Baroness Worthington
Main Page: Baroness Worthington (Crossbench - Life peer)Does the noble Lord agree that it is quite clear the reason for those price increases is the high price of gas?
No, I would not agree at all. I look at my bill, and I do not know whether the noble Baroness has looked at hers recently, and find that 20% stuck on the bill as a result of green policies and green taxes. It may be that gas contract prices have been rising, but spot prices, and indeed some contracts around the world, have been falling. The noble Baroness knows well that in the United States, for very special reasons which may become global reasons, the price of gas is about a quarter of what it is here. So I do not agree with that proposition, and would certainly disagree with it even more in the future.
Will the noble Lord therefore explain why gas bills have been rising when they do not carry any of the costs of the renewables obligations, as on electricity? There is very clear evidence in the public domain that up to two-thirds of the increase in prices is because of the underlying price of gas.
Obviously the bulk of a market price is the price at which gas is purchased: either contract or spot. However, if the noble Baroness is asking me to agree with the proposition that gas prices are now, or will be be, the driving force in raising prices, and that we should ignore the additional pace at which extra costs are placed on the consumer, I am afraid I cannot. The consumer is paying more. Energy prices in this country—I do not want to wander off the amendment too far—are very high, almost as high as in Germany. This is not good for our industry, and the pace at which people can be asked—it is a question of pace, not principle—to bear additional costs, particularly poor families, has to be handled with great care and calibration by policy makers.
That is why this idea of targets represents a danger, encouraging more over-ambition and more speedy decisions which distort incentives. Furthermore, technology is changing all the time, and all kinds of developments can take place which wrongfoot those who have established targets for years ahead. I know about that because in the 1970s and 1980s I was the Energy Secretary, and we launched a huge programme looking 50 years ahead for replacing our nuclear fleet, which, if we had done it, would have saved a lot of problems today. Although we announced that we were going to have nine new pressurised water reactors by 1990, we only actually built one. Today, those reactors would have been built and would be working excellently, producing low-carbon electricity. Alas, that did not happen.
So if the aim of this amendment is to bring greater firmity of purpose, and to reduce infirmity of purpose, it is not going to succeed. The aim of the Bill is to get more investment and to get the investors putting their money into new machinery, whether it is renewable, nuclear or gas turbines. That investment is not coming forward. It is not happening, and if people say it is about to happen, I have to ask—and this is where I am going to sound disloyal to the Government—why are Ministers rushing around talking about de-mothballing existing plant to fill likely gaps in our power supply in the next few years? Why is the National Grid talking about interruptible contracts? These are very frightening things. These are not going to increase certainty; they are vastly decreasing certainty. The oil companies and energy companies that come to me are not at all impressed by this Bill. They do not believe that it will create the investment certainty they need and they wonder when the politicians are going to show more finesse and care, and when the proponents of green energy, of which I am certainly one, are going to show more sense of pace in pushing forward these issues.
If we continue at the present rate, if we continue to install targets that apparently commit Governments—but of course time passes and they change—and if we continue to believe in targets driving investment and pricing decisions, we will create precisely the kind of political backlash that we now have. We will see poorer performance on CO2 than other countries that avoid all these sorts of targets, such as the United States, which has a brilliant performance on CO2. We are going to see less security, less affordability and more damage to our country, its competitiveness and, above all, the poorest families in the land. These targets are not only undesirable but dangerous and I very strongly oppose them.
Would the noble Lord accept that the figure that came out last week for the amount of shale gas under the UK is far higher than was assumed when his report was written? I went to talk to Cuadrilla at one point last year. I said that the 200 trillion cubic feet that they were talking about under Lancashire was being ridiculed as a very high number and asked whether they stood by it. They said, “Privately, we think it is much higher. It is about 300 trillion cubic feet but we dare not say so because people will not take that seriously”. Then an independent consultant, Nick Grealy, said 700 trillion cubic feet and everybody laughed at it. Now, the British Geological Survey has said there is 1,300 trillion cubic feet. This is the largest find of shale gas ever on the planet. The shale rock we are talking about, the Bowland shale, is in places 10 times as thick as the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania.
