Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Monday 7th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The Minister has used words such as “mercy” and “clemency”, which are fundamentally, in the end, religious words. I would have thought that, to many of the people who run Iran, those words would be intrinsically interesting. I just wonder—if I can put this question to him again—whether it would not be a good idea to ask the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York or maybe the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, to lead a religious delegation to Iran to see whether there might be a way of their asking that the quality of mercy be not strained.

[Dr Murrison]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that suggestion. We discussed this on 17 July when I was here talking about Nazanin. I have to say that it would be a bit of a challenge if any group of people were to act in the way that the hon. Gentleman has described with the Government’s fingerprints all over them. I do not think that would be very helpful. Such a thing has to be truly independent. I would need to stand here at the Dispatch Box with my hand on my heart and say, “Genuinely, this is not something that is Government-inspired or Government-delivered.” But I do know that there are people and organisations that are doing what they can to improve the relationship between this country, and the international community in general, and Iran. I continue to encourage them to do that.

Situation in the Gulf

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hunt]

I am very happy to do that. We have a memorandum of understanding with the Kingdom of Bahrain, and we are incredibly grateful for the support that Bahrain gives us in hosting HMS Jufair. In fact, that is the first permanent naval presence we have had in the middle east since 1935, so opening it last year was a very big step.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I, too, warmly commend the work of the right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Sir Alan Duncan), although I think it is a bit over the top to resign from office just to avoid appearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee tomorrow afternoon.

On a serious point, the UK’s position on Iran has always been subtly different from that of the United States of America, even though it is our closest ally. That is partly because of our historical relations with ancient Persia, but, more importantly, even on the night that George Bush declared Iran a member of the axis of evil, we were actually trying to send an ambassador to Tehran for the first time for many years, and the American position ended up scuppering that. Just how can we make sure, in the coming months, that while we maintain our strong alliance with the United States of America, we still maintain our independence of thought in relation to Iran?

[Mr Hunt]

That is a very fair question. The truth is that we have to do that by being very frank with the Trump Administration when we disagree with them and about why we disagree with them. I think that, under the surface, the positions are a bit closer than they might look in the simple sense that I have actually had a number of conversations with President Trump himself about his concerns about what would happen if that region became nuclearised. I do not think the United States is indifferent to the nuclear threat in that region, and it has started to talk a lot about that recently. We use our influence, I suppose in private circles, as much as we can to try to get a meeting of minds.

Persecution of Christians Overseas

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friends the Members for Croydon South (Chris Philp) and for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and to the hon. Members for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and for Glasgow East (David Linden) for securing the debate. The Minister for the Middle East, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), would have liked very much to be here to respond to the debate, but he is currently engaged in a parallel debate, so the honour falls to me.

I am grateful for the contributions of all Members. This really has been a most dignified and passionate debate. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Strangford. I have only a day or two left as a Minister—by choice; or perhaps, anyway—and I have to say that in my three years as a Foreign Office Minister, I have responded to many, many Westminster Hall debates, and without exception, when any topic involving human rights, religion, persecution of international justice is being discussed, the hon. Gentleman has been unfailingly present. I shall miss him, if not all Westminster Hall debates.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

You can still turn up.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Thank you for the offer. There are not many saints in this House, but the hon. Gentleman is about as close as anyone gets to being one.

On Monday 8 July, the Foreign Secretary welcomed the publication of the Bishop of Truro’s independent review of the persecution of Christians worldwide, and I would like now to set out in more detail the response of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The world is an increasingly challenging place for people of faith, and in some parts of the world for those of no faith. In the past two years, appalling atrocities, as we have heard today, have been committed against the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and the horrific shootings in two Christchurch mosques shocked us all, but there are so many other stories of suffering that gain far less news coverage, and the statistics tell us, as we have heard again today, that Christians suffer more persecution than any other religious group in the world, yet we hear far less about this than one would expect. We are too reticent about discussing Christian persecution, and we must overcome this mindset; the evidence justifies a much louder voice.

