Earl Attlee
Main Page: Earl Attlee (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl Attlee's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had some interest in the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has proposed. There is some question mark over why there is discretion in this regard, and it would be helpful to hear from the Minister on that. The Minister will understand my concern that there is a growing acceptance these days that everybody has access to the internet and that everything can be obtained from the internet. A large number of people in our population do not have access to the internet. More than that, as the Minister knows, the Home Office website is extraordinarily difficult to access. So I would have great reluctance in seeing a measure go through that gives discretion to the Home Secretary to publish on a website that most people cannot access most of the time.
My Lords, the Government are committed to publishing the NCA framework document and annual report so that all those with an interest in the work of the agency have ready access to them. That is indeed the spirit intended. The provisions on publication in Schedule 2 are directed to that end. I assure my noble friend that there is nothing sinister in the words,
“in the manner which the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
They are just a recognition of the fact that it must be for the Home Secretary and the director-general, as the publishers of the framework document and annual report respectively, to determine how best to publish these documents. It is only sensible that the person publishing the document should be empowered to choose the most appropriate means of doing so.
We would expect that, in practice, both documents will most likely be released via the NCA or Home Office website. My noble friend Lord Henley says that he will shortly be writing to the noble Baroness on problems with that website. Whether it is a good use of resources also to print and publish thousands of hard copies of these documents must be left to the judgment of the Home Office or the director-general, as the case may be.
With the assurance that we want these documents to be made freely available, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw these amendments.
My Lords, I shall certainly do so, but I have two comments. First, I thank the Minister for confirming the point about the spirit, which I am glad to have confirmed from the Dispatch Box. On another more general point, each Bill seems to be thicker than the last. A few years ago, it would have been adequate to say, “The Secretary of State shall publish a document”. Now we have to say, “The Secretary of State shall publish a document in the manner in which she deems to be appropriate”. The officials will understand why we probe some of these words more often than just from time to time.
I was a civil servant in the Met Office and used to visit other agencies. The variability in the publication of annual reports is quite extraordinary. A Minister visited the National Physical Laboratory and asked, “Why do you publish all these annual reports?”. I am glad to say that the Met Office continues to publish annual reports and they are still very valuable and people refer to them. Therefore, I was very surprised by the Minister’s insouciant response to this whole issue of the publication of reports. As the noble Baroness said, the relevant information is very unsatisfactory. Are the Government looking into this more broadly?
My Lords, in days of old there was only one way of publishing a report, which was in hard copy. Today we can publish on the internet. We can also issue a CD and issue hard copy on a limited circulation. The provisions in the Bill take account of the various ways of releasing the information without being too prescriptive.
My Lords, I do not think that I should take the time of the Committee by pursuing the issue but I suspect that the same question will come up more than once during the rest of this Session, as it comes up on almost every Bill. I am grateful to the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I see the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, readying himself to answer on this amendment. Perhaps he can answer my simple question. We listened to the protestations of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that the amendments that we just considered were completely unworkable because of the use of the word “must”, and that there would be circumstances in which urgent matters and urgent operational needs had to be dealt with. Why do we now find a clause in the schedule which says that before you can get the British Transport Police to do anything, the prior approval of the Secretary of State has to be obtained?
When the noble Earl reads his note, perhaps he could also say whether a fine distinction is being drawn between a direction and a request? If so, perhaps he could also tell us what is the status of the British Transport Police Authority. Does it have no say in the matter? Is it simply for the Secretary of State? I assume that we are here talking about the Secretary of State for Transport, although I understand that there is always a fiction in our legislative process whereby Secretaries of State are indivisible. I assume that, before a direction can be given, the Secretary of State for Transport must be found, diverted from whatever consideration she or he might be giving to high-speed rail, airports or whatever, and told that there is an urgent operational direction needed by the British Transport Police. How is that really meant to work?
My Lords, in responding to the amendment, I start by emphasising that in almost all cases, tasking will be voluntary, based on strong relationships and mutual co-operation, exploiting intelligence and building on existing arrangements. If not, surely something is going badly wrong, so of course such circumstances will be exceptional. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about “exceptional”, there are already strict legal tests in the Bill to prevent misuse of the directed tasking powers.
