national security determination—or NSD—authorising retention for a further limited period, subject to a maximum of two years currently, and renewable if retention continues to be necessary. NSDs will, of course, be made only where it is proportionate to do so. This determination must then be reviewed and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that the determination is necessary. An NSD can be renewed for a further period, but only if the legal tests continue to be met and if the commissioner approves the renewed NSD. The assessment is made on the basis of intelligence and other relevant information about the threat the individual poses. We shall, of course, come to national security determinations in the next group of amendments, but it is helpful to provide an overview of these provisions up front to inform the debate on Amendment 47.
The amendments to existing legislation contained in Schedule 2 do not depart from these principles. Rather, they are intended to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that this continues to be subject to proportionate safeguards, regular case-by-case review and robust independent oversight.
We should not underestimate the value of biometric data in helping to secure convictions in terrorism cases. Such information played a vital role in the conviction in June of this year of Khalid Ali. Noble Lords will recall that Ali was arrested not far from this House and was subsequently convicted of terrorism offences, including his involvement in the use of explosive devices against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2—which Amendment 47 would delete—will harmonise the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under PACE and the Terrorism Act 2000. At present, an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. However, this automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE.
In a terrorism case, retention for national security purposes would require the police to make an NSD with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention was necessary solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally. However, the noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the retention regimes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Terrorism Act 2000 would remain. This could therefore result in the situation where the police are deprived of information that could prove vital to keep the public safe. The measure as drafted will remove this anomaly and ensure a consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism, by providing for the same retention period regardless of the power of arrest used.
I do not accept the noble Baroness’s argument that this is a race to the bottom in terms of civil liberties. I say that because, as the Committee would expect, we have consulted the Biometrics Commissioner about this and other provisions in Schedule 2. In relation to this particular provision, perhaps I may read out what Professor Wiles has said:
“In my 2017 Annual Report I mentioned several issues that I thought the Government might wish to consider reviewing as part of the CT legislation review ordered by the Prime Minister ... I … noted in my Report my concerns about the police applying for ‘pre-emptive’ NSDs, often where a person has been arrested under PACE on suspicion of a terrorism offence. It is proposed in the CT Bill to allow biometric material taken after a PACE arrest for a terrorism offence to be retained automatically for three years (with the possibility of extending this period by making an NSD), as is already the case for the biometrics of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences under TACT”—
that is, the Terrorism Act. He goes on:
“It seems to me to be a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line”.
Given that authoritative opinion, which we sought expressly from the Biometrics Commissioner, and his view that this aspect of the Bill adopts a “sensible approach”, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, the Biometrics Commissioner’s response does not seem to go to the question of oversight. As I have heard and read it, it is about the period of retention. I am not sure, but the Minister may be saying that through this amendment I have produced another failure to make the two regimes consistent, and that would certainly be an oversight on my part. If the commissioner has powers of oversight under PACE, that immediately throws into question the proportionality, and maybe the necessity, of this Bill’s provision in omitting the oversight.
What the Minister has had to say will require careful reading and I will do that. However, there has been a temptation to slide from the issue of oversight into other aspects of the arrangements, and I am not sure that the Committee has quite been answered. We will look at it, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining that the amendments seek to strike out the provisions in Schedule 2 extending the maximum duration of a national security determination from two years to five years. In responding to her previous amendment, I explained to the Committee the circumstances in which such a determination can be made. I will not cover that ground again but I reiterate that all such determinations are reviewed by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who may order the deletion of a person’s fingerprints and DNA profile if he is not satisfied that a determination is necessary.
Schedule 2 extends the maximum length of a national security determination from two years to five years. In his most recent report, the Biometrics Commissioner commented that in some cases,
“the evidence/intelligence against the relevant individuals is such that they could be granted for longer than two years”,
and suggested that the Government may want to consider legislating on this issue. We have considered the issue carefully and agree that it would be appropriate to introduce a longer maximum period. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, because his comments put this issue in its proper context.
Operational experience has shown that the current two-year length is too short in many cases and that those involved in terrorism—such that it is necessary and proportionate for the police to retain their biometric data—will often pose a more enduring threat than this. The views of those who embrace terrorism can be very entrenched. Individuals who hold such views can disengage and re-engage in terrorism unpredictably and without warning over a period longer than two years, and so can pose an ongoing risk. Individuals who travel overseas to engage in terrorist training or fighting may remain there for more than two years and are likely to pose a particularly high risk to the public on their return. There is a broad range of circumstances in which a person who presents a terrorist risk today may continue to pose a sufficient risk in two years’ time such that it will still be necessary and proportionate for the police to retain their fingerprints and DNA to help them identify if the person continues to engage or re-engages in terrorism.
This provision will therefore ensure that if a chief officer reasonably judges that the case before him or her is such a case, they will be able to authorise retention for a period of up to five years if this is necessary and proportionate. I emphasise that this will be the maximum period; it will be open to the chief officer to specify a shorter period if they consider that more proportionate. In every case, the NSD will need, as now, to be reviewed and approved by the Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that its retention is necessary.
This measure will retain the key principle that biometric data should not be retained indefinitely where the individual has not been convicted. It will continue to provide that ongoing retention should be authorised at a senior level on a case-by-case basis, and subject to approval by the independent Biometrics Commissioner. Where ongoing retention is approved, this will not be open-ended but will continue for a finite period, with review and further authorisation needed if it is to be extended beyond the expiry of the NSD. But it will strike a better balance between these important safeguards, on the one hand, and, on the other, enabling the police to use biometrics to support terrorism investigations and identify suspects without placing a disproportionate burden on themselves. The increased maximum length of an NSD will ensure that, in appropriate cases, the police do not have to review cases and reaffirm necessity and proportionality more frequently than is necessary.
I hope that I have been able to explain the operational challenge which this provision is intended to address in a proportionate manner and to reassure the noble Baroness that we are not removing the important oversight of all national security determinations by the Biometrics Commissioner. For that reason and the others that I have advanced, I ask her to consider withdrawing her amendment.
My Lords, as the Minister said on the previous amendment, these amendments have to be read with that one. NSDs and their oversight are to some extent part and parcel of the same debate. As my noble friend said, it is perhaps a debate about convenience or inconvenience. It would probably be naive of me not to accept that there is an issue of resources here, but balancing how resources are applied and human rights does not always produce immediately obvious answers. This may be a matter of fine detail or where we place the line—that, too, can be a challenge.
Thinking of challenges and listening to what the Minister had to say about the period not necessarily being two years, I wonder how an individual would challenge the period applied and how many times over recent years NSDs have been of less than two years. That may be something that the Minister is able to tell me after today’s debate. For now, looking at these two groups of amendments together, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have not yet heard from the Conservative Benches.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 6 will add a number of further terrorism offences to the list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, as I have already explained, to which extraterritorial jurisdiction—or ETJ—applies. This means that individuals can be prosecuted in the UK courts for conduct that took place outside the UK which would have been unlawful under an offence listed at Section 17 had it taken place here.
Following further consideration, we have identified two additional offences where it would be right to extend ETJ to ensure that the full range of relevant terrorism offences is covered. These are, first, the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation at Section 12(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and, secondly, the offence of expressing an opinion or belief in support of a proscribed organisation, reckless as to whether another person will be encouraged to support the organisation, which Clause 1 will insert into the 2000 Act as new Section 12(1A). Extending ETJ to these offences will help to tackle radicalisation, particularly by people who have travelled from the UK to join a terrorist organisation and reach back to the UK to spread its propaganda and promote its aims. This will allow prosecution in a case where, for example, someone overseas is in contact with a person in the UK, who may be a vulnerable person such as a child, and is either deliberately or recklessly encouraging them to support a particular proscribed organisation, such as Daesh.
Clause 6 received broad support in the House of Commons and, with the exception of the extension of ETJ to the Section 13 offence which we have just debated, has also been supported in this House. None the less, I hope that your Lordships will be persuaded that it is the right approach to ensure that we have as comprehensive coverage as possible of terrorist offences that might be committed overseas, subject to the normal safeguards, so that we can protect the public in this country. I commend this amendment to the Committee on that basis.
My Lords, since the Joint Committee on Human Rights is meeting at this moment it has not been possible to take its view on this amendment but I think it must follow from my comments on Clause 1 that it would not be enthusiastic, as these provisions obviously have to be read together. I was amused that the Minister said, as did the noble Baroness’s letter to noble Lords of 24 October, that the Government have identified further offences. They are not quite offences yet, are they? It would perhaps be fairer to say that the amendment is consequential on Clause, but that is a minor point.