As the Bishop of Truro states in the introduction to his review, the majority of Christians are found in the global south and among the global poor, and the review takes case studies from China, India, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, where persecution stems from state oppression, terrorism and ethnic or nationalist conflict. As Christianity is perhaps the most truly global of religions, the persecution of Christians often indicates wider violations of the rights of all minority groups, and the report notes the large body of evidence for this. In some places the persecution of Christians is closely linked with poverty and social exclusion, and elsewhere it is compounded by discrimination against women, so increasing the attention given to Christian persecution does not dull but sharpen our focus on human rights for all.

Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Wednesday 17th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. I do not anticipate moving—touch wood—and she can be absolutely sure that this issue is right at the top of my list of priorities. Like the Vicar of Bray, come what may I hope very much that I will be here ensuring that this remains absolutely top priority, along with other dual national cases. For the reasons I have described, this case has particular poignancy, and the hon. Lady can be sure that I will continue to do what I can with my Iranian interlocutors to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I am not sure that the Vicar of Bray is the right person to cite, because he changed his religion whenever the regime changed, as I remember it, and the Minister has proved himself so far to be remarkably measured and sensible in everything he has said today.

Despite all the human rights abuses in Iran, the truth is that Islam at its best can be a religion of phenomenal humanity, generosity and magnanimity, and I think that is what we are hoping for at the moment, is it not? I just wonder whether there are not other envoys that we might send from this country—perhaps from the Church or on an interfaith basis—who might be able to speak of that humanity, compassion and magnanimity and be able to bring about the result that we all earnestly hope for.

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman is far better qualified to talk about the Vicar of Bray than I am—

[Chris Bryant]

I’m sure that’s a compliment.

[Dr Murrison]

Believe me, it is a compliment; I am paying the hon. Gentleman a compliment, noting his previous occupation. He makes a serious suggestion that is worth considering by all involved in this case. We have lost no opportunity to raise these dual national cases with those to whom we have been given access, at ministerial level and other levels, over the course of this sorry saga, and we will continue to do so. Of course, people need to articulate their concerns, and that is not confined to Ministers. National leaders of various sorts have commented on this case, and if they used any influence they can with their contacts in Tehran, that would be a very positive thing. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion.

Resignation of UK Ambassador to USA

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, I have confidence in the system; what has happened here is that somebody has abused it. The inquiry is under way, and I hope the House will understand that it is probably unhelpful to give a running commentary on what it might have found from one day to another, but it is going ahead very fully. As I and others have said in this House, if it turns out that we find the culprit and they have broken the law, the police may well become involved and there may well be criminal proceedings.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

This is a truly exceptional moment: not for 175 years has the Head of State of a nation friendly to the United Kingdom said that they would refuse to deal with a British envoy sent by the British state. This is behaving worse than Chavez’s Venezuela, which would never have done such thing; it is behaving worse than Iran. And to be honest the concatenation of events has humiliated this country. I want to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States of America, but I also want to stand shoulder to shoulder first with our Foreign Office diplomats, and for that matter with our Prime Minister, who has been humiliated directly by the United States President. When we are appointing a new ambassador to the United States of America in these truly exceptional moments, will the Minister make sure that the candidates for that post appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee so that this House can take a view?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that this is unprecedented. I do not think that this has ever happened before. As the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East said, a lot of these codes of conduct and assumed rules of the game are rather being turned on their head. This means that the normal process of diplomacy has become extraordinarily complicated by such trends in the world. The normal responses and expected reactions have to be crafted differently in circumstances such as this. In that sense, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. In terms of having approval hearings before his Committee, of course I cannot give that guarantee—

[Chris Bryant]

Go on!

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I see that he is trying to entice me to do so. I can but say that the appointment process will be of the sort that has taken place in the past.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his words. He points out what is evident to anybody who visited Washington when Sir Kim was ambassador. There was a very cheerful team and a great esprit de corps. He was very popular, and there were very good parties, which I hope will continue.

