Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 24th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am right behind the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in their Amendment 130. We know, and I believe that by and large we accept, that the Bill is not intended by the Government to hold out the prospect of instantaneous changes to the delivery of mental health care. It offers a series of measures that, over a period of years, should make a material difference to the well-being of a wide range of mentally ill people who require treatment, whether in a secure mental health setting or in the community.

The Minister has spoken of the need to view these measures in the broader context of the NHS 10-year plan and, certainly from the Government’s point of view, that is a perfectly reasonable position to take. However, if that is the Government’s policy, it begs a whole mass of questions around implementation and funding. For example, what do the Government see as the immediate high-priority measures that they wish to introduce? Which measures do they propose to defer, and for how long? What are the costs associated with these changes, both to the NHS and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, pointed out, to the justice system and local government? Bearing in mind Treasury constraints, when realistically do they believe a clear timeline for change will emerge? We have the impact assessment, but how far can we rely on that?

If those questions for the time being have to remain hanging in the air, as I suspect they will, I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that Parliament, in the not-too-distant future, needs to be given an account of what the longer-term future looks like in a way that reflects not only the Government’s current thinking but, as time goes on, how their thinking evolves, as it surely will. There is therefore a strong case for a report to Parliament sometime in the next few months and on an annual basis thereafter, making clear both the timeline of ambition and the timeline of what in reality is being delivered.

I am conscious that we all need to keep our remarks succinct and to the point, so I will comment only briefly on the other amendments in this group. I am afraid I cannot support Amendment 153 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I have always believed that what matters most in healthcare is not whether a service is delivered by a public or a private organisation but rather the quality of care to patients and whether good outcomes are achieved at acceptable cost.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Kamall has added his name to Amendments 163 and 164. These amendments stand absolutely four-square with the theme of Amendment 130, and on my noble friend’s behalf I express my warm support for them. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, has said it all.

Just as we accept that we will not get any instant changes arising from the Bill, by a corresponding token, the Government cannot take that as a free pass from Parliament to defer implementing its provisions sine die. We cannot have a situation in which, prior to implementing the provisions, the principle of parity of esteem is quietly put to one side. I hope the Minister will have reassuring words to say on those very important points of principle.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this first debate today, and I start by saying how glad I am—I am sure other noble Lords will say this too—to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in her rightful place. I certainly heard her support for the amendments that we are discussing.

Before I turn to the amendments, it may be helpful to your Lordships’ Committee if I briefly set out some of the high-level plans for implementation of these reforms. I am grateful for the understanding—the noble Earl, Lord Howe, made this point—that time is required. I also understand the emphasis that noble Lords are putting on pace and, of course, we try to match those two things together, but I know we are all agreed on the need to get the Bill in the right place and the Act delivering.

The first priority after Royal Assent will be to draft and consult on the code of practice, and we will be engaging with people with lived experience and their families and carers, staff and professional groups, commissioners, providers and others to do this. The code will be laid before Parliament before final publication, and I am committed to working with noble Lords to ensure that we get this crucial piece of work absolutely right. We expect that this process will take at least a year.

Alongside the code, we will be developing secondary legislation, which will also be laid before Parliament, with more detail on areas such as statutory care and treatment plans. We will then need time to train the existing workforce on the new Act, the regulations and the code. This will likely be in 2026 and 2027, and we intend to commence the first major phase of reforms in 2027.

Of course, some reforms are going to take longer, as noble Lords will appreciate. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, tempted me to go even further than five years, and I thank her for the temptation, but I know I will not be able to please her on this occasion. Of course, it takes time to train new second opinion appointed doctors, judges and approved clinicians, so, as set out in the impact assessment, we believe it will take 10 years to fully implement the reforms, but I emphasise that these timelines are indicative, and we will iterate these plans as we get more certainty on future funding and the wider workforce plans. Of course, I fully appreciate the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability of this work, which is crucial, and I am committed to updating the House throughout the implementation period.

Turning to the amendments, I will start with Amendment 130 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, kindly introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I say in response that any implementation plan, as proposed in the amendment, which would be published four months after Royal Assent, would be very unlikely to contain any more detail than is already in the impact assessment. It is important to prioritise drafting the new code and the secondary regulations after Royal Assent. I also confirm to your Lordships’ Committee that we will commission an independent evaluation of the reforms, alongside existing monitoring and reporting by the CQC.

As I have said, I fully expect to update the House during the planning and delivery of the reforms. However, a requirement in primary legislation to publish annually, and within four months of Royal Assent, would be premature.

Amendment 153, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would prohibit for-profit companies from delivering provisions of the Act. I listened closely to the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, but I do not share the view that a ban on for-profit providers is the right approach, for the reasons that were set out by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. Our focus should indeed be on ensuring that we have high-quality and good value-for-money services. However, I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that we are already investing in a significant quality transformation programme and piloting new models of care to ensure that care is focused on the individual, with maximum therapeutic benefit. That is where our priority lies and for that reason we are resisting this amendment.

Turning to Amendment 163, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Kamall, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Neuberger, for bringing this issue before the Committee. As I said in my opening remarks, I too want to see the benefits of these reforms coming into play quickly and effectively. We intend to commence the reforms in phases, because some can be implemented more quickly than others, which need more time. This is not just about money but about building system and workforce capacity. For example, the impact assessment estimates that we need over 400 additional second opinion appointed doctors and over 300 additional approved clinicians. Many of these will be consultant psychiatrists, who would already need to have commenced training prior to the legislation for us to fully implement the Bill within five years, as required by this amendment. Rather than having a fixed deadline, as is proposed, we intend to monitor the impact of investment and test readiness to commence new powers on an ongoing basis, commencing each phase when we are confident that it is safe and effective to do so.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 164, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler of Enfield and Lady Neuberger. I associate myself with the comments about the commitment to treating physical and mental health equally, in line with this Government’s manifesto commitments. The mental health investment standard requires ICB spending on mental health to grow at least in line with overall recurrent funding allocations. Based on total planned spend for 2024-25, we expect all ICBs to meet the standard in this financial year.

There are already mechanisms to ensure that spending on mental health is prioritised. I refer noble Lords to Section 12F of the NHS Act 2006, which requires the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to lay before Parliament an annual document setting out whether they expect NHS England and ICB spending on mental health to increase in the next year. The Secretary of State will publish this statement before the end of this financial year.

As several noble Lords said, funding for mental health spend goes beyond the scope of the Mental Health Act, which aims to improve the care and treatment of individuals who have a mental illness and need to be detained in hospital or subject to restrictions in the community. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that the Act is not the appropriate mechanism for holding the Government to account on mental health spend. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Earl Howe]

142: After Clause 50, insert the following new Clause—
“Accessibility for children with physical disabilities(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.(2) In section 131A (Accommodation etc for children), after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) Where a child who is accommodated under this section has needs arising from a physical disability, the managers, in determining the suitability of the environment in which the child is accommodated, must ensure that such reasonable adjustments to the environment are made as they consider necessary.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure improvements in accessibility for children with physical impairments who are accommodated in mental health inpatient units.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 142, I will speak to Amendments 143 and 144 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kamall. These amendments are about one critical issue that has proved seemingly intractable despite best efforts for many years: the way the mental health system looks after child patients. I am not talking just about child patients who have been compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act, although they are the subject of Amendment 143; I am referring also to children admitted to a mental health unit as in-patients for any reason at all. That is the subject of Amendment 144.

Noble Lords who are veterans of the last Mental Health Bill in 2007—I can see one or two—will remember that the late Lord Williamson of Horton, former Convener of the Cross Bench Peers, made this issue his crusade with, unfortunately, only limited success. We are still living with the problem. The current Mental Health Act code of practice says that it is government policy for under-16s not to be admitted to an adult ward, which is fine as far as it goes—although, in my book, when we talk about children, we should include young people aged 17 and 18.

The Government promised to eliminate the inappropriate use of beds in adult wards, but that has not happened. Last year, the CQC reported that 196 children were admitted to adult mental health units in 2022-23. This is not a trivial matter. The patient group Blooming Change, which I have mentioned before, has provided me with some first-hand accounts from children and young people who have been placed on adult mental health wards and who have been through some harrowing experiences. One has said:

“As a child I spent over 50 days in a mixed gender crisis unit … There was some very scary stuff that happened … During my first day on the unit, I witnessed a team of police dressed in riot gear with riot shields and dogs doing a drug search … At one point my bedroom was next door to a man who broke a student nurse’s nose and smeared his own bodily fluids over his bedroom wall … I was constantly scared and on edge and the ward was constantly unsettled. The staff on the ward were not trained on child restraint, so I often ended up really hurt … it would be, like, really big men who were used to going up to forensics to restrain people and then coming to restrain me, a little girl at the time, basically. It was horrific”.


That may be an extreme case, and one trusts that it is, but there are many cases that fall not far short of that level of emotional damage. It certainly is not that extreme as regards the complete absence for a child of any therapeutic benefit.

Another witness said:

“The worst thing about adult wards is you can’t access any intervention at all. No art therapy, no psychiatrist, because you’re under 18, so they say they don’t have the appropriate training to work with you. When I was on an adult ward, all my medication went unreviewed. I wasn’t allowed to ask for anything, not even allowed outside”.


What is the best way of solving this problem? The approach I have taken in these amendments is to say that, when a person aged under 18 is in desperate need of in-patient mental health treatment, the clinical decision-making around admitting that person to a mental health unit should be as rigorous as it can be to avoid, as far as humanly possible, admitting that patient into an adult ward. There surely to be a determination around best interests. There also need to be procedural safeguards so that, if it is decided that an adult ward is the only available option in a particular case, there is appropriate transparency around that decision, such that the local authority is informed of the fact and the hospital itself publishes statistics in its annual report recording the number of instances during the year when this has occurred.

I also suggest that a report to the local authority is equally appropriate in a situation where a child is accommodated in a hospital or mental health unit situated outside the local authority area in which the child is ordinarily resident. In one of our earlier debates, we talked about the particular vulnerability of children who are treated in a hospital far away from home. Alerting the child protection officer working nearby would go some way at least to mitigating the risk of the child self-harming.

There may be some Members of the Committee who think I have been far too lily-livered in tabling these amendments and who feel I should have tabled much stronger amendments proposing the outright abolition of placements involving children on adult wards. I quite deliberately have not done that for the reason we touched on in earlier debates: we have to work with the world as we find it, not as we would ideally like it to be. We have to recognise that, in a few cases—sometimes desperate cases—a temporary stay on an adult mental health ward could be the only way of saving a child from death or serious injury and, in those cases, I suggest that it is not for us in Parliament to prohibit the practice outright.

