Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Debate between Craig Whittaker and Holly Lynch(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert
“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”
This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.
Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.
At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that
“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,
the reasons for which include that there is
“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.
The report also pointed to
“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”
and times at which
“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.
The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)
It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.
I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.
Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.
At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.
Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.
As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.
Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.
It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Holly Lynch
I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Craig Whittaker
I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.
The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until
“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”
In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.
With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.
On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his response. We have seen this approach at previous stages of the Bill. The Minister cites the realities of processing times, but the fact that it is 45 days in the statutory guidance shows why the Bill is an absolute nonsense and does not make the first bit of sense. We should ignore it and trust the guidance. There is a commitment to driving down the processing times anyway. I hope that the Minister can therefore see why the amendment was tabled. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Craig Whittaker
As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.
Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for that contribution. I have been consistently concerned by the lack of provision for children and young people within the clauses before us. With that in mind, I will not be withdrawing amendment 180.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Craig Whittaker
Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.
The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. As we have heard from the interventions made by hon. Members, the case studies before us mean that we have grave concerns about clause 51. The assurances that the Minister has sought to make do not overcome some of the barriers that clause 51 will put in place.
I look forward to hearing more detail about the Children’s Society projects that the Government are funding and the Look Closer campaign, which I very much welcome, but, as things currently stand, this is much more of a blanket exemption than the Minister has tried to suggest. The very broad public order definitions in the Bill go beyond the intention that he has tried to explain, so once again I am concerned that children will be particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of clause 51 if unamended, so I am minded to press amendment 164 to a division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Holly Lynch
The amendments seek to incorporate our international legal obligations under ECAT within the provisions of support available to victims during the recovery period, as well as extending statutory support for those who have received a positive conclusive grounds decision.
Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to
“make matters worse for victims”.
Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm
“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”
and replace it with the requirement to assist a person
“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”
Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support
“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.
The British Red Cross has highlighted that
“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.
The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that
“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—
in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.
Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.
Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.
Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.
Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:
“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.
This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that
“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”
Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.
To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.
On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only
“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”
for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.
In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are
“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”
This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm
“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”
The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will
“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.
It adds that the clause will also
“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”
To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Lady for raising important issues around the support and assistance offered to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Support for potential victims is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by this horrendous crime and reducing the risk of their being re-trafficked. We are agreed on the importance of placing the entitlement to support in legislation, which is what the clause will do. Our intention in our drafting was to provide victims with certainty about the circumstances in which support is provided through the NRM; we know that is imperative in aiding their recovery. To this end, we have sought to put in clause 52 that support will be provided where
“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”
Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s
“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”
This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.
After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.
Craig Whittaker
I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for his response. He paints a picture of the NRM that I do not think would be recognised by those working with it on the frontline. We heard testimony from those within the NRM that it was not clear that they were even in it, because it was not clear what provisions or support they were receiving. I wish it was the case that the description and the offer of support that he outlines were there in reality.
The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.
The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.
Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as
“the person’s wishes and feelings”,
which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.
We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.
I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.
I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.
For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.
With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—
“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.
(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—
(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;
(b) the person’s need for support and care; and
(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”
This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Craig Whittaker
I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 53, page 48, line 10, leave out “reasonable” and insert “conclusive”.
This amendment corrects a drafting error.
Craig Whittaker
The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.
I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.
Holly Lynch
I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.
As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,
“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”
Craig Whittaker
Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—
Holly Lynch
The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?
Craig Whittaker
I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Debate between Craig Whittaker and Holly Lynch(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)
Identifying and supporting victims at an early stage is a key part of the Bill, and the new one-stop process. To underpin that process, clause 54 provides for legally aided advice on the national referral mechanism to be provided to individuals who are already receiving legally aided advice on an immigration or asylum matter. The additional advice will be free to the individual.
The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.
The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. Clause 54 amends the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable advice on referral into the NRM to be provided as add-on advice where individuals are in receipt of civil legal services for certain immigration and asylum matters. Although I and many other colleagues welcome the fact that the Government have recognised the importance of legal aid as part of the process, we argue that legislating for it only as an add-on misses the opportunity to extend access to all those who would benefit from it—I include the Home Office as one of the main beneficiaries of people having access to proper advocacy and advice from an early stage.
