Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Erroll]

Can I add something on that subject? I was not suggesting that the Secretary of State should specify specific company schemes, or whatever. However, I agree entirely that there should be a certification process so that people know whether they are okay or not. If there is not, there will be a massive test case in the courts, which will be very expensive for someone, to test what is adequate. The Secretary of State could avoid this by giving some direction on the regulations which reflects where you can change them, with changing technology, and which would satisfactorily protect the seller from vexatious things and awkward situations. The Government should look at this again.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I mentioned that, not long before coming into this debate, I—and no doubt other noble Lords—had a note from the British Retail Consortium. It also makes the point about how helpful it would be to have guidance—“possibly through guidance”, it says. Different situations may be different, but we are all concerned about not just protecting the seller but making sure that purchasers are able to purchase when it is reasonable to do so. I think it was my noble friend who mentioned John Lewis’s current policy on sending cutlery through the post.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, essentially come back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, made. Sellers want to make sure they are abiding by the law but, as the noble Baroness said, buyers want to make sure they are abiding by the law as well. On the systems that the noble Earl raised, I hope I did not suggest that he was trying to imply a specific system. I made the point that it would be wrong to specify a system in the legislation, given that systems are developing all the time.

To answer the point from the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about age-restricted products, I have already mentioned knives, alcohol and tobacco, but lottery tickets are age-restricted as well, of course. Retailers are very used to operating in these systems, without a specific approved system in place.

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that there will be guidance. Perhaps we might drop that into the Bill on Report, just to make sure. I think that guidance would be enough, but we should recognise that we have chosen to put into the Bill the words “all due diligence” and “all reasonable precautions”. That is a very high test. If we had meant the current systems to apply, we should have left out the word “all”. Nobody gets killed by being sold a lottery ticket—or at least not just one—but we are looking here at things that might quite quickly turn into serious criminal incidents. If in court someone says, “I looked at his passport”, but the police prove that the person in question has no passport, the poor delivery driver or shop worker is sunk. Noble Lords might remember a rather amusing TV ad from when we watched such things, “We’re with the Woolwich”, where somebody showed their Woolwich passbook to get out of East Germany. This passport or driving licence can presumably be of any nationality. How is a relatively untrained shop worker or delivery driver supposed to know that this is a Polish passport, not a Polish bankbook? We are asking people for whom there is no structured training to act as if they are trained. Under such circumstances we have to—

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord has made a very interesting point about the phrase “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence”. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can help the Committee, but that looks like a normal phrase. I did not read it in quite the same way as having to take every possible step that might be a reasonable precaution. I wonder whether the officials might help us as to the provenance of the phrase before Report.

[Lord Judge]

If I might say so, “all” means “every”. Without “all”, you have just to take reasonable precautions and show due diligence. Once you put “all” in, you fall foul of any particular point you could have but did not look at and did not do.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

4: Clause 1, page 2, line 9, leave out “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks” and insert “a community sentence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would replace the custodial sentences for the new offence in Clause 1 (sale of corrosive products to persons under 18) with community sentences.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 4 I will speak to Amendments 5, 6, 7, 20 and 21. This is not the first time that the Liberal Democrats has made clear our opposition to short custodial sentences, which, in our view, tend not to do good and too often cause harm. We are grateful to the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust in particular, as well as other organisations for helping me to articulate this. These amendments and some later ones repeat amendments that my right honourable friend Sir Ed Davey tabled in the House of Commons. We have thrown in some additional references because this is the scrutinising House. I heard a noise of agreement from behind me and it is clear that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is on the same page on this.