My Lords, I too had written down not just “timelines” but “evidence to the review”. I do not think one can disregard that. The Minister also referred to lower-level offences, which were commented on by the Sentencing Council, but we seem to have slid away from that.
The Minister put great emphasis on the need to—I hope I am quoting him correctly—strengthen the ability of the police and the agencies in the criminal justice system to intervene. I do not think anyone has queried the seriousness of the offences that we are discussing, nor have we queried the powers. That has not been the thrust of the argument.
The Minister has not disputed the mean average of three years and four months. Of course, I appreciate that any average is an average, so there are much higher periods and much lower ones, but 10 years seems to send a pretty clear message, which was the term that he used, and it leaves a lot of headroom above the average. Three years and four months is quite a shortfall from 10 years. Unless there is a big increase in that, there will be an even greater shortfall from 15 years. I would have thought that that sent a rather dangerous message. The message that I take is the one from the very recent sentencing guidelines, whose consideration, as a matter of common sense, must have been taken into account in preparing the Bill—or should have been.
I think we have more discussion to come on this issue. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I can ask both the noble Lord and the Minister a question: first, one to the Minister. Is the requirement for proof found in any other provision for reasonable excuse? I have been looking during the past few minutes; I could not find an example, but I did not get my iPad out to start reading through the whole of the Terrorism Act.
Secondly, I see the attraction of the term “state”. On who has to show what and in what order, we have been referred to Section 118 of the Terrorism Act. The terminology of that is “adducing evidence”. I am not sure whether the term “state” used by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is intended to be the equivalent of “adduce evidence”.
My Lords, as we have discussed, the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which would be inserted as a new Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Clause 4, is subject to a reasonable excuse defence. We have already debated the circumstances which might give rise to a reasonable excuse and how these should be catered for within the Bill.
Amendment 18 addresses a different aspect of that provision: the question of how much the evidence is required to establish a defence to the new offence. Related to this is the question of whom the evidential burden is placed on. Section 118 of the 2000 Act sets out how the evidential burden applies to a number of defences to criminal offences within the 2000 Act, including the new designated area offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is concerned that the current drafting of new Section 58B(2), which contains the defence to the designated area offence, is out of step with the existing provision in Section 118 of the 2000 Act and will place a greater burden on defendants to make out a reasonable excuse than is envisaged by Section 118.
I understand and respect the noble Lord’s wish to ensure that defendants facing a charge under Section 58B are not placed in a worse position than those charged under other offences with a similar reasonable excuse defence. However, I hope that I can allay that concern and provide a clear assurance that this will not be the case if I explain how Section 118 interacts with the defence to the new Section 58B offence.
The wording used in the defence, which refers to a defendant proving that he or she had a reasonable excuse, is the exact same formulation used elsewhere in various defences to offences contained in the 2000 Act, including the defence to the Section 58 offence amended by Clause 3. It is vital to recognise that this reference in the defence to “prove” should not be read on its own; rather it is subject to the operation of Section 118, which makes further provision on what is required to prove a defence in this context.
Specifically, Section 118 provides that if a defendant,
“adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”—
the matter that has to be proved under the wording of the defence—
“the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.
This, together with relevant case law, has the effect that if a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support a suggestion that he or she has a reasonable excuse, then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that defence, which it must do to the normal criminal standard—beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to do so, then the jury must assume that the defence is made out.
The precise extent and nature of evidence required on the part of the defendant to invoke the defence in the first instance will be a matter for juries to determine in individual cases. Parliament has set a threshold which is not particularly high; all that is needed is,
“evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”.
In practice, a trial judge would be cautious to rule out any proposed defence unless it was plainly incapable of being judged by a jury as a reasonable one. In relation to new Section 58B(2), the evidential burden placed on the defendant will not be any greater than that required in relation to any of the other offences to which Section 118 applies. Furthermore, were Section 118 to continue to apply to new Section 58B(2), the amendment would have no impact in practice. Whether new Section 58B(2) refers to the defendant stating or proving the defence, under Section 118, it will still be for the jury to decide whether the prosecution has disproved the defence beyond reasonable doubt.
My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. “Prove” is used in some six other sections of the 2000 Act, including Sections 57, 58 and 58A, so it is not inconsistent with the generality. However, as the noble and learned Lord has picked this out, I can do no other than to take the point very seriously, and I undertake to do so. If he will suspend his scepticism for a moment, I want to make the point that, in addition to creating an inconsistency between the designated area offence and others with a similar reasonable excuse defence, this would also unsettle a well-established legal position with which the courts and prosecutors are very familiar, and on which there is clear case law.
I very much hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment, subject to the undertaking that I have just given.
Before the noble Lord responds, I am not sure whether I heard the Minister correctly. It sounded as if he said that the requirement for proof elsewhere was proof on behalf of the prosecution. I may well have misheard him, but I am making the point now because that would not be an answer to this point, which is about proof by the defendant.
My Lords, if I misspoke or misread, I apologise. I was seeking to say that, as long as a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support whatever suggestion he is making—that he has a reasonable excuse—then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that to the criminal standard.
My Lords, it is probably best if I write to the noble Baroness in response to her specific questions. The broad answer is that we have thought of the practicalities. As regards informing people who are already in the designated area that it has been designated and that they therefore have 28 days to leave, there would be FCO travel advice that would almost certainly have pre-existed the designation. The regulations would be given significant publicity, including as part of the requested debate of the designation regulations. There would be a notice on the government website and we would consider other methods of publicity depending on the area being designated.
On the question of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, about innocent people who have already been caught up in events and the situation within a designated area, the reasonable excuse defence would kick in. As we said in our earlier debates, where it is perfectly obvious that someone is in a designated area for an innocent reason, it is almost unthinkable that the authorities would spend time trying to make a case against them. Their reasonable excuse would be advanced and the circumstances of the case, if they are innocent, would be obvious from the outset. As I have said, we have had the reasonable excuse defence in place for 18 years and, as far as I am aware, there have been no instances of innocent people being arrested or convicted.
That is as far as I can go at the moment, although I am conscious that I have not completely covered the issues raised. However, I will write and copy my letter to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
My Lords, when the Minister writes, could he confirm that the “one month” in new Section 58B(3)(b) is 28 days? He said 28 days; the wording is “one month”. I am sure somewhere we are told whether it is a calendar month or 28 days, but perhaps he could let us know.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before the noble Lord responds, I was wondering, as the Minister was speaking, why the Government decided to include new subsection (3A). It applies only to the subsection (3) but, if it is required for that subsection, was there something in the operation of the earlier provisions of Section 58 that has prompted this? New subsection (3A) provides that:
“The cases in which a person has a reasonable excuse ... include (but are not limited to) those in which … the person did not know, and had no reason to believe, that the document or record in question contained … information … likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”
The Minister may not be able to respond to that now, but it goes to the heart of the debate.
My Lords, I recognise the noble Baroness’s point. I understand that that provision went into the Bill when the three clicks provision came out. It was intended to provide a measure of reassurance in substitution for the three clicks idea that someone who acted in complete ignorance would not be caught. Frankly, one can argue it both ways—to leave it in the Bill or to take it out—but, on balance, we felt that it was right to put it in the Bill for that added measure of reassurance.
That is an interesting response and I will have to think about it. I share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, not to involve the Executive where it should not tread. There could be parliamentary scrutiny. We have become possibly too reliant on codes of this and that to flesh out what lies underneath legislation—it is not something I much like, and I have obviously been sucked into it. So we could have parliamentary scrutiny if we had a statutory instrument, but we could also list in the Bill the sorts of examples we have talked about, in the way that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, seeks to do in Clause 4. I think that that is a particularly good way of going about it.
I do not suppose the Minister can answer this, but his reference to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation prompts me to ask about progress in appointing the new reviewer. He is indicating that he cannot answer, and I did not expect him to, but it is a point that was worth making at some stage in this debate.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 245 and 246. These amendments take us back to the question of the reimbursement of the operators’ costs. We have heard frequent assurances about the operators’ compliance costs and that they are to be met, but the words of the Bill do not quite live up to some of the narrative.
Our three amendments cover two alternatives; they would not all be possible. Amendments 244 and 245 would provide that arrangements were in force to secure for the operators the full amount of all relevant costs—“relevant costs” are defined later in the clause—not an appropriate contribution. As Clause 225(1) is framed, the Secretary of State must ensure,
“an appropriate contribution in respect of such of their relevant costs as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
With these two amendments, we seek to take out that element of discretion.