In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.
It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:
“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”
We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.
It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.
Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.
In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:
“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”
The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56
Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
The trafficking directive—the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims—was adopted by the UK on 5 April 2011. The Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—is the principal international measure designed to combat human trafficking. The trafficking directive is intended, in part, to give effect to ECAT. ECAT’s objective is to prevent and combat trafficking by imposing obligations on member states to investigate and prosecute trafficking as a serious organised crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights.
Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.
The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,
“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”
There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.
The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.
I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to
“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,
which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any
“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”
that were saved cease to apply,
“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”
Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.
The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:
“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”
The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.
Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.
In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—
Craig Whittaker
I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his intervention. We are into the thick of the legal technicalities. These points are from some of the leading legal experts on the subject. They are not entirely satisfied that clause 56 is compatible, and that we are not missing some of the protections that have been hard fought for, with good reason.
In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
Let me start with amendment 150. I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that his amendment applies to all aspects of age assessments, not only the use of scientific measures. As such, it is extremely broad, although I do not know if that remains his intention.
The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.
We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
Holly Lynch
The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.
One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.
First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Debate between Craig Whittaker and Holly LynchTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 185, in clause 48, page 43, line 3, leave out from “determination” to end of subsection (4) and insert
“determinations mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) are to be reviewed by the Multi-Agency Assurance Panels, who will have the power to overturn the determinations made by the competent authority.”
This amendment seeks to introduce Multi-Agency Assurance Panels at the reasonable grounds stage and will enable them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I both congratulate and commiserate with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his rapid promotion this morning to take forward an incredibly important piece of legislation. I wish him all the very best with the rest of the week.
Amendment 185 seeks to build upon the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and introduce multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, as well as enabling them to overturn decisions made by a competent authority. That would ensure that multi-agency scrutiny is applied at the first stage, offering an important safeguard. Multi-agency assurance panels were part of a range of reforms to the national referral mechanism that were announced in 2017, following the NRM review commissioned by the Home Secretary in 2014. A recent review provided key recommendations, such as establishing new multidisciplinary panels headed by an independent chair, with a view to replacing the decision-making roles of UK Visas and Immigration and the UK Human Trafficking Centre with a single competent authority.
At present, there is multi-agency scrutiny only of negative conclusive grounds decisions, which, even then, is limited, with panels having the power only to ask the single competent authority to review a decision, as opposed to overturning it. A recent review of the national referral mechanism multi-agency assurance panels conducted by the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group found that
“at present, MAAPs do not adequately assure NRM decision-making”,
the reasons for which include that there is
“no multi-agency involvement in the reasonable grounds stage of the NRM, undermining confidence that there are any checks on bad decision-making at this first stage”.
The report also pointed to
“MAAPs lack of decision-making powers”
and times at which
“the evidence reaching the panels is minimal and of poor quality”.
The amendment applies those recommendations and highlights that, as the reasonable grounds stage is effectively the gateway to all anti-trafficking support, an extra level of safeguarding should be available to ensure good decision making. Both the amendments tabled to clause 48 are necessary to ensure that we are not turning our back on victims and restricting opportunities for individuals to refer into the NRM and receive the support they need. The measures have been widely endorsed across the sector and seek to introduce examples of best practice. I therefore strongly hope that the Minister will join us in endorsing these changes.
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)
It is a pleasure to serve under you, Sir Roger, but not particularly in this role. However, as always, it is a pleasure to be sitting on a Committee that you are chairing.
I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for her valuable contribution on this point. Decision making is of course central to our ability to support possible and confirmed victims of modern slavery. That is why, throughout the Bill, as she will know, we have discussed ways for that to be done as quickly and fairly as possible. It is in that vein that we have sought to clarify the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds thresholds in primary legislation, to support that effective decision making. It is also why we are committed to reviewing the guidance that under- pins the reasonable grounds test to ensure that it best supports that.
