Leaving the EU

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We are putting forward the facilitated customs arrangement for the future as part of the negotiations for the plan for the future relationship.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I say to my right hon. Friend how much we are looking forward to the publication of the White Paper on Thursday? Will she undertake to publish the White Paper that was set aside—the White Paper that was months in drafting by DExEU under the leadership of my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) ?

[The Prime Minister]

The White Paper that we publish on Thursday will be based on the work that has been done by DExEU over recent weeks and will of course reflect the decision taken by the Cabinet on Friday.

Advisory Committee on Business Appointments

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Thirteenth Report of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC 252, Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action, on the role and effectiveness of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA); notes that ACoBA regulates applications for business appointments by former Ministers and civil servants who have recently left the public sector; believes that ACoBA is an ineffectual regulator which fails to inspire public confidence or respect; expresses concern that the Committee’s inquiry revealed numerous gaps in ACoBA’s monitoring process with insufficient attention paid to the principles that should govern business appointments; agrees that failures of consecutive governments to address ACoBA’s deficiencies have damaged public trust in politics and public institutions and led to repeated scandals; calls on the Government to bring forward major reform by introducing a principles-based system to ensure that individuals act with integrity and behave according to those principles; and further calls on the Government to fund independent checks by ACoBA across all Government departments and executive agencies to reinforce those principles.

It is the role of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to oversee the UK’s changing constitution and the efficiency of the civil service and the machinery of government. Within that, PACAC covers matters of ethics and propriety in Whitehall, overseeing the work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the ministerial code, the special advisers code, the civil service code and the work of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, which oversees the rules governing departing Ministers and Crown servants when they take up outside appointments. PACAC has defined its overriding purpose, to quote from our website:

“to conduct robust and effective scrutiny in order to help create conditions where the public can have justified confidence in public services/government.”

In that context, just before the election, PACAC published a new report on ACoBA, entitled “Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action”.

In this House we do not work for ourselves. Our system of government relies on the principle that we who are intertwined with power act only when it is in the public and national interest. The vast majority of public servants do their best, and I certainly understand that. The business appointment rules exist to prevent the conflicts of interest that can arise when former Ministers, special advisers or officials—especially those with high-level Government experience—are looking to take up appointments in the private sector. I am afraid that there are rightly public concerns when senior officials move directly into sectors over which they had until recently had control and influence, including suspicions that the decisions they took may have been influenced by the hope or expectation of future employment or that a future employer could use official information that they had access to.

The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments—or ACoBA, as it is known for short—is appointed by the Government to advise on the implementation of these rules. The ministerial code requires former Ministers, for two years after leaving office, to consult ACoBA about any employment or consultancy they are looking to take up. ACoBA may recommend that an individual wait for up to two years before taking up a specific appointment, or that they do not undertake types of work falling into specific categories up to the two-year limit. However, the business rules themselves are largely procedural: they do not make explicit when or how former Ministers or officials can or cannot legitimately make use of their prior experience.

In 2014, the rules were updated so that only officials at director general, or equivalent, and above now need to apply to ACoBA. Senior grades below that level are now managed by individual Departments and agencies. There was also a change to retrospective applications, which are no longer accepted. Having to make a decision after a contract had been signed and an appointment taken up was seen as a possible constraint on ACoBA’s scope to advise, because how could it advise on something that had already happened? The updated rules also allowed Departments to continue to pay former officials and special advisers who are required to observe a quarantine period before taking up their new roles. ACoBA has stated that whether or not this pay is available, it will not affect its decision.

PACAC, which I chair, has concluded that ACoBA is a “toothless regulator”. There are serious problems with the system as it currently operates. A number of these problems are institutional, deriving from ACoBA’s structure and the practical realities of how it must function. I wish to make it absolutely clear in this debate that I am not making any personal criticism of the chair or any members of ACoBA. The committee comprises both political appointments and independent members. However, despite Baroness Browning, its chair, telling PACAC that she wanted

“every bus driver and hairdresser…to apply”

to be an independent member of ACoBA, its composition remains dominated by the great and the good. This is unsurprising given that the criteria for the role include senior level experience in the civil service, the military or business, which is hardly something possessed by most bus drivers or hairdressers. Furthermore, independent members also hold senior posts in the sorts of companies in which those applying to ACoBA may well be seeking to gain employment. There are notable examples of when these independent members have failed to recuse themselves, despite what would appear to be obvious conflicts of interest when considering cases.

Moreover, for lower grades of civil servant—their applications are managed not by ACoBA, but by their own Departments or agencies—what is known as the revolving door is essentially self-regulating. It is not impossible that civil servants, knowing any precedent they set by judging on a particular case might have an impact on their later careers, could unintentionally or otherwise approve appointments that perhaps deserved more scrutiny. However, civil servants in lower grades can still have significant influence in areas where potential conflicts of interest could arise, such as policy development or procurement decisions. Some may have had senior responsible owner roles, where they have taken responsibility for the management of substantial projects with sizeable budgets, and the private sector finds such experience very valuable. With the increasing interchange between Whitehall Departments and the private sector, this problem is growing.