On Amendment 142, a child being treated in a mental health in-patient unit who also has a physical disability can sometimes get a very raw deal. If the unit they are on has areas that are, in practice, inaccessible to that child, that simple fact can have a huge impact on their access to treatment. One member of Blooming Change has said:

“I am physically disabled, and for me, the room to speak to the psychologist was upstairs in the unit, and there was no way for me to access that space. I kept being told she would come down to see me somewhere else during my stay, but it didn’t happen, so for me, my physical impairments meant that I didn’t get equal access to the support”.


This is not the sort of amendment I would choose, in the normal way, to bring back on Report, but the questions it raises are important enough for me to ask the Minister whether the department and NHS England are sufficiently aware of that kind of problem and what, if anything, is being done to address it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 159 and 160. Amendment 159 is similar to Amendment 143. It merely proposes a different notification procedure where a child has been present on an adult ward, but it also requires notification to the local authority and applies to out-of-area placements, which were mentioned by my noble friend Lord Howe. It is important that that information is given to the local authority, as it has the duties to safeguard—particularly children in need. I will speak to this on Amendment 160.

I join with my noble friend’s comments on how the Bill treats those who are 16 and 17. We have raised the issue in relation to other areas of the Bill that, in law, they are children, and they are treated as children by the professionals, as outlined in the example of the psychiatrist saying, “I don’t have the training to do this”. Under-18s are treated as vulnerable young people and children. One can also draw attention to the fact that under-18s are no longer allowed to marry in our country. We are increasingly coming into line with the fact that you are a child, and have the protection of the law as one, until you are 18.

Amendment 160 relates to “children in need” under Section 17 of the Children Act. Recommendation 117 of the Wessely review said:

“Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 should be amended to clarify that any child or young person admitted to a mental health facility is regarded as a ‘child in need’ so that parents can ask for services from their local authority”.


That will, obviously, be particularly important if the child has been placed out of area.

That recommendation was rejected by the Government in their published response to the review, but I note that the review also asked for this provision to be if the child is admitted—that means as a voluntary patient, of course, as well as just being admitted under the Act. I have laid this amendment to clarify the Government’s response to this. That response stated that, basically, it is not necessary to amend the Children Act because disabled children, which includes children suffering from a mental disorder, are already deemed to be “children in need”, so there is no need for this recommendation.

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With these reasons, I hope that noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate and grateful for the support that they have expressed for the amendments, both mine and the others in this group. My noble friend Lady Berridge drew my attention to an inadvertent slip of the tongue that I committed in my earlier contribution. When I sought to define a child, I meant of course to say that we should include young people aged 16 and 17. In that regard, I was particularly grateful for the powerful interventions from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, citing their own experiences.

I much appreciate the Minister’s comments in response to these amendments, particularly Amendments 143 and 144. I believe, from what she said, that she and I are on the same page when it comes to age-appropriate settings for child patients. It was reassuring to hear from her what is contained in the current code of practice and what is intended to be included in the revised service specification. I am also pleased to hear that the CQC has it as part of its role to report on these very important issues.

I will study what she has said in Hansard and consider what is best to do between now and Report, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 142 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Earl Howe]

146: After Clause 50, insert the following new Clause—
“Recording of use of force on mental health patients(1) Each NHS facility must keep a record of any use of force on a patient who is at that facility for the purpose of treatment for mental disorder or assessment for mental disorder, by staff who work in that facility and in relation to the patient’s diagnosed or suspected mental disorder, in accordance with this section.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in cases where the use of force is negligible.(3) Whether the use of force is “negligible” for the purposes of subsection (1) is to be determined in accordance with guidance published by the Secretary of State. (4) The record must include the following information—(a) the reason for the use of force;(b) the place, date and duration of the use of force;(c) the type or types of force used on the patient;(d) whether the type or types of force used on the patient formed part of the patient’s care plan;(e) name of the patient on whom force was used;(f) a description of how force was used;(g) the patient’s consistent identifier;(h) the name and job title of any member of staff who used force on the patient;(i) the reason any person who was not a member of staff in the facility was involved in the use of force on the patient;(j) the patient’s diagnosed or suspected mental disorder;(k) the relevant characteristics of the patient (if known);(l) whether the patient has a learning disability or autistic spectrum disorders;(m) a description of the outcome of the use of force;(n) whether the patient died or suffered any serious injury as a result of the use of force;(o) any efforts made to avoid the need to use force on the patient;(p) whether a notification regarding the use of force was sent to the person or persons (if any) to be notified under the patient’s care plan.(5) The facility must keep the record for 3 years from the date on which it was made.(6) In subsection (4)(g) the “patient’s consistent identifier” means the consistent identifier specified under section 251A of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.(7) This section does not permit the facility to do anything which, but for this section, would be inconsistent with—(a) any provision of the data protection legislation, or(b) a common law duty of care or confidence.(8) In subsection (7) “the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act).(9) In subsection (4)(k) the “relevant characteristics” in relation to a patient mean—(a) the patient’s age;(b) whether the patient has a disability, and if so, the nature of that disability;(c) the patient’s status regarding marriage or civil partnership;(d) whether the patient is pregnant;(e) the patient’s race;(f) the patient’s religion or belief;(g) the patient’s sex;(h) the patient’s sexual orientation.(10) Expressions used in subsection (9) and Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Equality Act 2010 have the same meaning in that subsection as in that Chapter.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require NHS facilities to keep a record of any use of force on a patient who is at that facility for the purpose of treatment for mental disorder or assessment for mental disorder.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 146 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kamall. On the previous group of amendments, I cited the experience of a child held on an adult mental health ward being subject to restraint, where undue force was applied by the staff involved, causing unnecessary pain and distress to the patient.

In fact, the incidence of restraint being used on children being treated in mental health settings—and, indeed, general hospitals—is alarmingly high. This fact was recognised in the Mental Health Units (Use of Force) Act 2018, which came into effect in 2022. However, despite the provisions of that Act, not only has there been no drop in the number of restrictive interventions that children are subject to but there has been an increase.

In 2023-24, a total of 84,626 restrictive interventions were carried out on children, which is a 51% increase on the year before. That is the highest number of restrictive interventions recorded since figures were made available in 2019, despite what appears to be a drop in the number children being treated in mental health units. It is not only that restraint is being applied in these cases; all too often, because there is a physical struggle involved in the process of restraining someone, that patient ends up with an injury.

What lies at the root of this? Blooming Change believes that restraint amounting to abuse is entrenched in the system. Unfortunately, that rather depressing view was borne out last August by the Independent newspaper, which reported that children in a mental health in-patient unit in Coventry were captured on CCTV

“being dragged across the floor”

by the staff. There surely has to be something here about the need for staff in all mental health settings to receive training in the different techniques for de-escalating a crisis, with physical restraint being regarded as a last resort.

In fact, with the two very welcome principles set out in Clause 1, “least restriction” and “therapeutic benefit”, the training of staff in appropriate techniques of control will, one hopes, become an even more important priority than before. I hope the Minister can let me have some reassurance on this very troubling set of issues. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest and my experience as a retired psychiatrist, working for the majority of my career with people with learning disabilities and autistic people.

In 2019, the then Secretary of State for Health asked me to oversee an important review of the use of another restrictive intervention, long-term segregation, known as LTS, for people with learning disabilities and autistic people. The Government published the oversight panel’s report of that review simultaneously with their quite positive response to its recommendations in November 2023.

Amendments 155 and 156 in this group address critical issues highlighted in the report about the use of LTS and the measures needed to eliminate its use for people detained under mental health legislation. The amendments aim to improve oversight and accountability in its use, while pointing to the urgent need for appropriate community services to prevent delayed discharges. The proposed changes are not merely administrative; they are a necessary response to urgent human rights questions raised by the use of LTS, and indeed these other restrictive interventions covered by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, whose amendment I support.

The report, aptly titled My Heart Breaks, found that the mental and physical health of children and young people and adults detained in long-term segregation deteriorates as a direct consequence of enforced isolation. In medicine, we call this iatrogenic harm, and it is unacceptable. LTS is often used in association with other restrictive practices. There is substantial research evidence pointing to the harms of such enforced social isolation, including in conditions of solitary confinement. Nor does it have therapeutic benefit. Oversight panel members considered that LTS should actually be renamed “solitary confinement” to avoid the normalisation of the practice in healthcare settings. Currently, rather less clear terminology is used, perhaps to disguise what is really happening in practice.

It is interesting to note that not all psychiatric hospitals have rooms in which to detain people. The type of accommodation used is sometimes totally unacceptable, with people being detained in rooms with no natural light, with a mattress on the floor and no toilet facilities.

Amendment 155 would require notification of LTS to the CQC within 72 hours of its commencement. It would require that the CQC must initiate an investigation if LTS was used for more than 15 days within any 30-day period, and if it were used for a person under the age of 18, or for a disabled person whose condition would be exacerbated by its use—for example, an already psychologically traumatised person who would be further traumatised by the sensory and social deprivation caused by its use, which is probably most people.

The amendment would require that the code of practice introduced minimum standards for LTS, including access to natural light, outdoor space and meaningful human contact. As I am sure most noble Lords would agree, these are basic necessities for dignity and well-being. Psychiatric hospitals still using LTS would be required to appoint a responsible officer to review and report on its use to the CQC. They would also be required to comply with recommendations from independent care (education) and treatment reviews, known as ICETRs, as they relate to LTS.

Amendment 156 seeks to ensure that therapeutic alternatives to LTS have been properly considered by requiring independently chaired reviews for any person detained in LTS. Since the end of the Department of Health’s programme of ICETRs in 2023, which reviewed 191 cases between 2020 and 2023, the CQC was commissioned to restart the programme. The new programme includes that the independent chairs must follow up to see whether the recommendations have been implemented, but funding has been committed only to the end of this current year, while LTS continues. These reviews must be kept in place until the use of LTS comes to an end, or for as long as it is in existence, so the amendment would require ICETRs to be continued, and it outlines the role, responsibilities and authority of the independent reviewer. I hope the Minister will be able to assure the Committee that the continuation of these independent reviews will be funded.

By limiting the duration of LTS, mandating independent oversight and requiring therapeutic alternatives, we could protect people’s rights and lay the groundwork for effective rehabilitation and reintegration back into their communities. Meeting minimum standards and reclassifying such segregation as “solitary confinement” would rightly underscore its appalling and often inhumane nature. I know many clinicians dislike that term because it is equated with punishment, but it describes the conditions that we sometimes saw.

The excuse is often given that LTS is the last resort for a person, but in fact it is usually the first resort and the first response, because no appropriate care and support have been provided. I have seen systemic failures that are leaving individuals in restrictive settings due to insufficient community-based support. While commissioners and clinicians often act with good intentions, they lack the co-ordination, resources and expertise needed to deliver the care that is needed to keep people safe.

