House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, all these amendments are unnecessary as, in my opinion, there will be no next stage of reform at any time soon—certainly not in this Parliament. The drivers for this Bill are class-based and a need to reduce overall numbers, thanks—wait for it—to the mismanagement of various Conservative Prime Ministers. The only one of them who seemed to grasp the need for restraint was my noble friend Lady May.

The evidence for my statement is that Sir Tony Blair had two successive, clear election victories after the 1999 Act, as well as the benefit of the very carefully thought-out royal commission report chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham. He did nothing; I suspect that was because he could not be sure that any further reform would result in a better arrangement than what we already have. My question for the Minister is: why not just implement the Wakeham reforms?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will respond from these Benches to these three amendments, which all seek to hold the Government to their manifesto commitment to deliver “immediate”—that was the word used—reform of the House of Lords. I mentioned that commitment in my Second Reading speech on this Bill.

I can be brief this evening as the essential points have been made by, in particular, the three noble Lords who tabled these amendments. We have heard much of the Government’s plans, and there has been much talk in these debates of the importance of punctuation in the Government’s manifesto, but the central point on these amendments is this: the Government ought to give the Committee reassurance that the wider reform will come and, importantly, that it will come soon.

When the House of Lords Reform Act 1999 was passed, the Government claimed that the compromise as to some hereditary Peers remaining in your Lordships’ House would act as an encouragement to the Government to complete their reform of the House. However, we are now more than two decades on and still the Government have not brought forward to this House—as opposed to a few sentences in a manifesto—anything approaching proper reform. The obvious question is: why?

The Government often say that, if we seek to change everything, we run the risk of changing nothing, but the truth is, as we all know, that legislative time is precious. In SW1, the most valuable commodity is parliamentary time on the Floor of a House. We have seen Governments fail to deliver second-stage reform before, so why would it be different this time? As the noble Lord, Lord Newby, rightly pointed out, the noises off—if we can call them that—are not encouraging at all.

Therefore, I completely understand the concerns of the noble Baroness and noble Lords who have brought these amendments. We should reasonably expect the Government to give the Committee a much clearer sense of when, in their already busy legislative timetable, they intend to bring forward the next stage of reform. This House, on this issue, is very much once bitten, twice shy. I look forward to hearing from the Leader of the House on this important issue. I hope that she can be more definite than saying, “At some time in this Parliament”.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the difficulty with the noble Lord’s suggestion, in my case, is that I would be relying upon knowing the leader of my party. I do not properly know any of the party leaders, and they do not know me either, so I would have as much chance as a snowflake in a blast furnace of getting a life peerage.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Newby, but I am responding on Amendment 5, moved by my noble friend Lord Soames of Fletching from these Benches. In speaking to this amendment, I take the opportunity to recognise the significant and invaluable contribution that hereditary Peers have made to your Lordships’ House. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, this amendment is a different point conceptually from Amendment 9, tabled by my noble friend Lord True, which is essentially, if I may put it without any disrespect, the Grocott approach.

As my noble friend Lord True said earlier this evening, if we are to exclude anyone from the House, it should be those who do not contribute rather than those who have contributed and do contribute. To introduce a personal perspective, I say that as someone who makes every effort to play a proper part in the business of your Lordships’ House while maintaining a full practice at the Bar. That sometimes means that I miss the odd vote—may I record in Hansard for posterity my entirely sycophantic and appallingly oleaginous thanks to my Whip for his constant understanding? More seriously, that cuts into my downtime. I do not really have any downtime because of my work at the Bar and my obligations here. If I can use this rather demotic phrase, it does hack me off when some people do not contribute at all.