Central to that work is the premise that the reasonable grounds decision should be made quickly. Currently, where possible, that is within five working days of referral to the national referral mechanism. That timeline enables us to quickly identify possible victims and ensure that they receive the appropriate support that they need. All decision makers receive robust training to support that process, and any negative reasonable grounds decisions will be reviewed by a second caseworker or a manager/technical specialist to ensure that all decisions taken are in line with the policy. An individual, or someone acting on their behalf, may also request reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision by the competent authority where there are specific concerns that a decision made is not in line with the policy, or if additional evidence becomes available that would be material to the outcome of a case.
At the conclusive grounds stage, we already have a process whereby negative decisions are considered by those multi-agency assurance panels. That process is set out in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and non-statutory guidance for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We believe that that is the right place for the process, enabling us to adapt it in future to changing needs. To put in place the duty for multi-agency assurance panels to review all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions would cut across that approach. It is not appropriate for that to be set out in primary legislation, as amendment 185 seeks to do, as that would remove the ability to change such a process to appropriate bodies and needs in the future.
Moreover, the amendment would add a new power whereby multi-agency assurance panels can overturn competent authority decisions, rather than the current approach of asking the competent authority to review a decision in specific circumstances. It is right that only designated competent authorities have a decision-making role. The current approach supports a culture of continuous improvement.
As I have set out, we do not believe that primary legislation is needed here. The current multi-agency assurance panels have been subject to an evaluation, and we will consider the conclusions and lessons learned in due course. If in the future we wished to consider multi-agency assurance panels at the reasonable grounds stage, or to change their remit, it would follow that that, too, would be a question for guidance.
Although I presume not intentionally, the amendment would also remove the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery. That is the current test that is applied, in line with our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.
It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Holly Lynch
I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Craig Whittaker
I thank both hon. Members for their contributions. Let me see if I can answer some of their questions. Basically, there is no need to amend clause 49 to provide a 45-day recovery period as that is already provided for in guidance. The guidance is the statutory guidance under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where victims will still receive a 45-day recovery period unless disqualifications apply.
The hon. Member for Halifax is right when she quotes our obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which require us to provide a 30-day recovery period or, as the legislation states, until
“the conclusive grounds decision is made.”
In 2020, the average time for conclusive grounds decisions was actually 339 days. That long period stems from pressures on the system, which we are working to reduce through our transformation project, to ensure that victims get certainty much more quickly. This period is notably much longer than the 45 days that the hon. Member is proposing.
With regard to how that impacts on devolved pilots, as set out in the new plan for immigration, the Government are also piloting new ways of identifying child victims of modern slavery that will enable decisions to be taken within existing safeguarding structures by local authorities, the police and health workers. This approach will enable decisions about whether a child is a victim of modern slavery to be made by those involved in their care and ensure that decisions made are closely aligned with the provision of local needs-based support and any law enforcement response. The Government will continue to monitor the consequences of this measure and whether it will reduce further flexibility around decision making.
On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment and to support the clause as drafted.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his response. We have seen this approach at previous stages of the Bill. The Minister cites the realities of processing times, but the fact that it is 45 days in the statutory guidance shows why the Bill is an absolute nonsense and does not make the first bit of sense. We should ignore it and trust the guidance. There is a commitment to driving down the processing times anyway. I hope that the Minister can therefore see why the amendment was tabled. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Craig Whittaker
As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.
Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for that contribution. I have been consistently concerned by the lack of provision for children and young people within the clauses before us. With that in mind, I will not be withdrawing amendment 180.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Holly Lynch
The amendments seek to incorporate our international legal obligations under ECAT within the provisions of support available to victims during the recovery period, as well as extending statutory support for those who have received a positive conclusive grounds decision.
Having already discussed the changes to the recovery period in our discussion of clause 50, I will not repeat myself, but it is important to consider these amendments alongside the provisions in clause 50. We share the concerns of Christian Action, Research, and Education, or CARE, which has worked with us on amendment 4, that clauses 52 and 53 have the potential, if they remain unamended, to
“make matters worse for victims”.
Amendment 2 would update the definition of the reasons for providing a recovery period as solely to harm
“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question,”
and replace it with the requirement to assist a person
“in their physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their retrafficking.”
Therefore, amendment 2 would put into the Bill the wording of article 13 of ECAT, which provides support
“necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”.