Putting the problems of scope and propriety to one side, ACoBA simply lacks the powers to allow it to do its job effectively. As the advisory part of its name suggests, ACoBA cannot prevent an individual taking up an appointment, and it has no power to sanction anyone who ignores its recommendations. It makes a recommendation only when an appointment has been accepted, and does not make ex ante stipulations about the types of employment an individual may or may not engage in. It therefore relies on individuals coming to it for advice or with an application. It has very little capacity to investigate those who do not do so or to monitor non-compliance. We were told that ACoBA found that LinkedIn was a more comprehensive source of the employment histories of former officials than the disclosures of those officials themselves.

With resources failing to keep pace with ACoBA’s increased caseload, this embarrassing state of affairs is unlikely to change, meaning that a body intended to improve public trust in government will have to continue to trawl social media for vital information. Evidence shows that ACoBA is simply not being taken seriously. Frequently, applicants have taken up their role before ACoBA has considered their case and made any recommendations, and sometimes these recommendations are simply ignored. We were told that too many former Ministers and officials viewed ACoBA as a rubber stamp before pursuing a lucrative corporate career that might be perceived to conflict with their previous public responsibilities.

Departments take responsibility for those below ACoBA’s threshold, but we were told that monitoring was inconsistent and some agencies failed to publish the required data completely. There is evidence that this can result in too close a relationship between certain Departments and the companies working in related industries. Freedom of information requests in 2012 found that more than 3,500 former senior military officers and Ministry of Defence officials had been approved for arms company jobs since 1996. There might be nothing intrinsically wrong with those appointments, but the failure to have any sanction over them results in a lack of public confidence.

In the absence of a robust system of regulation, high-profile cases, such as that of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, threaten public confidence in the integrity of government. I make no comment about Mr Osborne, but after leaving government he accepted a post with the BlackRock Investment Institute, part of the investment management company the BlackRock Investment Group. As Chancellor, he had had contact with BlackRock and its competitors in the field. Significantly, as Chancellor, he had introduced the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014, which materially benefited BlackRock.

Our report made no comment on Mr Osborne’s conduct, except to document that he had taken up the appointment, but it raises questions about how effective the system of regulation is, because it does not inspire public confidence. He complied with the business appointment rules for former Ministers, and ACoBA considered his case, but because the current process commands so little confidence, its decision to approve the appointment has been questioned, and it has done little to enhance his reputation to have ACoBA as a protection. Among Mr Osborne’s other post-ministerial appointments is his editorship of the Evening Standard, a position he accepted without waiting for ACoBA to reach a decision at all. This might have been for perfectly understandable reasons.

Our report made a number of recommendations that would improve the confidence ACoBA commands but crucially without recourse to a statutory system. These related to the availability of data for those below the threshold for ACoBA review, the transparency of the lobbying process and the need for ACoBA to be adequately resourced. Crucially, underpinning all this, we concluded that there needed to be a clear statement of values and a clear setting out of principles to be talked about, taught and discussed, to inform and guide behaviour and to make it clear when behaviour falls below those standards.

I am very disappointed that in their response the Government rejected all but some minor procedural recommendations and even denied the seriousness of the problems we are confronting in the House of Commons today. We agreed with ACoBA when it said there should be a single collated list of decisions taken by Departments and agencies so that at least the self-regulated departmental aspect might be more exposed to public view. The Government rejected even this minor suggestion.

PACAC—and before it the Public Administration Select Committee—has returned to the subject of ACoBA and will keep returning to it, because the system remains ineffective and fails to command public confidence. The problems it is supposed to address have only escalated over this period. Governments have failed to address our concerns and public trust in the system has continued to decline. To restore public trust, it is crucial to stamp out not only impropriety by senior Ministers and officials, but the appearance of impropriety. ACoBA, although well intentioned, lacks the resources and structures to achieve that.

I hope the Government will pay attention to this. I do understand that this is a very difficult matter to address. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, I believe, should be having a look at this. As the Government consider the appointment of the Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life—I may have a role in that —I hope that it will be made clear to the new Chair that this is an issue that should be looked at. Perhaps the Committee on Standards in Public Life will conclude, in the same way as the Government, that there is no need for any significant change, but I think the matter deserves scrutiny.

One detects a kind of squeamishness in Whitehall among Ministers and senior officials, whom this question directly affects because they will soon, in their careers, be leaving public office and moving to the private sector. One detects that there is a reluctance to confront this issue, perhaps for the worst of reasons, which rather undermines public confidence in the system as it exists today. I am afraid it is an ineffective and poorly trusted regulator, which is probably worse than no regulator at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on his recent knighthood, richly deserved after many years’ service in this place, and on the work of the Committee and the dogged way in which he and his Committee have gone after this particular issue. It is a lesson to all in the House about the value and the strength of Select Committees when they are well led and follow the evidence with robust questioning. I pay tribute to him and his Committee.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his tribute, but may I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan)? We really do owe much of our work to the persistence of our absent friend, the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), who has always contributed and motivated the Committee on this matter.