In order for the director-general of the agency to use those powers, a threefold test must be met. The performance of the task would be to assist the NCA to carry out its functions; it would need to be expedient for the directed body to perform the task; and satisfactory arrangements could not have been made, or made in time. A further safeguard is that the director-general must personally exercise the power and may delegate it in his absence only to a senior NCA officer, who would be nominated for the purpose. Directed assistance powers would also be subject to a threefold test. There would have to be a special need for that assistance; it would need to be expedient for the directed body to provide assistance; and voluntary assistance could not have been made, or made in time. In addition to that threefold test, any directed assistance to the NCA would require consent from the relevant Secretary of State. Separate arrangements are in place for Northern Ireland.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked about the term “Secretary of State”. He will know very well that it is a legal term.
I was asked about the difference between tasking and assistance. “Tasking” means that the responsibility for the direction and control of the operation goes to the agency being tasked. Examples are that the NCA may task a specific police force to take the lead to disrupt a human-trafficking gang that is predominantly based in that force area but impacting across the UK, or that a police force could task the NCA, subject to the NCA’s agreement, to take the direction and control in an operation to disrupt that organised crime group’s overseas financial infrastructure by using its specialist cybercapabilities and overseas liaison officers. Under assistance, resources transfer from the operational command of one organisation to another. One example is that if a specific police force is faced with a local kidnapping case, the chief officer could maintain direction and control but request some assistance from the NCA’s specialist kidnapping unit. In the case of a co-ordinated day of national action against the smuggling of rhino horns, the NCA could request assistance from UKBA specialists on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora to assist with identifying seized ivory.
The powers in respect of directed tasking are a necessary and sensible backstop to enable the National Crime Agency to fulfil its role of ensuring that there is a co-ordinated national response to serious, organised and complex crime. In particular, directed powers could be vital in time-critical situations where arrangements need to be made quickly and there is not time to establish satisfactory voluntary arrangements. The question that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has quite reasonably posed is: why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to consent before the director-general can direct the British Transport Police to perform a task yet there is no equivalent consent requirement when one of the 43 territorial forces in England and Wales is subject to such a direction?
The British Transport Police is different from police forces in England and Wales for three reasons. First, it is not a Home Office police force but a special police force, ultimately accountable to the Secretary of State for Transport under the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003. Secondly—
Can the noble Earl explain how that accountability differs from the accountability that a Home Office force has to the police and crime commissioner?
My Lords, I will go on to say that but what is particularly important is how the British Transport Police is funded. Secondly, unlike police forces in England and Wales, the British Transport Police has a national remit which includes jurisdiction across the railway network in England and Wales—and in Scotland, where policing in the latter is otherwise devolved to the Scottish Government. Thirdly, the British Transport Police is primarily contracted and funded by providers of railway services—the train operators and Network Rail—applying the “user pays” principle. Railway service providers are required to enter into a police services agreement with the British Transport Police as a condition of their licence to operate. Home Office forces have no such contractual or financial relationship with industry of day-to-day significance.
Taking into consideration these difficulties, a direction to the British Transport Police is so significant in regards to the potential impact on accountability, devolved policing arrangements with Scotland and arrangements with industry that it requires a Secretary of State to affirm that the issue is of sufficient national interest. I would also be very surprised if my right honourable friend the Secretary of State did not want to be aware that agreement could not be reached. It would be a very serious matter. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
While the noble Earl is quite right about the funding, if the direction to the British Transport Police involves large expenditure, will that come with a cheque or a commitment to pay the extra cost or is the industry to be expected to pay it?
My Lords, in all these arrangements assistance is quite often provided under the old pals Act and they do not worry about the expenditure. However, if specialist resources were required—perhaps a mobile crane or a digging machine—that extra expense would have to be recovered. It is inevitable that agreement would be reached. However, the British Transport Police would not have that sort of equipment available. It would normally be used to intercept someone on the transport network.
Perhaps the noble Earl could also address this point. I understand the point about the different funding arrangements for the British Transport Police, which is extremely significant, but the funding is therefore coming not from the Government but from the transport operating companies. Those companies are engaged through the British Transport Police Authority so why does this clause not therefore relate to that authority, to which the chief constable is accountable, where the funders, who may feel that they have an issue at stake, would be represented? Would that not be a better arrangement?