I went to see shale gas extraction in the Marcellus shale in 2011 because I had heard about it and thought it was interesting. You could hardly find these well pads—they are tiny and hidden among the trees. There was a flock of wild turkeys running across the road on the way to one. I asked somebody for a calculation of just how much energy can come out of a small area when you are drilling for shale gas. The answer is that about 25 acres of well pad in Pennsylvania can produce as much energy from shale gas as the entire UK wind industry produces at the moment.
I am sure that that is a fascinating discussion and one we will probably return to, but can the noble Viscount point to where in this part of the Bill there is anything that prevents shale gas contributing to the meeting of our decarbonisation targets? I would embrace it and would hope that it came along quickly if it could be done sustainably; there is nothing in this part of the Bill that prevents it.
If we embrace within the next couple of years a decarbonisation target that is stricter than shale gas can help us to get to, I think that there will be a problem in the way of shale gas.
Perhaps I may turn briefly to climate change. This is not the time to re-fight the climate change debate, but others have brought it up. Given that shale gas offers the possibility of a slower rate of decarbonisation—not to as low a level of target as we are talking about—we need to retain the flexibility of that and to take into account where the climate change science has shifted to. It is simply not the case that the science has become more alarming in the past few years. There has been a series of studies of climate sensitivity in recent years by Otto et al., Aldrin et al., Ring and Searchinger and many others. The biggest of those, the Otto et al. study, which had 14 leading authors, two of whom are co-ordinating lead authors of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, concluded that transient climate sensitivity—that is, the number that we are likely to reach in about 50 years—is about half of what we thought it was. It is about 1.3 degrees centigrade, of which we have had nearly half already. It is not true to say that we are seeing damaging effects on weather from climate change. Weather is not climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change SREX report in late 2011 came to the very firm conclusion that you could not see a signal of climate change in current climate events, neither in droughts, floods, storms nor any of those kinds of things. Professor Roger Pielke at the University of Colorado has come to exactly the same conclusion. There is no evidence yet that we are seeing damage. Meanwhile, we are seeing clear damage from climate change policies. The denial of cheap electricity to people in poor countries and the effect of biofuels on food prices are having a demonstrable effect on both hunger and well-being in other parts of the world. We have to take these things into account.
I hasten to add that I accept the science of climate change. By that, I mean I accept that carbon dioxide has its full greenhouse effect. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, said that I was denying this, but I accept that it has the full effect. However, the full effect is only 1.2 degrees centigrade warming for a doubling of the quantity of carbon dioxide—it is there in section 8.6.2.3 of the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The danger arises from the potential feedback effects from water vapour in the atmosphere. We can measure whether those are happening and it is clear they are happening more slowly than expected—that is what those papers I cited are all about.
This is not about saying that climate change is or is not happening; it is about saying that potentially the world is changing. We are finding flexibilities in the way in which the world is changing which mean that we should retain flexibility in policy. That is why I oppose the amendment.
If my noble friend feels that anything that the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, said was incorrect, he had the opportunity to say so. He is quite unable to do so. What the noble Viscount said is right. Another fantasy, since I am provoked by my noble friend, was his statement that it is not the case that we are going out ahead of the pack and that everybody else is going green, going renewable, in the same way. This is patently untrue. The major European countries that have gone in this direction, Germany and Spain, are both winding back as fast as they can on their subsidies and support for renewables. They realise that it is a blind alley, which is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, pointed out, the share prices of the renewables companies have collapsed. That is what is happening.
Will the noble Lord explain, therefore, why there is currently a trade dispute between China and Europe on solar panel manufacture and why there have been disputes between the US and China on wind turbine manufacturing?