[Christian Matheson]

I am most grateful for that clarification and the House will have noted it.

The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments is entirely necessary, but, to use the phrase of the moment, not at all fit for purpose. The clue is in the name. The A in ACoBA stands for “advisory” and it is clear that the committee is just that: it has no teeth and if its harshest sanction is to embarrass—well, that is scarcely a sanction at all. I wonder whether, as currently constituted, it is even designed to make a difference with a very narrow remit. As far as I can tell, ACoBA has never actually refused an appointment.

ACoBA is appointed by the Government to provide independent advice to senior Crown servants and to all former Ministers of the UK, Scottish and Welsh Governments on any appointments they wish to take up within two years of leaving public or ministerial office. ACoBA applies the business appointment rules, which are largely procedural and set by the Government. They have no statutory basis and there are no sanctions for non-compliance. The rules apply for up to two years after leaving office and they are applied with inconsistency.

It is a clear failure of ACOBA that it cannot adequately distinguish between different types of post-ministerial appointment, for example paid as opposed to unpaid work. One former senior civil servant recounted to me the story of when they left the civil service. They took a position on the board of trustees of a community group. It took months upon months for this voluntary position to be approved. Part of the delay was down to due diligence, because the trust was a charity. If charities and the Charity Commission can undertake due diligence and prevent an appointment pending such checks, why can ACOBA not do that?

Meanwhile, as we have heard, the former Chancellor George Osborne can take a job with BlackRock in the City of London and not even tell ACOBA that he was taking a job editing the London Evening Standard. I understand the same applies to the former head of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, who was appointed to the European advisory board for a new US cyber-security firm, BlueteamGlobal, and did not even tell ACOBA. Because it is set up as an advisory and non-statutory committee, ACOBA finds enforcement difficult. I suspect that this is the reason it does not attempt to enforce. Indeed, it may be the reason it was set up in this way in the first place.

In addition to ACOBA’s toothlessness, there are further problems, for example with conflicts of interest. There are numerous, multiple examples of members of the committee declaring interests in firms to which the applicants were being appointed, but not recusing themselves from those cases. This included Mary Jo Jacobi, who has financial interests in BP but did not recuse herself from Vernon Gibson’s application, and John Wood, who has interests in BT, did not recuse himself from Keith Bristow’s commission with them.

ACOBA was also criticised by the former Public Administration Committee for having an “establishment” make-up—the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex raised this point. ACOBA is chaired by a Baroness and former Conservative Minister, who also works as a consultant for a company that looks very much like a lobbying firm. Other members of the committee include two Lords, a knight, a former general secretary of the First Division Association, lawyers and former senior civil service grandees. I go back to the evidence cited by the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee about bus drivers or hairdressers. As he says, there seems to be no sight of them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chloe Smith]

I hear and respect the hon. Gentleman’s view and I am grateful to him for taking the trouble to repeat it.

One of the other principles at stake is that we do not want to deter talented people from entering government service. I suspect that the Committee also recognised that principle, quite rightly. In the Government’s view, that could result from having an over-rigid system that could prevent or restrict people from returning to the sectors in which their expertise lies appropriately following a period of public service. Now, more than ever, with some major challenges in view for the public sector and for the civil service, we need to be able to attract the best skills and talent and to benefit from those who have capabilities and experience from outside the civil service—let us not forget this argument works two ways.

In order to deliver for the public and for taxpayers in the way in which they expect of their civil service, we need to be able to maintain a confident, professional and expert service when we are looking at such important and critical matters in the public sector.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

My hon. Friend knows that the PASC report of 2012 recommended a statutory scheme. In this later report, having listened to the Government’s objections about the cost-effectiveness of a statutory scheme, we invited the Government to produce a cost-benefit analysis, which indeed even the chair of ACoBA said would be a good idea. However, the Government have declined to produce even a cost-benefit analysis of having statutory rules, or enforceable rules of some kind. Will she revisit that recommendation and look at the question of a cost-benefit analysis? We are constantly told that rules would have a very negative effect on the public sector, but there is no evidence to support what she is claiming—although I understand that there is a perfectly legitimate concern.

[Chloe Smith]

I thank the Chairman of the Committee for that intervention. He gives me the opportunity to note that these arguments have been put back and forth a number of times over the years. It is my great pleasure to come to the House today and take up those arguments. However, it is still the Government’s case that a statutory system is not the right way forward. That is a matter of principle as much as of practicality, for the reasons I have set out. We do not therefore think it is right to go ahead and do a cost-benefit analysis, which, in itself, would take time and money, for something that, in principle, we are not convinced of the case for. It is question of principle and practicality.