A good deal was said at Second Reading on the complexity of what lies behind the carrying and use of weapons, and the context of that. Many noble Lords took what we regard as a necessarily broad view of the issues, expressly or implicitly criticising the use of legislation to send a rather broader message than the message to the police, to which my noble friend Lord Paddick referred. The Government recognise this, but not consistently. At Second Reading, I mentioned the Justice Secretary’s apparent opposition to short custodial sentences and his support for community sentences, which the Ministry of Justice’s own research shows are more effective at reducing offending. Surely that view counts. It is not so very long ago that home affairs and justice were in a single department, which was very unwieldly, but I hope that attitudes and values have not diverged to any extent.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am happy to look at that point. Of course, every case is different, so I cannot give a pronouncement here in Committee this afternoon. I have visited Styal prison, an all-female prison near to where I live. I would imagine that Styal is an example of best in class, as it tries to support the family as opposed to just dealing with the woman in custody. I recommend any noble Lords who get the chance to visit that prison, which is an example of a very supportive environment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we have ranged widely and it is tempting to respond to some of the points that have been made, continuing that wider debate, as opposed to focusing on Clauses 1 and 3, but I will try to resist that.

I think that we all agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that this is about the quality of sentences. I would regard it as rather despairing to accept that there should be imprisonment because community sentences are inadequate—not fit for purpose, in the jargon. I referred to comments made in April last year, I think, by the Secretary of State for Justice, David Gauke, in response to evidence published by the MoJ showing that, for people with matched offending backgrounds, community orders were more effective than a short prison sentence at reducing offending.

I should make it clear that we are not in favour of selling corrosives that may be misused—I do not want that to come out of this debate. Clause 6 includes the offence of possession, and it is this clause that prompts me to ask whether the Minister can confirm that the offences under Clauses 1 and 3 are summary only offences. Clause 6 refers to conviction on indictment, which would allow imprisonment for up to four years. One always learns something, and I did not expect to learn about the 2003 Act. There are two ways of looking at that: either our amendments are fatally flawed or we have material to come back to at Report. That is neither a threat nor a promise, but perhaps the Minister can answer my question about summary only offences.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can confirm that to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Hamwee]

We have all shared a lot more of our views on this Bill than I thought likely to be the case when I tabled these two amendments. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

12: Clause 2, page 3, line 19, leave out from “products” to “were” in line 20
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe and clarify why the seller needs to show the method of purchase employed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment on behalf of my noble friend I will speak also to Amendment 16. These are nothing like as technical as the matters raised in the previous group. Indeed they are probing, as all amendments are at this stage in Grand Committee.

The first probe concerns condition A, one of the defences in Clause 2, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has already referred. The Explanatory Notes very straightforwardly state of condition A that,

“at the time of any alleged offence being committed, a seller had a system in place for checking the age of anyone purchasing corrosive products that was likely to prevent anyone under the age of 18 from purchasing that product”.

That seems quite straightforward. What is important, as I read it, is that there is a system in place to check that purchasers are not under the age of 18. The amendment would delete the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

I am not entirely clear to what those words refer. I do not understand them and I apologise to the Committee if they are perfectly obvious to other Members. The purpose of my amendment is to obtain an explanation of what the words add to those in the Explanatory Notes.

Amendment 16 relates to Clause 2(10) and queries the term “supply”. We have a buyer and a seller, a reference to sale and a reference to delivery, which is to be read as its “supply” to the buyer or someone acting on the behalf of the buyer. The offence in Clause 1 is that of sale. That is not the same as delivery. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the choice of terminology here. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, if I can give some comfort to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I did not understand it either.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure that the noble Baroness is very much comforted. I hope I can clarify the meaning.

Amendment 12 seeks to test why it is necessary to include in Clause 2(6)(a) the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

There are many different ways to make purchases online or in response to an advertisement by post or telephone. The simple purpose of the condition set out in Clause 2(6)(a) is to ensure that, at the time of making the sale, the seller had the required arrangements in place to verify the age of the buyer. This would assist in proving that an offence had been committed.