Perhaps the noble Earl will respond to the question about the terrifying cases of urgency that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, worried us with on the previous group of amendments. How are they going to be dealt with with this requirement for the prior approval of the Secretary of State?
My Lords, in a terrifying case of urgency, it is in my opinion inconceivable that the British Transport Police would not agree to assist.
In answer to the noble Lord’s question about the British Transport Police Authority, he is right to point out that the chief constable of the British Transport Police is accountable to the British Transport Police Authority in the same way that chief constables of police forces in England and Wales are accountable to their respective police and crime commissioners. However, in the case of a directed tasking to the British Transport Police, the Secretary of State for Transport is ultimately responsible for the security of passengers and staff on the national rail network and on underground and light-rail systems. It is therefore right that she should have the ability to consent to direct tasking of the British Transport Police at the national level aimed at tackling serious and organised crime.
Moreover, tasking by the National Crime Agency may need to take place in time-critical situations. Members of the British Transport Police Authority meet six times a year to set British Transport Police targets and to allocate funds for its budget. It may not be possible to clear consent with the British Transport Police Authority in time for the necessary executive action to take place. This is not to say that the British Transport Police Authority would not be notified by its chief constable of a direct tasking request. I have no doubt that the chief constable of the British Transport Police would notify the British Transport Police Authority of direct tasking as soon as it was feasible to do so. Noble Lords have not convinced me that a situation would arise where the British Transport Police would refuse to provide assistance voluntarily.
If the Minister believes that there are no circumstances in which the British Transport Police would fail to provide the assistance required, why does he need directions in the Bill at all on the basis that, presumably, any police force would provide the assistance required?
As I said, it is to provide a necessary backstop. When two negotiating parties know that one party will win at the end of the day, it is amazing how agreement is reached quite quickly.
I think the Minister has answered the point that I made. If he is arguing that about the British Transport Police, he does not need the provision in the Bill for any police force.
I want to clarify that I have understood correctly what has been said. What I have inferred—and I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that I have understood it correctly—is that if the director-general makes a direction under Clause 5 that would require a chief officer of an England and Wales police force to perform a task, that direction does not require the consent of the Secretary of State, albeit that it would if it was in relation to the British Transport Police. Likewise, Schedule 3 provides that the director-general may,
“direct any of the following”,
including the chief officer of an England and Wales police force and the chief constable of the British Transport Police,
“to provide specified assistance to the NCA”.
While the approval of the Secretary of State would be required for a direction to a chief officer of an England and Wales police force, it would not be required for a direction to the chief constable of the British Transport Police. I simply want the Minister to clarify that I have understood what he said and that that is the distinction between Clause 5 and Schedule 3. I see the noble Lord, Lord Henley, nodding so I take it that what I have just said is a correct understanding of the position that the Minister explained.
I listened—frankly, I will wish to read it in Hansard—to the distinction between performing a task, which is referred to in Clause 5, and the director-general directing,
“any of the following to provide specified assistance to the NCA”.
Bear in mind that from the director-general’s point of view, if he can satisfy himself—or herself—that he requires a task to be performed by the chief officer of an England and Wales police force, he does not need the consent of the Secretary of State. Therefore, it might be quite tempting for a director-general to try to make sure that any direction that he gives comes under the heading of “performing a task”, rather than “providing specified assistance”. That is also what I have inferred from the Minister’s answer.
My Lords, I hope the noble Lord is not suggesting that the director-general would base an operational decision on bureaucratic convenience.
I am sure it would not be based on bureaucratic convenience. If he could satisfy himself that he was asking for a task to be performed, there would be less bureaucracy as he would not have to get the consent of the Secretary of State. Once again, I fear that there may be a view that there is a very clear divide between what could be defined as performing a task and what might be deemed to be providing specified assistance. I suspect that there will be grey areas over that in at least some cases.
I pointed out to the Minister that it was said at Second Reading that,
“the Bill provides that the director-general should, in exceptional circumstances, be able to direct police forces in England and Wales”.—[Official Report, 28/5/12; col. 974.]