We need to be able to attract capable people from a range of backgrounds, and I reiterate the commitment to being able to recruit fully externally to do that. It is therefore important to have an interchange of skills and experience between the public sector and elsewhere. That is good for our national life. It is also a matter of fairness to individuals who will wish to continue their careers in various ways. We need to strike that balance.

As I said, we remain of the view that a statutory system with enforcement powers but without the flexibility of the current arrangements to take account of the particular circumstances of individual cases would not be beneficial. As I have just said to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, we do not consider carrying out that cost-benefit analysis on the introduction of such a system to be a good use of public money at this time.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

My hon. Friend is being very patient, but unfortunately for her she has a lot of time. If she is going to refuse a cost-benefit analysis, will she at least accept this? ACoBA seems to be very preoccupied by what candidates might do after they have left the public sector in the context of their employers, and it often puts a lobbying ban on the person moving into the private sector. What regard should ACoBA have for the fact that the lobbying has already probably taken place and the granting of employment is just the implicit reward for having been lobbied when the candidate was working in the public sector? No regard seems to be paid to that potential conflict of interest in the way the ACoBA rules are applied.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am grateful for the attention that my hon. Friend has given this matter. I know that it is a matter over which to agonise, because it contains a lot of dilemmas. She has put forward extremely powerfully all the countervailing points about how to attract people into the public service and how not to punish them in the afterlife for giving up the salary and perks of the private sector to work in the public service, and so on.

The Minister has also talked a lot about processes and transparency, and I suggest that there is one process that would really open this up. That process would involve applications being published at the outset. I know that this is an advisory committee and that people go there for advice, but it really is ridiculous that they can go there on a fishing expedition. The advisory committee could tell someone that they could not possibly take a certain job because of what might happen, but nothing would ever appear in the public domain to indicate that that person had no moral compass of their own. Let them go and take advice from a lawyer about how the rules would be applied, but once they have applied to ACoBA, let it be transparent that they have applied. Let us find out what sort of person they are and whether they are applying for a job in a way that should not be allowed.

My second point is more about principles. In paragraph 105 of our report, we recommend a change to the civil service code, which should also be made to the ministerial code. Our recommendation is quite simple, and it is that these words should be included:

“You must: take decisions in the public interest alone; never allow yourself to be influenced in contracting, procurement, regulation or the provision of policy advice, by your career expectations or prospects if you leave the public service; always report to your line managers any offers of jobs or other rewards, or any informal suggestions of such rewards, that may have, or be reasonably seen to have a bearing on your role as a public servant; take particular care in your relations with former colleagues who may seek to influence your decisions as a public servant. You must not: take up any post outside the public service in business or [commercial] organisations operating in areas where you have been directly responsible in the previous [currently] two years for any form of contracting, procurement or regulation.”

We believe that that would provide a framework for people to think about what they are doing in the public service and at least some basis for discussion about how we expect people to behave. Sadly, leaving a Government Department, whether as a Minister, official or member of the armed forces, and, in time, finding oneself in related work in the private sector, has become something of a way of life. It is the new normal.

Unless we can find a way of providing reassurance about such behaviour, we will finish up with a statutory system in the end. I invite the Minister to reconsider that particular recommendation. I appreciate the opportunity to raise these matters this afternoon. They will not go away, I am afraid—they will be back, unless the Government take action.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the Thirteenth Report of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC 252, Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action, on the role and effectiveness of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA); notes that ACoBA regulates applications for business appointments by former Ministers and civil servants who have recently left the public sector; believes that ACoBA is an ineffectual regulator which fails to inspire public confidence or respect; expresses concern that the Committee’s inquiry revealed numerous gaps in ACoBA’s monitoring process with insufficient attention paid to the principles that should govern business appointments; agrees that failures of consecutive governments to address ACoBA’s deficiencies have damaged public trust in politics and public institutions and led to repeated scandals; calls on the Government to bring forward major reform by introducing a principles-based system to ensure that individuals act with integrity and behave according to those principles; and further calls on the Government to fund independent checks by ACoBA across all Government departments and executive agencies to reinforce those principles.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

In congratulating the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex on his knighthood—and I do so with some warmth and feeling, as we have known each other for 30 years—I call Sir Bernard Jenkin.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

May I join my right hon. Friend in remembering the anniversary of the Grenfell fire and commend her for the way she has established the inquiry looking into that tragedy. May I testify to her, having met victims of the Grenfell fire, as she has, that they are showing growing confidence that the findings of that inquiry will be what they want, to make sure that such a thing never happens again? That is a testament to my right hon. Friend’s personal courage and persistence in making sure that the inquiry was not blown off course by the understandable anger that immediately followed the tragedy.