Amendment 16 seeks to clarify why Clause 2(10) uses the term “supply” instead of “delivery”, given the terms of the Clause 1 offence. The use of “supply” is correct in this context because it is about the actual handing over of the product to a person or their representative at the collection point, rather than its delivery to the address from where the buyer ordered the product. I hope that provides clarification, although the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is looking even more puzzled than she initially was.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am afraid I remain a bit puzzled. I do not find all of this Bill entirely easy. My prejudice was confirmed this morning when, ironically, I got a rather painful paper cut from the Offensive Weapons Bill. On the second point, “supply” has all sorts of other connotations, particularly with the drug trade. That perhaps diverted me, but “delivery to a person” is not the same as delivery to premises. I remain puzzled by that. I will have to read what the Minister said about Amendment 12, but I thought she more or less said what I said I thought it should mean without the rather difficult words. I will go back and read that.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Would it be helpful if I wrote to noble Lords giving examples?

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that would be an excellent idea. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

You can buy it from either, but the mechanisms for age verification are slightly different.

[Baroness Hamwee]

We have referred quite a lot to Amazon. I do not use it very much, but the few times I have, I have ordered from Amazon but got my items from the producer or seller, which was often in the UK. Is the seller overseas or in the UK in that situation?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

If the seller is in the UK, the seller is in the UK. If the seller is overseas there is a slightly different mechanism. As I said, that is because of our ability to enforce sales in the UK as opposed to online sales abroad. The two are very different, but we are banning the delivery of corrosive substances to under-18s when ordered from an overseas seller, just as we are banning that here.

[Baroness Hamwee]

But if I order from Amazon, am I buying from Amazon or from the manufacturer in the UK?

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

22: Clause 4, page 5, line 12, leave out “before the sale, the seller” and insert “the seller has”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to clarify why delivery arranged after the sale is concluded (as a matter of contract) does not fall within the Clause.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 22 but I wonder whether, with the indulgence of the Committee, I can go back to Amendment 12. As it has puzzled at least three noble Lords—three of us have confessed to it—I urge the Minister, as well as writing, to consider whether the wording might be clearer. We would be happy to look at a government amendment on Report because, if it confuses people who are used to reading legislation, there is a good argument for making it clearer to others who will also read it.

Amendment 22 again concerns some detailed wording. Clause 4(1)(c) provides that the clause applies if before the sale the seller has entered into an arrangement for delivery. Why before the sale? Does this apply only if the seller already has delivery arrangements in place? Often that will be the case but I am puzzled as to whether those words might, in a few situations, limit the application of the clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

May I join the noble Baroness and say that I too am confused?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I fear that I am about to confuse people further—I hope not—because the noble Baroness is effectively asking why Clause 4 is drafted on the basis that the delivery arrangements for an online sale made to a vendor based overseas will have been made at the point of contract and not subsequently. It therefore might be helpful if I explain how we have drafted the clause in this way.

The purpose of Clause 4(1)(c) is to avoid criminalising a delivery company in instances where an overseas seller has simply placed a package containing a corrosive product in the international mail. By doing this, it then places an obligation on the delivery company, and potentially the Royal Mail, to deliver the item without having entered into a contract or necessarily knowing that the package contains a corrosive product. If we did not have the provision in place and in combination with the provisions of Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the company was aware that the delivery arrangements with the overseas seller covered the delivery of the corrosive product, then delivery companies such as the Royal Mail would be committing an offence.

We want to mitigate this, which is why we have constructed the offence in this way so that it requires the delivery company to have entered into specific arrangements to deliver corrosive products on behalf of an overseas seller.