Amendment 246 would provide that if the contribution was not an equal amount, there should be regulations regarding the basis of how the contribution is calculated. Our amendments provide that the Secretary of State should lay regulations to that effect. It will be obvious to noble Lords that our reasons are transparency, equality between operators and the opportunity to consider the criteria—the factors, if you like—applied in calculating the contribution. In other words, our intention is scrutiny, using the opportunity that regulations give for debate of their content.
We have debated this matter on a number of occasions, and the Minister will be well aware of our concern. This is an attempt, at this almost last stage, to pin down just how the contribution will be made. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 244 and 245 are intended to ensure that communications service providers are fully reimbursed for their costs in connection with complying with obligations under the Bill. As the noble Baroness knows, this matter has been considered at length both in this House and in the Commons. It is important to recognise that service providers must not be unduly disadvantaged financially for complying with obligations placed on them aimed at protecting national security or combating crime. Indeed, the Government have a long history of working with service providers on these matters and we have been absolutely clear that we are committed to cost recovery.
I once again take the opportunity to reaffirm to the House a point that both my right honourable friend the former Security Minister and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made very clear in the other place and that I made in Committee: this Government will reimburse 100% of reasonable costs incurred by communications service providers in relation to the acquisition and retention of communications data. This includes both capital and operational costs, including the costs associated with the retention of internet connection records.
The question that the House needs to consider, I submit, is whether it is appropriate for the Parliament of today to tie the hands of future Governments on this issue. That does not mean that we take our commitment lightly, or that future Governments will necessarily or lightly change course. Indeed, it is unlikely that any change in policy will ever take place. For example, the current policy has not changed since the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and so has survived Governments of three different colours, or combinations of colours.
The Bill adds further safeguards, requiring a data retention notice to set out the level of contribution that applies. This ensures that the provider must be consulted on any changes to the cost model and means that the provider could seek a review of any variation to the notice which affected the level of contribution.
Another question that I hope the House will consider is whether a communications service provider should be able to derive commercial benefit as a result of the obligations imposed on them in relation to the other powers under the Bill. Sometimes, it may be necessary for a communications service provider to upgrade part of its infrastructure to comply with an obligation imposed on it under a technical capability notice. As the communications service providers may be able to derive some business benefit from that upgrade, it is right that the legislation allows for the contribution to the costs to be appropriate to the circumstances.
Some noble Lords have expressed concern about the term “reasonable costs” and asked what it means. I hope I can provide some reassurance on that point. Significant public funding is made available to companies to ensure that they can provide assistance to public authorities in tackling terrorism, crime and other threats. As costs are reimbursed from public funds, the codes of practice make very clear that companies should take value for money into account when procuring, operating and maintaining the infrastructure required to comply with a notice. Were a company to select a solution that did not deliver best value for public funds, I am sure noble Lords would agree that it is absolutely right that the Government would need to consider carefully whether those costs were reasonable and therefore whether it was appropriate to reimburse the company in full.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 246 acknowledges that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for a communications service provider to be reimbursed less than its full costs. However, we do not think her proposed regulations provide the required flexibility. As I just explained, communications service providers may receive some business benefit from the changes made to their systems and it is appropriate that the Government are able to discuss these matters with them on a case-by-case basis, rather than be bound by general regulations. Indeed, while communications service providers would welcome an amendment to require 100% cost recovery in all cases, I suggest that they are unlikely to welcome regulations which enshrine in law circumstances where they would not receive full reimbursement.
I hope I have allayed any concerns about the Government’s position on costs and accordingly invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, until the last two or three sentences, I thought the noble Earl had made a much better case for regulations than I did. I am a little worried about his argument that regulations cannot provide for flexibility. Flexibility is not necessarily bad, but how it is exercised should be transparent, and that is what my amendment is driving at.
The noble Earl started his remarks by saying that the operators should not be “unduly disadvantaged”, and it is those words which caveat the commitment that has troubled us throughout our debates. We have tried, particularly with the third amendment, to meet the points made by the Government. I will obviously not pursue this any further; we have reached the end of the road. I have no doubt that someone will draw to our attention any problem in practice in future. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has set perhaps the hardest task for the Minister today in asking him to comment on what was perhaps not a coded speech but simply one inviting speculation.
Turning to the amendment itself, as on the first day of Report we are sympathetic to where the noble Baroness is coming from. Indeed, I think we had an amendment on “reasonable suspicion” at an earlier stage. However, perhaps again I should phrase what I have to say as a request for confirmation, as my noble friend Lord Paddick did last week. Reasonable suspicion is encompassed by the necessity and proportionality test. The way the noble Baroness has expressed it is that there is a moderate-sized hurdle to be got over and then a higher hurdle to be surmounted, by having “reasonable suspicion” and then the necessity and proportionality test. To keep up the athletic metaphor, you will not get over the higher hurdle even if you get over the lower one, so it seems to us that you might as well just have the higher hurdle. Perhaps we can be given some more assurances about how the different criteria will bite.
My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and I am grateful for the case she has put. However, I cannot agree with it, and I will explain why that is.
As the noble Baroness explained, this amendment seeks to provide that certain communications data authorisations can be approved only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. In short, the amendment would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. I will now set out why I believe that is so.
I shall start with the requirement for reasonable suspicion. As we discussed and agreed in this House last week, the necessity and proportionality test is established and well understood. It is difficult, therefore, to see what benefit would be derived from inserting a different test. Indeed, in order to approve an authorisation for communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required—a speculative authorisation would never be approved. Therefore, I suggest that the amendment responds to a concern that is fundamentally misplaced.
Turning to the serious crime threshold that this amendment would insert, assuming that the noble Baroness intends the threshold to be equal to that currently used to authorise the interception of communications, I believe once again that the amendment is inappropriate and damaging. Taking effective action against serious criminals often requires the investigation of, if I may use the phrase, lower-level individuals for activities that are not considered serious crimes in order to build a case against higher-ranked criminals. It may also include the investigation of minor offences where stopping an offender at this point may prevent an escalation of their criminal activities, such as in stalking and grooming cases.
It might be helpful if I expand on that. Placing this additional restriction on the acquisition of communications data would disrupt police investigations of online grooming and linked crimes, such as the sending of sexual communications to a child. This is because where such activity does not meet the high threshold proposed, which will often be the case if the child is over the age of 13, it may be impossible to identify perpetrators who may go on to be involved in child sexual exploitation. As such activities increasingly take place online, law enforcement agencies will rely heavily on communications data and the new power in relation to internet connection records in order to investigate this.
The amendment would also reduce the ability to investigate online fraud, which affects everyday internet users who shop or bank online, but which could, depending on the value of the fraud, fall below the serious crime threshold proposed here. Equally, the Department for Work and Pensions, for instance, investigates false tax credit claims which can result in the collective overpayment of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money, but these false claims may not individually reach the threshold of serious crime. Communications data are currently used to investigate such activity.
I also believe that these amendments are unnecessary given the strict safeguards that already apply to the use of communications data. Data can be accessed only on a case-by-case basis and only where judged necessary and proportionate by a senior officer of a rank specified by Parliament and who is independent of the investigation. Strong judicial oversight will also be provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for qualifying his party’s position on this part of the Bill. We maintain that our existing regime and the proposals in the Investigatory Powers Bill are compliant with EU law, but whatever the final judgment, given the importance of communications data to preventing and detecting crime and safeguarding national security, we will ensure that plans are in place so that the police and others can continue to acquire such data in a way that is consistent with our obligation. I hope that that is helpful.
My Lords, I hope that I can reassure the noble Baroness. Amendment 100A is unnecessary since the use, retention and destruction of all personal data held by public authorities, including communications data, are already regulated by the Data Protection Act 1998. That means that, once communications data have been obtained, there must be a lawful purpose for their use and ongoing retention, and they must be destroyed when they are no longer held for a lawful purpose. I would draw the attention of noble Lords to Chapter 11 of the Communications Data DRAFT Code of Practice, which sets out detailed requirements, consistent with the Data Protection Act, on public authorities about the use, disclosure, protection and destruction of the communications data they hold.
In addition, the amendment would unnecessarily, and in some cases very damagingly, require a public authority to destroy communications data it had obtained once they had been used for the purpose for which they were acquired, but other legitimate and important purposes for holding data may still exist. For example, a public authority is obliged by law to retain material it holds that has been used in evidence to support a conviction in case of appeal or to overturn a potential miscarriage of justice. It is also obliged to retain any material that is potentially exculpatory, even if it considers that it no longer requires the data for the original purpose for which it was acquired. This amendment would cut across those important tenets of our criminal justice system and I cannot imagine that that is what the noble Baroness wants to see.