[The Prime Minister]

I add my personal congratulations to my hon. Friend on his knighthood. I absolutely agree with him about the importance of ensuring that the inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire is able to provide the truth, to get to the answers of exactly why what happened happened and to ensure that justice is provided for the victims and survivors. It is a statutory inquiry; it has the power to compel witnesses and the production of evidence, which is important, and anyone who is found to have misled the inquiry would face prosecution. I hope this gives confidence to the survivors and people in the local community that this inquiry will indeed get to the truth.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 25th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[David Mundell]

What will happen is that today the UK Government will table an amendment to clause 11 of the withdrawal Bill in the House of Lords, on the basis agreed with the Welsh Government, and on the basis offered to the Scottish Government. The intergovernmental agreement accompanying the clause will also be published.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

As my right hon. Friend knows, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee has taken a close interest in this matter. Is he aware that we will be travelling to Edinburgh on Sunday, for hearings on Monday on the matter? I invite him to feel less disappointment and more hope, because the SNP Government have always insisted that their interests are aligned with those of the Welsh Government. Can we give the Scottish Government time to reflect on the fact that the Welsh Government now support the UK Government’s position, and that they might wish to do so in future?

[David Mundell]

I am sure that the Committee will be made very welcome in Edinburgh. Anything that it can do to focus Nicola Sturgeon’s mind on what has been offered, and what the Welsh Government have been able to sign up to, given that it protects the devolution settlement, will be very welcome. I hope that Nicola Sturgeon will think again.

Capita

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. I will seek to address them all, but please forgive me if I miss any. I will come back to him in writing if I do.

On the company’s overall position, it is important to understand that what has happened is exactly in line with what was announced back in February, so there is not really a new development. The company’s underlying position, as it has said publicly, is that it has about £1 billion of cash that it can call upon.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the Crown rep. I confirm that the Crown rep is Meryl Bushell. I met her this morning and continue to engage with her, as I do with all the other Crown reps.

The right hon. Gentleman asks whether new contracts had been awarded. Since the statement in February, no new contracts have been announced by central Government. However, I understand that the BBC and authorities in Northern Ireland have announced contracts.

The right hon. Gentleman asks what we are doing to break up the system of Government procurement. I always ask, with every contract that crosses my desk to be authorised, whether we have broken it up into as many small pieces as possible to make it accessible for small businesses. Over the Easter period, I made an announcement to help us meet the very challenging target we have set of 33% of all business going to small or medium-sized enterprises. We set a target of 25% in the last Parliament and met it. I announced a range of measures to help us towards the 33% target. I wrote to all the Government’s key suppliers saying that I wanted them to appoint an SME representative to try to drive business to SMEs. I have required all their subcontracting over the value of £25,000 to be published on the Government’s Contracts Finder. I am consulting on ways to improve prompt payment to make it a condition of business being awarded to strategic suppliers. That is very important to SMEs, and I am looking at ways to give them a right to go over the top of key suppliers to the Government to give them a right of recourse.

I say gently to the right hon. Gentleman that both he and I have a proud record from our time working for the coalition Government—he at a much more senior level, running the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. In line with other Governments, we continue to award contracts to Capita. The House may be interested to know that of the major central Government contracts that have been awarded to Capita, about 20% were awarded under Labour, over half under the coalition Government and 27% under this Government. This issue does not to relate to one party over another.

The reason we do it is that we know outsourcing delivers efficiencies. According to one survey, we receive efficiencies of at least 11%. If we get efficiencies of 11%, that means more money to spend on health, more money to spend on education and more money to spend on core services. That is why the Labour Government did it, why the coalition Government in which the right hon. Gentleman served did it and why this Government continue to use outsourcing.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is something of a correction going on throughout the sector, as it adjusts to the effects of the Carillion collapse and to the perhaps over-tight margins that some contracts have imposed on providers? I draw his attention to the fact that the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee is doing an inquiry into the lessons to be learned from the collapse of Carillion. Personally, I take confidence from the fact that the investors have decided to trust Capita with £700 million more of their capital to secure the long-term future of the company.

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question. He is absolutely right that what we discovered yesterday was that the rights issue is proceeding exactly as planned. In terms of the overall market, I have tried to be clear all along that suppliers should expect a decent rate of return—not an excessive rate of return, but one that allows them to run a profitable business, while ensuring that there are savings for the taxpayer. That is why we use private companies. It is not because of ideology; it is because they deliver savings to the taxpayer, which means more money to be spent on health, education and other public services.

Military Action Overseas: Parliamentary Approval

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will endeavour to be as swift as I possibly can.

The right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) has, I think, just punched a hole in his own argument. He responded to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), a former Attorney General, by assuring us that in any debate about some putative military action nobody would ask the Government to reveal specifics. I am sorry, but that is what this place does: we ask about specifics. He expects to debate forthcoming military action when the Government would be reluctant to reveal targets, the objectives of the operation and the nature of the deployment. That is ridiculous. I will come back to that point in a minute.

I rise as Chair of the Parliamentary Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which covers both the question of strategic thinking in government and the question of the relationship between the Government and Parliament. My predecessor Committee produced three reports on strategic thinking in government and I challenge my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who is in his place, on this. The Government have listened to the arguments and developed their capacity for strategic thinking, but the published literature of government is way behind the curve in dealing with the situations we now face. That underlines how we have to a large extent been asleep and complacent about the security we enjoy in this world. We are effectively now confronted by two great powers who are intent on subverting the international legal order. The problem in Syria is just a symptom of the superpower conflict that is already taking place, and which is simply not reflected in the 2015 strategic defence and security review or the 2015 national security review. I think we need to attend to those matters with some urgency.

I wish to concentrate on the more immediate question about the relationship between Government and Parliament. It is a complete misconception that there is an established constitutional convention that Parliament votes on the question of foreign deployments. This is a relatively new fashion. The Cabinet manual says that, but the Cabinet manual has no constitutional status whatever. It has no legal force. It is merely the expression of the opinion of a particular Prime Minister at a particular time—it was not even drafted by this Prime Minister—and it is vague.

The basis of the relationship between Government and Parliament is that Parliament controls laws and the supply of money to the Executive. Parliament is required to give its confidence to the Government in office for them to continue in office. It scrutinises Government decisions and holds Ministers accountable. However, I say to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that accountability is not the same thing as control. This Parliament does not control the Executive. We do not run the country. We hold the Government accountable. Parliament should not seek to directly control the decisions of Ministers.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Would my hon. Friend not go a little further and agree that if we crossed that boundary and made this into the Executive, we would actually reduce the ability of this place to hold the Government to account because we ourselves are forced, on a three-line Whip, to vote for them?

[Mr Jenkin]

It is ironic that the decision to go to war in Iraq is continually held up as an example of how these decisions should be made, when in fact the determination of the then Prime Minister to bring the decision to Parliament actually blurred the whole debate. It made the debate about a whole lot of factors that were irrelevant to the question of whether it was a sensible decision to go to war in Iraq. It also seems ironic to hold that up as an example of how decisions should be made when so many Members of that House regret taking that decision. It is easier to hold the Government accountable if we say, “You the Government make the decision and we will judge you on your performance after the event.”

When my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister received her seals of office from Her Majesty, she did not just take on the right to decide when, where and how our armed forces should be deployed. She took on the obligation, intrinsic to her office, to exercise her judgment, on proper advice and in consultation with her Cabinet, on military deployments of this nature and then to bring those decisions to this House when she has made them.

The Chilcot report has been raised. My Committee has considered it, and we made recommendations on how Government procedures might be improved to make sure that legal advice is not concealed from the Cabinet and that proper procedures are followed in Government. In particular, on the basis of a proposal from the Better Government Initiative, we recommended that it would be a good idea if the Cabinet Secretary had some mechanism to call out a Prime Minister who was deliberately bypassing proper procedures in Government. The Government have so far rejected that recommendation, but I hope they will continue to consider how we can be reassured that the proper procedures are being followed in Government. However, my right hon. Friend’s commitment to her sense of accountability and proper procedure seems to be absolutely unchallengeable—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I call Mr George Howarth—[Interruption.] Order. I am extraordinarily grateful to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), but his speech is over. We are greatly obliged to him.

UK/EU Future Economic Partnership

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 5th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

There are many examples of different arrangements for customs around the rest of the world. Indeed, we are looking at those—including, for example, the border between the United States and Canada.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her statement and congratulate her on a calm speech that has been widely welcomed. It was based on both the principles she has consistently set out towards leaving the European Union and the realistic compromises this nation will have to make to achieve a comprehensive trade agreement. Do we not now owe it to her to get behind her and her negotiations, instead of undermining her all the time, as the Opposition are doing?

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my hon. Friend. I think it would be a much stronger position if the Opposition were to get behind the Government and agree to support the approach we are taking to get the best possible deal from Brexit. We are focused on delivering for the British people. Sadly, the Opposition want to frustrate Brexit and fly in the face of the vote that was taken by the British people.

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Border Arrangements

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I do not think that I could be clearer than I have been so far. The Government are absolutely resolved to stand by both the Belfast agreement and all parts of the joint report of last December.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I am encouraged that everybody seems to want to avoid a hard border in Northern Ireland. The only people who seem to be threatening such a border are those who are trying to leverage their political advantage in domestic politics in the Republic of Ireland or trying somehow to blackmail the whole of the United Kingdom into substantially reversing the substance of the referendum result. Far more constituencies voted leave than remain, and it would be as politically unsustainable for issues around Northern Ireland to leverage the whole of the United Kingdom back into some kind of customs unions as it would be to erect any wholly unnecessary infrastructure at the border in Northern Ireland.

[Mr Lidington]

We are at the very start of the negotiations about the detail of the withdrawal agreement and then of the creation of the future deep and special partnership that we are seeking with our European Union friends and neighbours. The depth and comprehensive nature of the economic partnership that we are seeking is something that the Prime Minister will talk about on Friday.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

Public sector workers are among the most talented and hard-working people in our society, and they should be fairly rewarded. In respect of the Cabinet Office, the Chancellor’s Budget statement confirmed that we are moving away from the 1% average public sector pay award, and proposals will be issued later this year.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I wish my right hon. Friend every success in his forthcoming meeting with the Scottish and Welsh Governments this week. Will he bear in mind that he is being compromising and open, and will he invite them to be the same?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is right to point to the importance of all parts of the United Kingdom working together to deliver an orderly, smooth Brexit. We want to work in partnership with the Scottish and Welsh Governments to deliver a big increase in the powers devolved to their Parliaments and Governments.

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is the role of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to oversee the UK’s changing constitution and the efficacy of the civil service and the machinery of government. Within that, PACAC covers matters of ethics and propriety in Whitehall, overseeing the work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the ministerial code, the special advisers code, the civil service code and the work of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, which oversees the rules governing departing Ministers and Crown servants when they take up outside appointments.

PACAC has defined its overriding purpose as being

“to conduct robust and effective scrutiny in order to help create conditions where the public can have justified confidence in public services/government.”

In that context, just before the election, in April 2017, PACAC published a new report on ACOBA, entitled “Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action”. That followed a report published in 2012 by our predecessor Committee, which recommended replacing the existing business appointment rules with a statutory system. The main recommendations of that report, and of our more recent 2017 report, have been flatly rejected by the Government. I am afraid that many people believe that to be hopelessly complacent. PACAC is therefore announcing in its supplementary report, published today, that we intend to hold a further inquiry into these matters.

The way we manage conflicts of interest arising where former Ministers and Crown servants leave the Government to take up jobs elsewhere really matters. There is a constant stream of embarrassing stories in the media about the so-called revolving door between employment in the public and private sectors, suggesting that people misuse the advantage of a job in Government to get lucrative jobs outside. Although many of these stories may be unfair, the situation is deeply corrosive of public trust in our system of democracy and Government because the present system of oversight fails to provide adequate assurance.

For example—I will name only one Department as an example, but this includes every Department—a constant flow of Ministry of Defence civil servants, and of senior officers from the armed forces, finish up working in the defence industry. A similar situation occurs in other Departments. No one should assume that there is automatically anything wrong with that, but there needs to be an adequate system of assurance that there is, indeed, nothing wrong, and that we are not fostering an over-permissive attitude. The expectation of many people—even of some Ministers—is that this is the new normal and that everybody does it.

We acknowledge, and I pay tribute to, the hard work of the ACOBA board—the chair and the secretariat—but PACAC’s 2012 and 2017 reports can be described only as excoriating. In 2017, PACAC concluded:

“ACoBA, in its current form is a toothless regulator which has failed to change the environment around business appointments.”

That is because ACOBA lacks power and resources, and its remit is much too limited. It is not a regulator—it is merely advisory, with no sanctions for non-compliance—and there are regular instances of the business appointment rules being ignored.

Furthermore, serious gaps exist in ACOBA’s monitoring process, so while we know about some high-profile cases, we have little idea about the scale of non-compliance. That has got worse since the Government removed ACOBA’s responsibility to monitor and report applications from Crown servants below SCS3 in 2010. Departments are meant to post half-yearly data on their websites to show when advice has been given to applicants at SCS2 and 3 levels, but this data has become patchy. We just do not know how many civil servants below SCS3 level who have performed important roles in respect of policy formation and commercial relationships end up in a position to draw on inside information or their Government contacts after they leave the civil service.

In the period between PACAC’s two reports, the challenge has escalated, with increased numbers of public servants and Ministers moving between the public and private sectors. There have also been a number of high-profile cases, leading to declining public trust in a system that was designed to promote public confidence. A personal observation is that the magazine Private Eye, from which we took evidence, frequently appears to do a better job of policing the business appointment rules than does the advisory committee itself.

It is essential that steps are taken to ensure that the ACOBA system is swiftly improved. In PACAC’s more recent report, we set out a number of new recommendations in relation to how that could be done without resort to statute, although we recommend that a cost-benefit analysis of statutory regulation should be conducted. The Government have rejected statutory regulation on the basis that it would be too costly, but they refuse to do the cost-benefit analysis.

PACAC recommended that the Government provide ACOBA with the powers and resources necessary to actively monitor and enforce compliance with the rules. There should also be a substantial increase in transparency regarding ACOBA’s decisions, and that should be done by Department. Applications should be published on receipt and not just when they are approved. That might reduce a lot of ACOBA’s unnecessary workload.

Most importantly, the business appointment rules should be fundamentally changed. A system to manage conflicts of interest needs to be more than just a code of rules and declarations. A principles-based system, if it is effectively taught by leaders and learned by everyone so that it is intrinsic to public service, would create a new and different expectation that individuals will act with integrity, encouraging people to regulate their own behaviour and attitudes according to those principles.