The noble Baroness looks far less confused than she did in my previous explanation and I hope I have provided the explanation she seeks.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is perfectly clear and I am grateful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

29: Clause 6, page 7, line 6, leave out “or lawful authority”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with the amendment to page 7, line 14, is to probe what “lawful authority” is and how it is obtained.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 30 and 31. These amendments are in my name and that of my noble friend. Amendments 29 and 30 seek to understand what is meant by “lawful authority”. In Clause 6(2)—I am not making any concessions about the points made on the first group of amendments this afternoon—it is a defence to prove that a person had “good reason” or “lawful authority” for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place. Obviously, lawful authority is not the same as good reason, otherwise it would not have to be provided for—although one would have thought that lawful authority would be good reason. But what is lawful authority? Where does the authority come from? Who gives it? How does one apply for it? Is it a consequence of some other arrangement that is in place? Amendment 29 applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Amendment 30 to Scotland, but they make the same point.

Amendment 31 makes a very small point, but I have discovered over the years that sometimes small points are worth making. Under Clause 6(3) one can show that one had the corrosive substance for “use at work”. My amendment would substitute for those words “the purposes of work”, thereby distinguishing in my mind the purpose and the place. These days “work” is very often used to designate the place. Technically, that might be a bit lax, but it is what people say: “I’m going to work”. They do not mean, “I’m going to put in a good day’s effort”; they mean, “I’m going to my place of work”. The Minister may say that “for use at work” implies “purpose”, but one might take something to use at a place where there is no legitimate reason for using it. I beg to move—and I wish Hansard could record the look on the Minister’s face.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments address the defences available if someone is charged with an offence of possessing a corrosive substance in a public place. As I understand her, these amendments are intended to probe what would constitute lawful authority to be in possession of a corrosive substance in a public place. She then went on to comment on the phrase “for use at work”.

On the lawful authority issue, let me give your Lordships one example. Under the Poisons Act 1972 there is a licensing regime for regulated substances such that a Home Office licence is required to import, acquire, possess or use a regulated substance. Both nitric acid at above 3% concentration and sulfuric acid at above 15% concentration are regulated substances. Therefore, there may be circumstances where a Home Office licence holder has purchased a corrosive product containing one of these substances and is transporting it from A to B. This would be a scenario where the defence of lawful authority might come into play.

However, for the majority of cases, a person would need to rely on the defence of having good reason—unless, of course, they were a tradesperson and had purchased the corrosive for use at work. This brings me to Amendment 31, about how we have framed the defence for tradespeople and businesses. The reference to “for use at work” replicates the terminology used in existing knife legislation. The existing defences in relation to the possession of an offensive weapon in a public place are well understood by the police and various trades and businesses, and we are not aware of any issues in the operation of them in relation to the possession of knives.

While I can see the intention behind the amendment, I will need to think about what the noble Baroness has said—but I am not convinced that it is necessary or in practice achieves any significantly different result. I am also concerned that having a different defence in place for possession of corrosives, compared with that for knives, would or could cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate the law. So I hope that, at least for now, I have been able to provide sufficient clarification to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw these amendments—although, as I have said, I promise that I will read carefully in Hansard what she said.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. The approach to the wording of legislation has been updated quite a lot recently. That was partly in my mind when I raised the point about “at work”—that one wants legislation to be read as easily as possible, using words as they are normally understood. I understand, of course, a resistance to distinctions between offences relating to corrosives and offences relating to knives. That is not how it was dealt with in the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and in our amendment to it on shop workers. That does not mean that you cannot amend the earlier legislation.

Regarding licensing under the Poisons Act, it seems that one would have a good reason and would not have to rely on the lawful authority defence. I believe that we are going to look at the Poisons Act again—it has been brought up several times. Certainly for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 29 withdrawn.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 33.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is in the same territory as my noble friend and I. Like him, we seek to know how one objectively defines “corrosive substance”. His amendment asks what happens if the skin is particularly sensitive. I am not sure that there is such a thing as the “average human hand”, which he refers to in his amendment. I suspect that sensitivity may depend on age—whether one is young or old could affect vulnerability—as well as all sorts of other matters.