I hope that, in combination, what I have been able to explain will reassure her sufficiently to enable her to withdraw the amendment.
I should obviously have included something like the words “except as otherwise required by law”. I am grateful for that explanation and I am sympathetic to the Government trying to get everything into the Bill, but here we find yet another example of another piece of legislation that we need to look at. However, it is helpful to have the explanation, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 160 is a probing amendment, and the debate should be short. Schedule 7 provides for codes of practice. Our debates on the previous day of Report on journalistic material, which is referred to in paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 7, made me have a look at the personal records which are also referred to in that paragraph as being “relevant confidential information”. I was concerned about health records, because the information is described as that,
“which is held in confidence by a member of a profession”.
I wanted to check that health records would fall within this. A health authority obviously does not cover all of this. There are health records which are held for entirely proper purposes but not by people that one might describe as being professionals—or certainly not members of a profession. So I decided, even at this late stage, to table this amendment in order that we could understand precisely what is meant by confidential information when it consists of personal records. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 160 would amend Schedule 7 to the Bill to require that every code of practice made under the Bill must provide guidance in relation to personal records held by a health authority. I hope I can convince the noble Baroness that this amendment is unnecessary. Schedule 7 already requires that the codes of practice must make provision relating to personal records held by a member of a profession, which would include health records held by a medical professional.
The Government do not believe that it is necessary to impose a similar requirement for personal records held by a health authority, as that is a discrete issue which will not be relevant to all of the codes of practice. For example, it will not be relevant to communications data. Of course, that does not mean that the codes cannot include such material should it be necessary to do so. There is already a reference to a health service body in the draft personal datasets code, for example.
The codes of practice have been published in draft to help facilitate parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill, but they will be subject to consultation and separate further scrutiny by Parliament after Royal Assent. That will provide noble Lords and others with the opportunity to consider the detail contained in the codes, including to argue the case for the inclusion of particular issues in particular codes of practice. On that basis, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, that is helpful and it has enabled me to make my point, which may of course be one that we will come back to, depending on how we view the codes when we come to deal with them. I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hesitated because I thought the Minister might wish to introduce the government amendments before I spoke to mine, as I think one of mine may be an amendment to one of his. We on these Benches support the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, on Amendment 1. It would provide a very clear statement of purpose for the Bill, and one which would be very useful. The Lord Advocate said in Committee that an amendment similar to this would not add value. On the contrary, it would add value by giving that statement of purpose. The first clause is badged as an overview of the Act. In fact, what it does is to list the different parts of the Act and give an overview of each of them. The clause does not give an overview of the Act; the noble Lord’s amendment would do so, and the clause would live up to its name.
We have Amendments 8, 9 and 12 in this group. Amendment 8 would provide that the powers should not be used if the objectives could be achieved by other, less intrusive means. This, too, was an amendment that we debated in Committee. The Bill provides that regard must be had to the possibility of achievement by other, less intrusive means. My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill apologises that he cannot be here today—although I am not sure whether one should apologise for an illness. He has kept me up to date with his position. He talked about the “rubbery” quality of the term “have regard to”. This amendment would make the obligation an absolute one—but not an unreasonable one, because the term “reasonably”, as in,
“could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means”,
is included. My noble friend Lord Lester referred to this as,
“classic principle of proportionality language”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 53.]
I was pleased that, on that occasion, we had the support of my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who said that the wording,
“would be more useful and more certain”,
than that with which he was comparing it, and that, above all, it would,
“avoid unnecessary disputes about the meaning of and compliance with Article 8”—
that is, Article 8 of the convention—
“in the courts”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 54.]
My noble friend Lord Lester had painted a rather gloomy picture of the problems that could arise if the legislation was not absolutely clear.
The noble Earl agreed to consider the proposition. He referred to the use of the wording in codes of practice. My noble friend Lord Carlile, who was more polite than I was about problems with codes of practice, said that he supported the amendment because it would be preferable to have the words in the Bill,
“rather than face the inevitable consequences of legal discussions in the courts as to the role of codes of practice and their enforceability? Putting the words in the Bill at least provides certainty”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 56.]
Both my noble friends have very considerable experience of arguing the case—no doubt both ways—in the courts. I am not sure whether the Government’s Amendments 10 and 11 are intended to address the point that we were debating. I am sure I will be told.
Our other amendment, which I will have to speak to now because we are on Report, is an amendment to government Amendment 11. I welcome government Amendments 10 and 11, but I am a bit uneasy about intrusiveness being gauged against the sensitivity of the information. My point is a wider one: everyone in every case should expect the least intrusive means to be tried first. Amendment 12 to government Amendment 11 is tabled to understand whether everything in Amendment 11 falls within Amendment 10. We have wording in Amendment 10 about the “particular sensitivity” of information. Amendment 11 gives examples of “sensitive” information. Are there, therefore, two hurdles to be crossed: “sensitive” and “particular sensitivity”? Amendment 12 seeks to understand how the two amendments relate to one another.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, has again spoken persuasively on the importance of making clear that privacy is at the heart of the Bill. The amendment tabled in his name, on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, serves to reinforce that point and provide greater clarity. He will be pleased to know that, on that basis, I am happy to support it.
Included in this group are a number of government amendments. Clause 2 brings together in one place at the front of the Bill the considerations a public authority must have regard to, and the duties that apply, when exercising a power provided by this Bill.
Amendments 2 through to 7 are technical amendments to ensure that the obligations under Clause 2 continue to “bite” in relation to the roles of judicial commissioners under the Bill as amended in this House. Some of these could be seen as consequential to amendments that we shall discuss in the coming days. If the House will allow, I do not believe that it would be helpful to expand on them here, save to say that the Government propose to introduce greater protections in respect of the retention of communications data and the treatment of sensitive professions under the Bill. Where those protections create a role for judicial commissioners, the amendments will again ensure that the duties imposed by Clause 2 continue to apply in respect of the commissioners’ expanded remit.
My Lords, this will be, I hope, short and uncontentious. The amendment was suggested to us by the Law Society of Scotland. It seeks clarification and, of course, an amendment if one is required to achieve the point.
Clause 7 introduces Schedule 1 to the Bill and provides for “Monetary penalties for certain unlawful interceptions”. Under paragraph 4(4) of Schedule 1, a person who is the subject of a penalty notice may,
“request an oral hearing before the Commissioner in order to make representations”.
Our amendment would provide that such a person may have legal representation to assist with those representations.
The Law Society of Scotland says that,
“given the nature of the Bill and from an equality of arms perspective, legal representation should be available as a right”.
I would say that legal representation should generally be available, whatever the Bill, whether it is 10 pages or 250-plus pages and complicated. It is an important point to clarify. There is no provision which says there may not be legal representation, so it may be that this can be dealt with outside the Bill; certainly, there should be no block on it. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to the point. I beg to move.
My Lords, I trust I can deal with this amendment with a degree of brevity equal to that employed by the noble Baroness. I reassure her that the amendment is not necessary. It is already the case that a person on whom a monetary penalty notice has been served who requests an oral hearing before the commissioner can be legally represented at the hearing. There is nothing in the Bill that would preclude such representation, and of course it will be up to the person on whom the notice is served to choose whether or not they wish to be so represented. Therefore, what is intended by the amendment is already provided for. Accordingly, I hope the noble Baroness will feel comfortable in withdrawing the amendment.
I am grateful for that assurance. The point is that it is not provided against, rather than that it is provided for. I dare say somebody will be writing rules about these hearings at some point, so I am glad to have that assurance on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have three amendments in this group—but, first, I thank the noble Earl for the amendment reducing the five-day period in the case of urgency regarding modifications so that it is in line with the urgent issue of warrants. He referred to agility; three days preserves agility as it requires a judicial commissioner to be slightly more agile. More importantly, it is consistent and sensible. We were puzzled during Committee as to why the very similar arrangements about urgency were not consistent with regard to the time period, so we are glad to have taken that step forward.
Two of our amendments, Amendments 40 and 41, also refer to modifications. Clause 34 refers to modifications using provisions about,
“adding the name or description of a person, organisation or set of premises”.
We would add “or varying” to “adding” because it seems that a variation may be as significant as—and in effect amount to—an addition. I acknowledge that under Clause 32, which defines major modifications, variations of “name or description” are included. But Clause 34, to which our amendments would apply, allows modifications which are “necessary” and “proportionate”. Do we actually have consistency here? I am worried that by not allowing for variations within the regime of major modifications, we might let some additions in through the back door.
