(8 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. The point about the Bill is that it makes it possible to intercept communications only under that dual authority—the double-lock that has been put into place—and it is not the case that the authorities are looking for generalised access to the contents of communications. I thank him for bringing that to the attention of the House.
As the Home Secretary says, this is an extremely important power but also a very sensitive one. As I understand it, she exercises it about 2,500 times a year, or about 10 times in each working day. Given that they are so sensitive, how long does she take, typically, over one of those decisions?
It is impossible to put a time on it, because each decision differs. The amount of information that is available, the type of case that one is looking at and the extent to which it refers to a matter that is already being considered vary. The amount of time I give to each case is the amount of time necessary to make the right judgment.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs I have said, we all share the hon. Gentleman’s desire to bring these individuals to justice. That is why I have written to the DPP this morning to ask her to explore whether there are any other options that she can look at in relation not just to the extradition of the two individuals, but to criminal asset freezes.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should make a statement on this issue. As the hon. Gentleman can see, my right hon. Friend is present. The statement I made is obviously the view of the Government, and we have discussed the approach we are taking on these matters.
The hon. Gentleman asked about access to polonium-210. As I said earlier, this is a very detailed report, and sections of Sir Robert Owen’s report cover that particular issue. We are grateful to Sir Robert for the thoroughness with which he has conducted his inquiry.
I thank the Home Secretary for the tenor and thrust of her statement. The magisterial report written by Sir Robert Owen says in paragraph 10.16:
“The FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr Patrushev and also by President Putin.”
Given the secrecy of the Russian state, I do not think we need to worry too much about the word “probably”. This is way beyond the normal civil legal requirements and what is needed to take economic, political and diplomatic action. What is certain is that the Russian state under President Putin has killed over 100 opponents—lawyers, accountants, journalists and politicians. It is a kleptocratic state that uses assassination as a policy weapon.
May I ask the Home Secretary what we intend to do about Patrushev and Putin? We cannot tolerate their ordering assassinations on the streets of our country. Will she take targeted economic sanctions against them and, where possible, travel sanctions, although obviously those are not possible with a Head of State? Will there be an expulsion of intelligence officers—both FSB and others—from the Russian embassy, which would be entirely appropriate? It has been asked whether we should encourage our allies to help us. Of course we should, but we should also tell countries such as the Bahamas, Switzerland and Cyprus—all the Russian financial boltholes—that there is no hiding place for the money of these people.
(9 years ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman for the tone that he adopted for most of his response to my statement. I thank him for his willingness to understand and accept the importance of this legislation and for his clear comment that this is not mass surveillance. As he says, the message should go out very clearly from this House today that these are important powers that are necessary to keep us safe and secure, but that we must have the right safeguards.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a lot of questions. I will attempt to answer as many of them as possible, but if I miss any particular points I will respond to them in writing.
Before I come to the specific questions, I want to address the reference that he made to the Prime Minister at the end of his speech. I have to say to him that it was not justified by the tone that he adopted for the rest of his speech. What the Prime Minister has said, and what we are saying in our counter-extremism strategy—the strategy deals with extremism of all sorts, including Islamist extremism and neo-Nazi extremism—is that we want to work with people in communities and encourage mainstream voices. We want to work to ensure that, when people are in isolated communities, we identify the barriers that cause that isolation. That is why Louise Casey is doing the very important work she is doing. The characterisation of the Prime Minister that the right hon. Gentleman puts to the House is not one that I recognise.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about David Anderson’s view. I have had a private meeting with him on the matter and discussed it with him. We have taken virtually everything that he requested on board, but I do not think it is appropriate for me to say what his view is. That is for him to say separately. It was a private meeting and I just do not think it is appropriate for me to use it in that way.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to serious crimes. Yes, the measure will cover only the most serious crimes, as currently defined in RIPA. That definition will be brought into the legislation.
On the retention of communications data, it will be possible to require the intercept communications records to be retained for up to 12 months. That refers only to the front page of the website. As I have said, it is not exactly which pages within a website that people have been looking at, but just the fact of access to a website or communications device.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about recent cyber-attacks. The message we take from those is very simple: as criminals are moving into more online crime, we need to ensure that our law enforcement agencies have the power to deal with that cybercrime and work in that online space, which is precisely what today is about.
On encryption, the current requirement, which is in secondary legislation, that those companies issued with a warrant should take reasonable steps to respond to it in unencrypted form, is being put on the face of the legislation, but we are not banning encryption. We recognise that encryption plays an important part in keeping people’s details secure.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about providers. There may be a slight misunderstanding about requirements on overseas providers. There are some elements that we are not now requiring of overseas providers, but we retain the extra-territorial jurisdiction of our warrantry. It is still our view that we should be able to exercise against an overseas provider a warrant issued here in the UK. The work of Nigel Sheinwald, of which hon. Members will be aware, suggested that there was scope for a greater form of international agreement in this area. The Government will continue to look at that.