The British Red Cross has highlighted that
“making support dependent on specific ‘harm’ caused by the ‘conduct’ that led someone to be identified as a victim, fails to recognise the reality of human trafficking”.
The Home Office’s own research from 2017 says that
“unlike most crimes, which are time-limited single events, modern slavery is a hidden crime of indeterminate duration”—
in that it involves multiple locations and individuals. Therefore, amendment 2 better reflects the Home Office’s own assessment of the nature of human trafficking.
Amendment 4 seeks to set out the types of assistance and support that must be provided to a victim of modern slavery. Colleagues will be aware that presently neither the Modern Slavery Act 2015 nor the Bill includes such a provision, and therefore amendment 4 would fill a significant void in the legislation. The types of assistance and support include a range of provisions, such as safe accommodation, medical advice, a support worker, access to translation services, counselling, and assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation.
Amendment 4 is a practical and reasonable measure, and one that we hope will provide a sense of certainty and security to support survivors as they move towards recovery and towards justice, as confidence in the process grows, which will foster trust between agencies and victims, and enable more perpetrators to be brought before the courts. The types of assistance defined are basic provisions that victims should be entitled to if they are to rebuild their lives.
Building upon this idea of defining assistance, amendment 3 would offer long-term support to survivors with a positive conclusive grounds decision, stipulating that the Secretary of State must also secure assistance for at least 12 months, beginning on the day that the recovery period ends.
Given that there is no mention of statutory support after a conclusive grounds decision, amendment 3 seeks to correct another considerable omission from the Bill. In 2020, the Centre for Social Justice said:
“Long-term support is a further significant gap in the support system. In recent years a number of reports have concluded that the lack of long-term support puts victims of modern slavery at risk of homelessness, destitution and even re-trafficking after they exit the NRM support provision. It also has a significant negative impact on their engagement with the criminal justice system”.
This approach has broad support, as these amendments would build upon the recommendations made by the Work and Pensions Committee in 2017, which stated that
“There is very little structured support for confirmed victims once they have been given a ‘Conclusive Grounds’ decision...We recommend that all victims of modern slavery be given a personal plan which details their road to recovery, and acts as a passport to support, for at least the 12 month period of discretionary leave.”
Similar measures were also incorporated in the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by Lord McColl of Dulwich, which awaits its Second Reading in the House of Lords. That Bill was greatly welcomed across the human trafficking sector and by all parties.
To summarise the case for amendments 2, 4 and 3, they are vital in expanding support for victims, and can boast wide support. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on their merits.
On clause 52 more broadly, we welcome the fact that support for victims in England and Wales is being placed on a statutory basis during the recovery period, but this change is undermined by the limitations on support, and the decision to reduce the minimum recovery period from 45 to 30 days under earlier clauses. The clause introduces provisions for assistance and support only
“if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary”
for recovery, mental health and wellbeing purposes, and crucially only if the recovery is from harm caused directly by the trafficking.
In the explanatory notes, the Government state that the intention behind the clause is to implement the UK’s ECAT obligations under article 13 to provide a recovery period to potential victims of modern slavery, but that is not really what has been included in the Bill. The explanatory report on ECAT says that articles 12 and 13 are
“an important guarantee for victims and serve…a number of purposes.”
This wording emphasises the “guarantee” of support, and its serving different purposes. By contrast, the clause narrows the scope of the recovery support received solely to support needed as a result of harm
“arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”
The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit claims that as a result, the clause will
“create a huge evidential burden on survivors, in demonstrating that their recovery needs are linked to their experiences of having been trafficked”.
It adds that the clause will also
“necessitate an increase in the number of medico-legal reports that the Competent Authority will be required to consider.”
To summarise, the clause has the potential to further disqualify victims from support entirely. It has nothing at all to offer a person who had physical and mental needs before being trafficked—needs that may have been a factor in them having been targeted by criminal gangs. It risks trapping victims in an endless cycle of exploitation, which will undermine our ability to identify victims and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. For these reasons, the clause should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Lady for raising important issues around the support and assistance offered to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Support for potential victims is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by this horrendous crime and reducing the risk of their being re-trafficked. We are agreed on the importance of placing the entitlement to support in legislation, which is what the clause will do. Our intention in our drafting was to provide victims with certainty about the circumstances in which support is provided through the NRM; we know that is imperative in aiding their recovery. To this end, we have sought to put in clause 52 that support will be provided where
“it is necessary for the purpose of assisting the person receiving it in their recovery from any harm to their physical and mental health and their social well-being arising from the conduct which resulted in the positive reasonable grounds decision in question.”
Amendment 2 would restrict this support to where it was needed for a victim’s
“physical, psychological and social recovery or to prevent their re-trafficking.”
This provides less clarity on what these terms mean for victims and decision makers, reducing the clause’s effectiveness in supporting victims. Our approach is not to do as amendment 4 suggests and go into detail in the clause on the types of support provided, but to instead do that in guidance. The reason is twofold: it provides us with the flexibility to tailor support to victims, and to ensure that we are able to amend the guidance and support as our understanding of victims’ needs changes.
After entering the NRM, potential victims are entitled to access a wide range of specialist support services to help them rebuild their lives. This includes safe house accommodation, financial support, and a social worker to assist with access to services including, but not limited to, health care, legal advice and translation services. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims’ ongoing recovery needs are assessed, and a clear plan is tailored to their specific recovery needs to help them transition out of support and back into a community, where this is possible. Confirmed victims’ recovery needs are assessed to ensure that the overall support package provided through the modern slavery victim care contract is specific to the individual. This needs-based approach ensures that the Government provide targeted and personalised support to victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives.
Craig Whittaker
I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for his response. He paints a picture of the NRM that I do not think would be recognised by those working with it on the frontline. We heard testimony from those within the NRM that it was not clear that they were even in it, because it was not clear what provisions or support they were receiving. I wish it was the case that the description and the offer of support that he outlines were there in reality.
The Minister says the discretion within the Bill is necessary in order to facilitate going further and doing more, but we know that discretion is also used to offer less than we think is appropriate for victims who require that support. We will continue to argue and make the case for amendments 2, 3 and 4, but in the interests of time, we will simply vote against clause 52 in its entirety. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.
The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.
Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as
“the person’s wishes and feelings”,
which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.
We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.
I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.
I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.
For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister, once again, for his contribution. In the interests of time, I will seek to move amendment 189 formally as, once again, I am not satisfied that the appropriate provisions for children have been recognised. I will gently make the point that statutory guidance has been referred to so often as the place where we would look for further detail on how the Bill would actually affect people’s lives that it would have been diligent to produce the statutory guidance at the same time as the Bill. That would have given Members the ability to really scrutinise it in full.
With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 189, in clause 53, page 47, line 21, at end insert—
“(2A) If the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the National Referral Mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests.
(2B) In determining the length of leave to remain to grant to a person under subsection (2A), the Secretary of State must consider the person’s best interests and give due consideration to—
(a) the person’s wishes and feelings;
(b) the person’s need for support and care; and
(c) the person’s need for stability and a sustainable arrangement.”
This amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims (as per Article 14(2) of ECAT) into primary legislation.—(Holly Lynch.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Craig Whittaker
The Government have tabled a minor amendment to subsection (9) of the clause to reflect that a grant of leave comes after the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the reasonable grounds decision. Subsection (9) has therefore been amended to provide that the relevant exploitation for the purpose of granting leave under subsection (2) of the clause means the conduct resulting in the positive conclusive grounds decision rather than the positive reasonable grounds decision. This corrects a minor drafting error.
I will briefly speak on clause 53. It reflects our commitment to supporting victims of modern slavery by setting out in legislation, for the first time, the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. The aim of the clause is to provide clarity to decision makers as to the circumstances in which confirmed victims qualify for temporary leave to remain. It is a Government priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. As such, the legislation makes it clear that where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceedings, confirmed victims who are co-operating with this activity and need to remain in the UK in order to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain, to support that crucial endeavour. The clause will ensure that victims and public authorities have surety about victims’ ability to engage with prosecutions against those who wish to do harm.
Holly Lynch
I have heard the Minister’s opening remarks on clause 53 stand part. Only 11% of confirmed victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2020 received discretionary leave. I therefore ask the Minister to make it clear how an individual’s need for leave will be judged under the criteria in the Bill, and to provide us with clear evidence on how he believes that clause 53 is in keeping with the ECAT obligations.
As colleagues are aware, just weeks ago the High Court delivered a significant judgment that foreign national victims of human trafficking should be granted leave to remain, which really requires starting from scratch on these clauses. The ruling came following the case of a 33-year-old Vietnamese national who was coerced into sex work in Vietnam back in 2016, before being trafficked to the UK in the back of a lorry. From November 2016 to 2018 she suffered further exploitation, being forced to work in brothels and cannabis farms. In April 2018, she was identified as a victim of human trafficking. However, as is the case with many victims, she was charged with conspiring to produce cannabis, and was sentenced to 28 months imprisonment. In May 2019, a trafficking assessment was sought once again by her lawyers, to which the Home Office responded that it had no record of her case; she was later placed in immigration detention. It was not until her legal representatives made a further referral that she was finally recognised as a victim. In his judgment, Mr Justice Linden said,
“The effect of the refusal to grant the claimant modern slavery leave is that she is subject to the so-called hostile environment underpinned by the Immigration Act 2014.”
Craig Whittaker
Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked how the clause is compatible with ECAT, and where is the certainty. This measure will clarify in primary legislation the obligations set out in article 14 of the European convention on human rights, and clarify the policy that is currently set out in guidance. This confirms that victims of all ages, including children, who do not have immigration status will automatically be considered for temporary leave. A grant of temporary leave to remain for victims of modern slavery does not prohibit them from being granted another, more advantageous, form of leave, should they qualify for it. It continues to be the core principle of the approach to modern slavery—
Holly Lynch
The Minister refers to a piecemeal approach to extending leave—and extending leave—and extending leave. That is preventing victims from moving on with their recovery, from trusting the agencies and from establishing relationships that will lead to the prosecutions that we all hope for. Since he says that further extensions are likely, could we not reflect on more significant periods of leave being given in a single grant?
Craig Whittaker
I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Debate between Craig Whittaker and Holly LynchTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Craig Whittaker)
Identifying and supporting victims at an early stage is a key part of the Bill, and the new one-stop process. To underpin that process, clause 54 provides for legally aided advice on the national referral mechanism to be provided to individuals who are already receiving legally aided advice on an immigration or asylum matter. The additional advice will be free to the individual.
The provision of legally aided advice under the clause will help the individual’s lawyer to provide holistic advice on the individual’s situation as a whole, looking at the range of protection-related issues, including modern slavery. Advice under the clause will additionally help to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery at an earlier stage. Potential victims of modern slavery will be able to understand what the NRM does and able to make an informed decision as to whether to enter it and obtain the assistance and support provided under it.
The Government are firm in our commitment to identifying and supporting all victims of modern slavery. The clause seeks to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the NRM at the same time as they are receiving advice on an asylum and immigration matter, which will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and supported.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. Clause 54 amends the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable advice on referral into the NRM to be provided as add-on advice where individuals are in receipt of civil legal services for certain immigration and asylum matters. Although I and many other colleagues welcome the fact that the Government have recognised the importance of legal aid as part of the process, we argue that legislating for it only as an add-on misses the opportunity to extend access to all those who would benefit from it—I include the Home Office as one of the main beneficiaries of people having access to proper advocacy and advice from an early stage.
In England and Wales, 63% of the population do not have access to an immigration and asylum legal aid provider, due simply to a lack of provision—what is known as a legal desert. Where there are providers, many are operating beyond capacity. Sadly, it is therefore commonplace for support workers to be unable to find lawyers for clients who are victims of trafficking.
It is not reasonable to expect vulnerable victims to be able to navigate the system without legal representation. It is vital that this is provided at the earliest stage possible. As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out:
“The provision of legal aid to individuals who seek redress is not simply a matter of compassion, but a key component in ensuring the constitutional right of access to justice, itself inherent in the rule of law and an essential precondition of a fair and democratic society. Failure to provide it can amount to a breach of fundamental rights under the common law and/or the European Convention on Human Rights.”