Amendment 66 would amend Clause 96, which is about the subject matter of equipment interference warrants. There is no restriction on the use of targeted thematic equipment interference warrants, unlike bulk EI warrants, which can be used to obtain only overseas communications data or information and are available only to the security services. Under the clause, there is no limit to the size of,
“a group of persons who share a common purpose”—
although I accept that “common purpose” contains a natural limit—nor to what is meant by,
“more than one person or organisation”.
That has dictated where we have tabled this amendment, which suggests a limit of 50 persons for a single investigation. It is clearly an arbitrary figure but it is there to try to tease out, a little more than perhaps we were able to in Committee, how this will work and how it could not grow in the application to such an extent as to defeat what we see as the purpose of those provisions. So we are not of course wedded to 50 but we are wedded to finding out a little more about the operation of this.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for speaking to her amendments so clearly, as she always does. Perhaps I may first address Amendments 40 and 41, which relate to Clause 34. I do not believe that these amendments are in fact necessary. I agree that in circumstances where an agency seeks to add something to a warrant, that should be possible only where it is both necessary and proportionate. That is what the Bill provides, and that necessity and proportionality test applies whether a name or description is being added, or where a factor is being added.
However, I do not agree that a necessity and proportionality test is relevant where a name, description or factor is simply being varied. In such a case, the conduct authorised by the Secretary of State and approved by the judicial commissioner is not changing in substance. An example might be where an individual is identified initially by a nickname but their true identity subsequently becomes known. I will give another example, which I hope will reassure the noble Baroness. During Committee noble Lords expressed concern about warrants against premises. If an agency applies for a warrant against a premises at, let us imagine, 25 Acacia Avenue and it turns out that it actually intended to target 125 Acacia Avenue, in that sort of case the original warrant should be cancelled and the error reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner —and an entirely new warrant should be sought. So there are two types of variation, if I may put it that way. One, I suggest, should not require the process that the noble Baroness has suggested; the other also should not require the process because it should be subject to an entirely fresh warrant. I hope that that provides her with the necessary reassurance.
Turning now to Amendment 66, as the noble Baroness explained, the amendment seeks to limit the number of persons that a targeted examination warrant issued under Part 5 may relate to. The amendment would clearly mean that any individual targeted examination warrant that relates to multiple persons for the purposes of a single investigation or operation under Clause 96(2)(c) could not relate to more than 50 persons. I believe that inserting such an arbitrary limit would be a mistake—I know the noble Baroness realises that it is an arbitrary figure—and that it would not add to the strong safeguards already provided for in the Bill.
The decision on whether a warrant is necessary and proportionate is rightly one for the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner. There may be circumstances in which the case for examining the material of more than 50 persons is entirely proportionate to what is sought to be gained from that task. For example, if the security and intelligence agencies are investigating UK-based users of websites hosting illegal child pornography, it would be detrimental and dangerous to limit the number of people they could investigate to a particular figure. This could in some cases result in material relating to dangerous subjects of interest escaping entirely appropriate examination simply because they were past the relevant number that would be set out in statute if this amendment or something like it were accepted.
Mandating that a targeted examination warrant must not relate to more than 50 people would mean either that vital operations could not proceed or that the intelligence agencies would on some occasions need to submit multiple applications for warrants relating to a single investigation or operation. That would needlessly increase the bureaucratic burden placed upon the agencies and the issuing authority while also hampering the ability of the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner to consider the operation in full. Such a restriction would add no additional rigour to the already robust double-lock process.
Introducing an arbitrary restriction does nothing to ensure that the principles of necessity and proportionality are upheld, but the role of judicial commissioners, already provided for by the Bill, does. That is why the Bill requires both the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the breadth of a warrant is appropriate without the imposition of indiscriminate limits. In summary, the amendment has the potential to be damaging, needlessly bureaucratic or both, and I invite the noble Baroness not to press it.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, Amendment 234A deals with the review of the operation of this legislation. The amendment would reduce the length of time for which it has been in operation from five years and six months to two years and six months. It is of course good practice to conduct post-legislative scrutiny, particularly for legislation as significant as the Bill. That is what the Bill provides for. Notwithstanding any suggestion by virtue of the amendment that the House might be eager to revisit the issue within the scope of this Parliament, I suggest that reducing the time for which the legislation had been operating before the review takes place would be profoundly unhelpful in assessing its utility.
First, the timing of when the review should occur is precisely as the Joint Committee convened to scrutinise the draft Bill recommended. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, that committee considered that work on a review,
“should begin within six months of the end of the fifth year after which the Bill is enacted”.
We have followed that lead.
I was asked what kind of review this would involve. As I mentioned, the Bill attempts to give effect to the recommendation of the committee. We cannot, clearly, bind Parliament in the actions that it takes, so the Bill provides for consideration of any report by a committee of Parliament. I hope that again accords with the steer that the Joint Committee gave us.
Of course, we must ensure that before such a review takes place, all the Bill’s provisions have commenced and been in effect for a sufficient period so that a review is meaningful and effective. As the Joint Committee again concluded:
“The evidence of several years’ operation will inform the debate”.
A review after two and a half years runs the risk that processes and capabilities will not have had sufficient time to bed down before they are subject to a formal review. We need to bear in mind, in particular, that communication service providers will need to implement legislation. Surely the last thing we want is for them to turn round after a short time, if the noble Baroness’s proposal gains traction, and say that it is too soon. We do not wish to create uncertainty for them at this stage. They have to implement this, as has everybody else. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, rightly said that it is important that the impact of the Act should be reviewed and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also correctly spoke of the need to monitor how the Act was working. I do not disagree with either.
However, I would just point out that an urgent review of the Act is not necessary, given the strong oversight provided in the Bill by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the requirement that the commissioner should publish annual reports. The exercise of the powers provided for under the Bill will be subject to the ongoing oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and his report will be laid before Parliament. I was grateful for the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He referred to David Anderson’s recommendation to establish a technical advisory panel. I am reserving judgment on that recommendation in the light of our debates last week. David Anderson said, in paragraph 9.3, that the point of the TAP would not be to provide an alternative oversight function, or to place new regulatory burdens on the SIAs. Rather it would serve to inform the Secretary of State and enhance the work of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner by ensuring that both are kept as up-to-date as possible with the fast-moving technologies whose use they are asked to approve. There is good sense in not overlaying the oversight that the Act will have too heavily. For all those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. I hope that what I have said convinces her that there is some logic to the Government’s position.
My Lords, before I respond, I wonder whether the Minister can tell the Committee when it is expected that the provisions of the Bill will commence. Does he have that information?
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and I am sure he will understand the importance of the question of the extent to which the Government have decided when the provision should commence. I imagine they must have a programme in mind. He says that the timing is precisely as the Joint Committee proposed, but it is not, as we have heard, the type of review proposed by the committee, as I understand the report. Yes, of course we want to avoid uncertainty, but we would argue that a shorter period would give greater confidence to the communication service providers and others that changes in technology and the operation of the Bill will be made as soon as they reasonably should, to assist them as well as everyone else.
The Minister mentioned the IPC’s report under Clause 210, but I believe the Secretary of State does not have to act on it. The Minister mentioned that the technology advisory panel is primarily about technology, although David Anderson argued forcefully that it should comprise more than technicians. I do not want that word to sound pejorative—I am searching for a more respectful term—but I am sure the Committee will understand.
This is an important issue, and I cannot promise that we shall not return to it on Report.
(7 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend and I decided that I would be the one to confess how difficult I find it to understand Clause 151(5), so this is a probing amendment. I managed to make some progress in following the trail between different clauses and subsections this morning, but it involved something like copying and pasting chunks of wording in my head. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain straightforwardly what follows from modifying a bulk acquisition warrant so that it no longer authorises or requires telecoms operators to do what is listed in Clause 146(5)(a). We are told to disregard Clause 151(2)(a), but the same criteria are then brought in by reference to Clause 146(1)(a) and Clause 146(2). I am sorry to be dim, but we decided that this probably justified seeking a short explanation.
I have complimented the draftsmen of the Bill—and I do not resile from that—as it is very helpful to have references to where definitions are to be found and so on, but given the complexity of the subject matter, this is a plea for the Bill to say, for example, “If a warrant is modified so that there is no requirement on a telecoms operator, then, in the case of renewal, the following”. That would have caused slightly less of a scrambled brain. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness has explained, Amendment 210ZA relates to the modification of a bulk acquisition warrant for the purpose of allowing examination of material after acquisition has ceased. Here, we come back to the issue that we debated earlier in relation to Amendments 201ZC and 217C, which covered bulk interception and bulk equipment interference warrants. The amendment would remove important technical provisions from the Bill—a point that I made in that earlier debate.