[Chris Bryant]

If you’re invited.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, I hope I am allowed back. Sir Kim was absolutely excellent.

The other thing my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale (David Morris) allows me to point out is that one of the great tragedies of this is that the leaked communications were not at all representative of the tenor of the vast majority of those emanating from Washington. If the President were able to read them, I think he would have been perfectly happy.

UK Ambassador to USA: Leaked Emails

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I certainly condemn the leaker, and I certainly back our ambassador and his entire team in what is an excellent embassy. I very much hope that this causes no upset. I imagine that some of the reports from the US embassy in London will be saying some quite interesting things about the state of our politics. That will not necessarily represent the view of the ambassador or the US Administration; it will be people reporting from post back to the capital about what they think is going on. That is what they are there to do.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The Foreign Office simply cannot function or do its job properly on behalf of all of us unless a confidentiality guarantee is written into the whole fundamental system. In the 1930s, the British ambassador in Berlin regularly reported back in a way that sought to please the Prime Minister here, as well as the Führer in Germany. Is it not absolutely vital that all our ambassadors and high commissioners around the world are certain that their job is to tell the truth, not only about the country in which they are resident, but to Ministers here, whatever those Ministers may think?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who, of course, has experience as a Foreign Minister, so he knows this process very well. It is not the purpose of an ambassador to ingratiate themselves with anybody; they are there to tell the truth, and it benefits everybody when they do, but leaks of this sort make that more difficult. I very much hope that our ambassador to Washington will not in any way feel browbeaten by the media onslaught. He has the full support of every single person in this House of Commons.

Hong Kong

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes. In addition to one country, two systems, the same principles about the rule of law that we would apply here should apply in Hong Kong—that is, that peaceful protest is legitimate and violence is something that we condemn. We can quite understand the grievance felt, and the millions of people who have been taking to the streets show the intensity of that opinion, but in order to be effective protesters must, in their own interests, stick to peaceful protests and not allow a small number of people to destroy the credibility of their actions.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Behind the specifics of this incident, is there not a bigger, wider and more problematic concern, which is that the Chinese Communist party is fearful of losing its grip on its people? That is why it is tightening its grip—squeezing harder and harder—and Hong Kong is just a tiny aspect of that. Is there not an irony in the fact that China is trying to argue in favour of the rule of law when it constantly flouts the rule of law around the world, even though Hong Kong has done China proud over the last 50 years?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

There is, of course, ample scope for analysing what is going on in Hong Kong within the broader question of what is happening in China and what role China wishes to play within China itself and across the world more widely, so the hon. Gentleman’s question is a valid one. However, with regards to the specific question we are addressing today, we should keep our focus on trying to de-escalate tension in Hong Kong itself so that a path forward can be mapped out for the benefit of everybody there.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hunt]

Absolutely. I think that what happens in Hong Kong is, for us all, a litmus test of the direction of travel that China goes in, because we had an internationally binding agreement signed in 1984 that Britain feels very, very strongly about. It is, as my hon. Friend rightly says, at the heart of Hong Kong’s economic success as well as its political freedom.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Is not the real problem that although the Chief Executive may not directly take her orders from Beijing, she often looks over her shoulder to find out what the Communist party of China is saying? Is not the fundamental truth that in the end one can repress human freedom for a while but one cannot finally quash it?

[Mr Hunt]

The hon. Gentleman puts it beautifully; he is absolutely right. Whatever the pressure that may or may not be exerted on the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, what works in Hong Kong at the moment is that the judiciary is independent, and that must not change.

Russia (Sanctions) (EU-Exit) Regulations 2019

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 General Committees

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 855).

Hon. Members will be aware—not least following our recent discussions about other sanctions regulations—of the importance of sanctions to our foreign policy and national security, and of the Government’s commitment to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. I therefore do not intend to rehearse the same arguments today, although I am happy to do so if hon. Members wish.