The amendments simply aim to ensure therapeutic care close to home. They require that, by monitoring the continuing use of LTS and understanding the barriers to eliminating its use, the CQC would be able to identify the themes, trends and changes that are taking place over time in the use of this restrictive intervention. I urge the Minister to support the amendments.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I understand that point, and the noble Baroness makes it very well. I simply refer her to the points that I made about needing to look at evidence, the outcomes and the value of those reviews, and whether that is the right approach for everyone. I take on board her point, but my comments probably tell the Committee that we feel that there is more work to be done in this area.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I express my appreciation to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I highlight in particular the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, which I found extremely powerful and persuasive, as did other noble Lords.

It strikes me that this is an especially appropriate grouping of amendments. The overuse of restraint in mental health settings and the use of completely untherapeutic long-term segregation are equally pressing and emotive concerns.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pulled me up slightly on the issue of protection for those undergoing gender reassignment. The concern that I had in drafting the amendment was to cover protected characteristics across the piece, but she has drawn my attention to a lacuna, and I am very grateful.

I was somewhat disappointed with the Minister’s reply on the issue of restraint applied to mental health patients, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pointed out, is an issue affecting adult patients as well as children. The amendment was drafted with precisely that in mind. The point that I sought to make was that, despite the statute law to which the Minister referred, the incidence of restraint on children in particular has rocketed, which raises questions about clinical practice, staffing and training around the code of practice. To my mind, it was a pity that the Minister had little to say about those possible areas for practical follow-up.

I shall read again what the Minister said about my amendment between now and Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 146 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I came in today particularly to support Amendment 149, as others, including the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have clearly done. What we are asking for is either for the loophole to be closed or for clarification. I share with the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, the view that the judges produced a somewhat narrow definition of the situation. I agree with everything that has been said, and I do not want to repeat it, but with a narrow interpretation by the courts and with some lawyers here in Parliament and others who have put things so beautifully, Parliament can put right what is happening. That is what I am here to support: Parliament putting right what at the moment is not clear, is a loophole and needs to be put right.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I should like first to speak to Amendment 160BC standing in my name. Although it may not look like it, this is a probing amendment. I have tabled it because I have been made aware of concerns that there is a serious lack of clarity around one aspect of the Mental Health Act 1983 that would greatly benefit from a clarifying statement from the Minister.

Let us imagine a patient who is detained in a mental health hospital under the Act and who requires urgent treatment in another NHS setting, such as a general hospital. The treatment, let us further imagine, is kidney dialysis—that is just a random example. Unfortunately, in this case, the patient is deemed to lack decision-making capacity for his own health and well-being, and the doctors therefore agree that if he is transferred to the other hospital, he will need to be restrained during the time that he is receiving the treatment, because if he is not, there is a likelihood that the treatment will not be deliverable.

The question then arises: in that particular situation, does the Mental Health Act 1983 allow for the patient to be deprived of his liberty in a setting other than a mental health hospital in order for necessary life-saving treatment to be administered? I am aware that there are contrary opinions among lawyers and clinicians as to the answer to that question. Some believe that, in that example, it would be necessary for the managers of the mental health hospital to apply to the court for a deprivation of liberty order under the Mental Capacity Act, which the court could grant under its inherent jurisdiction. I understand that this is standard procedure in a number of mental health hospitals. By contrast, other experts are clear that Section 17(3) of the Act already provides authority to place the mental health patient into the custody of the managers of the acute hospital and that there is therefore no need to apply for a DoL order under the Mental Capacity Act in order to achieve this.

Section 17(3) of the Mental Health Act says:

“Where it appears to the responsible clinician that it is necessary so to do in the interests of the patient or for the protection of other persons, he may, upon granting leave of absence under this section, direct that the patient remain in custody during his absence; and where leave of absence is so granted the patient may be kept in the custody of any officer on the staff of the hospital, or of any other person authorised in writing by the managers of the hospital or, if the patient is required in accordance with conditions imposed on the grant of leave of absence to reside in another hospital, of any officer on the staff of that other hospital”.


Those words appear to confirm the opinion that I have just set out—that the responsible clinician can authorise “leave of absence” in another hospital, with the patient being kept in custody so long as this is seen to be in the patient’s best interests.

Unfortunately, it also appears that there is more than one way of interpreting Section 17(3). There are those who maintain that what one might call the carte-blanche interpretation is too broad a reading of Section 17(3), which they insist needs to be read with Section 63 of the Act. Section 63 says:

“The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering, not being a form of treatment to which section 57, 58 or 58A above applies, if the treatment is given by or under the direction of the approved clinician in charge of the treatment”.


Taken together, those two sections say that the Mental Health Act authorises treatment only for mental disorders and physical disorders that are part and parcel of the treatment for the mental disorder; in other words, for treatment of physical disorders that are not directly connected to the mental disorder, a court would need to make the appropriate order under the Mental Capacity Act. Who is right? I should be very grateful if the Minister would use this opportunity to bring some clarity to bear on this area of the law, around which there appears to be a veil of fog. Whatever the answer, will she ask NHS England to examine the guidance contained in the relevant part of the code of practice to ensure that it is as clear as possible about what the current law permits?

Finally, I shall comment briefly on Amendment 149, which the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, has tabled jointly with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I fully support this amendment. At the same time, I regret that it appears to be necessary, and I say that with some personal feeling. The issue addressed by this amendment is precisely the same as the one which in 2014, as a Health Minister, I endeavoured to close down by means of a government amendment to the Care Bill, which now forms Section 73 of that Act.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 24th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

160BA: After Clause 50, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to publish investigations(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.(2) After section 54A insert—“54B Duty to publish the outcome of investigations(1) Integrated care boards, hospital managers and the relevant authority must, if requested to do so by the court, publish any report, review or investigation that they have undertaken in relation to a relevant patient.(2) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant patient” is a patient who–(a) has received treatment under this Act,(b) is currently receiving treatment under this Act, or(c) has been detained under this Act, andhas been sentenced for a “specified offence” under section 306 of the Sentencing Act 2020.””

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 160BA and will speak to Amendment 160BB. These amendments, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kamall, stem directly from the harrowing case of the murder of three people by Valdo Calocane in Nottingham. The Minister and, indeed, other noble Lords may question the propriety of referring to an individual case in this way. However, I believe that this is one occasion on which it is legitimate to do so.

The amendments I have tabled were drafted in the light of the facts that have emerged from the full independent investigation into the care and treatment of Valdo Calocane in the months leading up to the tragic events of 13 June 2023. There have also been press articles on a report by the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the IOPC, which identified 11 mistakes in the run-up to that fateful day. There is a great deal about the case that is known and not disputed, and, given the magnitude of the tragedy, it would be remiss of this Committee not to spend at least a little time considering its implications.

Before I go further, there are two things I need to say. The first is to acknowledge that the Government have agreed to a judge-led public inquiry that will start in a matter of weeks. Secondly, on that account I will do my utmost to avoid saying anything that would undermine that inquiry.

There are a number of issues arising from the treatment of Valdo Calocane that are directly relevant to the Bill because they are of wider application. The report of the independent investigation recounts the timelines associated with Calocane’s treatment. His first contact with mental health services was on 24 May 2020, when he was arrested for criminal damage and a Mental Health Act assessment was undertaken. That assessment indicated that Calocane was experiencing the first episode of psychosis brought on by sleep deprivation and social stressors.

During that first contact, he was not detained for treatment as he acknowledged that he required help for his condition. However, after returning home, Calocane was arrested again and, on admission, was considered not to have capacity to consent and was consequently detained under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act. After that episode of treatment, he was again detained on 13 July 2020, this time under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act. Upon discharge, he was

“considered to have a primary diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and was to continue with antipsychotic medication”.

During the course of 2021, Calocane was detained again under Section 2 of the Act and continued treatment in the community. He began missing appointments with his care co-ordinator and mental health care team from July 2022. On 4 August, the care co-ordinator attempted to make a home visit, but the given address was incorrect. On 17 August, the care co-ordinator attempted to reach Calocane at a new address, which received no response.

The report then states:

“On 23 September 2022 it was documented that as no contact had been made with VC, a decision was made at an MDT meeting on the 22 September to discharge VC back to his GP due to non-engagement. A letter to VC’s GP was written the same day, outlining non-contact and that VC had been discharged”.


The key aspect of all this is the problematic last line:

“There was no contact between VC and mental health services or his GP between this date and the tragic incidents in June 2023”.


For a whole nine months prior to the killings there was no contact between any health service and Calocane. What this demonstrates is that the co-ordination of the community aspect of Calocane’s care was clearly inadequate. After he began to miss appointments, it appears that there may not have been sufficient attempts at outreach. There were evidently issues with maintaining contact between mental health services and the patient.

It is this issue that my Amendment 160BB tries to address. The amendment takes the form of a report on continuity of care, to ensure that all options can be explored. I do not profess to have the answers but, as proposed subsection (2) in the amendment makes clear, such a report must include discussion of the possibility of creating some form of duty, placed on ICBs and/or hospital managers, to

“maintain contact with patients known to have a mental disorder”.

This is not too far from one of the recommendations of the independent investigation, which said:

“NHS England and other national leaders, including people with lived experience, should come together to discuss and debate how the needs of people similar to VC are being met and how they are enabled to be supported and thrive safely in the community”.


The point is that, somewhere along the line, the mental health care system failed Valdo Calocane and ultimately his victims and the wider public. As we debate this Bill, we have the opportunity to address these potential failures, in the hope that we can make progress towards minimising the number of patients who slip through the net in this way.

The second issue to arise from the case relates to the publication of the investigation. Noble Lords will remember that controversy arose when the NHS trust responsible refused to publish the full version of the independent investigation into the treatment of Valdo Calocane, due to patient confidentiality. We all know that the NHS did subsequently publish this investigation—I have just referenced it above—but this was not without significant public and political pressure.

There are questions to be answered about whether patient confidentiality rules should apply in cases such as this, where there is a significant public interest. Of course, there should always be adequate safeguards to ensure that a patient’s medical records are protected, but, as my Amendment 160BA sets out, where there have clearly been significant institutional failings regarding a patient who has been treated under the Mental Health Act and who has then gone on to commit a violent offence, it may very well be in the wider public interest for such investigations to be published in full.