The Bill enables a bulk acquisition warrant to be modified such that it no longer authorises the acquisition of any material but continues to authorise the selection of material for examination. The circumstances catered for here are limited to a situation where it may no longer be necessary or possible to continue the collection of data, such as where a communications service provider goes out of business, but the data collected up to that point under a warrant remain pertinent. In circumstances such as those, it may continue to be necessary and proportionate to examine data that have already been collected under that warrant.
Clause 151(5), which the amendment would remove, simply clarifies that a warrant that has been modified in that way remains a valid bulk warrant if the Secretary of State considers that examination of the acquired data remains necessary and it is approved by a judicial commissioner. That is necessary because Clause 146(5) states that one of the conditions of the warrant is that its main purpose is to acquire data. But, of course, a warrant that has been modified in the manner I have described will no longer meet that condition because it will no longer authorise the collection of data.
I hope that that explanation clarifies any uncertainty in the noble Baroness’s mind and that she will agree that these provisions are necessary.
My Lords, that is extremely helpful, and I got an example without asking for it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(7 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, let me turn first to Amendments 194CA and 194CB in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which deal with Clause 214.
Clause 214 allows a Secretary of State to modify the functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or other judicial commissioners. This will allow the functions of the judicial commissioners to be extended, but also to be changed to reflect any potential changes to the investigatory powers that the commissioners oversee. The judicial commissioners will oversee the use of a wide range of powers, including some in other enactments. Those powers may in due course be changed or updated, perhaps in the same way that this Bill is replacing parts of RIPA. In such a case, it is right that the functions of the judicial commissioners could be modified to reflect the changes. However, this may not mean an extension of the judicial commissioners’ oversight. The change may be entirely neutral—for example, a public authority changing its name or something of that sort. If these amendments were accepted, such a sensible change would not be possible.
I hope I can reassure noble Lords that this power will not be used to reduce the oversight provided by the commissioners. The Government have been very clear on this point. It is also worth reminding the Committee that this power is subject to the affirmative procedure and that Parliament will have to approve any regulations made under this clause. So any attempt to diminish the commissioner’s oversight responsibilities, were such an attempt to be made, would no doubt be scrutinised extremely carefully by each House of Parliament, particularly in the light of the assurance that I have just given.
The Committee will recall that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed a concern about the breadth of the order-making power, as was made clear by noble Lords. It recommended that it should not extend to the IPC’s functions relating to the authorisation of warrants. The Government accepted this recommendation, and this clause has been amended accordingly.
Amendments 194CC, 194CD and 194CE deal with changes to Schedule 7. Amendment 194CC would require the Secretary of State to consult persons interested in a code of practice before issuing such a code. This amendment is unnecessary as the clause as drafted provides for the publication of codes in draft and for the Secretary of State to consider representations on the draft codes. In order for the Secretary of State to hear representations on the code, the Bill requires a consultation to be conducted.
I understand that Amendments 194CD and 194CE are intended to probe whether the use of “have regard to” or “take into account” strengthens or weakens the effect of the consideration of a failure to comply with a code conducted by a supervisory authority or a court or tribunal. Having taken advice on the matter, I can assure your Lordships that the choice of language is based on the context and it is appropriate to refer to a court or an oversight body taking matters into account. However, that form of words does not provide any greater or lesser degree of consideration.
Amendments 238A, 238B, 240A, 240B and 242A I believe respond to the recommendations made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on this Bill of 8 July 2016. These amendments relate to the parliamentary procedure used where primary legislation is modified and to the power to make consequential amendments not being time-limited in relation to Clause 242(2) and Clause 242(3).
The proposed amendments to Clause 238 seek to ensure that whenever a delegated legislative power is used to modify primary legislation the affirmative procedure should apply. This is a point which has been raised by the committee in the context of a number of Bills, and I am afraid that it is one that the Government cannot accept. Where secondary legislation amends the text of primary legislation, the Government agree that such legislation should be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government have committed that, wherever possible, changes to primary legislation will be made by textual amendment rather than by modifying the primary legislation. There are likely to be relatively few occasions when the powers to otherwise modify primary legislation need to be exercised—I apologise for the split infinitive which the noble Baroness pointed out. However, it remains the Government’s position that there are some cases where it is necessary to modify primary legislation and that it is not possible to specify which kinds of modification of primary legislation should attract the negative procedure and which the affirmative procedure without creating legal uncertainty.
The Government have set out their position in the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum on this Bill, and in relation to a number of different Bills, and remain of the view that the position is justified and that the powers in the Bill are subject to the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. I have in fact today written to my noble friend Lady Fookes, the chair of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, setting out the Government’s position and the reasons for it in response to the committee’s view on this issue and on the point raised by the committee on the power to amend Schedule 8. I will, of course, place a copy of that letter in the Library of the House. I therefore ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
The proposed amendment to Clause 242 seeks to constrain the power to make consequential amendments so that it could not be used to amend legislation passed after this Bill receives Royal Assent. Clause 242 contains the usual power to make amendments to other legislation consequential on the provisions in the Bill. However, as currently drafted, the power would permit the amendment of legislation passed at any time in the future. Amendment 242A would in fact go further than the committee’s recommendation, which recognised the necessity of amending of enactments passed or made during the current Session. I can confirm that the Government will bring forward amendments on Report which would restrict the powers conferred by Clause 242 and the similar power in Schedule 8 to the Bill in response to the committee’s recommendation.
The power to make consequential amendments to enactments passed in the same Session is necessary because other Bills before Parliament at the same time as this Bill touch upon the powers and public authorities covered by this Bill, such as, for example, the Policing and Crime Bill. Since it is impossible to predict how those Bills or the Investigatory Powers Bill may be amended during their parliamentary passage, and which Bill may achieve Royal Assent first, it is necessary to allow for the possibility of consequential amendment of future enactments.
I have just been handed a note to amplify what I said on Amendment 194CC in relation to consultation on codes of practice, and will just add that consultation comprises publication of a draft and consideration of any representations made. I suggest to the noble Baroness that publication, by its nature, is conspicuous and is the means by which government consultations are established. I hope she is satisfied on that point.
Finally, government Amendment 241, which is in this group, makes it clear that a statutory instrument containing regulations made under Clause 50(3)—the designation of relevant international agreements under which interception may be carried out—is subject to the negative parliamentary procedure. This amendment is consequential on the amendment to Part 2 which was considered in July. I hope that the House will agree to that amendment when I come to move it.
My Lords, I apologise for the rather cheap gibe about the split infinitive. I recognise that I am old-fashioned, and styles have moved on. It would obviously be inappropriate to pursue the points made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee at this point, given that the Minister has written to it, and we will wait to see if anything more happens on that. However, I will just say, on the question of consultation, that the Government are often very good at being proactive in consulting and at contacting organisations which they know have an interest. That is something that should be encouraged. To my mind, consultation which simply involves publication on a website—or perhaps in common parlance, “slipping something out”—the day before a recess and waiting to see whether there are any comments is not good practice. That was why I was concerned to spell this out. I am not of course suggesting that anyone on the Front Bench at the moment would indulge in such a practice, but it has been known to happen. This is not an unnecessary point, but I will not pursue it this evening.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberNo, I do not believe it does. A lot of these overheads, such as those relating to back-office functions, can be shared with other arms of the executive, so my advice is that these would be extra costs that would have to be paid for by the new body.
The new commission will also have to appoint a board and at least three non-executive directors. That would certainly add significantly to the expense of creating a new oversight body with, I contend, very little benefit in the quality of the oversight that it provides. Creating a commission would not serve to advance independence, which was one argument put forward by the noble Baroness. The current oversight bodies, the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, are provided for in statute in the same way as we propose to provide for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The model we propose will allow the oversight bodies to focus on their core tasks of inspections and investigations without tying them up in too much administration; that is a sensible approach. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to reflect on that between now and Report.
As for the comment that the model we propose does not respond to the recommendations about separating powers, it will be for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide how to arrange and run their office. The commissioner will have responsibility for two distinct functions and will have sufficient staff to undertake them independently of each other. However, as David Anderson recognised, there are distinct advantages in having that relationship, even if it is an arm’s-length one, between the two functions. An example of where David Anderson felt that the relationship will be useful is when the judicial commissioners could specifically advise the inspectorate on matters to look out for on their inspections. The dialogue would be lost if the two functions were kept completely distinct.