I therefore share the concern of my noble friend Lord Soames that we are removing people who contribute while leaving people who play very little, if any, part in the House. The key to a sensible approach, I suggest, while recognising that the hereditary principle has come to an end—like the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, I also enjoyed “Tomorrow’s World” in its day, and what was innovative then is commonplace now—is to retain those who have demonstrated over many years their commitment to public service and duty to the House. She is no longer in her place, but I respect fully agree with what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said in an earlier group. She expressly invited the Government to just look, to use what I think was her phrase, at those whom the Government are removing. She said that the approach in this Bill, which removes the fully involved and the truly indolent alike, was “profoundly wrong”. She is right about that.

Turning to the text of this amendment, I know that there are many ways in which noble Lords can contribute to the business of the House, but those who currently serve or have previously served as Ministers and Whips, Deputy Speakers, chairs of committees or as Convenor of the Cross Benches have made a determined and determinable contribution. Their institutional knowledge and dedication to public service has made them indispensable, I suggest, to the functioning of the House and thus to the functioning of Parliament. The positions which they have undertaken in the House have been earned through merit and service. To remove these noble Lords would be to discard a wealth of experience that simply cannot be replaced. I therefore agree with the points made by my noble friend Lady Finn in that regard.

We have had some stats thrown at us; let me try to identify what the position actually is. During the 2019-24 Parliament, 168 Members had official roles. This includes government and Opposition ministerial posts and parliamentary positions such as the Lord Speaker and Deputy Speakers. Life Peers filled 143 of these roles, 23 were filled by hereditary Peers and two by Bishops. About 18% of life Peers served in an official role compared with 26% of hereditary Peers. Despite making up only 12% of the total membership of the House, in the last Session hereditary Peers made up 20% of government posts and 26% of Deputy Speakers. My noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom rightly made the point that hereditary Peers as a group have contributed very significantly.

I will not read out my Excel spreadsheet, but do we really want, I ask rhetorically, to lose people such as my noble friends Lord Courtown and Lord Howe—who, as your Lordships have heard, has provided simply incredible service to the House? My noble friend Lord Strathclyde serves as chair of our Constitution Committee is a former Leader of the House and a former Chief Whip. He has served as a Minister over four departments. The noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, is a serving Deputy Speaker and Deputy Chair of Committees. His CV in the House reads for several pages.

I am not sufficiently brave to stand for much longer between your Lordships and your Lordships’ dinners, so I will not refer to every hereditary Peer, but I trust that noble Lords recognise the expertise, experience and dedication that those individuals have brought to our parliamentary system.

I make one final point. Some years ago, the House removed a number of Peers. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, gave us the correct figure, which I think was 667. Yes, I was listening. I always do to the noble Lord, indeed to all noble Lords but especially the noble Lord, Lord Grocott on this topic. Does removing the final 88, or however many are left now, make any difference? Of course, the difference goes to the heart of this amendment. Those who remained some years ago were chosen wholly, or in the vast majority of cases, because they were contributing. That is why they remained. That is what this amendment seeks to do.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, makes a very good case for his amendments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister can satisfy the House, but I think that he will struggle a bit.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, that is a very encouraging note on which to rise. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for bringing back matters that we discussed in Committee.

I say respectfully that Amendment 66B, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, commendably deals with the need for consistency in both the use of, and compliance with, the code of practice that will guide the use of diversionary and community cautions under Part 6 of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making time to discuss this matter with me.

For the record—it may have been in the mêlée that occurred when people were leaving—I thought I heard the noble and learned Lord refer to cautions as part of the sentencing framework. Without wishing to split hairs, we see this as separate from the sentencing framework and as an out-of-court disposal, but if the noble and learned Lord did say that, I understood that he was talking in broad terms. I am keen to reassure him and, indeed, the House that a fundamental aim of reforming the out-of-court disposal options currently in use was to improve consistency by reducing the number of disposals and creating two clear and statutory options.

Some attention was paid in Committee to the lack of data currently recorded and available on the use of cautions, whether conditional or simple, and the types of conditions attached to the former. We are keen to address that and believe that the proposals in Part 6 of the Bill, along with the code of practice that will accompany it, will do so. We are currently engaging with the Home Office regarding the outcomes framework so that police can accurately report the number of cautions given, and we will also explore the practicalities of gathering qualitative data from police on the types of conditions used.

