(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we know that the Ministry of Justice is constrained by some very tight budgets and needs to save money. However, it is clear from these orders that it is proposing to save money very much at the expense of the low-paid and the most vulnerable in our society. The argument that was made by my noble friend Lord Beecham about the comparison with the fees at the Supreme Court tells its own story. The fees at the Supreme Court are disproportionately low compared to what will be the position in the tribunals. Therefore, I do not see the Minister’s argument that saving money has to be at the expense of those in the lower income parts of our society compared to those who are much better off and will be taking cases in the higher courts. The burden is in the wrong place.
Secondly, it is clear that this is all about deterring applicants. My noble friend Lord Young will remember debates on another regulation about raising the qualifying period for unfair dismissal. That took 3 million people out of the unfair dismissals scope virtually at a stroke. Now we have got this as well. As people have said, it is not going to deter the well paid executive who can see a crock of gold at the end of the case. Nor will it deter the union member, because we already know that unions are preparing to support their members in appropriate cases by covering the fees. It will be those who are on their own, probably low paid and vulnerable, and who will not find it easy to get a comparable job. They are being told to go away quietly. I think that is a green light to the heartless, careless, poor employer that they can now get away with it when previously they would have had to be more circumspect.
I do not put too much weight on the remissions scheme. The idea that if one has a £3,000 household investment income or savings certainly seems to be unfair because it lumps the household together for those calculations. I think it is still very much an attack on the low-paid, and the remissions scheme is nowhere near adequate to cover that. This is Beecroft by the backdoor. I know the Minister’s party colleague has been very strong in his condemnation of Beecroft, but why is it that these particular measures keep appearing, under a different guise for sure, and we keep seeing these attacks on employment rights in exactly the same spirit that Beecroft meant them in his original report.
I, too, add my voice to that of my noble friend Lady Turner in asking for these regulations to be withdrawn.
My Lords, I just want to speak briefly because I sat on employment tribunals for several years and I do not remember any vexatious claims. Although some were poorly argued, they would actually have done better with a lawyer. Of course conciliation is desirable where it can be arranged, but where it is not, I fear that these regulations will curtail access to justice. I am uneasy about the implication that assertion of rights is an unnecessary burden on business and therefore needs to be disincentivised.
There is exploitation and ill-treatment; I saw plenty of evidence of people sacked when pregnant or being sexually harassed. They were not glamorous bankers in the way that we read about them in the newspapers but, for instance, three cleaners whose lives were made a misery every day and people who were dismissed without a proper reason. The cases we found proved were brought by ordinary poor people who had lost their jobs. How could they afford to bring such cases under these regulations? I cannot imagine that they serve justice or provide that desirable balance between the interests of the employer and those of the employee; they distort it.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I rise to support the question put by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and to follow some powerful speeches that have been made in support of it. I declare an interest. I am a non-executive director of Thompsons, probably the most prominent trade union firm of solicitors.
The Government cannot be accused of inconsistency when it comes to rights at work. I see Clause 61 in a wider context: namely, that the direction of travel which the coalition has adopted is pretty clear. It is to keep chipping away in the name of deregulation at a range of rights, some more fundamental than others. When the opportunity comes along to chip away a bit more, it is taken. The Bill enabled this late amendment to be added. It can be seen in the context of raising qualifying periods and other obstacles to justice, changing the personal injuries area, without touching road traffic accidents, which is the major problem area of a compensation culture, and generally moving to disadvantage the already vulnerable. It is a kind of convoy and Clause 61 is one ship in the convoy.
For those of us who have spent most of our lives working to advance good relationships and security at work, and particularly to make sure that health and safety is of the best possible standard, Clause 61 is disappointing and frustrating. Of course, for the victims it is much worse than that. Clause 61 removes the ability of an employee to enforce a civil claim for workplace injury on the grounds of workplace regulations. I hope that we can take advantage of what my noble friend Lord Browne said, and pause and have a better look at this. If this change is enacted, the employee would have to rely on the common law doctrine of negligence to enforce a civil claim, but it is not always about negligence. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, picked an example where negligence did not come into it, certainly on the part of the employer, even if it was not quite in the mainstream of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act. As she said and as others have repeated, health and safety legislation is always looking for a balance between different types of obligation. In my long trade union career I have not met too many employers who are totally blameless, but I will accept the suggestion that there are some.
Before today’s discussion I did some research on this issue. In this House in 1969 Lord Morris of Kenwood introduced some regulations on protecting machinery. I summarise what he said, “If both parties are innocent and neither is to blame, who should bear the loss?”. The reality is that the legislation up until Clause 61 has favoured putting the liability on the employer. He has more resources. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, powerfully pointed out, he also has insurance. The principle is a mutual one which means that the insurance payment does not go up very much if, because of the mutual process of sharing the burdens, a pay-out has to be made by the insurance company.
However, an employee has no such resources to fall back on and removing strict liability at civil law makes the process that much harder. Removing strict liability does not remove unfairness; it merely shifts it on to the most vulnerable. I worry, too, about the cultural signal that this clause sends out. It is basically saying, “Health and safety is a bit overregulated. You do not have to take it quite so seriously as you did before. We are removing one bit of liability and if you are not negligent you might get away with this in future”. It is the wrong kind of signal. It is a signal that bad practices will be encouraged rather than good practices; that health and safety is not quite such a central feature of business culture as it is in many places, I acknowledge, and should be in all places.
I am proud of the United Kingdom's record on health and safety. If you look at the comparison with similar countries in the European Union, whether on skills, productivity or a range of other issues, we are not at the top of the league. We are at mid-table in most areas. But in health and safety we are at the top of the league. This is an area of excellence and many of the EU directives on health and safety have been the British Government's diplomacy spreading good practice through some countries that have some pretty ropey practices in this area. It is an area of excellence and our regulations, plus the fact that they enjoyed support on a wide basis, have laid the basis of a good record. It is not as good as we would have liked: there are still too many people killed, as has been recited today. There are too many people being injured and whose lives are wrecked, but this is an area of comparative excellence.
I ask the Government to think again and pause. They should have a look at this before Report. I have one question to add to those that have already been asked. In the impact assessment, there was no mention of the applicability of the European framework directive on health and safety. If an injured worker has no redress outside the negligence area, some legal opinion is already beginning to form that says that they can exercise the right under the European directive against the Government. In other words, they cannot take action against the employer so they will take it against someone else. Will the Minister comment on that particular expression and view? Generally speaking, this is a clause that goes in the wrong direction and I hope that while there is still time we can turn back in the right direction.
My Lords, as a former head of bits of HSE policy, I want to say that this clause undermines the main concept behind the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act to make it clearly enforceable that employers should not with impunity be so recklessly negligent as to imperil life, limb or health if they can help it—that is part of the Act, too. Clause 61, as has been said, does not minimise the potential criminality of this behaviour, but it prevents anyone using a proven breach with any degree of liability as grounds for compensation. Injured employees must fall back, as my noble friends have said, on the common law duty of care, which is very hard to prove.
Recalling the debates over the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act when it was passed—and it received all-party support—Section 47 was put into the Act for this exact reason: so that the workforce could have something effective and tangible if they were severely injured, not just the knowledge of a successful prosecution in which they were a passive witness.
Section 47 was widely consulted on. I would like to ask the Minister the response of the Governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to this provision, Clause 61. Can he confirm that they were consulted?
Finally, there is a potential increase in National Health Service costs from this clause because costs are clawed back from the employer if there is compensation and they will not be if there is none. Does the Minister agree? I fear that the Government will be going backwards in their understanding of workplace risks, let alone in recognition of justice for injured work people if the provision goes forward in this form.