We believe victims deserve better than what is set out before us in the Bill. The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has highlighted how the single competent authority is currently sending out template witness statements as a guide for how they should be prepared. They warn of the legal implications of the document even in the absence of a lawyer. That is unacceptable. I am sure the Minister agrees that it would make for an improved system with more integrity and fewer errors—the very sort of system he proposes—if a broader approach to legal aid was adopted.
It is also fair to argue that access to legal aid remains somewhat of a postcode lottery, with many outside London and the south-east experiencing difficulties in accessing legal assistance. I take this opportunity to highlight the great work of the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit in attempting to widen access, having developed an online referral system for support workers to simplify the process for sourcing legal aid representation. However, it should not fall to organisations such as ATLEU to plug the gaps in the system. We wish to see improved access through this clause.
Similarly, the Government state in the explanatory notes to the Bill that clause 55 is designed to provide an add-on to legal aid on referral to the NRM if the victim has been granted exceptional case funding and is being advised in relation to the claim that their removal from or requirement to leave the UK would breach the Human Rights Act 1998. That means that clause 55 does not provide a route to pre-NRM advice for those who are not already in receipt of legal aid via the scope of another matter, and therefore does not provide free legal aid pre-NRM for all trafficking cases.
In scrutinising these measures, we have worked closely with the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which I thank for having been so generous with its expertise, as I know it is for MPs right across the House, and for providing real-life examples that demonstrate the scale of the issue. It said:
“We assisted the pro bono department of a non-legal aid law firm when they helped a potential survivor apply for exceptional case funding—ECF—in August 2020. The funding was requested in order to provide advice on an NRM referral and associated immigration advice. This application was refused. A request to review the decision was refused. A decision on a second review is pending a final decision from the Legal Aid Agency. One ground of refusal at first review stage was that no decision had yet been made to remove the individual as they had not come forward to the authorities, and if a decision to deport or remove a client from the United Kingdom is made, an application for ECF could be made at that stage. The application remains undecided 13 months after the original submission.”
The system is a mess, Minister. It is the Opposition’s view that free legal aid and advice for potential victims of slavery and trafficking in the UK pre-NRM should not be limited to cases with existing immigration and asylum aspects. Only then will the Government’s offer of legal advice on referral to the NRM work in practice. In summary, the proposals contained within clauses 54 and 55 do not fully address the existing shortcomings in the system—another missed opportunity.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56
Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
The trafficking directive—the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims—was adopted by the UK on 5 April 2011. The Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—is the principal international measure designed to combat human trafficking. The trafficking directive is intended, in part, to give effect to ECAT. ECAT’s objective is to prevent and combat trafficking by imposing obligations on member states to investigate and prosecute trafficking as a serious organised crime and a gross violation of fundamental rights.
Following the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but ECAT remains unaffected. Therefore this Government intend, by means of clause 56, to disapply the trafficking directive in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in the Bill. That will bring legislative certainty to the Bill and how its clauses will apply. It will also provide further clarity to victims about their rights and entitlements.
The Government maintain their commitment to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, as part of the world-leading NRM. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and ECAT, which sets out our international obligations to victims, remain unaffected, as do the UK’s obligations under article 4 of the European convention on human rights.
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on clause 56. The explanatory notes on the clause state that, as the Minister has just outlined,
“the Trafficking Directive should be disapplied in so far as it is incompatible with any provisions in this Bill.”
There are some substantial and quite technical inconsistencies here that need to be worked through, and to do so we have had to enlist legal expertise from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit and others, so I thank them all for their service.
The trafficking directive is part of a suite of measures designed to combat the crime of trafficking. The EU has introduced several legislative measures to strengthen the protection of victims of human trafficking, including the 2011 EU directives on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims of trafficking.
I turn first to the heading of clause 56—“Disapplication of retained EU law deriving from Trafficking Directive”. Subsection (1) refers to
“Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”,
which saved the trafficking directive in domestic law, so that it continued to have effect on or after the UK left the EU at the end of December 2020. However, it has the opposite effect, by stipulating that any
“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures derived from the Trafficking Directive”
that were saved cease to apply,
“so far as their continued existence would otherwise be incompatible with provision made by or under this Act.”
Therefore, our primary concern about clause 56 is that the power to disapply the rights derived from the trafficking directive will cease the rights and remedies available to victims generally as a matter of domestic or EU law that continues in force in the UK.
The world’s largest group of modern slavery researchers, Rights Lab, has argued:
“After eight years of the government’s general position being that the rights under the Trafficking Directive were already in domestic law, the choice to legislate now in the Nationality and Borders Bill—to reduce and restrict rights and entitlements through Part 4 of the Bill—and the presence of the express power to disapply them in the event of an incompatibility with the Bill in Clause 56 is concerning. The government should instead ensure that rights under the Trafficking Directive continue to apply in UK law, by incorporating it, and further, it should incorporate ECAT in domestic law and end the fragmented approach to victim identification, protection, and support.”
The clause will also threaten the Government’s ability to combat the perpetrators of human trafficking, as it will further undermine the response to criminal justice and the rights of victims of trafficking as victims of crime in the victims of crime directive and relevant codes of practice. Additional concerns have been voiced in relation to the rights under the NRM of victim identification and support and non-penalisation. For example, article 8 of the directive provides for the non-prosecution or non-allocation of penalties to victims, and requires the UK to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities that they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to any of the acts referred to in article 2.
Therefore, that directive is clearly threatened by clause 56 and other provisions of part 1 of the Bill, including clause 51, which I appreciate is precisely why this Government want to disapply it. However, I am afraid that that is just the wrong judgment call.
In conclusion, the clause is incompatible—
Craig Whittaker
I am not sure whether the hon. Member is aware that the transition period for this measure finished in January, so in effect it has already been disapplied.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his intervention. We are into the thick of the legal technicalities. These points are from some of the leading legal experts on the subject. They are not entirely satisfied that clause 56 is compatible, and that we are not missing some of the protections that have been hard fought for, with good reason.
In conclusion, the clause is incompatible with the UK’s legal international obligations and will have far-reaching consequences. For that reason, it should not stand part of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
Let me start with amendment 150. I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield Central that his amendment applies to all aspects of age assessments, not only the use of scientific measures. As such, it is extremely broad, although I do not know if that remains his intention.
The Home Office takes its statutory duties towards the welfare of children very seriously. The current age assessment system is desperately in need of reform. We have heard many reports from local authorities about the prevalence of adults posing as children and claiming services designed for children, including accommodation, education and social care. This poses significant risks to the welfare of genuine children in our care system and undermines the integrity of the immigration system. Equally, we need to safeguard vulnerable children from being placed in adult services, although I am not sure I agree with the hon. Member for Sheffield Central when he said that this is headline grabbing.
We must do everything in our power—whatever that is—to safeguard children, including vulnerable and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
Holly Lynch
The Government were less enthusiastic about protecting children under part 4 of the Bill.
Craig Whittaker
I do not think that deserves a response because I do not believe any Member of the House, wherever he or she sits, would advocate that we leave children vulnerable in the system.
One measure we look to pursue is the use of scientific methods, as has been said. Assessing someone’s age is an incredibly difficult task. It is only right that in this complex and sensitive area we seek to improve and expand the evidence base on which decisions can be made. We are aware there are ethical concerns around the use of certain scientific methods for age assessment, which is why new clause 32 includes a number of changes to the Bill to ensure proper safeguards are in place for those who are asked to undergo a scientific age assessment.
First, the Secretary of State may only specify a scientific method of age assessment in regulations once she has sought scientific advice and determined that the method in question is appropriate for assessing a person’s age. I expect that scientific advice to also cover related ethical considerations. Secondly, a scientific method of age assessment will not be performed unless the appropriate consent is given by or on behalf of the individual on whom the method is to be performed. We will be as transparent as possible about the nature and consequences of the specified method where consent is required once an appropriate method has been identified. Thirdly, where a person has reasonable grounds for refusing to undergo a scientific age assessment, they will not be required to undertake one. That decision will not then count against them.