We want to preserve the balance between a national framework for decision-making on the one hand and, on the other, operational decision-making that rests on the facts of the case and can be independently and locally scrutinised. We believe that working to develop more effective and consistent scrutiny panels in forces, thereby ensuring independent representation and transparency of findings, would be the most effective course of action. For that reason, we are currently engaging with stakeholders on precisely this issue, including a range of questions on transparency and scrutiny regarding the use and monitoring of the new cautions. It will only be possible to find the balance we seek once we have that feedback. I can assure the noble and learned Lord and the House that this will subsequently be included in the code of practice accompanying this legislation, which will itself be brought before Parliament for scrutiny in due course.

Amendments 66C and 66D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relate to the essence of the reform that the Bill makes to the out-of-court disposals framework. As I noted in Committee, this reform has its roots in the work led by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, whose strategy in 2017 removed the need for the simple caution, penalty notice for disorder, and cannabis and khat warnings. The Government have listened to the NPCC and are now taking steps to ensure national consistency in the framework that it has helped to develop. The current position is that one-third of police forces have already moved to using only conditional cautions and community resolutions, and many more, including the Metropolitan Police, are currently in the process of moving over to this two-tier framework.

With Amendment 66D, the noble Lord seeks to retain penalty notices for disorder. We have already seen a marked decline in their use by police. The most recent CJS statistics show that the use of penalty notices for disorder has fallen 28% from the previous year. These are distinct from the fixed penalty notices, which are unaffected by Part 6 of the Bill.

I should also make reference to an important matter that was raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester in Committee, speaking through—if I can put it in these terms—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. This was in regard to the intention behind the use of conditional cautions. The point she made was that they should have the aim of rehabilitation or restoration. The purpose of this is both to address the causes of the offending in order to support the offender to desist from reoffending and to put a welcome emphasis on the wishes of the victim, allowing for appropriate restoration to be made, where appropriate. The fact is that simple cautions and penalty notices do not allow for this victim-centred approach that mandates rehabilitative and restorative actions. I therefore do disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this gives rise to what he called—if I heard him correctly—a bureaucratic nightmare.

Retaining the use of penalty notices and simple cautions would undermine these aims entirely and indeed the reform itself. They are inconsistent with it. I heard the noble Lord say, somewhat in stereo as it was repeated behind me by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that I have my work cut out to persuade him not to divide the House. But I hope I have set out the principles that underly the new approach: the conditions support rehabilitation and encourage the offender to desist from reoffending. You simply do not get that with a simple caution or notice. I therefore hope that, having listened to what I have said, both he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, will not press their amendments.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right to say that that is the origin of the life sentence for murder. It was a deal done, if I can put it in those respectful terms, but we have life sentences elsewhere in our legislation as well. The point that I was seeking to answer—and, with great respect, I think I have answered it—was, as I understood it when it was put against me: what is the difference if the trial judge is going to give a tariff of x years, why not just have a sentence of x years? However, there is a difference, as we all recognise, between a life sentence with a tariff of x years and a sentence of x years. We can have a debate—