Before the noble Earl moves on, 20 minutes ago I was not hugely enthusiastic about a single body; I have become a little more so as the debate has gone on. I have one question and another point. Have the current commissioners been consulted about the Bill’s proposals for the structure? What is their view about a single body as distinct from the parallel arrangements? Secondly, I absolutely understand that if you create a new body you create the need for some administrative—bureaucratic, if you like—arrangements, but for the argument to hinge too much on savings really worries me. As my noble friend says, surely, from paperclips onwards, the needs will be identical. If savings are expected from this, there must be concern that the functions will be affected.
I understand the noble Baroness’s strength of feeling on this. Part of the purpose of our debates in Committee is to enable all of us to reflect on the points that have been made between now and Report, and I will certainly go away and do that. The answer to her first question is yes, the current commissioners were consulted about bringing the functions together into a new commissioner, and they approve of creating that single function.
Amendment 194A would require the Secretary of State to provide the judicial commissioners with support and assistance. While I agree with the intention behind the amendment, it is unnecessary. In terms of support, Clause 213 already places a duty on the Secretary of State to provide the IPC with staff, accommodation, equipment and other facilities. As regards assistance, Clause 211 requires the Secretary of State to provide the IPC with any access and assistance as necessary to fulfil its functions. Amendments 194B and 194BA are more specifically about the funding and resources that the IPC receives from the Secretary of State.
I fully support the principle that the IPC should be both well resourced and well supported. The impact assessment the Government have published makes it clear that the predicted future funding of the IPC is £7.4 million per annum. That is an increase of 131%—well over double—when compared to the combined funding that the existing commissioners received before the Bill was introduced. I also appreciate that the needs of the commissioner may change over time. Therefore, Clause 210(2)(d) makes it clear that the annual report of the IPC must contain information about,
“funding, staffing and other resources”.
I am certain that the IPC would use this opportunity to alert the Prime Minister if it felt that it was under-resourced in any fashion. The Prime Minister must then lay this report before Parliament, so Parliament could then take up the cause of the IPC if we ever reached that state of affairs. Therefore, I do not believe that Amendments 194B and 194BA are necessary.
Amendments 194E and 194F propose changes to Clause 220 of the Bill. This clause provides for the continued existence of a technical advisory board, currently provided for in Section 13 of RIPA. It also provides for the make-up of the technical advisory board to be prescribed by the Secretary of State in regulations. Amendment 194E would make a minor change to this clause. From what the noble Baroness said, I do not think that the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the membership of the existing board is replaced in its entirety—that we should scrap the existing board and start from scratch. If I am wrong about that, perhaps she could indicate as much, but I did not gather that from her comments. But it might be helpful for me to provide some additional information about the make-up of the current board.
Current board members were appointed from the very small pool of people who have knowledge of the cost and technical feasibility of developing the technical capabilities used to give effect to warrants. In line with RIPA and the provisions in this clause, there is a balance of representation from the telecommunications industry and from the agencies entitled to apply for warrants or authorisations under the Bill. The role of these experts is to advise the Secretary of State on cost and technical grounds if an interception notice given under RIPA is referred for review.
The Investigatory Powers Bill extends this important safeguard to data retention notices, national security notices and all technical capability notices. It is of course right that board members must be able to meet the requirements of this new role. So, in response to the recommendations of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, the Government committed to audit the membership of the current board to identify any gaps in knowledge; those will be addressed as a priority through the recruitment of new members.
It may be helpful for me to make the Committee aware that the board’s independent chair may, if required, call on external expertise to assist the group in deciding reasonable costs and the technical feasibility of an obligation. Furthermore, regulations under Clause 220 may also provide for other persons to be appointed to the board as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. This ensures that the technical advisory board is sufficiently flexible to be able to seek particular expertise as required.
I note that the noble Baroness feels that the word “continue” is inappropriate in this context, but I argue the opposite. If the board exists at the moment, it is perhaps not the right thing implicitly to deny its existence by failing to include a word that acknowledges the fact. I hope that we are not dancing too much on the head of a pin there, and that she will not insist on the change that she has proposed.
I understand the point made by the noble Lord, but I think it would be unimaginable that Parliament would not protest if there were a redaction in the report around the commissioner’s funding. Redactions, in any case, are made only on national security grounds, not on matters of this nature. Nevertheless, I will consider carefully over the summer period what the noble Lord has said, and no doubt we can return to these matters at a later stage.
My Lords, I have been listening to what the Minister has been saying. It is not too much of a stretch to imagine an argument that goes, “We can’t publish comments about the funding available because that would give clues about the severity of the security system situation or about the effort that is or is not going into dealing with it”, so it is a serious point. Regarding the phraseology in Clause 220, I was never much of a dancer so I hope the Minister will forgive me. I accept that it is a continuation of an existing board, but that is not how it appears in the Bill. I think it would benefit from being anchored by a reference to the existing board. I do not want to bring back such a minor point on Report, so I thought I would make it now and see if it gained any traction.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 48 maintains the position set out in RIPA that interception is lawful in certain circumstances in psychiatric hospitals. The clause sets out that interception is lawful if it takes place in any hospital premises where high-security psychiatric services are provided and is conducted in pursuance of, and in accordance with, any relevant direction given to the body providing those services at those premises.
While the clause provides that the interception is lawful, it is the relevant direction under the National Health Service Act 2006, the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006, the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, or the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, that sets out how and when the interception may be conducted—that is not a function of this Bill.
Clause 49 provides that certain interception carried out in relation to immigration detention facilities is lawful. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 contains powers for the Secretary of State to make rules for the management of immigration detention facilities, and Clause 49 provides that interception carried out in accordance with those rules will be lawful. At present, rules have been made only in respect of immigration removal centres—the Detention Centre Rules 2001. The interception of communications in relation to immigration removal centres, in line with the statutory rules, is purely for the purposes of maintaining the security of those centres or the safety of other persons, including detainees. It is right that officers should be able, for example, to intercept attempts to send controlled drugs or other contraband material into particularly sensitive and secure environments.
Contrary to speculative claims, this power can never be used to determine the outcome of any person’s asylum claim. Again, the precise circumstances in which interception may take place in immigration detention facilities are not a matter for the Bill. To be clear, the purpose of this clause is not to determine rules relating to the management of immigration detention facilities. The purpose of the clause is simply to make clear that conduct authorised and regulated under existing legislation—specifically, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999—would be lawful.
Rules made under the 1999 Act about the regulation and management of detention facilities are subject to negative resolution, as specified in the Act and as agreed by Parliament. Such rules in relation to interception would be based on the clearly legitimate purposes already contained in the Detention Centre Rules 2001. The interception of communications in relation to immigration removal centres, in line with the statutory rules, is purely for the purposes of maintaining the security of those centres or the safety of other persons, including detainees, as I explained.
I hope the noble Baroness will accept that the amendments are unnecessary and that the clauses should stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I have found it difficult throughout the Bill to accept that something is necessary just because it is in RIPA or is currently in effect. I am afraid I gave up chasing through the references in Clause 48—I thought my iPad was going to give out on me if I asked www.legislation.gov.uk any more questions on Sunday morning. I should have pursued this, and for that I apologise to the Committee. I think I am reassured by the explanations I have. I will go away and read the record, but I am grateful to the noble Earl.
My Lords, this amendment seeks to ensure that communications service providers are fully reimbursed for their costs in connection with complying with obligations under this Bill, and that arrangements for doing so are in place before the provisions in the Bill come into force. It is, of course, important to recognise that service providers must not be unduly disadvantaged financially for complying with obligations placed upon them. Indeed, the Government have a long history of working with service providers on these matters. We have been absolutely clear that we are committed to cost recovery. I want to reaffirm to the Committee a point that my right honourable friend the Security Minister made very clear in the other place: this Government will reimburse 100% of reasonable costs incurred by communications service providers in relation to the acquisition and retention of communications data. This includes both capital and operational costs, including the costs associated with the retention of internet connection records. I hope that that assurance is helpful.
The key question that this Committee needs to consider is whether it is appropriate for the Government of today to tie the hands of future Governments on this issue. I wonder whether, on reflection, the noble Baroness thinks it right to press for that. That does not mean that we take our commitment lightly or that future Governments will necessarily change course. Indeed, I suggest that it is unlikely ever to be the case; for example, the current policy has not changed since the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and so has survived Governments of three different colours or combinations of colours.