I asked where in the Bill it says “exceptional circumstances”. I take it from the noble Earl’s answer that he agrees with me that the statement that the Bill provides for the director-general to be able to direct police forces in England and Wales in exceptional circumstances is not correct. Such wording does not appear in the Bill, although this was implied at Second Reading. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these are purely drafting amendments to the provisions in Schedule 3 relating to the exchange of information between police forces and the National Crime Agency. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the schedule apply these provisions to each UK police force and the British Transport Police. However, the British Transport Police is already covered by the definition of a UK police force in Clause 16. Consequently, it does not need to be separately listed. The amendments therefore remove the superfluous paragraphs 3(1)(b) and 4(1)(b). I beg to move.
My Lords, we can see that this is a drafting amendment. I must admit that when I first saw the clause I wondered what had happened to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence Police, which also should have been covered if it was necessary to include the British Transport Police. I think that the Minister has been able to give me an assurance for each of those special police forces, which, as the definitions on page 12 indicate, are UK police forces. They would have the same relationship as regards having to be notified and the disclosure of information as all other police forces in the UK. It is a helpful amendment that clarifies the existing position.
My Lords, this group of amendments all relate to the provisions in Schedule 3 regarding payments for tasks, assistance and facilities. Amendment 40, in the name of noble friend Lady Hamwee, seeks in effect to bring the provisions relating to charging in Schedule 1 into line with those in Schedule 3; namely, that they must be agreed by both sides.
I put it to my noble friend that this amendment would conflate two quite separate charging regimes. The charging provisions in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 enable the National Crime Agency to provide particular services, whether to another law enforcement agency or to any other person. They are not about the provision of assistance or facilities under Schedule 3 or the tasking arrangements in Clause 5. Such services might include, for example, the provision of training, crime operational support or the services provided by the Specialist Operations Centre. Charging for these services, which are provided on request, will normally have to be on a cost-recovery basis in line with the Treasury’s guidance on managing public money. In other words, these services cannot be made under the old pals act; they have to be properly accounted for.
Amendment 41 seeks to provide for a protocol which sets out the appropriate amounts to be paid for tasks, assistance or facilities performed or provided under the provisions of Clause 5 and Schedule 3. I can certainly support the spirit of this amendment. The National Crime Agency will need to agree policies for cross-charging with the police service and other law enforcement partners that are equitable, practical and help to support the co-ordinated effort to tackle serious and organised crime. However, I do not think the amendment is necessary as the existing schedule already allows for the appropriate amount to be agreed through a broader policy or protocol. The key point in Schedule 3 is that payments for tasks, assistance or facilities, if any, must be agreed between both sides. It does not specify how that agreement must be reached or that it must be done on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, Amendments 42 to 44, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, seek to replace the Home Secretary’s role as final arbiter with an independent advisory panel on payments. I would argue that creating another quango is not a good way to provide value for money or to secure the simple and speedy resolution of disputes over charging arrangements. Indeed, I hope that there will be few disputes, and I imagine that both parties would be reluctant to involve the Secretary of State.
In addition, the approach to cross-charging in Schedule 3, including the role of the Secretary of State, broadly mirrors the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. The previous Administration did not see the need for creating a separate body to decide on appropriate amounts for payments in the absence of agreement, and neither do this Government.
Amendment 43 would remove any role for the devolved Administrations in setting appropriate amounts if agreement cannot be reached. As the budgets for these law enforcement bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland are devolved, it is right that the devolved Administrations have a role to play in ensuring that payments are fair in situations where either a Scottish or Northern Irish body is involved.
I would hope and expect that the cross-charging arrangements for tasks, assistance and facilities will be agreed amicably between the NCA and its partners. It is right that the Bill includes backstop arrangements for resolving any disputes. The arrangements provided for in the Bill broadly mirror those for SOCA, and there is no good reason why we need to adopt a different approach for the NCA. Accordingly, I would invite my noble friend Lady Hamwee to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I wonder sometimes whether the noble Earl lives in a slightly different and more benign world than I do. Several times during the course of today’s debate, whether it has been on the power of direction and payments, he has said, “We hope that it will be okay, we can’t see ourselves using this power, things should work out okay”. Real life is not like that; disputes occur. This idea of having a backstop and saying that it does not matter if it is not perfect and not okay because it will hardly ever be used is not really good enough. We need to have some kind of process. I do not know whether the noble Earl took on board what I said. I am not wedded necessarily to an advisory board, but I think that we need a process that is not the Secretary of State or, as the noble Earl calls it, a backstop.