On journalistic sources, I did not mention it, but we will include in the legislation what we included in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 code earlier this year: access to communications data to identify a journalist’s source will require judicial authorisation.
The point of the double lock is that both parties have to authorise the warrant for it to go ahead. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the time delays. There will be an urgent process, so it will be possible for a Secretary of State to sign an urgent warrant that will come immediately into effect. There will then be a period of time within which the judge will have to review it and make a decision on whether it should continue. We will look to ensure that, in that urgent process, the time delay is as little as possible between those two parts of the process. As I have said, the purpose of a double lock is that, in most circumstances, we will have that double authorisation.
In view of the size of the Bill, I will confine myself solely to the judicial authorisation aspects of it. Will the Secretary of State tell the House whether the measure will replace all 66 statutory approval mechanisms for intercept and use of communications data? Will the judiciary involved in the authorisation procedures be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission or by the Prime Minister? Will Members of Parliament get the same protections on communications data, to which she referred, that are being extended to journalists? My understanding is that that is not the case.
In relation to the warrantry that will be subject to the double lock and the process of interception, where the process currently requires a warrant signed just by the Secretary of State, it will in future have the double lock. Additional processes will be introduced in relation to some of the bulk capabilities to which I referred. Obviously, we have to appoint the investigatory powers commissioner. There will then be a process to determine who should be under the commissioner and the areas of expertise they should have. I have said to the Justice Secretary in Scotland and the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland that we would expect to ensure that Scottish and Northern Ireland expertise is available to the commissioner.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIn about two weeks’ time we are expecting the return of the last British resident, Shaker Aamer, from Guantanamo Bay, and I thank the Government for their actions in support of that measure. However, the last 16 residents of Guantanamo Bay who returned to Britain had been subject to torture and were paid compensation by the Government. Can the Home Secretary tell us how many of those 16 were subject to gagging orders as a result of the settlement?
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the shadow Secretary of State for the tone and approach she has adopted on these matters, which—as we all accept across the House—are incredibly serious. It is important that we have full debates about them, as we will be able to do. In the timetable I have set out, people will have an opportunity to reflect fully on the David Anderson report, and other reports that have already been published or will be published, so that when they come to look at the Government’s proposals, they will be able to do so against that firm background.
It is important to draw to the House’s attention the fact that David Anderson looked into all investigatory powers and techniques. He recognised the necessity of the powers and techniques. The issue he was looking at was whether the legislative framework we have is the right one. He has made the point that the current legislative framework is found in a number of different Acts of Parliament, so it is sometimes difficult for people to see the complete picture. Obviously, one of his purposes in his recommendations is to bring that picture together, and to look at the questions of authorisation and oversight.
The right hon. Lady mentioned two particular issues, one of which was access to third party data. David Anderson does not say that this should not be permissible or possible; he says that he would like to see a better case made for it than has been made in the past, but he does not reject the use of access to third party data. On judicial authorisations, he has come down with a particular point of view in that area, and it happens that the ISC took a different view. In looking at this carefully, the point that we will want to reach is ensuring that any decision taken in this area does not adversely affect the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary in relation to other aspects of Government powers and what they need to do, and where any arrangements made are seen to have clear legitimacy and also reflect the issue that the shadow Home Secretary referred to—that the individual who bears the risk, regardless of who takes the authorisation, is of course the Home Secretary. So we have to look at those proposals in the context of that complex mix of areas that we need to consider.
Mr Anderson said in the preamble to his excellent report:
“The current law is fragmented, obscure, under constant challenge and variable in the protections that it affords the innocent.”
He went on to say:
“A multitude of alternative powers, some of them without statutory safeguards, confuse the picture further. This state of affairs is undemocratic, unnecessary and—in the long run—intolerable.”
Of his 124 recommendations, the shadow Home Secretary picked up on perhaps the most important—the one relating to this issue of judicial authorisation. This country relies on ministerial authorisation more than any other country in the world, with the possible exception of Zimbabwe. Will the Home Secretary please look hard at this recommendation, with a strong recommendation that it is carried out and the transfer of power from ministerial authority to proper judicial authority takes place as soon as possible?
As I indicated in my response to the shadow Home Secretary, we will look at that recommendation carefully, as indeed we will look at all 124 recommendations. Obviously, we will reflect on what David Anderson has said and on any further debate that takes place in relation to this. As I said to her, it is important that we recognise that the question of the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary is not just one that relates to the powers that David Anderson has been looking at, and we need to think carefully about this issue. I recognise the force with which my right hon. Friend encourages me to go down that route, but today I am not in a position, and do not intend, to say that the Government are going to do one thing or another. I think it is right that we reflect more fully on these aspects and make our proposals in the draft Bill that we will publish in the autumn.