This Government have been absolutely clear that we practised cost recovery and we have been consistent in our policy for a very long time. Indeed, this Bill adds additional safeguards requiring a data retention notice to set out the level of contribution that applies. This ensures that the provider must be consulted on any changes to the cost model and also means that the provider would be able to seek a review of any variation to the notice which affected the level of contribution. The Government already have arrangements in place for ensuring that providers receive appropriate contribution for their relevant costs without delay, so the amendment that seeks to ensure that they are in place before the provisions come into force is, I suggest, unnecessary. Accordingly, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I wrote down a number of phrases, including “not unduly disadvantaged”. In the light of the absolute, clear commitment to full cost recovery, I wonder whether “unduly” is the right term. I also wrote down “100% of reasonable costs” that ought to be covered by the audit provision. The noble Earl has just referred to an appropriate contribution for relevant costs. I am sure he will understand where I am going with these terms.
The noble Earl asks whether it is appropriate to tie the hands of future Governments. I would say that in this instance it is appropriate, because a future Government can bring forward future legislation and that would be the way to do it—not to seek to resile from what everyone regards as a very important commitment given, but where there is a detraction from it in the terminology of Clause 222. I do not know whether the noble Earl is in a position to make a comment about “unduly” now. I suspect he is not. It is a rather unfair question from me.
We are clear that it is important to ensure that communications service providers are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by obligations imposed under the Bill. The Government will maintain, therefore, their long-standing policy of making a reasonable contribution to costs, but it is unthinkable that the Government would seek to place any unreasonable financial burdens on a company simply for complying with a warrant. So we are talking about reasonable costs. That is surely right. It is not appropriate for the taxpayer to subsidise unreasonable costs, but as I have said, we have made a commitment to reimburse 100% of reasonable costs incurred by the communications service providers, and that includes both capital and operational costs.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for expressing his expert opinion so clearly. I can undertake only to study carefully what he has said between now and Report. Clearly, the Bill has been drafted by expert hands, but I am the first to say that there is no monopoly of wisdom on the Government’s side, and I am sure we need to taker full account of what he said.
My Lords, one of the things that we are saying is that because the Bill has a mixed heritage, it is perhaps not as clear as it could be and does not have the benefit of the expert work to which my noble friend referred. I am clearly going to have to read very carefully what has been said, but I want to make a few comments now.
First, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, but I do not think what he was saying was quite as the noble Earl put it with regard to the word “may”. We need to come back both to the “may” and the “other considerations” in particular and to the relationship between the subsections. That fact that the list in subsection (4) is not exclusive makes the matter even more difficult.
I obviously do not want to go over all the ground again. With regard to the privacy and civil liberties board, it was of course a construct—a compromise—but my noble friend Lord Strasburger’s point about somebody having the responsibility to make sure that privacy and civil liberties are right at the top, immovably in the agendas that the Government may have, is an important one. I, for one, would welcome something more than was in the Act.
I agree that listing where the duty bites does help clarity and transparency, but I had a difficulty in being completely certain that it bites on everything that I think it should; the filter in Clause 63 was my example. If the filter is part of granting, approving—obviously not—or cancelling an authorisation, that is fine, but it should be clear. I am afraid I am not hugely persuaded by a code of practice, since it is not primary legislation. In fact, I think the Minister said that we should have regard to it. If it provides that these matters are absolute, rather than discretionary, then the codes of practice will not be consistent with the primary legislation, and that will be a bad thing.
I come back to whether this clause has been invented here, or wherever it has been invented. I will offer to supply the hot towels for everybody—I might even provide cake—but this is a provision that would benefit from further discussion. I certainly do not offer not to bring it back on Report—I might if we can get to somewhere that satisfies all of those who are clearly concerned before then—but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would, as she explained, provide that a person disqualified by virtue of their immigration status may apply to the Secretary of State for written confirmation that permission to rent has been or will be granted to them. The amendment would amend the Immigration Act 2014, which introduced the right-to-rent scheme. It would work in conjunction with the existing provision, which states that a person who is otherwise disqualified from renting premises as a result of their immigration status is to be treated as having a right to rent where the Secretary of State has granted them permission to occupy premises under a residential tenancy agreement.
I hope that I can persuade the noble Baroness that the amendment is unnecessary and potentially even a step backwards. The Secretary of State is already able to grant permission to rent to people who are otherwise disqualified from renting. This may include migrants without leave who have sought asylum, families with minor children who are in the family returns process or those who face a genuine obstacle to leaving the UK. A migrant may obtain confirmation that they will be afforded such permission by contacting the Home Office, and all a landlord need do then is to contact the Home Office landlords’ checking service with the migrant’s Home Office reference number to confirm that they may rent to that migrant. Following that process will give the landlord a statutory excuse from any civil penalty under the right-to-rent scheme.
Very importantly, this system allows for a swift process, without the need to require a migrant to make a formal application or for them to await written confirmation through the post that they may rent. Our experience since the right-to-rent scheme was introduced on 1 December 2014 is that this process works well. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Incidentally, there is no inconsistency between the FoI response and the letter from my noble friend Lord Bates. As I explained, a migrant may already contact the Home Office in order to establish whether they will be granted permission to rent. Existing arrangements are straightforward and work well. I should also mention that the Home Office is in the process of revising its published guidance in response to concerns raised during previous debates. I have no doubt that it will factor in the points made in this debate as well. Once that is done, the guidance will set out even more clearly how a migrant may contact the Home Office. But I suggest that requiring that they make a formal application and then have to await written confirmation may lead to unnecessary delays and in fact would serve no useful purpose.
My Lords, I wish that I were persuaded. The letter from the noble Lord, Lord Bates, said that migrants,
“may contact the Home Office to establish whether this is the case”.
The clear implication there is that the migrant himself may establish the position, not ask the Home Office to make sure that, if and when a landlord inquires, the landlord is given that information.
Of course, I am aware of the landlord’s statutory excuse. I do not want to be too harsh, but I wonder whether the person in the Home Office who has been drafting this has had any recent experience of trying to rent a property. Not that long ago, on the question of the rollout of the 2014 Act, two or three Members of this House explained very clearly that as landlords they, and indeed most landlords, would want to get on with letting and not have gaps in that letting. The information that I and other noble Lords have received is not that the situation is working well—that is not the position. I am glad to hear that there has been some revision of procedures, but it seems to me that by denying that there is a problem, there is denial around looking at how to solve that problem.
It seems to me that this is not considered a big deal. Perhaps I can simply urge the Minister to urge the Home Office to take this as a very serious concern. If there is a different way of assisting tenants—and my goodness, this House is spending a lot of time talking about the housing crisis at the moment—and making the whole process that much easier, avoiding the concerns about discrimination that we have debated in this context at some length, then I urge him to do that. I am clearly not going to make any progress on this now, but I will not let it go: I will keep asking questions about it.
My Lords, I am happy to give the necessary undertaking to the noble Baroness. Indeed, I am sure she will have gathered from what I said that the whole purpose of the scheme we now have is to have a straightforward and rapid process for people to follow, rather than a more labyrinthine paper-based process. Clearly, the information she has received contradicts, at least in part, the information that I have had about how well the scheme works. I will of course ensure that Home Office officials look at any evidence she has which may cast into doubt the efficient working of the scheme.
My Lords, I think the first piece of evidence will be the case to which the noble Baroness and I have referred. I am grateful for that undertaking and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me prior notice of his question. We very much look forward to the visit of the President of Ghana. His wish to discuss the Ebola emergency with the Prime Minister or a member of the Cabinet has been fed through at the highest governmental level. I cannot yet confirm whether or with whom such a meeting might be arranged, but I have asked that a response be forthcoming to the Ghanaian High Commission as soon as possible.
My Lords, the noble Earl mentioned information to GPs, pharmacists and so on. Can he tell the House anything about information to be given to the general public about the symptoms that we should be looking out for? Obviously I appreciate that one does not want to cause alarm, although I think the public are likely to be alarmed anyway, nor to overwhelm the services, but I imagine the Minister would agree that information is important.
Secondly, can he say anything about advice to air passengers? I do not mean those coming directly from the countries that we know are affected, but all air passengers. I imagine that all of us after a plane journey have got off thinking, “Hmm, with all that stale air, I think I’m about to go down with something—I can feel it at the back of my throat”. Are there precautions that air passengers generally should be taking? If so, will there be advice about this?
My Lords, we are reviewing those very questions all the time. Our position at the moment is that it would be disproportionate to alert the general public to the risk of Ebola, because it remains low. As for air passengers generally, it is important to understand that the virus is transmitted only by direct contact with the blood or bodily fluids of an infected person. It is not an airborne infection. So while I do not in the least belittle the importance of a public health campaign should that prove necessary, we do not consider that it is warranted at the current time.