Our report recommends a substantial change of emphasis in the ministerial code and the civil service code to highlight the values and principles that should guide attitude and behaviour. We need to instil an expectation of integrity in individuals’ decisions. That, combined with independent checks, could effectively foster a substantial improvement in attitudes and behaviours. Evasively, the Government responded that the essence of those principles and values is already embedded in the code, but they are not explicit enough. We need a change of heart, and we need a stronger system—otherwise public confidence will continue to be eroded.

[Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman and his Committee for their powerful report and for the statement he has just made. The Opposition are committed to bringing this issue to the top of the political agenda and to seeking reform, as not a week seems to go by without the exposure of some conflict of interest in the heart of Government. Bearing in mind his statement and his report, does the Chair of the Select Committee agree that the report raises serious questions of governance and confirms that this is a Government of the few, by the few and for the few?

[Mr Jenkin]

I will leave aside the soundbite that came at the end of the hon. Gentleman’s question, but the substance of his remarks is correct. The system is inadequate and needs to be strengthened and reformed, and I am delighted that Her Majesty’s official Opposition are taking an interest in the matter.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

It is very good to see you in the Chair, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I thank the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) for his statement. The SNP agrees that the business appointments rules should be strengthened, and we are disappointed with the Government’s response to the report. As Burns might have said, “I wad na gie a button for it.” Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the public and the press, specifically Private Eye, recognise that the Government’s response to the evident revolving-door problem smacks of complacency and self-interest? Does he agree that the actions of the former Chancellor demonstrate how little respect there is for ACOBA? Does he also agree that, if the Government and this House do nothing to strengthen the business appointments rules, we risk further undermining trust and integrity in politics?

[Mr Jenkin]

Our report mentions George Osborne in two respects. First, we state that it was striking and startling that ACOBA appeared to give the former Chancellor a blank cheque in allowing him to join BlackRock on an inflated salary so shortly after he left his office. Secondly, George Osborne also completely bypassed the appointment rules prior to accepting his appointment as editor of the Evening Standard. We regard that as a glaring example not necessarily of any particular dishonour by any particular individual, but of how the system absolutely fails to command public confidence.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Chloe Smith)]

I join others in welcoming you back to your place, Mr Deputy Speaker, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) for his work in bringing these affairs to the House’s attention today. If Members present have not already taken a look at the Government response to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee report, I encourage them to do so. We clearly state that the Government are committed to maintaining the highest standards of conduct for Ministers and civil servants, including special advisers, and we believe that the rules and procedures in place are proportionate and adequate. We look forward to working with the Committee to do more, however, and I put on the record my willingness to work with its Chair to do so.

[Mr Jenkin]

I welcome my hon. Friend back to the Front Bench in her new position at the Cabinet Office, to which she brings considerable experience, including of this issue. However, I have to express my disappointment at the Government’s response. Some minor amendments were accepted, but it regards the system as the highest example of regulation and openness when it simply does not deliver the public confidence that we want. I appreciate that this is a vexed issue and that we do not want to deter people from coming into the public service for fear of being treated unfairly on the way out, but the present arrangements are inadequate. The response even refused to put more explicitly into the ministerial code words such as

“You must… take decisions in the public interest alone”

and

“You must… never allow yourself to be influenced in contracting, procurement, regulation or the provision of policy advice, by your career expectations or prospects if you leave the public service”

and

“You must not… take up any post outside the public service in businesses or [commercial] organisations operating in areas where you have been directly responsible”.

I do not understand why those things cannot be put explicitly in the ministerial code so that they are talked about and understood, which would begin to change the attitudes that unfortunately pervade many of the Ministers, special advisers and civil servants in Whitehall.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

The Government’s conduct in responding to the report reinforces the public’s view that we here are acting in our own private interests, not in the public interest. Is it not significant that a Prime Minister who did not lift a finger during his period in office in answer to pleas for reforms to jam the revolving door has now taken advantage of that period of office to take a job in China, with which he worked when in Government? Will the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee explain to us why George Osborne did not come to the Committee to explain why he had five meetings with BlackRock, why he altered the law in its favour and why, after losing office, he took a job with them on £650,000 a year for one day’s work a week? If that is not an egregious example of the abuse of the revolving door, it is hard to see what is. We have a shameful record, and perhaps the Chair will agree that the public will rightly regard us with contempt and as unfit to police our own affairs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

Sadly, I agree with the hon. Gentleman. As a member of my Committee, he has been instrumental in drawing the Committee’s attention to these issues. I would almost describe him as the conscience of the Committee on the issue, and long may he continue to encourage us in this work. As he knows, it is not the practice of the Committee to prosecute individual cases, and we should resist that because it would divert attention from the substance of the work that we need to undertake. I am actually quite pleased about how obviously carefully drafted the Government’s response is to our report because the points we are making in our report are having a telling effect. We have a long way to go, however, and that is why the hon. Gentleman has been one of those encouraging the Committee to continue pursuing the subject with a further inquiry. I thank him for his work for the Committee.