Our amendment proposes two points. The first refers to the testing method. That would not help the point, with which I have a great deal of sympathy, about knowing whether a substance falls within the definition but it enables us to ask about the status of the testing kits. The noble Earl has said that work on them is well under way. Can he tell us any more about them? Are they intended to work—as I understand it—like a breathalyser? It is enough to get you taken off for a second and different test, but does it start with a roadside test? As with a breathalyser, it may look as if you have failed it. Again, this is as I understand it; I do not have personal experience of going down to a police station and giving a blood test or a mouth-breath test. The point is about the process.

My second question is about the definition of the substance as one capable of burning human skin. Our amendment refers to eyes, since a lot of awful acid attacks have involved throwing acid into someone’s eyes. Are eyes “skin” for this purpose? We simply want to be sure that we have covered the ground here.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, perhaps I may speak briefly on this rather macabre amendment. First, I am not sure who the testing is to be done on. I cannot see many volunteers being willing to be corroded. My second and more substantive point is that I cannot see why the definition is required because, as I read the Bill—not an easy Bill to read, as we have discovered today—a corrosive substance is de facto defined by Schedule 1. I would have thought it much more satisfactory to retain the concept of a schedule, which can be altered by order, than to have this rather frightening test.

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I turn to the issue of testing kits. The Home Office, together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, is on the case, as I have described. We are in the process of establishing an appropriate approvals process for these testing kits. Naturally, we want assurance that the kits are capable of detecting and identifying corrosive substances, but I am not persuaded that we need to build into the Bill a statutory approvals process. Various options for these testing kits are currently being looked at by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. I am afraid it is too soon for me to say what form the kits will take; there is still further work to do on that. Given where we are—I understand we are at a reasonably advanced stage with these testing kits—I hope my arguments have persuaded my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw, or not to move, their amendments, at least for the time being.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the noble Lord responds, first, will there be an opportunity for Parliament to consider the arrangements for testing when they are pretty much complete? I am sure it will be of interest. Secondly, are skin and eyes similarly sensitive? Or do we risk not outlawing a substance that might damage the eyes but would not damage the skin?

[Earl Howe]

In answer to the second question, my understanding—on advice—is no. A substance capable of burning the skin by corrosion would also be capable of doing severe damage to the eye, and the other way round. We do not think we are excluding any substance by accident in defining corrosive substances in this way. On the noble Baroness’s first question, as I understand it, the approval of the testing kit will not be subject to any formal parliamentary procedure, but I am sure the noble Baroness is capable of finding ways to tease out relevant information from the Home Office at the appropriate time.

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In general terms, we must have clear evidence that everything has been tried, and has failed, before any child is sent to custody. That would, not least, honour the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which says that custody should be used only as a last resort. In tabling this amendment, I add that no child should be ordered into custody for a mandatory short sentence.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend and I support the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, particularly on the question of the clause standing part. I am conscious of progress in the Chamber, so I will not say as much as I might otherwise have done. It looks like some negotiations are going on. We have a number of other amendments to these clauses as well. In addition to supporting what the noble Lord has said, I want to make clear our implacable opposition to mandatory sentences—in this case custodial ones. Judicial discretion is very important and precious in our system.

Clause 8(4) is a get-out clause, referring to having regard to the duty under the 1933 Act to have regard for the welfare of the child. I do not think this works. It was obviously a response to representations, but it applies only to children, not young adults, and seems to be a nod to that well-established provision without changing anything that surrounds it. I also have a question about the particular circumstances in Clause 8(2). I had a look at the sentencing guidelines yesterday. If that phrase originates from those guidelines then subsection (2) is actually an inversion of them. They require the court to look at the particular circumstances, but Clause 8(2) is the reverse: it is an “unless” provision. Finally, Amendment 37 deals with the appeals subsection. We have added a reference to the criteria in Clause 8(2). I am not sure whether this is appropriate technically, but perhaps we could have an explanation as to how the appeal takes into account the points made in that subsection.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the clause stand part Motion spoken to so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Lords made the case very strongly against short-term prison sentences. I want to add my voice to emphasise very strongly just how unhelpful these short-term sentences are, particularly to the very vulnerable young people who are most likely to be caught up in these offensive weapons allegations or crimes. Apart from doing nothing for those individuals, short-term sentences do absolutely nothing for society as a whole. If we do not prevent these young people committing crimes in the future, our society will be all the worse off.