Colleagues will also be aware that statutory instruments such as the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations are necessary to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within the framework of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. As required under the Act, a report on the purposes of the regulations and the penalties in them is available in the Vote Office in case hon. Members have an interest.

Under regulation 1(3), the provisions to allow designation decisions to be taken commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April; since the time at which they would come into force was not specified, there was a period on that day when the regulations were in force but had not been laid. Regrettably, owing to an administrative oversight compounded by the Easter break, we did not meet the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speaker and the Lord Speaker of that pre-laying commencement until eight working days after the regulations were laid.

I have written to Mr Speaker, the Lord Speaker, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of my letter has been placed in the Library. We have reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that this will not happen again.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I recall that barely an hour ago, when the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs asked the Minister why the regulations had been laid before Parliament so late, he chose not to mention any of this. Why not?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thought that it would be much more appropriate to mention it to this Committee, out of respect for the House more widely—something that the hon. Gentleman and I always take pains to display. Once again, I thank the JCSI for its close and helpful scrutiny over recent months of so many statutory instruments relating to sanctions.

The regulations provide for the transfer into UK law of the three existing EU sanctions regimes against Russia in respect of Russian actions in Ukraine. They seek to deliver substantially the same policy effect as the measures in the corresponding EU regimes—to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions, to press it to change its Ukraine policy and to end its illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The measures include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities; sectoral measures to restrict parts of Russia’s finance, energy and defence industry; and restrictions on trade and investment relating to Crimea.

The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong, unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. Approving the regulations will ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Russia from the date of EU exit. During the period of our membership of the EU, or the implementation period in the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply and the regulations would not immediately be needed. In those circumstances, we would seek to use powers in the 2018 Act to the fullest possible extent, but there would be some limitations on the measures that we could impose autonomously during that period.

I know that in the light of the Russian Magnitsky case, many hon. Members are keen for the UK to develop our own independent human rights sanctions regime, so they may query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law. That is because this statutory instrument has been laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures. I assure everyone that the 2018 Act does indeed give the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, it is important to recognise that that cannot be done immediately. It would be the first UK national sanctions regime, so the legal and policy risks must be carefully scrutinised, and the correct processes must be put in place to ensure that it delivers the desired effect, while avoiding any unintended consequences.

This statutory instrument provides for the transfer into UK law of well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. It encourages respect for the rule of law, for the rules-based international order and for security and stability. Approving this statutory instrument will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions against Russia from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

It is a delight to sit under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie, even though we are in the gloomiest of Committee Rooms in the building. Just a minor point: one of the problems for disabled access in this building is that many people who are partially sighted find it very difficult to read papers in such a room. I hope one day we will be able to sort that out.

I wholly support the sanctions, as the Minister suggested. Indeed, I want to praise the Government of the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for having been such an ardent advocate of sanctions on Russia. Several people from other countries who have been to Foreign Affairs Councils during her time have told me that had it not been for her strong argument at those meetings in favour of maintaining sanctions, they would have been dropped by now. I am not sure whether it is because of her experience as a former Home Secretary that she is particularly conscious of the pernicious influence that sometimes Russian foreign policy can have elsewhere in the world, and in particular in the UK, or whether it is for some other reason, but I do want to laud the role that the Government have played in that.

I have an anxiety for the future, that if Brexit does ever happen, when we are no longer sitting at the table it will be more difficult for the UK Government to secure the kind of sanctions regime for France, Germany and other members of the European Union that we would want them to advocate, and we may find ourselves standing rather alone. That may well be a worrying situation for us in the future.

It is undoubtedly true that the Russian state’s deliberate annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine—I do not think there is any doubt that that was done deliberately by the Russian state; although they pretended to be independent forces of some kind, they were to all intents and purposes operating under Russian military command—was an illegal annexation and would not have happened had it not been for Ukraine’s surrendering its nuclear weapons as a result of the Budapest accord, of which the UK was a signatory, and of which Putin himself was a signatory, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

However, I have some anxieties about the way that this statutory instrument has come forward. First, it was laid on 11 April. This SI was meant to meet the problem, had we fallen out of the EU on 29 March without having a new sanctions regime in place because there was no deal. It seems odd that it should not have been laid until 11 April, even though it was meant to meet a need for 29 March. I know there was a second deadline, which was 12 April, and I presume that is what led to the rather strange rush at the final moment. Now we are having another rush, because presumably the Government expect that at any moment something will transpire in the Brexit negotiations that will lead to some change in the situation governing our being kept permanently in aspic or in suspended animation in the House.

It feels as though these mistakes in timing are a result of a lack of capacity in the sanctions section of the Foreign Office. As I understand it, the sanctions team consists of 40 people at the Foreign Office. Reading between the lines from the note that has been sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee, I suspect that that is insufficient to be able to do the job properly. Ministers have said several times—I do not doubt the sincerity of the Minister with us today—that it is a bit difficult to get a new sanctions regime all lined up and put together, because there is so much other business to be got through. I see sanctions policy as an absolutely vital part of our foreign policy. It is one of the key parts of our toolbox—alongside diplomacy, defence and other soft power measures—in trying to secure our foreign policy aims. I hope the Minister can respond on whether there is sufficient capacity and whether that led to the hiccup.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland said, the key question is whether we can have an independent, autonomous sanctions regime while we are a member of the European Union or during a transition period—if the withdrawal agreement is ever agreed. My hon. Friend referred to the advice by two QCs that makes it very clear that, in their opinion, it is perfectly possible for us to have an independent sanctions regime; if we wanted to, we could draw up anything we wanted while we are still a member, or during a transition period.

As I understand it, the Government’s policy is that that is not the case. The Minister said that an autonomous and independent sanctions regime cannot be introduced immediately and can only happen once we have left the European Union. I presume that is the meaning of paragraph 6.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which says:

“The UK’s implementation of UN and other multilateral sanctions currently relies largely on the European Communities Act 1972.”

The Government’s argument seems to be that we cannot implement any form of sanctions policy.

I believe the Government are wrong, but it seems that they are in doubt as to whether that is the case. If I am right and the Government are wrong, I do not understand why the sanctions measures before us today do not include the Magnitsky measures to enforce sanctions against human rights abusers in other countries in the world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland rightly states, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 does not refer to an implementation date of Brexit day, and the Government have to report by the end of this month on the Magnitsky provisions in that Act. Since they have to report to Parliament, that means they have to do so before we rise next Thursday, 23 May. At the moment they have not done anything about those provisions, so I presume that the Government will present a sort of nil return. Will the Minister confirm what he said previously in the Foreign Affairs Committee on that?

I would prefer us to be implementing far more substantial measures. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have a list of 49 people who have sanctions against them under the Magnitsky provisions in their nation states. I do not understand why we cannot simply do the same.

Finally, the Government will be reporting annually on each of the sanctions regimes such as this one that they are starting. What form will those reports take? Will there be an opportunity for debate when they are tabled?

I very much hope that the Government will make it as clear as possible that, while they may feel legally constrained, they would none the less like to implement further sanctions regimes as soon as possible.

[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister to sum up, I would tell the Committee, in response to the question from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland earlier, that should this question be called to a Division, and should the noes have it, that would simply confirm that the Committee has not considered that which we are now considering, but it would not stop the ability of this matter to be put as a question on the Floor of the House later this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Procedurally, the hon. Lady is right. If it were to be voted down there would remain a danger that there could be a lacuna or a hiatus in which there were no extant Russian sanctions. She mentioned Magnitsky: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have Magnitsky-lite, as it were. Their regimes only include travel bans, whereas the provisions in the primary legislation passed by us—with great cross-party approval—would allow for much more, once the Magnitsky provisions are put in place. We intend to do that. The hon. Member for Rhondda has pointed out—fairly—that our sanctions team are working very hard. Indeed they are. They are an excellent team and I am glad to take this opportunity to say so and put it on the record. But they have a massive rush of SIs. It is not just the number of them going through this House; it is the enormous body of work that goes on beneath the bits of paper we then end up with here. It totally absorbs the 40 people in the team who work so hard. When they do it, we will bring forward a Magnitsky SI.

[Chris Bryant]

I am glad to hear that. On the travel ban issue, I do not understand why, in the UK, we cannot simply state that anybody involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky or the corruption unveiled by him is not welcome in this country and will be banned from entry. That is what the three Baltic countries have done. Why can we not do that?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is not for me to speak on behalf of the Home Office. There may well be provisions in law for them to be able to do that, should they so wish. Again, that is a broader Home Office issue rather than a Foreign Office matter for this Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister says that the immigration and travel ban situation is not a matter for him. In his own sanctions, it states in section 20 of part 4, “Immigration”, that a person

“who is designated under regulation 5 for the purposes of this regulation is an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971”.

His own sanctions regime includes provisions around travel bans, but not in relation to Magnitsky.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, but the instrument transposes existing EU sanctions regimes; it does not add to or amend them. The process has been to transpose as identically as possible the EU regimes into what will be our law when we leave.

It is clear that the sanctions have been working in broad ways. There are massive economic pressures on Russia, and we should not think that they are not causing concern among those who govern that country. Sanctions are an integral part of our response to some of the most important foreign policy challenges that we face.

We must be ready to deliver sanctions independently as soon as we leave the EU. That is why the SI is so important. Transposing EU sanctions regimes in this way puts the UK on a solid footing to continue to protect our interests, defend our values and maintain the position of leadership that we have built on sanctions since 2014. Once again, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put.

Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 General Committees

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 855).

Hon. Members will be aware—not least following our recent discussions about other sanctions regulations—of the importance of sanctions to our foreign policy and national security, and of the Government’s commitment to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. I therefore do not intend to rehearse the same arguments today, although I am happy to do so if hon. Members wish.

Colleagues will also be aware that statutory instruments such as the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations are necessary to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within the framework of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. As required under the Act, a report on the purposes of the regulations and the penalties in them is available in the Vote Office in case hon. Members have an interest.

Under regulation 1(3), the provisions to allow designation decisions to be taken commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April; since the time at which they would come into force was not specified, there was a period on that day when the regulations were in force but had not been laid. Regrettably, owing to an administrative oversight compounded by the Easter break, we did not meet the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speaker and the Lord Speaker of that pre-laying commencement until eight working days after the regulations were laid.

I have written to Mr Speaker, the Lord Speaker, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of my letter has been placed in the Library. We have reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that this will not happen again.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I recall that barely an hour ago, when the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs asked the Minister why the regulations had been laid before Parliament so late, he chose not to mention any of this. Why not?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thought that it would be much more appropriate to mention it to this Committee, out of respect for the House more widely—something that the hon. Gentleman and I always take pains to display. Once again, I thank the JCSI for its close and helpful scrutiny over recent months of so many statutory instruments relating to sanctions.

The regulations provide for the transfer into UK law of the three existing EU sanctions regimes against Russia in respect of Russian actions in Ukraine. They seek to deliver substantially the same policy effect as the measures in the corresponding EU regimes—to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions, to press it to change its Ukraine policy and to end its illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The measures include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities; sectoral measures to restrict parts of Russia’s finance, energy and defence industry; and restrictions on trade and investment relating to Crimea.

The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong, unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. Approving the regulations will ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Russia from the date of EU exit. During the period of our membership of the EU, or the implementation period in the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply and the regulations would not immediately be needed. In those circumstances, we would seek to use powers in the 2018 Act to the fullest possible extent, but there would be some limitations on the measures that we could impose autonomously during that period.