That is an interesting question, which I will answer. The Chinese felt that the Europeans were so foolish that there was a big potential export trade sending solar panels to Europe. Their solar panel industry is in dire straits, so they have cut their prices to the bone, which is why there is this dispute. The noble Baroness may be interested to know more: China has a five-year plan. In that plan, how much of their electricity does she think would be generated by the solar industry by 2020? The answer is 0.5%. That is what China is doing. However, China thought that credulous Europeans would buy these panels and that there was a great export trade to be had. The winding-down, which I was referring to a moment ago, of the renewables industry in Europe has meant that their market is not nearly as big as they thought. So the Chinese are in a very difficult state on this front and that is the origin of the trade disputes. I am glad that the noble Baroness asked me that, because the answer is interesting.
Before I go on to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, there is one thing that I hope we can change if we are going to debate this important issue in an honest and sensible way. We should get away from the idea of saying, “I am all in favour of clean energy”. Two noble Lords have said this already. There is nothing cleaner than carbon dioxide. It is a colourless, odourless gas whose main effect is to make the world habitable, because without it there could be no plant growth and without plant growth there could be no animal or human life. Scientists are agreed that the biggest single effect of carbon dioxide is to enhance plant growth; it is known as the fertilisation effect. There is nothing unclean about that.
No, I have not finished. It is true that carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has a warming effect. How big a warming effect, as the noble Viscount said, is disputed among scientists, and the consensus is moving to a much lower effect than was previously thought. However, the sun has a much greater warming effect and I have not heard anyone referring to the sun’s rays as dirty. Therefore, can we get away from all this clean/dirty nonsense, which is emotive rubbish and has no place in a proper parliamentary, or any other, debate?
Did the noble Baroness wish to intervene? No, she has thought better of it.
One of the curiosities of this Government in this area is that we have not one energy policy, but two. This Bill represents one of them. Calling it an energy Bill is somewhat misleading; it should have been called a decarbonisation Bill, or maybe an anti-energy Bill. Nevertheless, ostensibly it is an energy Bill. That policy is out of date, if it ever was in date. The draft was produced in 2010 and the gestation goes back to the previous Administration in the era when the Climate Change Act was passed. That is one energy policy.
I will quote the other energy policy. In his comprehensive spending review Statement, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that we,
“will put Britain at the forefront of exploiting shale gas”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/6/13; col. 310.]
A week earlier, at a European Council meeting, the Prime Minister, my right honourable friend David Cameron, said that we must make,
“the most of indigenous resources such as shale gas”.
Perhaps it is a consequence of coalition government that you have two separate energy policies. However, the other energy policy and the one in the Bill are in complete conflict. The purpose of this Bill is, through long-term contracts for difference of 15 years or even more, to lock this country into high-cost renewable energy and nuclear energy. That will leave very little space for shale gas, although, as my noble friend Lord Ridley pointed out, it is now clear that we have enormous reserves in this country. Having indigenous reserves is particularly important and, because of liquefaction, the cost of transporting gas across the ocean adds considerably to the cost of the gas.
We cannot have it both ways. We either go for shale gas, which is cheap, or we lock ourselves into high-cost energy. That is what worries me. The only way in which you can make sense of these two conflicting energy policies is if you think that the purpose of developing our resources of indigenous shale gas—we cannot use it here because of this Bill—is for it to be exported to our competitors so that they can have the benefit of the cheap energy that we are foregoing. That is the only way in which you can reconcile the two policies. Of course, it is complete rubbish, complete nonsense. It is the economics and the politics of the madhouse.
Finally, I come to the amendment about the target in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, on which I think that he is a little naive. As my noble friend Lord Howell said, just putting in this target does not give any guarantee to energy companies in the slightest, because things can change. No Parliament can bind its successor. As I said earlier, the Germans and the Spanish are changing all their subsidies and support for renewable energy. No businessman believes that this target means anything. It is true that the contracts for difference, which are legally binding, will bind us and lock us in. That concerns me, but this target is neither here nor there.