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, does the Minister not run the risk of ending up, in the case of the pub brawl, with the offender being sentenced to life but with only a four-year tariff?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I would not use the word “risk” at all. On the one hand, I am being charged with not trusting the judges and, on the other, giving the judges too much discretion. I am entirely happy with a trial judge having the ability to set an appropriate tariff in these cases, as trial judges do in all cases of murder. Whether the tariff given is four, 10, 15, 20 or 30 years is entirely a matter for the judge. I am entirely happy to trust the judge. However, it is absolutely right for Parliament to say that, in these cases, where somebody has committed an unlawful act that has led to the death of an emergency worker who was acting as such, a life sentence ought to be the correct response from the court. Two points arise. First, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if there are exceptional circumstances, that sentence does not apply at all. Secondly, if it applies, the judge can impose a tariff.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I do not know which of the no-doubt multifarious press releases the noble Baroness read, but it was clear in the ones that I saw that the matter was going to be brought back here. This amendment was, I understand, tabled on 1 December, so the issue has been live. I am very happy to take any further interventions. That was probably not a good idea.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot resist the temptation. Would the Minister be prepared to express some uncertainty about the “exceptional” rule? If he expressed that uncertainty, it would mean that a Third Reading amendment to the noble Lord’s amendment would be acceptable.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not quite sure what I am being asked to accept, but I do not have any uncertainty as to what “exceptional circumstances” is. It is a phrase used in this legislation; it is used in other legislation; it is a phrase that is well known to the courts. It is a phrase that they are perfectly able to deal with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am not convinced that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is correct because if we delay the amendment, we would be putting it at the back of the Bill, but it has to be in this position in the Bill. Therefore, I think we should leave it until Third Reading rather than delay it.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not going to try to adjudicate on that point, which seems to be a point of procedure, better left to those who know more about it than I do. I have listened very carefully to the debate, and points of principle have been raised. With genuine respect, however, I believe that I have set out the Government’s position on those points of principle. Kicking the can down the road—attractive as that can sometimes appear—will not achieve anything substantive.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

I would like to quickly pick up on one thing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, touched on, which was the position of a blind juror. I would have no problem at all with a blind juror. I expect that there are blind jurors and that the current legislation in Section 9B already provides for that without any difficulty.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, this was an especially thoughtful and constructive debate. I agree with the words that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, used to describe the debate. His reference to the magistrate was interesting, but the problem with all analogies is that they are different. I am going to focus specifically on the jury issue because I recognise that a number of Members of the Committee have made particular points about jurors.

I will start with the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who referred us to the Equality Act; that is an important starting point for the debate, although it may not be the finishing point. We must ensure that the services of the courts are accessible to everyone, including those with disabilities. We must pay due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity wherever possible. That, in a nutshell, is why Clause 165 is part of the Bill. Having said that, and because I know that this will be a debate that is looked at by those outside this House as well as by those inside it, let me place on record what need not be said but I am going to say it anyway: that everybody in this Committee shares that aim. We heard a very personal example from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, of Lady Judge’s work in this area. Again I say this for the avoidance of doubt where there should not be any: I am proceeding on the basis that all who have questioned or opposed our proposals do so with the very best of motives and certainly not for any other reason.

Trial by jury is a fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system, and serving as a juror is one of the most important civic duties that anyone can be asked to perform. I agree with my noble friend Lord Attlee that it is a duty and not a right, but the Government and I want to ensure that as many people as possibly can perform that duty. Reasonable adjustments can be made by our courts to enable most people with disabilities to complete jury service. This, importantly, includes deaf jurors who can lip-read. I invite the Committee to reflect very carefully on the position of the deaf juror who can lip-read and to consider it in respect of each of the objections that have been put. I will come to some of them to which this would not apply, but a number of the objections would potentially apply to a juror who is deaf but who can lip-read. Nobody else in the court is likely to know how good the lip-reading is, whether the lip-reader gets every nuance, or how lip-reading affects the dynamics either in the jury box or in the jury retirement room.

That is the first point we get from the deaf juror who lip-reads, but there is another point as well: it underlines the proposition that there is no bar in principle to a deaf person serving on a jury. This is about one issue only, which is the 13th—I will come back to the 14th—person in the jury retirement room. That is why we need the legislation, because at the moment it is 12 and no more; I put the jury bailiff to one side. The issue at the moment is that, unlike a lip-reader who, if the judge considers that they can effectively discharge their duties as a juror—which I will come back to—can serve on a jury, a juror who needs a British Sign Language interpreter is unable to get that assistance because entry to the deliberation room is limited to the jurors, and no one else may enter. The essential point that this clause focuses on is permitting the BSL interpreter to go in, thereby enabling that juror to fulfil their duty.