There will from time to time be disputes on payments and the power of direction, and we need to have a process that this House is confident can deal with any of those problems that occur—and not just think that it will be okay because it will not happen very often. I think that we will pursue this at a later stage. There may be further discussions in Committee, but at this stage I am happy not to press my amendment.
My Lords, I share the noble Baroness’s concerns about this. I wrote down “amicable?”. The noble Earl referred to a backstop, but the point of providing a very clear framework—although I do not want to use that term—and making clear provisions is that they are clear and, if things are not amicable, one knows where to go. It had never occurred to me until an earlier group of amendments that the old pals arrangement might apply to anything under this Bill—but perhaps I am just too cynical.
On Amendment 40, as I understood the noble Earl’s remarks, the NCA will be subject to certain formal Treasury guidelines. He is nodding at that, but I wonder whether he might share those with Members of the Committee after the debate. It may not be appropriate to go into all the detail now, but it would be very helpful to be clearer about this before we return to the matter, as I suspect we will.
My Lords, I was referring to the Treasury guidance on managing public money.
Let us see how the Treasury website operates and whether we can get into it.
On Amendment 41, the noble Earl argued that what is provided in paragraph 29 is not on a case-by-case basis but is an overall principle. I do not read it like that, because paragraph 29 refers to a provision requiring,
“one person (“R”) to pay the appropriate amount to another person (“P”)”.
The only way in which I can construe that paragraph is that we are talking about the particular “R” and the particular “P”, not anyone who might come under “R” or “P” in a range of different situations. Perhaps that is something that we can seek to understand rather better after the Committee stage. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 40.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 58B. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 deals with the disclosure of information, and regulations that may cover disclosure. We are told at sub-paragraph (6) that:
“Such regulations may, in particular … modify any provision of Schedule 7 in its application to such a disclosure, or … disapply any such provision”.
My amendment would exclude from that modification or disapplication paragraph 1 of Schedule 7, which provides that,
“any disclosure, in contravention of any provisions of the Data Protection Act”,
or,
“prohibited by Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act”,
is not authorised. I hope, and expect to be told by the Minister, that that is what Schedule 6 provides because of the way that it is drafted. However, that was not obvious to me when I read it, and therefore it seemed quite important to clarify the point.
My Lords, although I recognise the absolute importance of safeguarding the disclosure of sensitive personal information, I believe that Amendment 58B is unnecessary. The kinds of information that will be required for the purpose of an inspection will be limited in nature to those required for exercising an inspection function. The disclosure of information to a policing inspectorate, and any onward disclosure, will be subject to the safeguards in Schedule 7.
Schedule 6 contains a back-stop power that enables the Home Secretary, by regulations, to make further provision about the disclosure of information by the NCA to policing inspectorates. Although this includes a power to modify Schedule 7, should this be necessary to enable the proper, independent inspection of the NCA, it is not intended to use this power to override important existing statutory safeguards relating to sensitive personal data.
Furthermore, let me reassure my noble friend, it is not paragraph 1 of Schedule 7 that applies the extensive safeguards set out in the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but those Acts themselves. This paragraph simply puts that beyond doubt. I will be clear that should any regulations be made governing the disclosure of information from the NCA to policing inspectorates and their onward disclosure of such information, those regulations cannot override these safeguards by modifying paragraph 1 of Schedule 7.
I hope that in the light of this explanation, my noble friend is satisfied that there will be adequate arrangements in place to independently inspect the agency that respect important data protection safeguards. I accordingly invite her to withdraw her amendments.
My Lords, I think I had better read that following today’s debate, because the noble Earl seemed to be saying that those two Acts could be not be overridden; but he started his explanation by saying that it was not intended to use the provision in Schedule 6 to override them. I do not quite understand how those two statements fit together. If they cannot be overridden, the Secretary of State could not intend to override them. However, that was not, as I heard it, the implication of the introduction when he said that it was not intended to use them in that way. Of course, I withdraw the amendment, but will also read what has been said and make sure that I am entirely comfortable with it.