I know that in the light of the Russian Magnitsky case, many hon. Members are keen for the UK to develop our own independent human rights sanctions regime, so they may query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law. That is because this statutory instrument has been laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures. I assure everyone that the 2018 Act does indeed give the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, it is important to recognise that that cannot be done immediately. It would be the first UK national sanctions regime, so the legal and policy risks must be carefully scrutinised, and the correct processes must be put in place to ensure that it delivers the desired effect, while avoiding any unintended consequences.

This statutory instrument provides for the transfer into UK law of well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. It encourages respect for the rule of law, for the rules-based international order and for security and stability. Approving this statutory instrument will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions against Russia from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

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[Chris Bryant]

It is a delight to sit under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie, even though we are in the gloomiest of Committee Rooms in the building. Just a minor point: one of the problems for disabled access in this building is that many people who are partially sighted find it very difficult to read papers in such a room. I hope one day we will be able to sort that out.

I wholly support the sanctions, as the Minister suggested. Indeed, I want to praise the Government of the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for having been such an ardent advocate of sanctions on Russia. Several people from other countries who have been to Foreign Affairs Councils during her time have told me that had it not been for her strong argument at those meetings in favour of maintaining sanctions, they would have been dropped by now. I am not sure whether it is because of her experience as a former Home Secretary that she is particularly conscious of the pernicious influence that sometimes Russian foreign policy can have elsewhere in the world, and in particular in the UK, or whether it is for some other reason, but I do want to laud the role that the Government have played in that.

I have an anxiety for the future, that if Brexit does ever happen, when we are no longer sitting at the table it will be more difficult for the UK Government to secure the kind of sanctions regime for France, Germany and other members of the European Union that we would want them to advocate, and we may find ourselves standing rather alone. That may well be a worrying situation for us in the future.

It is undoubtedly true that the Russian state’s deliberate annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine—I do not think there is any doubt that that was done deliberately by the Russian state; although they pretended to be independent forces of some kind, they were to all intents and purposes operating under Russian military command—was an illegal annexation and would not have happened had it not been for Ukraine’s surrendering its nuclear weapons as a result of the Budapest accord, of which the UK was a signatory, and of which Putin himself was a signatory, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

However, I have some anxieties about the way that this statutory instrument has come forward. First, it was laid on 11 April. This SI was meant to meet the problem, had we fallen out of the EU on 29 March without having a new sanctions regime in place because there was no deal. It seems odd that it should not have been laid until 11 April, even though it was meant to meet a need for 29 March. I know there was a second deadline, which was 12 April, and I presume that is what led to the rather strange rush at the final moment. Now we are having another rush, because presumably the Government expect that at any moment something will transpire in the Brexit negotiations that will lead to some change in the situation governing our being kept permanently in aspic or in suspended animation in the House.

It feels as though these mistakes in timing are a result of a lack of capacity in the sanctions section of the Foreign Office. As I understand it, the sanctions team consists of 40 people at the Foreign Office. Reading between the lines from the note that has been sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee, I suspect that that is insufficient to be able to do the job properly. Ministers have said several times—I do not doubt the sincerity of the Minister with us today—that it is a bit difficult to get a new sanctions regime all lined up and put together, because there is so much other business to be got through. I see sanctions policy as an absolutely vital part of our foreign policy. It is one of the key parts of our toolbox—alongside diplomacy, defence and other soft power measures—in trying to secure our foreign policy aims. I hope the Minister can respond on whether there is sufficient capacity and whether that led to the hiccup.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland said, the key question is whether we can have an independent, autonomous sanctions regime while we are a member of the European Union or during a transition period—if the withdrawal agreement is ever agreed. My hon. Friend referred to the advice by two QCs that makes it very clear that, in their opinion, it is perfectly possible for us to have an independent sanctions regime; if we wanted to, we could draw up anything we wanted while we are still a member, or during a transition period.