I recognise that there have been what I might call practical, and almost philosophical, principled objections and concerns raised about the proposal. I note that the Bar Council of England and Wales has expressed its support, subject, it is fair to say, to the right safeguards, which I believe we have in place. I reassure the Committee that we considered the safeguards very carefully in developing the legislation. We looked at research and current practice in the USA, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland—which is planning to legislate for this form of interpretation—and Australia, where provision is already made for BSL interpreters or the equivalent in its jury systems.

I will first deal with the philosophical or principled objections. I understand the reservations that this might undermine the jury deliberation process, and I understand the argument, although I do not accept it, that interpreters could unduly influence or impact the dynamic of the discussions. There has been a lot of research, particularly in New South Wales, to explore whether deaf people can sufficiently access court proceedings and make informed decisions as jurors. The research suggests that deaf jurors are not hindered from speaking during deliberations and that other jurors seemingly have no issue with the presence of the interpreter or interacting with the deaf juror.

We have put safeguards in the Bill to help to address these issues. Offences relating to research and sharing research during the trial will apply as much to the interpreter as they do to the jurors. As has been pointed out, there is a new offence whereby an interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury or proceedings before the court. I have said “interpreter”, but I accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out—I acknowledge my gratitude to him and others for sparing time to discuss this with me—that there will be two BSL interpreters present in the jury deliberation room, not only because they need to switch over as it is a very intensive process for the interpreter but because it has the benefit that they will be able to monitor each other and maintain a consistently high quality of interpretation. To take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I say that the nuances will be as much picked up by the sign language interpreters as we can anticipate—or not—that they will be picked up necessarily by a lip-reader.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the jury room is not just confidential but also private; those things are different, and it is both. There is no intention to allow the academics or the researchers in. There is certainly no intention to move from what I think in the judicial review context is called “the judge over your shoulder” to the Minister standing over the juror’s shoulder. We are certainly not going there.

The interpreters will be bound by a confidentiality agreement and be bound by law, and there is an offence to keep everybody honest. They will also be required to swear an oath or affirmation to that effect, alongside their existing interpreter’s oath or affirmation.

I turn to the practical concerns around the nature of evidence and whether a deaf juror will be able to interpret facial expressions, together with audio evidence, effectively. Again, I heard the example from the noble and learned Lord as to how something was said in a tone of complete resignation. The word used in the Act, and in this clause, is “effectively”. The judge would have to decide whether the juror could effectively discharge their role as a juror. This provision does not require judges to admit such jurors on to the jury; it simply removes the blanket ban that would otherwise be present. It means that jurors who need a BSL interpreter can be considered alongside other jurors for whom other reasonable adjustments might be required.

The ultimate decision will be for the trial judge, who will take into account the nature of the case and the nature of the evidence that is going to be heard. No doubt he or she would want to hear submissions from the parties, although they would not be bound by them. As I have said, none of this is new. Again, I ask the Committee to consider how the trial judge should deal with a juror who says, “Well, I lip-read.” The trial judge, again, would have to consider what the evidence in the case was going to be and whether they were going to be able to fulfil their role effectively. There is no difference in principle, and the test and approach of the judge would have to be the same.

I accept that there will be cases where a deaf person would not be able to serve on a jury. I expect that there will be cases where a lip-reading juror might not be able to serve on a jury—for example, if the evidence is audio only and there is nobody to look at; there is just a telephone call playing.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Baroness and I are sitting on opposite sides of the House. If I was driving, I would normally open the door with my right hand, so I was turning round to open it. I think my example was right, but I will look at the video tonight and write to the noble Baroness if I was wrong.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend has been very helpful, but I am slightly worried that he does not fully appreciate how difficult it is to secure conviction for dangerous driving. On the Dutch reach, could we not include this in the driving test, which would mean that driving instructors would have to teach their students how to do it? I like to think I am an experienced driver and I carefully check my mirror before opening the door. Not doing so is an easy mistake for a novice driver to make, but it would be easy to train those drivers to use the Dutch reach.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am certainly aware of the differences between dangerous driving and careless driving. Dangerous driving is reserved for those instances of driving which fall “far below” the objective standard. The question of whether the Dutch reach should be included in the driving test is a matter for colleagues at the Department for Transport. I will pass that suggestion on; I hope they will get back to my noble friend on that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the good thing is that the party opposite is being consistent, because it introduced the offence of causing death by careless driving.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, objects to Clause 66 standing part of the Bill and has tabled Amendment 155 in its place. We have had a very interesting and more wide-ranging debate than we perhaps anticipated when the amendment was put down. Thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, we have got on to gross negligence. In the time available, it reminded me that it was Lord Cranworth in Wilson v Brett, back in 1843, who said that gross negligence is actually only

“negligence with a vituperative epithet”

attached. That is a little legal chestnut about what gross negligence actually is—in the civil context, I accept.

We need to focus on the fact that we are looking at driving offences, and I will come back later to whether it was a valid comparison put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The amendment we are dealing with here is perhaps the reverse of the approach taken in the earlier group to Amendment 152. Some of the speeches made in that context, such as that made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are also applicable here. With Amendment 155, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, hopes to add additional requirements, thereby raising the threshold for the new proposed offence of causing serious injury by careless driving.

As I said on the previous group, we are back to the issue of relatively low-culpability offences that can attract custodial sentences because the consequences can be catastrophic. Of course, I hear the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—it was a sort of “There but for the grace of God go I” point, if I can summarise it in that way—but, as I have said, there is a balance to be struck between the culpability of the driver and the harm that they cause. The Government believe that the current position—whereby a driver who by careless driving has caused serious injury, including perhaps very serious or life-changing injuries, may only be fined—is wrong. That is why we have created this new offence and why we believe it should be incorporated in the Bill.

I respectfully agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that we have to have sight of, and due regard to, the consequences of the driving. If I may, I will come back a little later to the other point the noble Lord made, about whether prison is the only way to respond to that.

Having said that, we recognise that the standard of driving required for this offence is relatively low. Careless driving can sometimes amount to no more than a short period of inattention—we had the example of the wasp on the back seat—but we do not agree with the noble and learned Lord that we need to add a requirement explaining what we mean by “causing serious injury”, or that the definition should provide that the notional “careful and competent driver” would know that their driving was likely to cause serious injury. I am grateful for the support—at least on this amendment—of the Benches opposite and of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. He also asked whether prison is the right response, and I will come back to that too.

I make three substantive points in response to the proposed amendment and the clause stand part proposal. First—I will make this point relatively softly, because I think the noble and learned Lord, realistically, if I may say, accepted that there may be drafting issues with the amendment and the scope of it—it would create inconsistencies in the law and that is because this additional test would apply only to this new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving and does not, for example, apply to the offence of causing serious injury by disqualified driving, where it might be argued that the level of culpability is even lower, because there is nothing actually wrong with the driving there at all. I will come back to that in another context.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am happy to deal with that in the letter.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, on a couple of occasions, my noble friend the Minister has said that the only disposal available to the courts is a fine. Surely, disqualification is available? For most of us, that would be a very severe penalty.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I accept that it may be a severe penalty. It depends who you are dealing with, and the circumstances. There are other factors which the courts have to bear in mind when considering the particular effects of disqualification on a particular driver.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support these amendments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, told us roughly how many pets had been stolen. Can the Minister tell us how many prosecutions have taken place for theft of a dog?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to respond to an amendment about pet theft, but I will start by saying a few words about amendment theft. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, stole some of the Committee’s time to give us a lecture about the rule of law. I regard the rule of law as a matter of supreme importance, but let us remember what it is and is not.