I am under no illusion that this amendment is the absolute best solution to the problem. But I hope it at least starts a conversation and pushes the Government to review their approach to publication. There are obviously a number of concerns raised by these harrowing events. We obviously must do better. In the light of the published report, does the Minister believe that there are any measures that could and should be taken now, prior to the report of the judge-led inquiry? I thank the Minister in advance for the considered answer that I know that she will give. I beg to move.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise quickly to say that I am very sympathetic to the aims behind these two amendments. They have been set out very powerfully and comprehensively by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I feel, particularly, that an obligation to publish a report of an investigation of the type we have just heard about is absolutely essential if we are to avoid a repetition of these terrible events. There must be a way of learning lessons from this, and transparency and publication are an important part of that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. While the Calocane tragedy provided the trigger for these amendments, there are messages sent out from that case that are of wider and more general application that it would not be inappropriate for the department and NHS England to think about now, and I am glad that such consideration is being given as we speak. I recognise that there are established processes set out in the community mental health framework, among other places, but those processes clearly failed, which is why the Calocane case is such a seminal one.

The inquiry will no doubt shed further light on who bears responsibility for what happened, but that is not my concern today, as I am sure the Minister will appreciate. My concern is that practical steps could be taken, perhaps in the areas of professional training, updating the code of practice and the revision of standard referral protocols—the Minister has spoken broadly about those sorts of things, which I very much welcome. I will give further thought to this very vexing set of issues between now and Report but, for now, I am content to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 160BA withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 160C and 160D in the name of my noble friend Lord Scriven. These amendments would ensure that any changes to this primary legislation implemented through secondary legislation were properly considered by Parliament before they took effect.

Amendment 160C makes it clear that certain provisions in subsection (5) should not be included under the general powers in Clause 51, and Amendment 160D then strengthens parliamentary oversight by requiring that any statutory instrument amending or revoking this primary legislation be approved by both Houses before it comes into force; that is, by using the affirmative procedure.

This is a matter of proper scrutiny. Primary legislation is carefully debated before it becomes law, as we have demonstrated throughout this Committee stage, and any later changes to it should not be made too easily or without full consideration. If a statutory instrument can amend or remove part of an Act without Parliament’s approval, there is a risk that important legal protections could be altered without proper deliberation.

This is particularly important in the context of mental health legislation, where the law directly affects the rights, personal liberties, and treatment and care of highly vulnerable people. I hope that the Government will recognise that these amendments, which are completely in line with the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, simply ensure that when primary legislation is changed, it is done with the same level of scrutiny that was given to it in the first place. I beg to move.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I will keep this brief since I can do no more than back the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in every word that she has said in support of these two amendments. We are dealing here with a Henry VIII clause that is surely far too permissive given the great sensitivity of the Bill’s entire subject matter and, as the noble Baroness said so well, its momentous significance for the health and well-being of very vulnerable people.

The absolute minimum that Parliament can expect is that Parliament be consulted in the exercise of these powers. The affirmative procedure is therefore entirely appropriate for any statutory instruments made under this clause and I hope the Minister will not disagree with what is proposed.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, for tabling Amendments 160C and 160D, which were introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and spoken to by the noble Earl, Lord Howe.

The proposal in the amendment, as was referred to, was a recommendation in the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope that your Lordships’ Committee will welcome that we are actively considering this proposal and will publish our response to the committee’s recommendation ahead of Report.

Mental Health Treatment: Waiting Times

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a very important point. This is one of the many areas where long waiting lists and delays in people receiving the necessary service are creating additional pressures on the individual, communities and the NHS. We are doing work in a number of areas, such as ensuring that NHS 111 can provide for those in crisis, or those concerned about a family member or loved one, so they can speak to a trained mental health professional. We are constantly looking at and providing new ways for people to get more instant access.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, do the Government see a role for employers in promoting the mental health of their respective workforces?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I certainly do, and with the NHS being such a large employer, that is one of the areas that we will be attending to. The long-term workforce plan will provide its report around the summer of this year and there will be much detail on how the workforce will be but also on the ways that we can improve its health and retention as well as recruitment.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, with this group of amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, my noble friend Lady Berridge, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have exposed a crucial set of issues: in my judgment, one of the two or three most important issues that we shall be dealing with during our debates on the Bill. At their heart, I suggest, is the conflict, or perhaps I should say the high risk of a conflict if nothing is done, between the arrangements that the Bill seeks to put in place for the creation of nominated persons on the one hand and, on the other, the law of the land as set out in the Children Act 1989.

Both this group of amendments and those in the next group in the name of my noble friend Lady Berridge focus on matters of the highest significance for child protection and child safety in all its aspects. The assumption inherent in the Bill’s provisions for nominated persons is that the process for appointing a nominated person is rigorous enough to ensure that someone unfit to be appointed to that role will not in practice be appointed, or that, if they are, the system will find them out. I believe that it is evident from what we have heard in this debate that that assumption is a highly dangerous one.

A nominated person will be someone in a position of considerable power. They will be able to exercise all the functions exercised currently by a nearest relative, as well as availing of additional powers as set out in the Bill. Children and young people under 18 will be able to appoint a nominated person. That person will be someone of their own choosing. It could be a parent or someone other than a parent, but the principal qualification for such a person is that they must have the child’s best interests at heart.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have been given I also support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Just to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, I respectfully point out to the Minister that if she does get in touch with the Judicial College, which I think would be a very sensible move, she should also let the President of the Family Division know.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, in this group of amendments my noble friend Lady Berridge has raised an armada of issues which I think it is clear to all of us cannot be ducked. These issues, as she said, were examined at length both during the independent review and by the Joint Committee, but it has to be said that in both instances it proved too much of a challenge to identify a satisfactory resolution to them. For that reason, as we observed in our debate on the previous group, the weight of these matters now rests on the shoulders of this Committee and of the Government.

In summary, we need arrangements that are robust enough to ensure that a nominated person’s appointment can be effectively challenged, and that, in certain circumstances, where necessary, the exercise of their powers can be legally contested and blocked. Without those measures, we shall leave an unacceptable lacuna in the law and, more pertinently, run a high risk of exposing children to personal danger.

My noble friend is to be thanked for assisting this Committee’s deliberations with the clear way in which she has set out the challenge, and I hope and trust that the Minister will wish to grip the challenge with her usual vigour.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, like the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for introducing an appropriately wide range of scenarios, questions and testing. That is important for the Committee but also for our ongoing work. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, to describe this area as complex is to use too small a word, and I think we are all wrestling with that to get it in the right place. I know that noble Lords are aware that the work is ongoing, and I thank them for their engagement and interest in this issue. As I said previously, I very much understand the need for a robust process to keep children and young people safe and ensure that only appropriate individuals can take on the role of nominated person, while giving children and young people that right to choose.

I will respond collectively to the amendments put forward in this group. As I set out earlier, we agree that in the vast majority of cases there is an expectation that a parent or whoever has parental responsibility would take on this role, and that would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders. We also agree that, where parental responsibility has been removed due to care proceedings, in the vast majority of cases it is unlikely to be appropriate for such a person to take up this role. My reference to this being a complicated area—

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

115: Clause 42, page 54, leave out lines 9 to 15 and insert—
“(1) An eligible patient shall have a right to create an advance choice document.(1A) For the purposes of this section, an “eligible patient” is a patient who—(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act, or(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future.(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 115 takes us to one of the features of this Bill which has been universally welcomed: the creation of advance choice documents or ACDs. An ACD is a means by which a person can record in writing their decisions, wishes and feelings about their treatment, should they be admitted to a hospital or a mental health unit as an in-patient, whether informally or detained compulsorily.

On that account, ACDs are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value. Giving that element of extra control also reduces the risk of discrimination creeping into any decisions about care and treatment.

The Explanatory Notes say that the people most likely to benefit from an ACD are those who may be detained in a mental health unit or who are likely to be hospitalised at some point in the future. This is because research has shown that ACDs have the potential to reduce time spent in hospital and, significantly, to reduce compulsory detention rates by up to 25%. So the creation of ACDs carries enormous potential.

Clause 42 sets out the duties of NHS England and integrated care boards in making the necessary arrangements for facilitating ACDs. Each of them is required to make information about ACDs available to the people for whom it is responsible, as defined in the clause, and to help such of those people as it considers appropriate to create advance choice documents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I would be very glad to share the date if I could put a date on it. It will be after Royal Assent, and I will keep noble Lords updated.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I very much appreciate the support from around the Committee for my Amendment 115. I support all the other amendments in this group, each of which is designed to bolster the rigour and thoroughness of the advance choice document process.

It is good to hear from the Minister that the code of practice will include guidance on how information on ACDs will be made known to relevant would-be patients. I shall need to reflect on this, but I confess I retain a worry in this area. The CQC in its annual report of 2020-21 on monitoring the Mental Health Act reported that many patients do not have their rights explained to them during their treatment. This is despite the existing requirement in the Mental Health Act code of practice for hospital managers to provide information both orally and in writing. Clearly, if someone without an existing ACD is admitted to a mental health unit for treatment, it will be too late for them to execute a valid ACD during that episode of care. The time to be informed that an ACD could be an appropriate thing for them to draw up is once they are discharged, to cater for possible future contingencies.

I suggest that the CQCs finding is still relevant, its point being that the NHS is not all that good at providing information to patients in a timely or appropriate way. Therefore, I think that creating a duty to do so would add value—perhaps not in the precise terms I have used in the amendment, but in similar language. That could, incidentally, be achieved quite easily if mental health patients were automatically invited to complete a debriefing report following discharge from hospital in the way that I suggested in an earlier amendment.

The prize, let us remember, could be significant. I refer noble Lords back to remarks by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, in an earlier debate, where she indicated that independent advocates have been proved as central to the success of advance choice documents—a facilitator, in other words. She referred to a study in North Carolina that showed that providing a facilitator in the form of an independent advocate increased the number of people making a psychiatric advance directive from 3% to 60%. That is a very powerful set of figures.

I hope the Minister will be open to further discussion on this and the other amendments in the group between now and Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 115.

Amendment 115 withdrawn.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Browning (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 128 is in my name. A person with autistic spectrum disorder or a learning disability may be stuck in hospital for years; we know that they often are. We sincerely hope that matters will improve dramatically when this Bill is enacted, but we should not be so optimistic as to think that will happen in the near future. However, when somebody is in hospital that long and no longer needs clinical supervision—some in the autistic and learning disability community, for example, never needed to be in there at all—parents become extremely stressed and frustrated. There may be long periods when a close relative, often their adult child or a younger child, is stuck in these hospitals and the parents cannot get them out.

We heard in debate earlier this evening of the differences between the county courts and the mental health tribunals; of course, there are also people who sometimes resort to the Court of Protection. Although I heard noble and learned Lords giving their different views on these, most seemed not to regard the county courts as the most appropriate course. It is a fact, though, that the Court of Protection has had some success in getting out people who have been unduly held in mental health hospitals.