Since it is neither here nor there, I am very much tempted to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, for a good reason. This Bill is absurd and unworkable, but some people may not have realised quite how absurd and unworkable it is. Voting to include his amendment will make the full absurdity and unworkability of the Bill clearer. Nevertheless, I shall do my best to resist the temptation.
My Lords, with regard to the first question that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, posed to me, yes, of course, I agree with him. I read out the sentence from paragraph 40 of our report. It was one of our conclusions that certainty was a pre-requisite for the investors. My question to my noble friend and the Committee was: is a delay of two years going to make that amount of difference when we have an EU target for 2028-32 to agree within a short timeframe ahead of us?
With regard to carbon capture and storage, I did not want to go down that track. I totally agree with the noble Lord but, again, we have limited evidence about it to date. I wish that there was much more that we could report to the Committee about the tests for carbon capture and storage. There are still some people who say that, despite what is going on at the moment, it will never become a commercial issue. With regard to nuclear, of course, having lived next door to Dounreay—as has my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart—I regret the closure of that research centre. Dounreay had the potential to have got us out of the hole we appear to be about to fall into.
My Lords, I am delighted to speak to Amendments 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14. If your Lordships will permit me, I will speak to Amendment 22 when we discuss Amendment 27, because I think that they are very similar. Unsurprisingly, having put my name to these amendments, I support them.
I congratulate the Government on having introduced these measures into the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, pointed out, they were not there at the start of the process, but the Government have clearly listened to the representations from a large number of organisations requesting that they be put into the Bill. Here they are, and here we are debating them in detail for the first time. We have had a fantastically detailed and wide-ranging debate today and I would like to make some contributions to some of the issues that have been mentioned already, as well as a few additional points.
First, why do we need such a target and why should we support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh? It is simply the fact that investors want this and the country needs it. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, said that only one trade organisation had made representations to him, but he and I were both present at a joint meeting of the Nuclear Industry Association, the Carbon Capture & Storage Association and the Renewable Energy Association, and all three were united in calling for greater certainty and for a decarbonisation target to be set as part of the Bill. That is just three trade associations. An additional 23 trade associations support it. Another 83 commercial companies support it. In total, more than 200 organisations support this provision being in the Bill. It is absolutely certain that we need it; investors have said that they need it. Simon Howard, chief executive of the UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association, has said:
“There is significant investor appetite for the UK to be a global leader in profitable low-carbon energy solutions, providing the high-quality innovation and jobs that the country needs to ensure a future economic recovery”.
Basically, people want to invest in the UK, but they need certainty.
I thank the noble Baroness for letting me intervene; I shall not intervene again. I do not want to get in the way of the thrust of her argument, but I would ask her to say, “Well, of course, those people would say that”. There is at the end of the day a whole bargain going on here where suppliers will try to get the best deal they can, so they are bound to say things like that. The difficulty of the Government’s position is in being able to assess, as we have seen in the negotiations for the nuclear strike price for Hinkley Point, what that balance of risk and proper price is.
No other industry, not even agriculture under the common agricultural policy in the 1960s and 1970s, has offered a fixed index-linked price for 15 years. I do not in any way want to undermine the noble Baroness’s general argument, because it is an important area, but I think that we have to be really careful in our negotiations about how much we have already given within this framework, given the very large businesses that have very good negotiators. I know that the noble Baroness is one of the least naive people, but I think that we on this side have to be slightly careful about being naive in these price arguments. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made the strong point at Second Reading that we are in an international market—I absolutely agree with that—but we have to keep a sense of proportion about what else is being offered. I shall not interrupt the noble Baroness again.