As I understand it, the Government’s policy is that that is not the case. The Minister said that an autonomous and independent sanctions regime cannot be introduced immediately and can only happen once we have left the European Union. I presume that is the meaning of paragraph 6.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which says:

“The UK’s implementation of UN and other multilateral sanctions currently relies largely on the European Communities Act 1972.”

The Government’s argument seems to be that we cannot implement any form of sanctions policy.

I believe the Government are wrong, but it seems that they are in doubt as to whether that is the case. If I am right and the Government are wrong, I do not understand why the sanctions measures before us today do not include the Magnitsky measures to enforce sanctions against human rights abusers in other countries in the world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland rightly states, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 does not refer to an implementation date of Brexit day, and the Government have to report by the end of this month on the Magnitsky provisions in that Act. Since they have to report to Parliament, that means they have to do so before we rise next Thursday, 23 May. At the moment they have not done anything about those provisions, so I presume that the Government will present a sort of nil return. Will the Minister confirm what he said previously in the Foreign Affairs Committee on that?

I would prefer us to be implementing far more substantial measures. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have a list of 49 people who have sanctions against them under the Magnitsky provisions in their nation states. I do not understand why we cannot simply do the same.

Finally, the Government will be reporting annually on each of the sanctions regimes such as this one that they are starting. What form will those reports take? Will there be an opportunity for debate when they are tabled?

I very much hope that the Government will make it as clear as possible that, while they may feel legally constrained, they would none the less like to implement further sanctions regimes as soon as possible.

[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister to sum up, I would tell the Committee, in response to the question from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland earlier, that should this question be called to a Division, and should the noes have it, that would simply confirm that the Committee has not considered that which we are now considering, but it would not stop the ability of this matter to be put as a question on the Floor of the House later this evening.

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[Sir Alan Duncan]

Procedurally, the hon. Lady is right. If it were to be voted down there would remain a danger that there could be a lacuna or a hiatus in which there were no extant Russian sanctions. She mentioned Magnitsky: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have Magnitsky-lite, as it were. Their regimes only include travel bans, whereas the provisions in the primary legislation passed by us—with great cross-party approval—would allow for much more, once the Magnitsky provisions are put in place. We intend to do that. The hon. Member for Rhondda has pointed out—fairly—that our sanctions team are working very hard. Indeed they are. They are an excellent team and I am glad to take this opportunity to say so and put it on the record. But they have a massive rush of SIs. It is not just the number of them going through this House; it is the enormous body of work that goes on beneath the bits of paper we then end up with here. It totally absorbs the 40 people in the team who work so hard. When they do it, we will bring forward a Magnitsky SI.

[Chris Bryant]

I am glad to hear that. On the travel ban issue, I do not understand why, in the UK, we cannot simply state that anybody involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky or the corruption unveiled by him is not welcome in this country and will be banned from entry. That is what the three Baltic countries have done. Why can we not do that?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is not for me to speak on behalf of the Home Office. There may well be provisions in law for them to be able to do that, should they so wish. Again, that is a broader Home Office issue rather than a Foreign Office matter for this Committee.

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[Chris Bryant]

The Minister says that the immigration and travel ban situation is not a matter for him. In his own sanctions, it states in section 20 of part 4, “Immigration”, that a person

“who is designated under regulation 5 for the purposes of this regulation is an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971”.

His own sanctions regime includes provisions around travel bans, but not in relation to Magnitsky.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, but the instrument transposes existing EU sanctions regimes; it does not add to or amend them. The process has been to transpose as identically as possible the EU regimes into what will be our law when we leave.

It is clear that the sanctions have been working in broad ways. There are massive economic pressures on Russia, and we should not think that they are not causing concern among those who govern that country. Sanctions are an integral part of our response to some of the most important foreign policy challenges that we face.

We must be ready to deliver sanctions independently as soon as we leave the EU. That is why the SI is so important. Transposing EU sanctions regimes in this way puts the UK on a solid footing to continue to protect our interests, defend our values and maintain the position of leadership that we have built on sanctions since 2014. Once again, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put.