Amendment 128 proposes that mental health tribunals are strengthened to give them the same opportunity as the Court of Protection to make progress in releasing people from long stays in hospitals. If they are to do that, the mental health tribunals need to have more powers, particularly to require local authorities and the NHS to provide a report to enable discharge for a person who no longer clinically needs to be in hospital. This would give tribunals the same powers that the Court of Protection has under Section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act, because there has been some success.

The Court of Protection has been able to secure discharges because it is able to call for reports from local authorities and health services to put the case that it feels confident that it would be safe to discharge somebody. Parents who do this very often have to fund it themselves. Strengthening the tribunal cases, in line with the sort of powers that the Court of Protection has in getting information collated, to make sure the discharge package is sound is very important. This approach would be stronger and more effective than the Government’s proposal that tribunals make recommendations on Section 117.

That is what the Government propose, but I hope that the Minister will look carefully at this amendment. It would enhance mental health tribunals, increasing the number of people who have proper discharge packages through these tribunals. I do not see this as a competition between the Court of Protection and tribunals. Both have a place, and this will be important if we are to achieve what this Bill wants to achieve: to make sure that people do not stay in health mental hospitals a moment longer than they absolutely have to. I beg to move.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I believe we would all accept—and, personally, I am in no doubt—that my noble friend Lady Browning possesses a breadth and depth of experience in matters relating to autism and learning disability. By that, I mean that she has not just a familiarity with the day-to-day challenges of life for individuals with one or more of these conditions but a knowledge of the practical frustrations and hurdles that often have to be overcome if the best interests of such individuals are to be properly defended.

It is amply clear from what my noble friend has said that, if this amendment were inserted into the Bill, it would have the potential to make a material and beneficial difference to the process of discharging certain patients from a secure mental health unit in particular types of situations. As my noble friend said, and as we all know, there have been many instances where autistic patients have been detained inappropriately and for long periods under the Mental Health Act and where families have struggled to secure their relatives’ release.

I cannot see a logical reason why a mental health tribunal should not be placed on an equal legal footing with the Court of Protection in this very limited respect. I hope the Minister will agree.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for tabling Amendment 128 and for her contribution, along with that of the noble Earl, Lord Howe.

On the proposals in Amendment 128, I can tell your Lordships that, under the current tribunal procedure rules, the tribunal can direct responsible authorities, which could be a local authority or an NHS body, to provide evidence. The practice directions that apply in mental health cases place a requirement on the responsible authority to provide reports and records relating to the patient’s detention treatment and any after-care plans. The tribunal can use these reports to decide whether the detention criteria are being met. Therefore, it appears that the tribunal has extensive powers to require responsible authorities to provide the information to support its decision on whether to discharge a patient. I hope that the noble Baroness will be satisfied with this response and will withdraw her amendment.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

46: Clause 8, page 14, line 17, at end insert—
“(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 46, I will speak also to Amendments 47, 53, 54 and 95 in this group. These amendments have one central aim in common, which is that of maximising the therapeutic benefit of being cared for in a secure mental health unit. That aim should be common to all mental health patients, young or not so young, but it is largely the concerns of younger mental health patients which have prompted these amendments.

Blooming Change is a small independent charity whose membership is comprised of children and young people who have experienced detention in mental health in-patient units in England as children. It is at their urging that I have tabled Amendments 46 and 47. I have done so after hearing some first-hand accounts of incidents in which children in mental health settings have been treated in a fashion that is the very opposite of therapeutic, by which I mean treated with a lack of understanding, with an obvious vindictiveness, sometimes, and sometimes even with outright cruelty.

It is perhaps hard to imagine this happening when we know how professional and caring most staff in mental health units are, but I am absolutely persuaded that it does happen, and not just rarely. Medical interventions such as nasogastric feeding or sedation are threatened and used as punishments. Patients who have raised concerns with their parents have been silenced by their parents being told by staff that they should take no notice of the concerns, because the child was either unwell or lying.

One young person reported as follows: “Young people on section were essentially incarcerated, yet still not able to voice views or share how they felt or generally engage with their treatment. This would lead to overuse of medical interventions or the threat of this, leading to young people living in fear and not having a way to raise concerns. Many of these things had a long-lasting impact on me. Had this coercion not occurred and medicalisation not been used as punishment, I would have been able to access treatment and recover, instead of the treatment compounding my illness and in many ways contributing to me being stuck in the cycle”.

Blooming Change has pointed out the significance of childhood trauma as a factor underlying a large number of mental health admissions involving young people and the challenging behaviour that they then exhibit. The problem is that, all too often, the link between childhood trauma and the way that a patient behaves is not recognised or understood. As a result, someone with autism or a severely troubled and traumatised young people person going into meltdown —as was well described, incidentally, by my noble friend Lady Browning during our first day in Committee —is simply viewed as wilfully disruptive or downright disobedient, with punishments doled out in response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I would be very pleased to look into it further, but, as I have described, this is a rolling programme. I emphasise that the CQC has that duty both to monitor but also to make the relevant bodies subject to sanctions if needed—in other words, more immediately. So I am concerned that through this amendment we could be creating a structure which is actually less flexible and responsive than the one we have now.

Amendment 148, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would impose on integrated care boards—ICBs—a legally binding duty to provide local, in-person, specialist withdrawal treatments for patients on psychiatric medication prescribed during the course of their treatment by services under the Mental Health Act. In addition, there would be a duty on each ICB to send to the Secretary of State an annual report on the availability, uptake and outcomes of this support. Under this amendment, the Secretary of State would be obliged to lay these reports before Parliament. ICBs would also be subject to a requirement to provide a 24-hour helpline and online platform to support patients to receive withdrawal treatment.

Let me say at the outset that I recognise the difficulties that withdrawal can pose. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, spoke on this very point in the Chamber last month and was also good enough to speak directly to me. It is, I agree, an issue that will not go away and, per the noble Lord’s request, I would be happy to arrange a meeting. I feel there is a whole area here to which we today, considering amendments, cannot do justice, so I would be pleased to do that. To the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, who has tabled Written Questions, I say that I look forward to answering them, and I hope that he will look forward to reading my Answers.

Where relevant, we would expect the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan to include a tapering plan and put in place whatever additional support is needed to enable a patient’s recovery and effective discharge. On the requirement to provide support in the community and report on availability, this is the responsibility of local health commissioners. In 2023, NHSE published a framework for ICBs and primary care boards on how to optimise personalised care for patients prescribed medicines associated with dependence or withdrawal symptoms. With regard to the requirement in the amendment for a 24-hour helpline, this would not seem proportionate, given the relatively low numbers of people who might need this service, who should already have a support plan in place, including access to relevant local support services.

Finally, Amendment 154, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations giving people detained in hospital and those subject to community treatment or guardianship orders the ability to have certain care and treatment matters considered by a mental health tribunal.

This is a very complex area, as I am sure the noble Baroness is aware. The amendment seems to draw on the recommendation made by the independent review to give patients a new right of appeal to a single judge of the mental health tribunal regarding compulsory treatment. I recall that the previous Government publicly consulted on this new right, and the majority of respondents raised major concerns in this regard. The consultation was followed by further long and careful consideration with stakeholders, which led the then Government to the conclusion that this safeguard is just not viable. A solution could not be found that provided an efficient and effective route of appeal for patients while avoiding the risks of the tribunal intervening in clinical decision-making, alongside significant resource burdens. Many of these concerns were reflected in the report of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which also acknowledged the complexity of the issue.

We believe that the other provisions in the Bill will better achieve the same objectives of providing patient choice and autonomy, so while we do not support introducing a new role for the tribunal, I assure your Lordships that the emphasis on therapeutic benefit within the detention criteria will mean that whether care and treatment are proving effective will play a role in the tribunal’s consideration of whether or not detention should continue to be upheld. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Earl feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate in such compelling ways, and I think we can see that when it comes to the experiences of children and young people in mental health units, we are dealing with a story that is a lot more substantial than mere anecdote. From briefing I have received, I am afraid I have been left in no doubt that the therapeutic environment in a number of mental health hospitals around the country—not all, of course—is, to put it mildly, a lot less than optimal.

Clearly, it is unacceptable for any patient, of whatever age, to be detained compulsorily without being offered treatment. It is unacceptable that drugs or restraint should be used as punishments. Challenging behaviour can be difficult to deal with, but staff should be trained to deal with it in a way that demonstrates that they understand the root causes of the behaviour. Those causes can be extremely complex.

To pick up another strand of the debate, I am in no doubt that medication has a place in mental health therapy. It can often be the treatment of choice. It is one tool in the toolbox. However, I very much agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, had to say about social prescribing. It can not only be clinically effective but save costs if it is delivered, for example, by local charities that work in the fields of music, drama or art. Incidentally, it can help budding musicians, actors and artists in their downtime to train as music, art or drama therapists, which is an added bonus.

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[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I make two specific points in response to what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. The amendments refer to Section 24 of the Mental Capacity Act, but if one goes on to Section 25 of that Act, there are a number of conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a record of an advanced decision to be deemed valid. I think it is worth pointing out subsection (5) to noble Lords, which states:

“An advance decision is not applicable to life-sustaining treatment unless … (a) the decision is verified by a statement by P to the effect that it is to apply to that treatment even if life is at risk, and (b) the decision and statement comply with subsection (6).


Subsection (6) states that it must be,

“in writing … it is signed by P or by another person in P's presence and by P's direction … the signature is made or acknowledged by P in the presence of a witness, and … the witness signs it, or acknowledges”

it to be true.

I am trying to convey to the noble and learned Baroness that these are very formal procedures. They are not taken lightly. That applies to somebody who is 18 and one day, and I think it should be applied to somebody who is younger than that with as much seriousness.

Noble Lords and others have referred to these decisions as advance decisions to refuse treatment. Advance decisions can also be for treatment. People can say in an advance decision, “I know that when I am in an episode of illness, I may be saying that I do not want medication. At this moment in time, when I have capacity, I wish it to be put down in writing that if I do that, you are to ignore it”.

I would like us to have a fuller appreciation of what it is we are talking about, although I do not detract from any of the considerations that people want to bring in about young people.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I venture to say that all the amendments in this group approach similar issues in not dissimilar ways. The most compelling point that perhaps should be underlined in relation to them all is that implied by the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston: that there is no earthly reason why the law should prohibit a young person with sufficient decision-making competence recording a valid expression of their wishes and preferences around their own mental health care, and the logical consequence of that is the need for a competence test, or a capacity test for child patients.

My Amendment 56 seeks to address an issue allied to those addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston. As it stands, the Bill does not permit a 16 or 17 year-old to make a valid advance decision about their mental health care. An advance decision has the same effect in practice as a capacity decision to refuse a particular treatment. It is important to understand that under the Mental Health Act, making an advance decision does not give someone an unfettered right to refuse that treatment. Treatment can still be administered notwithstanding the advance decision, albeit only if certain strict conditions are met. Nevertheless, an advance decision made by an adult patient carries a huge amount of weight, and placed within or alongside an advance choice document, which enables a patient to outline their treatment preferences, it does a great deal to ensure that the patient is placed genuinely in the driving seat when it comes to their mental health care and treatment.

Under the terms of the Bill, young persons aged 16 and 17 will be able to execute an advance choice document, but what they cannot do is to make an advance decision to sit alongside it. That means that an advance choice document that purports to include an advance decision made by an under 18 year-old is likely to carry a good deal less weight than such a document executed by an adult. My amendment invites the Government to put this right.

An associated but distinct issue arises in relation to children under the age of 16. I will not repeat the excellent arguments for a competency test put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but I agree entirely with what they have said. The point that resonates most with me in the context of a Bill that places great emphasis on patient empowerment is that in the absence of a statutory competence test to determine a child’s decision-making ability, it will, in practice, be impossible for someone under 16 to execute an advance choice document and then expect professionals to take due notice of it.

Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, seems to me to be as good as it gets in articulating the key requirements necessary to establish decision-making competence in a child. My only hesitation about his amendment is that it invites us to place the terms of a competency test in the Bill without further ado. For a measure of this significance, I tend to feel that any final formula for a competence test merits a prior consultation exercise, and then encapsulation in regulations approved by Parliament. I fully agree with my noble friend Lady Berridge that relying on a code of practice in this context would be wholly unsatisfactory. For what it is worth, I suspect that a consultation would be likely to throw up some further considerations that would need to be factored in to the formula. That aside, I very much hope that the Minister will be receptive to the arguments she has heard. If we can deliver this added empowerment to children and, as regards advance decisions, to 16 and 17 year-olds, the prize will be very great, and I hope she agrees that the challenge is one we must address.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, if the noble Earl is suggesting that the provisions in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, should go either to consultation or to further consideration, will we not end up in a situation where this Bill becomes law and nothing is done to advise anyone, on the face of the legislation, how to deal with those under 16, although it is there for those over 16? Why should, in this particular instance, those under 16 basically be discriminated against? Whether or not they have capacity is the point of the amendment.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness. I hope it was implicit in what I said that I would look to this Bill to include an order-making power that would enable regulations to be laid in due course that would cover not only 16 or 17 year-olds but also those under 16, and Parliament would then approve them. No doubt this is a matter that we can discuss further after this, but I hope that the point of principle is clear, which I fully support, that this issue needs to be sorted through this Bill.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have listened to the noble Earl’s argument carefully, and in principle I support what he is trying to do. The only problem with leaving the matter to a statutory instrument, rather than putting it on the face of the Bill, is that it is far easier for the Secretary of State to change that, even despite the will of Parliament, based on the way that Parliament works. Why could it not be on the face of the Bill, to give absolute certainty, rather than in a statutory instrument, which normally gives flexibility and powers to a Minister?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

There are two answers to that. First, it is generally unthinkable for a Government to lay regulations without first having consulted the relevant parties. Secondly, if we are honest, putting something on the face of a Bill is not the whole story; there would need to be proper clinical guidance published alongside that for practical purposes for hospitals and elsewhere.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for examining the important issues that have been raised in this group of amendments.

Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seeks to change the Mental Capacity Act to allow young people aged 16 or 17 the ability to make a binding advance decision to refuse medical treatment for mental disorder. I shall set out some concerns about the amendment that may be helpful.

First, the amendment would mean that a young person who is not detained under the Mental Health Act could refuse a mental health treatment, even if it was life-sustaining. While the Mental Health Act and the Bill currently provide safeguards that enable a person’s advance decision to be overruled, detention under the Act may not always be appropriate. For example, if a 16 year-old is left very unwell following an attempted suicide, then currently they may be given treatment on the basis of what is in their best interests, under the Mental Capacity Act, if they lack capacity to consent at the time. However, under the amendment, if the 16 year-old had made an advance decision to refuse treatment necessary for their recovery or to sustain their life, then they might need to be detained under the Mental Health Act simply so that their advance decision could be overruled. This is important in terms of timely access to treatment and to avoid loss of life, of course.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 20th January 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

23: Clause 4, page 9, leave out lines 9 to 13
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify the Government’s intended definition of “specified risk factors for detention” under Part 2 of the 1983 Act.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 23 I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group, Amendments 139 and 141. These amendments, although they may not look it, are all of a piece, because they bear upon the fulcrum for any decision to detain a patient under the Mental Health Act, which is the concept of “serious harm” and what we mean by it. My noble friend Lord Kamall’s Amendment 141 offers such a definition, but we have tabled the amendment more as an Aunt Sally than anything else, because what matters is how we want the phrase to be interpreted in real-life situations by clinicians and others on the ground.

The concept of serious harm as a determining factor for detention is introduced by Clause 5. Clause 5(2)(b) replaces Section 2(2)(b) of the Act, which refers instead to detention in the interests of a person’s own health or safety, or with a view to the protection of other persons. The new wording is undoubtedly tighter than the old wording and, on that account, it is to be welcomed. However, it is not, as far as I can see, fleshed out by any definition. That could, of course, be deliberate, because, in the end, a decision to detain someone will always be a matter of clinical judgment. Such judgments, though, ought surely to rest on established understandings. Serious harm, as applied to the health or safety of the patient themselves, may be a relatively straightforward clinical judgment to make in many, if not most, circumstances. But what about serious harm as applied to the health or safety of another individual? Do we mean just physical harm or are we talking also about psychological harm? If so, of what kind and to what degree? Detaining someone on the grounds that serious psychological harm may be caused to another person raises all sorts of issues that fall outside a standard clinical judgment about the health and/or safety of a prospective in-patient.

The threshold of serious harm being caused, or at risk of being caused, is of huge significance for different types of patients. One of the really good things that this Bill seeks to do is to keep individuals with autism or a learning disability out of a mental health unit, unless they present with other behavioural symptoms that are treatable. That is because we recognise that not only is there no point in detaining such individuals when they display no treatable symptoms, it is also positively harmful to them to do so. In the same way, I think it is accepted that to detain a child or a young person forcibly in a mental health unit is a very big decision indeed, because what is meant to constitute a therapeutic environment is all too often no such thing. On the contrary, a mental health ward or even an A&E department can often seem both alien and frightening to a young patient, in a way that can exacerbate their acute disturbance of mind.

Nobody wants to see people detained forcibly in a mental health unit unless it is essential and right, but so often the choice is a binary one: to detain in hospital or not to detain in hospital. How much better it would be if, in particularly sensitive cases, there were another option, a place of safety and comfort close by in the community.

That is why I tabled Amendment 139. We know that community-based services can be a significantly positive alternative to treatment in mental health hospitals and secure units. We need to look at affordable ways of creating more, especially for those with autism and learning disabilities and for children where the alternative may indeed be forcible detention under the Mental Health Act.

The King’s Fund reported in July 2024 that

“community health services have about 200,000 patient contacts”

every day. Anxious Minds argues that community-based mental health services provide three key benefits:

“Geographical convenience of mental health facilities”,


the relative affordability of such services and, importantly, culturally sensitive approaches to care

“that appeal to diverse populations”.

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We very much appreciate the desire for accountability and scrutiny, and I want to give that assurance to Parliament as we progress these reforms. I say that as a general point, because I understand that noble Lords will have heard my responses to a number of the amendments. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Earl feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on this group of amendments. As I trust was clear from my opening speech, all three are intended as probing amendments designed to tease out some key definitions. It was actually Amendment 141, regarding the definition, that I described as an Aunt Sally.

I was particularly grateful for noble Lords’ support for Amendment 139 and for the Minister’s helpful comments. There is very little doubt that, as I think is generally accepted, community services delivered in partnership by local charities and civil society both reduce the cost to the state and carry the benefits I articulated earlier. Without implying any criticism of the NHS, those sorts of organisations will of course know their own communities better than an NHS hospital will.

I am grateful to the Minister for what she was able to say about the definition of “serious harm”. The Explanatory Notes state that a test of serious harm has been introduced

“to provide greater clarity as to the level of risk of harm that a person must present in order to be detained”.

They then state that further guidance on what constitutes serious harm will be set out in the code of practice. So far, so good, and it is welcome that that will be clarified in the code of practice, but one of the issues here is that that will come later. Serious harm is included as one of the two key tests for detention in Clause 5, so what is meant by serious harm will impact on all future decisions made within the scope of the legislation. Therefore, we need maximum clarity from the Government as we debate the Bill.

As regards the “specified risk factors”, I am again grateful to the Minister. I slightly worry that a person’s past history of admission to hospital could constitute a specific a priori risk factor for detention. There is a danger that that may turn into a directly determining factor for detention, rather than a factor to be taken into account in assessing an individual set of circumstances.

As regards drug and alcohol misuse, we need to be careful not to encourage a circumvention of the Mental Health Act, which explicitly excludes drug and alcohol addiction as grounds for detention.

I am once again grateful for the support that noble Lords were able to give to my amendments. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 23.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

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[Lord Kakkar (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 42A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and I ask the Minister what justification there could be for refuting the amendment. It seems entirely appropriate, and indeed essential, that in taking such an important, far-reaching decision, one of the two registered medical practitioners who is responsible for that decision, taken at one point in the management of the natural history of disease in that individual, has the specialist skills and training to be able to make an appropriate assessment, one that will affect interventions on all future occasions for that individual.

I hope that, in addition to accepting this important principle, the noble Baroness might outline how His Majesty’s Government will go about ensuring that the development of such medical practitioners and their training is adequately resourced to ensure that, in future, as a result of the Bill being enacted, what we have seen in the past, regrettably on repeated occasions, does not remain the norm for managing patients with autism and learning disabilities.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief, because other noble Lords have already eloquently articulated the arguments that are almost self-evident about the importance of services for people with autism or a learning disability and, in particular, the importance of training all staff who may find themselves working in those fields. I agree very much with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and I was particularly interested in the research mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, which brings us into a whole new dimension, I think, in this debate.

The need to train all healthcare staff, no matter what role they perform or which part of the health service they serve in, should surely be taken as read. This should be training both in the initial identification of those with autism or a learning disability and in the skills needed to handle such individuals with the necessary sensitivity and insight. I was interested in what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, had to say about that. The behaviour of a person who is on the autistic spectrum can be baffling to anyone who has had no experience of it, and because of that it can be open to misinterpretation. A situation of that kind carries dangers, which is why it is so necessary for healthcare staff to know how to react in a way that will make the situation better and not worse.

This is not the first time that we have debated this important topic. I believe we may be told by the Minister that mandatory training in these areas is already provided for in Section 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. The provision reads:

“Regulations under this section must require service providers to ensure that each person working for the purpose of the regulated activities carried on by them receives training on learning disability and autism which is appropriate to the person’s role”.


That broad provision was inserted into the 2008 Act thanks to an amendment which your Lordships approved three years ago, during our debates on the Health and Care Act 2022.

So, a provision on training is already enshrined in law; the problem is that we have no way of knowing the extent to which it is being implemented in practice. Hence, Amendment 145 would require the Secretary of State to publish a review on mandatory training for all persons who treat patients with learning disabilities and autism under the 1983 Act and consult as necessary to determine the extent to which health service staff are actually in receipt of such training. I see this amendment as perhaps a logical partner to Amendment 152 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and indeed, in his absence, to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale.

While the vast majority of people who provide care to people with learning disabilities and autism do so with compassion and professionalism, we have seen a number of failings in care for people with those conditions. At the same time, detention will continue to be necessary in some cases where a patient with autism or a learning disability is suffering from a separate mental health condition. In all those cases, regardless of the context in which a person presents, we need to have confidence that the people providing care have the training they need to deliver that care sensitively, and above all, capably. I would venture to say that the people who need to have most confidence in the system apart from the person receiving the care are the parents or nearest relatives of that person. Hence, I believe we need more transparency on how well the system is working than we have currently.

Incidentally, one of the things that could come out of a review of training is an opportunity to look at the current processes for whistleblowing. An important aspect of improving standards of care is to have a system of accountability that includes listening to everyone in the sector, from the most senior staff to the most junior. No one should be afraid to speak up when they see something going on that does not look right, and I should be very grateful to hear what the Minister has to say on this whole theme and on the other important issues that noble Lords have raised.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I express my gratitude to noble Lords, not just for their amendments but for the way in which this debate has been conducted. I appreciate much of what lies behind the contributions and amendments today.

I first turn to Amendment 33, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and also Amendment 150 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale. All of these were spoken to throughout this group, including by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy. I noticed that Amendment 150 was particularly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe.

On the matter of data collection, I absolutely share my noble friend Lord Beamish’s view on its importance, the need for the visibility of data and the need to find out what is behind detention. However, I can give the reassurance that the data and statistics that were referred to are being collected and published. They will continue to be monitored and published monthly in the assuring transformation statistics for learning disability and autistic people, and I hope that will be helpful to my noble friend.

The amendments I am referring to, which the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, introduced, require the Secretary of State to publish plans within a specified timeframe, outlining the Government’s plan to allocate sufficient resources for the commissioning of services for the detention and treatment of autistic people and people with a learning disability, as well as costed plans which show how integrated care boards and local authorities will ensure provision of adequate community services for these groups.

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[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt, but I want to make much the same point that the noble Baroness has made based on my experience of a trip to A&E last year. I mentioned it anecdotally at Second Reading. There was a very disturbed person in A&E when I was having to wait there for some three hours. The hospital staff were struggling to contain the person in one room, as he kept leaving. He was not violent, but he was obviously distracting the hospital staff and worrying the other people present, who included children. As soon as anybody asked the staff what they were going to do, they said that they had to wait for the police. I have no doubt that the whole episode that I witnessed was prolonged by the need to wait for the police. Clearly, if this amendment or something like it is approved, it will widen the range of those who could be called upon to deal with such a crisis.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, there is little for me to do following the persuasive speech of my noble friend Lady May, other than to say how much I support her in putting forward her amendments. I hope that the Minister will approach the proposals my noble friend has made in a receptive and constructive way.

I was struck by the case put forward by my noble friend Lady Buscombe about how technology could assist in the handling of mental health incidents. I hope equally that the Minister will wish to follow up on my noble friend’s suggestions.

The question of whether police officers, and only police officers, should exercise the powers under the Act to remove a person suffering from a mental health crisis to a place of safety is one that, as my noble friend Lady May said, has been simmering in the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care for a decade or more. Extending those powers to suitably trained healthcare professionals would be a change that I suggest goes with the grain of this Bill as regards the emphasis that it places on looking after mental health patients in the best possible way. That is not a criticism of the police in any sense. The police do a magnificent job in tackling anything that they are called upon to do, but, as we have heard, the police themselves say that the vast majority of instances in which they are called upon to deal with a mental health incident do not require a policing response.

The issue of risk is important to consider. Statistically, as my noble friend said, most mental health incidents present no risk whatever to the police attending. Admittedly, it is not always possible to tell in advance how risky a particular encounter is likely to be, but I agree with my noble friend that, provided that a paramedic is suitably trained and equipped, they will have the necessary skill set to deal with any risk to their own safety, bearing in mind that if a police presence turns out to be necessary, they can always call for one.

I very much hope that, between now and Report, the Minister will agree to meet my noble friend, if that is what she wishes, to map out a way forward that will lead to a broadening of the Sections 135 and 136 powers.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate, with much agreement across the Committee. I noted the support from both the other Front Benches, from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for much of what has been said.

Let me first discuss Amendments 37B, 38C, 42C, 42F and 128B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady May, along with Amendment 158 in the name of my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton. I am most grateful to the noble Baroness and my noble friend for bringing this issue before the Committee today. Amendments 37B, 38C, 42C and 42F would add a new category of authorised persons and would provide that police constables and such authorised persons may detain a person under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Act.

I share the recognition from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, of the noble Baroness, Lady May, who I commend for her work to pave the way and dramatically reduce the use of police cells as a place of safety for those who are experiencing a mental health crisis. I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s words of advice to all government Ministers; all I can say is that I cannot think how much better we could be advised than by a former Home Secretary and Prime Minister.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for what I might call her notes of caution in respect of extending provisions, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for sharing his first-hand experience to add to the debate today.

We understand the broad intention of these amendments and of Amendment 128B, also in the noble Baroness’s name, to reduce police involvement in mental health cases for all the reasons that were said, including the extra distress that an officer may—inadvertently, of course—bring to a very delicate crisis situation.

The noble Baroness, Lady May, asked how the Bill will ensure that pressure is not placed unduly on police resource. I understand that that is very much a driving consideration, so let me say a few things on that matter. We recognise the pressure on the police, who are responding to a very large volume of mental health-related incidents, although—this is not to dismiss the point—detentions under Section 136 have decreased this year by 10%, and we are removing police cells as a place of safety to reduce some of this burden. We recognise, in particular, that police time in health settings should be reduced. I give an assurance that we have committed to look at this issue and to update the code of practice to clarify the handover process between police and health, including in A&E, which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, spoke about. We recognise the confusion around the application of the legal framework that can tie up police time when it would be lawful for them to leave a patient with health staff.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by extending my gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for introducing the Bill into your Lordships’ House and for her very clear exposition of its contents. It is a Bill that we on these Benches warmly welcome. That welcome should not come as a surprise because, as the noble Baroness said, the Bill before us is the successor to a draft Bill prepared by the previous Government, a draft that owed its origin to my noble friend Lady May, on whose watch a review of the 1983 Act was initiated some seven years ago during her time as Prime Minister. Much of what we see laid out here is the product of diligent work carried out by Professor Sir Simon Wessely and his review committee, as well as the Joint Committee of both Houses, so ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Buscombe.

The passage of the Bill presents us with a golden opportunity to address both the current state of mental health provision and the law that governs it. The last major update of the Act took place in 2007 under the previous Labour Government. That may not sound like a long time ago but, as we shall no doubt hear from others, experience gained in the intervening years has taught us that a further update is indeed warranted if we are to ensure that the Act remains relevant and appropriate, and that its powers are proportionate.

Wherever the state uses its powers to deprive an individual of their liberty, the necessary safeguards must be in place so that those powers are used sparingly, proportionately and with the highest regard for human dignity and autonomy. That is why the Bill is so important. Since the last set of changes to mental health legislation in 2007, the number of people being detained under the Mental Health Act has grown exponentially. In fact, since 1983, the numbers have nearly doubled to a total of over 52,000 new recorded detentions between 2023 and 2024.

Within that total, we have also seen a stark disparity in the classifications of those being detained. Black people are 3.5 times more likely to face detention under the Act. Shockingly, to my mind, there are currently over 2,000 people with autism and learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals across the country. I was equally shocked by the realisation that people with autism can be detained even if they do not have a mental health condition, leading to disproportionate, burdensome and wholly inappropriate treatment.

These issues occupied centre stage in the Wessely review, which proposed the formal recognition of four key principles that should from now on govern both theory and practice in this area of the law. The principles are: choice and autonomy; least restriction on liberty; therapeutic benefit; and the person as an individual. The previous Government fully accepted these four principles and—giving life, as it were, to those principles—the draft Bill set out to make a number of important changes. It strengthened the rights of patients with a learning disability, it gave patients greater autonomy in choosing how they wish to be treated, it introduced duties on commissioners to better understand and support people with a learning disability or autism, who may be at risk of crisis, and it sought to update community treatment orders, which are one of the key drivers of racial disparities in the numbers of people subject to restrictions under the Act.

It is therefore very pleasing indeed to see this Government’s firm commitment to enacting exactly these reforms, and I, for one, hope that as the Bill proceeds, we can come together as a House to implement and, where necessary, improve this hugely beneficial set of changes.

With consensus as the thread that, happily, we expect to run through our consideration of the Bill, there are nevertheless certain themes within it that are likely to require our particular attention. The first of these is community treatment orders. CTOs were first introduced in the Mental Health Act 2007. The Joint Committee on the earlier draft Bill was very clear that CTOs had been widely overused and that they are one of the leading causes of the racial disparities that I referred to a minute ago. The Bill before us makes a number of changes to the criteria governing the use of CTOs, all of them designed to support two of the key principles in the Bill: those of least restriction and therapeutic benefit.

As far as they go, these changes are desirable. However, the Bill stops short of including the full suite of recommendations made by the Wessely review. The Centre for Mental Health has raised this as a key concern. It points out that there is still no persuasive evidence of the benefits of CTOs. Against that background, it argues that a number of checks and balances are needed on the use of CTOs in future, over and above those already in the Bill. In particular, it notes that the committee recommended a full statutory review of the use of CTOs to report within a fixed timeline, which, on the face of it, is the least that we should be doing. I think we will want to debate in Committee why the Government have not felt it appropriate to go as far as the Joint Committee and the independent review recommended in this area.

The next important theme is children and young people. According to NHS data—and this was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, in his recent review—932 children in mental health units were subject to restrictive interventions in 2023-24. In total, more than 84,000 restrictive interventions were carried out on these children, which is a 51% increase from the year before. This is the highest number of restrictive interventions recorded since figures were made available in 2019, and that is despite the number of children in mental health units appearing to decrease.

We have a duty to use the Bill as an opportunity to identify ways of reducing such restrictive interventions and using them more humanely and more proportionately. Two years ago, the Government launched the Oliver McGowan training for NHS staff to help them better deal with young patients with autism. Noble Lords may remember that this was in response to a truly harrowing and appalling set of occurrences that ended with the death of a young man. It is fair to say that the case shook the health service to its core. I believe we have in the Bill the opportunity to take forward those lessons so as to protect children who may be at risk from unwarranted detentions.

The independent review and the Joint Committee had much to say about how treatment of children under the Mental Health Act could be improved. Unfortunately, by no means all those recommendations have found their way into the Bill. One such omission relates to the inappropriate placement of under-18s into adult wards or facilities that can sometimes be miles away from their home. The Joint Committee found that in each of the years 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19, over 1,000 children were placed out of area, and that in 2020, 21% of children and young people were placed as in-patients more than 50 miles from their home.

It is perfectly obvious that being taken to an unfamiliar environment in a place far away from friends and family is almost guaranteed to exacerbate the issues young people face when experiencing a mental health crisis. On top of this, data from the Care Quality Commission showed that in 2021, 249 children and young people admitted for mental health treatments were housed on adult wards for more than 48 hours, some for a good deal longer than that. These are uncomfortable figures; I hope noble Lords on all sides of the House will want to ensure that, through this Bill, we take all possible steps to bear down on the scale of these problems and strengthen the protections afforded to children and young people.

One of the core themes that has remained prominent throughout the process that has led to this Bill is that of choice: giving patients as great a degree of autonomy as possible in how they are treated and maximising their ability to determine what happens to them if they are detained. In that regard, I think the Bill succeeds on many counts, but one measure recommended by the Joint Committee was that there should be a statutory right to an advance care document for every patient who has been or may be detained under the Mental Health Act. The Bill, as it stands, does not follow up on this recommendation. Instead, it places a duty on NHS England and integrated care boards to make information regarding such documents available to patients. I do not doubt that this is a beneficial reform, but we should debate whether it goes quite as far as it usefully might. Guaranteeing patients and service users the chance to state and record their preferences for care and treatment plays directly into the key principles of choice, autonomy and treating every person as a rounded individual—so what are the barriers to doing that?

There are a whole host of detailed issues which we will need to cover in Committee. The final, major area I want to touch on is that of the role played by the police. Inevitably, circumstances arise in which the police are required to become involved with people who may be a risk to themselves or to others. There is a strong feeling that encounters with the police are far too common for people with mental health conditions. As the independent review and the National Police Chiefs’ Council have pointed out, the presence of the police in situations where a mental health issue poses a risk of serious injury or death can be counterproductive. In its written submission to the Joint Committee, the Metropolitan Police stated that:

“Our officers simply cannot provide the specialist care needed, exposing both patients and officers to extreme risks”.


The NPCC has also expressed its concern that the role of the police in mental health pathways must be reduced.

It is welcome that the Bill goes some way to addressing this. Clause 46 removes police stations and prisons as places of safety, thereby preventing patients experiencing mental health crises from being locked up inappropriately. However, there is a potential knock-on effect that we should talk about in Committee. Well-intentioned as the provision is, it could well lead to a rise in people being admitted to accident and emergency departments, escorted by the police, and having to wait in crowded spaces with the lack of the necessary, specialised facilities until they can be assessed by clinicians. In this environment, the risk of harm could well be multiplied. We need to ask how this risk can best be mitigated. I fear that any realistic answer will need to involve resources, by which I mean taking steps to ensure that the requisite arrangements are made for NHS trusts to deal with an increase in the number of mental health patients being admitted to hospitals as places of safety. This is not an easy set of issues, but it is a subject that we cannot duck.

Parliament must see to it that wrongful, inappropriate and untherapeutic detentions of those undergoing a mental health crisis are brought to an end. The Bill provides us with a necessary and welcome opportunity to transform the treatment of those with mental health conditions and to bring both doctrine and practice well and truly into the 21st century. Along with my noble friend Lord Kamall, I look forward to working with the Minister and with noble Lords on all sides of the House to scrutinise and—where we can—improve the Bill’s provisions. Many thousands of the most vulnerable members of our society are depending on us to do so.

NHS: Independent Investigation

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad we are having this debate on the report by the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, even if the tone set by the Statement—which I am sure noble Lords have read—is, as far as I am concerned, rather regrettable. It is regrettable because the noble Lord, as one would expect of that most distinguished man, has produced a thoughtful and carefully argued diagnosis and set of prescriptions for the NHS. It would have been better to treat those findings on their own terms rather than as an excuse for a highly charged political rant. Having said that, I hope that, in this House at least, we can maintain debate on a rational and civilised level.

There are indeed problems in the health service that are there for all to see and others that are less immediately visible. These problems are real and indeed require sustained remedial effort. The noble Lord, Lord Darzi, attributes them to a mixture of causes, one being inadequate central government funding. I do not expect the noble Lord to be an apologist for the previous Government, but it would have been nice if he had acknowledged more fully that, despite so-called austerity, health service funding rose in real terms in every year since 2010 and in the last five years by nearly 3% in real terms per annum. The problem, as Sir John Bell has pointed out, is not a lack of money: it is that too much of the money has been sucked, suboptimally, into acute care settings and not enough into the community. The noble Lord goes on to say that very thing. But let no one conclude from that that community funding has been neglected. The last Government oversaw the opening of 160 community diagnostic centres. As my right honourable friend said in the other place, this is the largest central cash investment in MRI and CT scanning capacity in the history of the NHS.

Is there more to be done? Yes—but the results are there and proving their worth. The NHS is currently treating 25% more people than it did in 2010. It is delivering tens of millions more out-patient appointments, diagnostic tests and procedures than it did when the coalition Government came into office. Some of the community services are being delivered by staff employed by acute trusts—the statistics tend to hide those numbers. Yes, we can talk about the need for greater productivity, but this progress—it is indeed progress—is all down to the efforts of the dedicated clinical staff across the health service on whom we all rely, and who are more in number than at any time in the service’s history.

Please do not criticise the last Government for focusing on the numbers. The imperative of planning ahead to train the right number of staff for the right care settings was amply fulfilled in the last Government’s workforce plan—a publication heralded by the NHS chief executive as

“one of the most seminal moments”

in the NHS’s history.

Can the Minister nevertheless say, despite the fact that the report is not mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, whether the Government will embrace the workforce plan and take it forward as the NHS clearly wants and needs? Can she also say whether the Government will adopt the productivity plan announced in the last Government’s Spring Budget? That plan—again, unaccountably not mentioned in the report—would deliver the “tilt towards technology” that the noble Lord rightly advocates, with a big productivity gain to boot.

I said that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi’s report was carefully argued, but not all of it is well argued. I cannot allow his colourful statements about the 2012 Health and Social Care Act to go unchallenged. To attribute the NHS’s current difficulties and challenges in large part to that Act is, frankly, ridiculous. What that Act did was to complete the process that the noble Lord himself started, which was to ingrain quality into the commissioning and delivery of healthcare based on clearly defined standards and outcomes, meaning that providers would be competing with each other based on the quality of care and treatment that they delivered to patients.

The noble Lord, Lord Darzi, now says that we need to move away from the whole idea of competition, but I suspect he has misled himself, because he goes on to say:

“The framework of national standards … incentives and earned autonomy … needs to be reinvigorated”,


along with patient choice. What is that framework if it is not a framework of healthy competition between providers based on quality? Therefore, what role does the Minister see for competition alongside collaboration —I do not think the two are mutually exclusive—in driving up the quality of NHS care?

I have a few final questions. We are told that a 10-year plan will be produced based on the findings of the noble Lord, Lord Darzi. Whose plan will that be? Will it be the Government’s plan, and if so, how will the Government avoid what might look like a prescriptive top-down set of instructions to the health service? Does the Minister think it important that the NHS takes ownership of the plan and, if so, how will that be achieved?

In essence, the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, believes that we need to get from point A to point B—in other words, from acute settings to community settings; from tired old premises to brand new ones; et cetera. Does the Minister agree that we cannot transition from point A without first finding the money to create a functioning point B? In other words, will she and her fellow Ministers urge the Chancellor to commit to the capital expenditure necessary to achieve that?

Lastly, I quote the noble Lord, Lord Darzi:

“The vast array of good practice that already exists in the health service should be the starting point for the plan to reform it”.


Does the Minister agree with that and, if so, how does she reconcile those sentiments with the Government’s mantra—which is so discouraging to the men and women of the health service—that the NHS is “broken”?

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the Statement to the House. You do not have to be a mastermind to realise that the NHS is straining at its seams. It is only down to the great work of the many thousands of people who work in the NHS that millions of people get great care, even though some fall between the cracks.

The Darzi report is a very good medical history and it gives a diagnosis, but we all know that the treatment plan is going to be the important point if we are to deal with a reformed, new and productive NHS. There are some welcome themes in the report that are not new. Those who know the previous Darzi report will see have seen some of them before: prevention; moving resources from hospital care to primary and community care; dealing with the wider determinants of health; improvements in and parity for mental health; and a bigger role for public health.

I understand that the Minister will answer many questions by saying that we need to wait for the 10-year treatment plan, and probably the Budget, before such specific questions can be answered, but I have a few general questions for the Minister, to get at least a sense of the direction that the Government wish to take.

Is it the Government’s intention to restore the public health grant back its 2014 levels? Are there any general views about looking at changing the structure of public health, nationally or locally? On capital, what is the Government’s thinking about the general theme of allocation to hospital and non-hospital services, and how will this be managed and monitored? On data, what is the Government’s thinking on the workforce plan, particularly when there is a huge imbalance when it comes to digital and data between the private sector and skills within the NHS? That is not to say that there are not some good skills within the NHS, but there is clearly an imbalance.

Welcome as it is that the report talks about moving resources from hospital to non-hospital settings, I was a manager in the health service in the early 1990s and I know that this has been said since at least the 1970s. What are the Government going to do to be able to move resources from sunk costs in the acute sector into other sectors? What mechanisms will be put in place? How will this be monitored? More importantly, who will be held accountable for making sure that it actually happens? How will the new neighbourhood approach affect the existing workforce plan? If a new health service is anticipated, what will the effect be on the workforce plan and the implications for capital allocation?

We all want to see a productive and effective healthcare system that improves peoples’ health and independence, but that cannot be brought about if we do not have a strong, effective, well-funded social care system. I do not understand why social care has been kicked down to the next Parliament, or how we are going to solve the health and well-being of the population without that being done. If the major reforms of social care are in the next Parliament, what steps are the Government going to take in this Parliament to deal with the social care crisis?

I look forward to the Minister’s answers, but, more importantly, to the 10-year treatment plan’s arrival in the next few months.