First, it is not a law; it is a constitutional principle. Secondly, we can have a debate about the scope of the rule of law. The rule of law as adumbrated by Lord Bingham, for example, has a different scope from that set out by Lord Justice Laws in his book; there are different views as to the breadth of the rule of law. But everybody agrees that one has to abide by the law as set out by a court. There was no court in the circumstances set out by the noble and learned Lord. The only court involved is the court of Parliament and, with great respect, the other place was quite within its rights both legally and, I suggest, morally to set out its own procedures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I cannot commit to that, but, as I say, I have heard the strength of feeling and what the noble and learned Lord has said on this topic. I am sure we can have future discussions on this point.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend take the precaution of instructing parliamentary counsel to draft suitable legislation just in case?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I shall put it this way: I am well aware that if we wanted to table the amendment to this Bill, we would need a properly drafted clause, and we know how to go about that.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

It seems pretty obvious that if you get hauled before the courts for damaging life-saving equipment, you are going to be in deep trouble. What you do not know is what the penalties are.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We seem to be reaching a measure of agreement. I still say, with respect, that because we have that on the statute book at the moment, it is not appropriate to re-legislate in another place. I will take away the points put to me by the noble and learned Lord about more education and sign-posting, and clarifying and explaining to people what the law is. If people do not know what the law is in the Criminal Damage Act 1971, it is unlikely that they are going to be any more familiar with the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021, as I hope it will be. If we have it in the law, however—and we do—with the reckless addition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, I suggest that that ought to be sufficient. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord not to proceed with the amendments. I hope that I have already responded to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, as usual, my noble friend has been very helpful, but what he has not convinced me about is why there is an increased deterrence value in having a maximum sentence of not, say, two years but one of seven years. I do not see why going to seven years is going to increase the deterrence value of the new offence.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am sorry, is my noble friend now back on the memorials point?

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

Yes.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The short answer to that is that I did not make my argument on the basis of deterrence. Sentencing encompasses a number of factors: there is deterrence; there is the actual punishment for the offence; there is marking society’s disapproval at what was done. I hope that I made my argument very clearly on the first two. I was not suggesting that people would necessarily be deterred; I hope that they will be, but that is not the main basis of my argument.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Earl Attlee and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think I made it clear earlier that I was making two points in response to this amendment. The point that we are focused on at the moment is whether we could have more—and I say this respectfully—felicitous drafting than the drafting of the amendment that we currently have. I have accepted in principle that one could, and I made that clear in my previous answer and my answer to the right reverend Prelate. However, I do not want us to lose sight of my first response, on the point of principle: we have a definition in the 2018 Act of “emergency worker”, and that was regarded in 2018 as suitable and fit for purpose. It treated that definition as a separate status and a distinct group, and the Government’s position is that definition was good in 2018 and remains so now.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. On Amendment 11 from the right reverend Prelate, I am aware of the problem that he describes, but I did not make my new offence cover other Prison Service staff. I deliberately excluded probation officers just for reasons of simplicity, but if I managed to make my potting amendment find favour with the House, I would have to decide who was to be protected by it.

I am slightly disappointed by my noble friend’s response, because I thought that I was offering him the best thing since sliced bread, but he turned me down. The problem for the Minister running the Prison Service is that he cannot direct the police force to investigate these issues and, as he carefully explained to the Committee, he cannot direct the Crown Prosecution Service to pay greater attention to these offences either. My noble friend has no tools to protect prison officers—so I suspect that the Prison Officers’ Association will be a little bit disappointed with his approach.

I think we identified the underlying issue, which is the probability of being prosecuted for these sorts of these offences, and we need to have another look at that. I shall, of course, withdraw my amendment, subject to the usual caveats and discussions with the Opposition Front Bench.