I thank the noble Lord for making that comment. I simply say that that is a complaint against the CFDs, which we will come on to discuss under Part 2 of the Bill. This is Part 1, which simply states the purposes of the Bill. There are many things that the noble Lord said with which I agree. If we had focused more on setting a framework of legislation, with clear outcomes and the right policies to create the link between those outcomes and the responsibilities placed on government and the commercial people who have to deliver on them, we would be in a much better place than we are. I said at Second Reading that I believe in markets. I believe that, as legislators, we should set a clear framework and allow the markets to live with the least-cost solutions. We are not in that position right now—that is not the Bill that we have in front of us—but this part of the Bill could be an important element in doing just that. The amendments would create that framework of certainty and guarantee a trajectory of travel. That is what is lacking in the Bill at the moment.
As others have said—I do not want to repeat it—the Bill does not set a decarbonisation target; in fact, it prevents a decarbonisation target from being set and seeks to tie the hands of future Governments. That is very regrettable. Moreover, it is simply enabling. It simply says that the Secretary of State “may”, if he or she chooses, set a decarbonisation target. Of course, that is going to create uncertainty. Why the discretion? Ministers in the Commons were keen to point out that they were in disagreement not about the principle but merely about the process and the timing. If that is true, why is there a need for discretion? Why the “may”? It seems to me totally illogical; it creates needless uncertainty. A number of noble Lords have used different phrases—“government vacillation”, “infirmity of purpose” and “gratuitous increase in uncertainty”. The discretion seems completely illogical and gratuitous and I hope that, at the very least, this process will bring some clarity to that issue.
However, we would go much further and, as other noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the amendments have said, require the target to be set now. There is no reason to delay it by two years. It unnecessarily politicises the issue and kicks it out beyond the next election when we have people lining up now to invest in the supply chain.
My Lords, I echo the noble Baroness in saying that this has been an excellent debate and, given the strength of arguments on both sides, I really believe that with our reasonable and measured approach to the decarbonisation target range, the Government have got it right. I agree that a decarbonisation target range, set at the right time, could provide further certainty for developing low-carbon energy. That is why, having heard many strong views on the matter, the Government brought these new clauses forward in the other place, which now form Part 1 of the Bill. This will enable us to be the first country in the world to set a clean energy target.
Having said that—and as a number of noble Lords have highlighted and illustrated with great skill—changing the Bill as proposed by these amendments would not be the best way of achieving what I believe are shared goals. I shall expand on this and hope to respond to some of the issues that have been raised today. The issue of when we set a target comes down to what will provide the greatest certainty for investors. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Madingley, made the point at Second Reading that in his experience as a businessman and an investor:
“The incentive structures contained in the Bill are far more important than targets or aspirations, because they are the mechanism for action”.—[Official Report, 18/6/13; col. 192.]
My noble friend Lord Howell raised that point clearly.
We have recognised that investors need more details. That is why last week we set out additional details about our reforms. We have published some information about contract terms, which go to costs and thus value. We also published strike prices for renewable technologies to encourage investment in wind, tidal wave, biomass and large solar projects. We also confirmed the trajectory of funding for tripling support for low-carbon electricity up to 2020.
Those recent announcements have been welcomed by industry. For example, the CBI’s chief policy director said:
“The energy plans are a big step forward and should unlock the private investment we need to keep the lights on and costs down. The renewables strike price and capacity mechanism will enable investors to take their plans off the drawing board and on to building sites.”
Some of the arguments I have heard about not giving investors certainty are covered by this point: industry itself says that it recognises that it is now being given certainty. Looking beyond 2020, there are already legal targets in place that clarify the future of electricity in this country. There is the 2050 target, which is likely to require electricity to be virtually decarbonised, and there is the fourth carbon budget, which runs up to 2027 and requires the UK to halve emissions in the whole economy.
In order to make progress, if the noble Baroness has a question, perhaps I could take it after I finish. To provide further clarity out to 2030, the Government have committed to issuing guidance to National Grid on an indicative range of decarbonisation scenarios for the power sector to 2030, consistent with the least-cost pathway to 2050. Just last month the Government set out an ambitious position for 2030 at a European level, to urge Europe to set a binding emissions reductions target of 50% by 2030 as part of the ambitious global deal—and 40% even if we move unilaterally. Finally on this point, Amendment 4 has an unintended consequence, in that it would prevent targets being set for years beyond 2030.
This brings me to my second point: whether the Bill should provide a power or a duty to set a decarbonisation target range. Of course there is an attraction in saying in the Bill that the Secretary of State must set a target by a certain date, as both the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, and my noble friend Lord Stephen propose. However, my honourable friend, the Member for Wealden, Charles Hendry, pointed out in an article on this issue that it does nothing for any Government’s credibility to set out a target before they are in a position to say how they will achieve it. He stated:
“The challenge with a decarbonisation target set now for 2030 is that we cannot yet know how it can be met—or indeed, if it can be met”.
That is the argument that a number of noble Lords have raised today.
My Lords, I would like to ask the Minister about her assertion that there are targets post-2020, citing the fourth carbon budget as one of them. I will just reiterate the point that those budgets are about emissions and take into account flows of emissions using trading. It is not true that they give any certainty at all about what will happen in the UK. What happens in the UK is governed by UK policies, which include the RO and other support mechanisms. After 2020, there is no visibility as to what will happen next. In moving towards the CFDs, we are creating a whole host of uncertainties, whereas under the RO there is a great deal of certainty. I would hope that she could concede that budgets are a completely different issue to the domestic policies that we are talking about today.
Of course, the point is that we have to make sure that this happens against the backdrop of what else is going on in the economy. We cannot set targets solely on one part of the economy. That is why we have been very clear that the investment in climate that we have made to 2020 through the levy control framework has already given certainty. We are putting £7.6 billion into low-carbon renewable energies to introduce that certainty to investors. We have already said that National Grid will be given an indicative range of decarbonisation scenarios for the power sector for 2030 consistent with the least-cost approach to the UK’s 2050 carbon budget. The fourth carbon budget will run up to 2027 and requires the UK to halve total emissions in the whole economy. We have set out in the carbon plan the likely implications for the electricity sector.
My Lords, I do not wish to prolong this debate greatly although I am grateful to have this opportunity to speak to this amendment, which raises a different issue from the one we have just debated.
Almost in anticipation that the Government would use the setting of the carbon budgets as a reason not to agree to setting a decarbonisation target, I tabled this amendment to probe the logic of that. I have tried to explain, possibly in vain sadly, that carbon budgets and carbon intensity are not one and the same and should not be linked. However, I feared that I might not succeed in making that point, so tabled this amendment simply to show that the carbon intensity of electricity is a very clear indicator of progress in the implementation of the Bill. Carbon intensity is a value that is currently recorded and reported but, sadly, over the past decade has not fallen. It fell dramatically between 1990 and 2000 when we invested in CCGT gas plants which were more efficient and cleaner. The carbon intensity of power fell from around 950 to around 450 to 500. That was achieved in a decade.
Since then, I am sad to say that both the previous Government and this Government have utterly failed to deliver anything comparable and carbon intensities have been bouncing around pretty much at will, reflecting the global prices of the commodities involved—gas and coal. Last year, we saw almost a record high of 530 grams per kilowatt hour in the UK in 2012. This is just wasteful carbon emissions, I am afraid to say. Had we got a grip and introduced a proper energy policy that took into account the carbon intensity and managed it down, we would not have seen the high carbon burn that we saw last year, which is displacing gas.
Members of the Committee who are fans of gas ought to note that we have a common enemy in coal, particularly coal treated in old stations built 30 or 40 years ago, some of which are now fitted with filtration equipment that knocks their efficiency down even further. There is probably no worse way of generating electricity in terms of carbon emissions, yet there they were base loading all the way through last year, pushing up the carbon intensity to record levels. As I have mentioned previously, that can be addressed. The merit order of existing plants, if it operates optimally, could take 200 grams off overnight without the need to sign any long, expensive and hard to negotiate contracts—if we simply introduce the right policy framework.
The amendment would require budgets to start to be set in 2020, when it would be possible to get emissions to around 200 grams per kilowatt hour with very little in the way of any extra investment. Simply using the investment that is already in the supply chain to meet our 2020 renewables targets, coupled with a change in the merit order, would take us there. Beyond that, we can look at a target in 2025 of around 150 grams per kilowatt hour. Again, there is no great need to invest in lots of new capacity to achieve that. It simply means continuing to invest in renewables on roughly the same scale as we are doing now, seeing the CCS demonstration projects get under way on gas and coal and seeing the biomass conversions. Essentially, this is not a hard trajectory. The point of putting down this amendment is to explain that the pathway from where we are today, with ridiculously high carbon intensity, to where we need to get to in 2030 to reach our legally binding targets cost-efficiently is not difficult. If you want to see the road map or the plan of how to get there, you need only refer to the CCC’s reports on the subject, which contain a huge amount of detail outlining this and explaining how existing kit and existing plant can be used to reach very much lower levels than we have today.
I also mentioned in my previous speech that we already have a carbon floor price. The Government should accept that targets need to be set that justify that policy. It is an incredibly distorting policy, with no environmental benefits. As I have said before, reductions that occur underneath the cap set in Europe are simply traded away. So it is not about carbon. It is meant to be about securing investment in UK plc. If that investment is not forthcoming—if, for whatever reason, the policies in this Energy Bill do not deliver—the public and Parliament have a right to be able to measure that. This is a significant piece of legislation, taking wide-ranging powers. It is matched in its size and significance by the existing carbon floor price. It is only right that we take it upon ourselves to deliver an outcome for these policies. That outcome must be a steady decline in carbon intensity.
Obviously, I would not recommend the setting of a series of targets starting in 2020 and going five years beyond that if I was not confident that we had the policies to deliver on that. If they work, CFDs are the mechanism which the Government hope will be used to achieve this. If the Government have confidence in their Bill and the measures contained in it, they ought to have the confidence to set these targets. Many people have made the point that flexibility is necessary, as we cannot predict the future and should not be technologically specific in our aspirations. I completely agree. I have said before, and will say again, that the market should decide how best to meet these targets. It will do it with much more efficiency than even the best minds in the Treasury can achieve.
I will stop there because I do not want to prolong this debate too much and I am grateful for being able to raise this separate issue. When we go through the Bill, I will speak to amendments concerning the energy performance standard because that is the mechanism within this Bill that could certainly deliver on these decarbonisation targets. Taken as a whole, these targets are actually very sensible: carbon budgets already exist and, knowing that, the Government can set them happily. There is nothing to stop the Government and it is something that should accompany this Bill. Consumers and wider society deserve some accountability for all these powers that we are giving to the Secretary of State.
My Lords, Amendment 8 raises questions about when a decarbonisation target range should be set. The noble Baroness has already said that the merit order in which generation is dispatched is a commercial decision, so the Government really should not interfere with that.
However, we are supporting decarbonisation, as the noble Baroness is aware, by making low carbon more attractive with the EMR provisions. When we come to the EMR part of the Bill, this issue will have a much fuller airing. Rather than fettering any future Government, this Government have taken the most important step of putting in place the legislative framework to allow a binding target range to be set in 2016. As I said earlier, it has to be set against a backdrop of a number of things and not taken in isolation. There are two issues that we must address: first, whether the Secretary of State should set future targets after the first target range is set; and, secondly, whether he should set a target range for a date earlier than 2030.
On the first of these issues, I agree with the noble Baroness that there is merit in the Secretary of State having the ability to set targets for years beyond the setting of the first target. After all, we are guided in this debate by the framework provided by the Climate Change Act, which looks out to 2050 and not 2030. I am pleased to say that the Bill already permits future target ranges to be set beyond 2030. On the second issue, I do not think that we should set a target as early as 2020 because we already have a suite of targets and measures that give very clear signals about the pace and trajectory of the power sector up to 2020. A further target at this stage would probably be very unhelpful and not very useful.
In addition, neither the Committee on Climate Change nor industry leaders have been calling for a decarbonisation target earlier than 2030. Their support is for a target that clarifies the long-term trajectory of the electricity sector. I think the noble Baroness accepts that that is a far better forward-looking view than shortening the timescale and adding uncertainty to industry by adding further targets to which it would have to adjust. Industry already has certainty until 2020. The issue about what more is needed, and when, beyond that date was aired fully in the previous debate.
This view was echoed at Second Reading by a number of noble Lords who argued that a decarbonisation target would be a way to provide certainty to investors. I think that I made the point clearly in the previous debate that we need to be able to set it with the fifth carbon budget and while looking at a whole range of other scenarios and mechanisms rather than setting it in isolation. We also need to look at what other countries are doing so that we do not put ourselves at a disadvantage competitively, ensuring that we are among the world leaders in the competitive race. I think it would start hampering industry if we keep adding targets to those it is already meeting. The noble Baroness’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, said:
“Most of the investment decisions that will be contemplated in the next two or three years will relate to a period beyond the current target of 2020”.—[Official Report, 18/6/13; col. 232.]
That provides a brief explanation of the Government’s view that the framework in the Bill is the right one and that it would be inappropriate either to set a target range for as early as 2020 or to set the range for 2030 before the setting of the fifth carbon budget in 2016. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her response. I have to point out that at the moment we have a policy introduced by a Treasury, which is trying to achieve exactly what she said that the Government should not do; namely, to affect the merit order. She said that the merit order is subject to the market and that therefore we cannot do anything about it. Why then have the Government introduced a carbon floor price, if not to influence that merit order? That is exactly what it is designed to do and trying to encourage. Generators will internalise the price of carbon and therefore run their cleanest plant first. Let us be honest, the cheapest way in which we can hit our carbon targets is simply by supply companies switching to a cleaner station rather than a dirtier one. That is the lowest hanging fruit possible, which is why the carbon floor price has been introduced.
I do not think that the carbon floor price is a very good policy. It is not bankable. I know no one who is able to invest on the back of it. In fact, I have heard from suppliers that they are now no longer able to get PPAs for their thermal plant more than two years in advance because of the uncertainty of the carbon floor price. It is a suboptimal policy and it does make me wonder whether the Treasury is happy to throw its fine logic about not going further than Europe and always keeping with the pack out of the window the minute that the revenue starts to flow in. That is clearly what that mechanism is designed for.
It is scandalous that the Chancellor thought that it was insufficiently interesting even to mention it in his Budget, yet it will be raising billions—I repeat, billions—in revenue in the coming years. It has started already. There is a total illogicality here in the Government’s position. On the one hand, we are happy to introduce carbon floor prices and are trying to interfere with the merit order but, on the other hand, we are not prepared to give the consumer—the citizen—the reassurance that this is being done with the purpose of reducing the carbon intensity. That is the simplest, cheapest and most cost-effective way of reducing our carbon and meeting our targets.
I take the point about the 2020 target being quite soon. I put it at 2020 simply to point out that there is this 200 grams of carbon intensity that can be got at overnight. The Government should be spending every effort to try to make sure that that is achieved. I am afraid that the carbon floor price does not achieve that. It simply is not bankable and people do not feel confident to invest on the back of it.
I think that the 2025 target is necessary, partly because the fourth carbon budget which parallels it is subject to a complete lack of clarity. The Secretary of State’s report on setting the fourth carbon budget states quite clearly that the Government intend to make full use of flexibility and that if Europe does not change its targets in the ETS, we will revise that budget upwards. Where is the certainty there? There is none. A decarbonisation target would absolutely provide that certainty for 2025. We would then be in a much stronger position to meet our 2030 targets.
I will, of course, withdraw the amendment but I wonder whether the Minister would indulge me and perhaps ask her officials to consider a 2025 target and the advantages that might deliver. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.