Scotland has shown the way. The removal of judgment in Scotland has been proven to be more cost effective and positive when responding to people with drug and alcohol addiction and other problems often associated with the carrying of knives or corrosive substances. I believe huge proportions of these young people have drug problems. As others have mentioned, the Ministry of Justice has already produced its own evidence of the ineffectiveness of short-term imprisonment. Perhaps the Minister can explain why we are adding to these short-term sentences in this Bill.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the radical Checkpoint deferred prosecution scheme in Durham, run by Chief Constable Mike Barton, and very much supported by his police and crime commissioner, Ron Hogg. Checkpoint is a multi-agency initiative which aims to reduce the number of victims of crime by reducing reoffending. This is what this should all be about. The scheme targets low and medium-level offenders—it is not just for people right at the bottom—at the earliest stage of the criminal justice process and offers them a suspended prosecution. It encourages them to engage in services designed to address their problems instead of receiving a caution or going to court, which does not seem to have anything to do with where these kids or young people are coming from. Checkpoint is evaluated by Cambridge University. This is very important because the evidence on this is really very thorough and reliable.

If this amendment were to be accepted by the Government, the objective would be for the Checkpoint policy, or something like it, to be applied to children and young people who are found in possession of an offensive weapon. I know very well how utterly appalling these corrosive substances are. I happen to know a young, beautiful girl whose face has been utterly destroyed by an acid attack. The poor girl has had endless operations and she will not be the beautiful person that she was, although she will be a beautiful person inside and that is what really matters. Nevertheless, I want people to know that I really understand that these are shocking and horrible crimes. The most important thing that we can do is to cut them down, reduce them and, ideally, eliminate them. Anything that somehow does not achieve that is an utter failure, so I feel very strongly about it because we have to do something that is effective.

Checkpoint shows that it is the threat of punishment, rather than the severity of a punishment, that is cost-effective and, most importantly, effective. It argues in favour of taking a whole-person-centred approach to understand the causes of their offending and ensure that those people receive appropriate interventions to address the problems of drug dependence, debt issues or homelessness—a whole range of problems that these young, very vulnerable people face. Indeed, its figures from a random control trial—and I emphasise that it is a random control trial, not just any old tin-pot kind of study—show that reoffending is reduced by 13% if we do not send these people to custody but instead try to get them involved in help for their problems.

Its study of young offenders who have committed crimes on more than five occasions within a year is very important. You might think that these are hopeless cases and that there is no point in doing anything. This study looks at the traumatic experiences during childhood that so many of those repeat offenders have experienced. Almost all have been exposed to violence, physical harm or danger, parental offending or admissions to A&E due to physical harm or trauma. They have frequently exhibited violent behaviour or problems in school and have been excluded.

We have to ask ourselves about the effect of putting those young, very vulnerable, damaged children into custody for just another dose of punishment. They obviously need a great deal of therapeutic help and support to begin to recover from their childhood experiences. Durham Constabulary, West Midlands Police and other police services are, in my view, leading the way in exploring policies which will benefit not only the vulnerable but society as a whole by reducing reoffending and will also save vast police and prison resources, but that is not the point. This is about reducing these terrible crimes and helping the vulnerable.

I hope this legislation can be amended to ensure that it works with the grain of new, evidence-based criminal justice policy. It is interesting that police services are taking the lead in this crucial field. Of course, the police have their street-level experience; I always have great regard for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for this reason—he knows what goes on on the street. They are saying we should not send these people to prison because they see them coming round again and again. I take this very seriously; I think we all should. I hope the Minister will discuss with us how best to amend this Bill. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply.