(5 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeAccording to the BIA, which is a cautious body that keeps its finger on the pulse of the sector very well and in my experience always represents that sector extremely accurately, it is concerned about the impact of this approach on patients’ access to new medicines and the effect on jobs of a decline in using the UK for the growth of innovative products in the bioindustry sector. It says:
“Eroding intellectual property protection whilst also seeking global free trade deals sends a signal to industry that the UK Government may further erode protection as it seeks to quickly conclude deals. This would further impact the industry in the UK and future inward foreign investment”.
That is what the industry is saying, it is not what I am saying. I am repeating to the Grand Committee what the sector and the industry are saying, having been involved in this set of regulations. The BIA and the industry are also concerned that the proposal has simply not been properly consulted on:
“The suggestion that the government might take this approach first appeared in a Technical Notice at the end of August”,
2018. The BIA,
“raised concerns with Ministers and the MHRA. The MHRA stated that concerns should be included in responses to their ‘no deal’ consultation which concluded on 1 November (the consultation did not ask specifically about exclusivity)”.
So the Government did not actually consult on the point of exclusivity. That is the view of the trade body which is responsible in this area. This is why I urged a bit of caution on the reassurances that the Minister might want to give until after I had spoken. This is what the industry is saying. The statutory instrument,
“was tabled on 1 December, when follow-up discussions from the consultation were still ongoing. There has been no formal consultation”,
on this issue, which undermines the validity of the regulations.
The sector is saying that it was not consulted on the specific items in the regulations and that is as a result of its contact with the MHRA, the regulator.
In its response to the MHRA no-deal consultations, the BIA, together with the ABPI, stated:
“We are also concerned that the proposal for data and market exclusivity for marketing authorisations is not being consulted on”.
It has made that clear beyond peradventure. I do not know who the IPO spoke to. It may have been one individual company—that is what my intelligence from the BIA suggests. By any stretch of the imagination, it was simply not a proper consultation with the sector that is most affected and which is genuinely concerned that the regulations will have a massive adverse effect on the life sciences industry in this country.
In its response to the consultation, the MHRA stated on 3 January that there would be a review within two years. However, by that time some UK patients will not be able to receive the medicines that they would have if the UK was a member of the EU and there will have been a significant impact on the UK industry as well as on the global industry’s perception of the UK. This is what a responsible trade body is saying has been the effect—
I am sorry if I am taking up a bit of time. I have heard longer speeches and I have been interrupted a few times.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I first apologise to the Minister for being caught out—
Is it really appropriate that the noble Baroness speaks, given that she was not here for any of the Minister’s introduction of the statutory instrument at all?
I apologise: I got caught out because I was advised of a rather different timescale. With the permission of the House, may I speak?
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment, to which I have added my name. The first basis on which I do so is that, like the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, I regard the cap as an unfortunate necessity. The ambition and the emphasis must be to end the cap as soon as possible. Therefore we need to focus minds on the creation of that effective marketplace.
My Lords, the amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe would ensure that the price cap comes to an end in 2020 with no provision to extend it. The Bill allows a temporary and targeted price cap on poor value, standard variable and default tariffs. Fixed tariffs that are not default tariffs will not be affected by the cap as these are where the most competitive rates can be found. The price cap is only necessary to protect consumers on poor value tariffs until the conditions for effective competition are in place.
The Bill has a sunset clause at 2023 and the cap would fall at the end of 2020 if, at that point, the conditions for effective competition are in place; I think that my noble friend wanted a response on that issue. The Bill is constructed in this way because the Government do not want an open-ended intervention, which would not be good for competition and, therefore, consumers.
At this point, I want to address the communication received by many noble Lords about the way the Bill is drafted, potentially preventing the cap from being removed, as the cap itself may have an impact on competition. That point was not lost on the Government when the Bill was drafted, which is why the judgment on removing the price cap, as set out in Clause 7(5), depends on whether,
“the Secretary of State considers that conditions are in place for effective competition for domestic supply contracts”.
In its recent consultation, Ofgem stated:
“We interpret ‘conditions for effective competition’ as meaning that the right market framework is in place for competition to be effective for currently disengaged consumers once the cap is removed”.
In assessing whether the conditions for competition are in place, Ofgem said that it would expect to analyse both the demand side and the supply side of the market, consider whether the market structure will promote good outcomes for disengaged consumers and consider whether there are remaining barriers to engagement. It refers to market conditions, not current market outcomes, for example on the rate of switching.
Coming back to the amendment, it is clear that the Government want the cap to be in place for as short a time as necessary. Ofgem will report on the conditions for effective competition and make a recommendation. Ofgem’s recent consultation points towards a number of factors that might indicate that the conditions for effective competition are in place. On the supply side, these include more innovative business models and the rollout of smart meters. On the demand side, they include making it easier for customers to share their data securely with third parties—meaning that they do not have to look up and enter lots of data on websites when they want to switch—and promoting engagement to help customers identify the best deal. These measures will need time to be established but it is right that we ensure protections are in place until the conditions for effective competition are in place. That is why the Bill enables the price cap to be extended, one year at a time, up to the end of 2023 at the latest.
I am grateful to my noble friend for her amendments. I can confirm that, all being well, the price cap will fall away in 2020—but as we have noted, if all is not well, it will not. With that, I hope that my noble friend is assured and will withdraw her amendment.
It seems that the Secretary of State has to make a decision before the end of 2019, in respect of 2020. At that stage, it must be assumed that the price cap will not continue because, unless the Secretary of State continues it, it will stop at the end of that year. There is an extra argument, as it were, to the argument about the cap stopping then: the cap will not be in contemplation in examination of the situation because we will have to assume that it has stopped. Therefore, any effect that it has on reducing competition is out of the equation at that juncture. I hope that noble Lords follow me.
My Lords, I was doing really well until the last sentence. I tried to follow my noble and learned friend. Of course, there will be a period leading up to the point at which the Secretary of State has to make the decision on whether to keep the cap. At that time, he will look at the information that is available to him and make a judgment on whether the conditions for effective competition are in place.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her full and helpful answer. I was very clear when she sought to sit down that all was well. I will need to read my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay’s intervention before we come back at Third Reading. My expectation is that we can find a way through this to meet my concern that, conditions permitting, the cap can end in 2020, and to meet the concerns that have been expressed by a number of learned experts from the industry on the correct discretion on the extension of the cap. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions and for their questions. I hope that I can deal with the points they made.
I will start with the point made by both noble Lords about the delay in getting the decision right. I have to say that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, in a sense answered that point. The important thing was that we wanted to get the decision right and wanted to look at it as a whole, not just in relation to the cost of energy but also taking into account all the other factors that the noble Lord mentioned, including, for example, the amenity advantages and—this was raised in another place—the use of steel and the effect that that might have on the Port Talbot steelworks. Of course we did. We looked at those issues, which made the sums much more complicated. At the same time, we were also seeing quite a reduction in the cost of offshore wind, as the Statement made clear. I quoted those figures; the reduction complicates matters further. It also makes clearer the case put forward by my right honourable friend about making this decision. That is why—at the right point, I would say—my right honourable friend came to another place and made decisions. It is my privilege to repeat them today.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked about other potential benefits. There are some, which we looked at. In the end, one has to come back to them, whether they are amenity advantages or jobs in the construction phase, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson —or perhaps it was the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. The benefits are necessarily limited and the jobs are limited to the construction phase. Though great, the amenity benefits are not enough to deal with the fact that, over the period of this project’s existence, we will still pay three times as much for electricity as for electricity that could be obtained from offshore wind, because the cost of that wind has reduced so much.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, also talked about the need for diversity of supply. Again, I have discussed that at some length in this House a number of times. Occasionally, I put to noble Lords on the Liberal Benches the need to look at the advantages that might come from the extraction of shale gas. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, does not like to comment on that, but his noble friend Lord Bruce offered praise for shale gas, whereas his noble friend Lady Featherstone is not so keen. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, looked as though he did not want to comment on this when we discussed it last week. We want diversity of supply because, as made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, it brings us security. We want security, but not at excessive cost. I will not rehearse the figures in the Statement about the potential cost, but it is too great on this occasion.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, also talked about new technology and the possibility of costs coming down. On this occasion, I do not think that the technology is particularly new. We are talking about boring earth, concrete and other things with steel into the ground or the sea to make barriers. That is the major cost. I do not think there is the scope for cost reduction that came with the development of offshore wind, where we saw installations getting bigger and blades getting more efficient. As a result, we saw the great advantages of technology moving forward. Here, we are dealing with what one might call relatively old technology that will not come down in cost.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked what the acceptable cost was. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State made clear in another place, he was not prepared to put a figure on the cost because other factors would be taken into account for each project, which we would look at in the context of other possible benefits and the cost of the electricity. We are not ruling out the prospect of tidal lagoons in the future but this particular one looked expensive. Other tidal lagoons might be cheaper if they are bigger. There are economies of scale in electricity costs. Each project would have to be looked at individually.
Both noble Lords talked about the reduction of carbon emissions. We accept that there would be such a reduction in this case. We want to go on doing what we can to reduce our emissions as much as possible. But again, as I want to make clear, we can do that only when taking costs into account.
I want to comment briefly on the alleged reduction in investment. There has been a reduction but a great deal of investment was made. We have seen rapid growth in renewables since 2010. We have seen the use of renewables go up from 6.9% in 2010, at the beginning of the coalition, to around 30% today.
I think I have dealt with most of the points made by noble Lords. I hope they will accept that, in the end, the case is pretty clear. The scheme was imaginative and good, and it was right that we looked at it in some detail, but the cost of the electricity is just too great.
My Lords, I respectfully remind noble Lords that this is an opportunity to question the Minister. Therefore, short questions rather than long comments would be much appreciated.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone. The amendments in this group are variations on the same theme, which is the question of how one can find in the Bill the right balance between the wish to encourage the drive towards reduced carbon and no-carbon generation of power as far as possible and, at the same time, trying to get out of what appears to be a cul-de-sac in which the more we propose exemptions from the tariff for those who exercise clear preferences for green supply and carbon-free generation, the more they will not feel the benefit from measures that are meant to reduce the cost of the electricity and power that they consume. I do not know what the right balance for that is, so this is a probing amendment.
Our solution—we are not wedded to it but I would be interested to hear the Government’s observations on it—is that a situation where a consumer has clearly and unambiguously signified their intention to always select energy provided from wind or other renewable sources might provide a break point in which one could exercise discretion on whether they obtained the benefit of the cap. That seems to play to my earlier concern that this would prioritise people who used carbon-based energy sources as the only ones to benefit from the cap and would therefore reduce their costs.
I am not entirely clear which way we should go on this. It seems unreasonable to take an extreme position one way or the other, but that seems the only way to find an equitable solution. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I will address the proposed amendments to Clause 3 from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, regarding arrangements for exemptions from the price cap.
On Amendments 13 and 14, the Government are clear that it is right for Ofgem, as the expert regulator, to look at an exemption from the cap for green standard variable tariffs, remembering that fixed-term green tariffs are not covered by the cap. The Bill requires Ofgem to consult on an exemption and, if it decides to put an exemption in place, it must be for tariffs that are chosen by consumers and which support the production of gas and the generation of electricity from renewable sources.
The Government do not wish to prejudge the outcome of Ofgem’s consultation. We are very much aware of the arguments around having an exemption but are also aware that, as with any exemption, there may be a risk of gaming—or greenwashing, as it is sometimes known. This is a complex area and we should not make any judgments or decisions until Ofgem has undertaken its consultation and examined the approaches to an exemption.
The Government note that many fixed-term green tariffs that support renewable energy generation are already available on the market. These offer consumers considerable savings compared with non-green SVT tariffs. Some new entrants to the market also expect to deliver green standard variable tariffs at levels below where they expect Ofgem to set the price cap. Fixed-term green tariffs would still be available in the event that the regulator chooses not to exempt green SVTs from the price cap. In view of this explanation, I feel that Amendments 13 and 14 are unnecessary.
Amendment 15 concerns vulnerable consumers. As has been noted in relation to earlier amendments, Ofgem will keep the safeguard tariff in place for warm home discount recipients if it offers a higher level of protection than the market-wide price cap under the Bill.
Amendments 16 and 17 are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. Amendment 16 creates a situation whereby, if Ofgem decides that actively chosen green tariffs that support the production of renewable energy should be exempt, all consumers on such tariffs would need to opt in to this exemption; otherwise, the cap would still apply. There may be unintended consequences from this approach. If Ofgem does decide to exempt green tariffs and yet only a small proportion of consumers opt in to the exemption—for whatever reason—these suppliers could find that their tariffs become financially unsustainable. Such a situation could counteract the aim of encouraging and maintaining investment in renewable energy, while also limiting the choice of green tariffs available to consumers. The Government are therefore not convinced that an opt-in clause would be helpful.
On Amendment 17, I remind noble Lords that Ofgem published its policy consultation on 25 May and it remains open for submissions. The consultation contains a section on the green tariff exemption. Ofgem is engaging widely on the consultation, including through workshops with suppliers and consumer groups. As such, the amendment comes somewhat after the fact, and so I believe it is not necessary.
Finally, Amendments 18 and 19 are also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. I agree with the thrust of Amendment 18. As I have said, Ofgem’s policy consultation is already under way. In Appendix 13 of the consultation, Ofgem sets out the proposed criteria by which it may consider green tariffs to be exempt. One is that the green tariffs,
“provide support for renewables, materially beyond support provided through subsidies, obligations or other mandatory mechanisms”.
On Amendment 19, the Bill requires Ofgem to complete the consultation so that the licence modifications giving effect to the price cap include the exemption. Of course, this is subject to Ofgem deciding to put the exemption in place following the consultation. As setting a price cap and determining a robust exemption—subject to the outcome of the consultation—clearly involve a lot of work, the Bill provides a little flexibility in the event that this is not possible. Nevertheless, it still requires Ofgem to put in place any exemption as soon as practicable following the modifications putting in place the cap taking effect. Consequently, the Government do not see the need to include Amendments 18 and 19 in the Bill, and I hope the noble Lord will feel able to not move them.
I am sorry to interrupt: perhaps I might check two things with the Minister. I think we agree that there is an issue here that is very difficult to bottom out and therefore the consultation process is obviously helpful in that. What I was trying to get across, although perhaps I failed—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made the same point—is that given that we are in a consultation process, where does this all lie in relation to the Bill? Are the Government really saying that actually this is too difficult to deal with in the Bill and it is being passed to Ofcom to make whatever decision it can make in the light of the consultation?
I am not saying that that is wrong. I just ask the Minister to accept my earlier argument that this was actually rather a difficult principle and perhaps should be in primary legislation; otherwise, there is a question of gaming and other things. The point of principle was whether we should give priority to the encouragement that would flow to smaller, greener energy producers, which would not have their income reduced because they were carved out of the new tariff, at the expense of green-minded ordinary citizens who want to get their supply from green sources but are poor, vulnerable, disabled or fall into the category of needing support but find themselves removed from that support system because they are prioritising green energy. That does not seem fair. I wonder whether we should think very carefully about whether it is right to simply pass this to Ofgem to do on the basis of the consultation or whether we should take a decision within the Bill itself.
I thank the noble Lord for his questions. I would like to come back to the second question in due course because I did not quite follow the tension he identified between different types of consumers and whether they would be caught by the exemption and so on. I think there is an opportunity for us to meet again after this to discuss the green tariff exemption specifically.
On the first issue, the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to put an exemption in place for appropriate green tariffs, but the issue, as was brought out in previous discussions on the Bill, is that sometimes what is green is not green and the whole area can actually be very grey. We must not get ourselves into a situation where the real green tariffs are losing out. I am happy to have conversations in future.
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. It is very complex. There is still the kernel of an issue here, so I will read Hansard and consider what the Minister said. At the moment, I am uneasy that we have not bottomed out the issue that needs to be defined in the Bill to give the Government and the opposition parties surety that we have not, by accident or by design, done something to ace out what we are trying to value in all this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I shall speak to Amendments 21 and 24, which are in my name. Under Clause 4, Ofgem must undertake various actions by way of notice of proposed modifications, including giving notice that it proposes to make modifications. Amendment 21 specifies that Ofgem must provide reasons in a narrative that explains why it is making modifications—ideally, an assessment of why modifications are being proposed.
We all recognise that energy bills soared 20% between 2007 and 2013 and that the average household pays around £300 more today than it might otherwise do in a more competitive market. However, in the interests of transparency it is imperative that Ofgem outlines its reasons for setting the price cap at any given level for the benefit of suppliers and customers alike. That would help set parameters when undertaking later reviews and assist greater scrutiny.
Amendment 24 has been proposed following the debate last week in your Lordships’ House on the European Union Committee’s report Brexit: energy security. In its report the committee portrayed how the UK and the EU are already increasingly interconnected on energy. Already, high levels of gas are being piped from Norway and over 5% of electricity demand is being met from the EU, with estimates that this source of electricity supply is likely to increase to over 25%. At present the UK is a member of the internal energy market and the committee’s report underlines the risk should the UK not remain within the IEM. From evidence received, it is universally argued that the UK could be more vulnerable to supply shortages or challenges, making supply less efficient, with the result that retail prices to consumers could rise. Amendment 24 specifies that the consequences of Brexit must become part of the review of the market and the application of the cap.
In the Government’s response to the Select Committee, they failed to address this point while being pressed to undertake an assessment of the consequences of the UK leaving the IEM. How do the Government propose that Ofgem should assess the situation in its review? The effect should be recognised for the application of the cap and, hence, included in the Bill.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20, 21 and 24, which relate to the reasons for this cap and the details of its implementation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, proposes a review of the energy market, in particular setting out the reasons for the cap, whether it could have been avoided and how a price cap can be avoided in the future. The Bill follows on from an extensive two-year investigation undertaken by the Competition and Markets Authority. This reported that there was, in effect, a two-tier market, with good value tariffs for those who engage in switching suppliers but for those who do not, the market was uncompetitive and these consumers were being charged an unjustifiably high price for their basic energy needs.
The CMA also found that the significant market share of the largest energy companies and the use of the standard variable tariffs had led to a situation where customers, including some of the most vulnerable in society, are simply paying too much, They are also paying for the inefficiencies of the larger companies to the tune of around £1.4 billion a year. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, mentioned E.ON and its 41%. I was not quite sure what she was referring to and whether that was a return on capital. A profit increase of 41% would depend on its starting and end points; it is not hugely relevant, depending on the leverage of the company. Potentially, we should look at its return on capital, which is far more instructive.
It was as a result of this very detailed, two-year report that the Government and Ofgem undertook to protect those on the poorest-value tariffs on a temporary basis until the conditions for effective competition are established. In addition, Ofgem is actively considering the future of the energy retail market. This work is looking at barriers to innovation and whether the current market model needs to be reformed. Another review at this stage would simply tell us what we already know and take resources away from the vital work being carried out to support the necessary reforms of the market.
On Amendment 21 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, I am sure he is aware that, as part of the licence modification process, Ofgem will be required to state that it proposes to make the modifications and their effect. Subject to the will of Parliament, it is clear that this action is going to take place; indeed, suppliers and other interested parties are actively involved in the consultation being conducted by Ofgem. The amendment is therefore not necessary.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 24 relates to those matters which Ofgem should consider during its review of the level of the cap, which must take place at least once every six months. It is incredibly important that Ofgem, as the industry regulator, be allowed to consider what it feels matters the most. He may be pleased to learn that Ofgem has published a consultation paper which sets out the matters it proposes to review when considering the level of the cap. That will of course include wholesale prices and many of the factors raised in the debate of last week, which he mentioned. Hence, the amendment is unnecessary at this stage.
I hope that the noble Baroness and noble Lord are content with my explanations and will be willing to withdraw or not move their amendments.
I thank the Minister for her response. I understand that the Bill puts in place an examination of the conditions for effective competition, as an answer for not having a cap, but I am trying to go a little deeper. I want to avert the idea that a cap can become a mechanism whenever the market is dysfunctional. It is not the answer and we therefore have to go deeper. On the basis that I will consider what the Minister has said, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 4 and 5 seek to place a time limit, also called a sunset, on use of the power in Clause 2. I would like first to explain how Clause 2 works.
Clause 2 contains the power to amend by regulation the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It can amend those three pieces of legislation only, and amendments can only be those in consequence of a “relevant safeguards agreement”, that being very specifically an agreement relating to nuclear safeguards to which the UK and the International Atomic Energy Agency are parties.
This is a narrowly drawn power to enable the amendment of references in this legislation to provisions of safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency—which I shall refer to simply as the agency. This legislation enables the agency to carry out its activities in the UK, including by providing it with legal cover for activities of its inspectors in the UK. For the UK to have a domestic safeguards regime in future, it is essential that the legislation specified in Clause 2(1) can be amended to make correct reference to new safeguards agreements that the UK enters into with the agency.
The legislation cited in this clause is extremely unusual in that it makes detailed references to specific provisions of international agreements. As such, these references—for example, to articles—are likely to change as a result of any amendment of, or change to, those agreements. The power in the Bill is therefore necessary to make the changes to the relevant legislation to update those references when the new agreements are in place.
The UK’s safeguards agreements with the agency, and the agency’s ability to perform safeguards activities in the UK in accordance with those agreements, are absolutely fundamental to the agency’s application of safeguards in the UK. While the power is narrow, it is essential and underpins the entire regime. The unavoidable nature of negotiations means that we are tied to timing uncertainties and this power constitutes the only way we can address that uncertainty.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee agreed that the power in Clause 2 is necessary and appropriately framed. It recognised that it is intended as a way of reflecting the new agreements with the agency required to establish the UK’s civil nuclear safeguards regime, and recommended preventing the use of the power after a period of two years had expired.
The Government accept the principle of the committee’s recommendation, and of Amendment 5, that we should not retain this power for an indefinite period. However, the regime is heavily reliant on wider international negotiations and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the power is not sunsetted prematurely. Prematurely sunsetting this power could result in the relevant provisions becoming ineffective, leaving the UK without an effective domestic safeguards regime and in breach of any new international safeguards agreements put in place with the agency. The potential consequences of such failures are serious. The UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state would be damaged.
The international negotiations relevant to this power are unprecedented in their nature. I consider it essential to retain a provision enabling the UK to adapt to any circumstances affecting the timing of the commencement of international safeguards agreements between the agency and the UK. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendment, and the House will feel able to support government Amendment 4. I beg to move.
I speak to our Amendment 5, which is in this group. In Committee, we proposed that the power of the Secretary of State to enter into relevant international agreements without parliamentary approval be limited to a two-year period. The Government have accepted the principle but wish to extend the power to five years, as the Minister has proposed. We accept that this power is necessary and that there is oversight in its use through the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
However, I would like to press the Minister on why the Government think that a two-year period that coincides with any transition period could be insufficient to conclude necessary wider international agreements. We certainly do not wish to leave the UK without an effective domestic safeguards regime, in breach of any new international safeguards agreements put in place with the IAEA, but the Minister has not properly explained why she thinks it could be premature if this sunset clause were brought in at a period of two years.
The government amendments seek a further three years beyond the end of any transition period. Can the Minister clarify the kind of agreement she thinks could still be outstanding? I wonder whether included here could be the circumstances already drawn attention to in the earlier amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Broers, under proposed new subsection (3)(c), regarding international agreements with third countries, whereby the NCA agreement with, for example, the US could well take longer than any transition period. He argued for a suspension to our leaving Euratom.
I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. It is clear that the sunset provision we are discussing relates to the arrangement with the agency; it does not cover the nuclear co-operation agreements. Those are separate agreements.
We have thought very long and hard about the sunsetting of this—I think it falls into the territory of known unknowns—and we believe that two years is certainly too short and that five years is the right length. There may be circumstances that we cannot possibly foresee at this time that will make it necessary for the sunset clause to exist for slightly longer. We have now agreed—we hope, because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed—the implementation period. I think that noble Lords should take quite a lot of comfort in that implementation period in that, during that period, our safeguard arrangements will still be provided by Euratom. Indeed, it gives us an extra 21-month period for these arrangements to be put in place. Nevertheless, I think that the five-year period is appropriate. We have looked at the recommendations of the DPRRC and agree with them. A period of five years is the most appropriate time.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI support Amendments 8 and 13 and do not intend to speak at length. When the Minister was responding to Amendment 6 in the Committee’s previous sitting, he expressed a high degree of approval of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and I trust that that continues through these amendments. The case has been set out by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and the DPRRC, and I hope that on these two amendments the noble Baroness can give us similar encouragement to that given by the Minister on Amendment 6. We on these Benches support the restricted use of these measures to give the Government the flexibility that they need. This is a good compromise between untrammelled power and the power they need for the flexibility to ensure the necessary regime.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Fox, for their contributions. The amendments apply sunset provisions to two key powers in the Bill, Amendment 8 in respect of new Section 112(1B), which enables the Secretary of State to specify in regulations international agreements relating to safeguards that should be treated as “relevant international agreements”, and Amendment 13 in respect of the Henry VIII power in Clause 2.
I am grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its considered report on the Bill. We are considering the recommendations carefully, and my noble friend Lord Henley hopes to respond positively to many of the recommendations soon.
I welcome the principles that appear to be behind these amendments, namely those of scrutiny, certainty and restriction of powers. However, as the underlying purpose behind these powers is very different, the proposed two-year sunset clauses must be considered in each context specifically.
The noble Baroness may accuse me of being pedantic, but she said that her noble friend “hopes” to be able to respond. Does that really mean “expects” to be able to respond, or is it merely a hope? If it is an expectation, most of us will be content; if it is merely a hope, we will be troubled.
My noble friend Lord Henley has just whispered “expects” to me.
Noble Lords will recall that I updated the House last week, during the first sitting of this Committee, on the progress the Government have made in discussions on our new agreements with the IAEA and key NCA partners. These discussions provide important context for the amendments as, despite having made significant progress, we do not expect all of them to have been concluded by the time of the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
Amendment 13 would apply a two-year sunset provision to Clause 2, which contains the power to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It can amend these pieces of legislation only in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement.
Of course, it is very difficult to be specific on that but, as we know, we are focusing on four NCAs in the first tranche. The noble Lord will know that there are many other countries with which we would like to have an NCA in future which perhaps do not fall within the first tranche. The second thing to recognise is that this is not just about entering into new NCAs; it is whether new obligations arise as conditions change within the international community for safeguarding. This gives us the flexibility, but it is not drawn so widely that we can do whatever we like.
While we cannot accept Amendment 8, I would like to provide reassurance of the scrutiny that will be in place to ensure that there is proper oversight in the use of this power. Pursuant to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, we would expect any new international treaties relating to safeguards to go through the ratification processes set out in that Act. Use of the power to make regulations specifying agreements as “relevant international agreements” is itself subject to the draft affirmative procedure in all cases, and any regulations made under the power that relies on these agreements must be consulted on. I am therefore confident that an appropriate level of scrutiny and restriction of powers is already in place.
I recognise the principles which lie behind the proposed amendments, and I hope that noble Lords will accept why I cannot accept them today. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, feels able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for that very full response and am grateful, too, to hear the whispers between her and the Minister on the Front Bench. Our expectations are always full of hope, but I am rather troubled by her response to Amendment 8, and we will need to consider her reply very carefully. I am not sure that the power should be enduring. However, she said in her response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that it is important that there continues to be scrutiny and oversight of these agreements. We will study her response very carefully. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have added our names to Amendment 4 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. It is Labour policy to remain a member of Euratom or to continue equivalent arrangements with it. The Conservative Government have been reckless to reject immediately the UK’s membership of Euratom. Your Lordships’ discussion in Committee last night on the withdrawal Bill highlighted how the Euratom treaty is distinct from the EU treaty. The Government state that, because there is an overlap of membership, with the same nation states as are in the EU, it is part of the same organisation. However, the two treaties are legally distinct, which has not been contradicted by the Government.
The Minister said this morning that both organisations are uniquely and legally joined. He needs to explain how they are so legally. It is reckless to make the theoretical and technical oversight of the European Court of Justice a defining reason, when the UK is far from ready to undertake its own safeguards regimes to the standard maintained by Euratom. The ECJ has never been called on to make a ruling.
Furthermore, the Government have committed to continue as far as possible through negotiations to be in close association with Euratom. They must be exhaustive in their endeavours and report back to Parliament on the outcome. If it is no longer possible to establish an association, they must say so, with reasons.
Amendment 9, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, map out further agreements to be pursued before withdrawal. It requires the Secretary of State to request “a transition period” so that the UK,
“can continue to benefit from existing nuclear safeguard agreements”,
with the approval of the IAEA, that the ONR is the approved UK safeguarding authority. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath has spoken to Amendment 12 on the transitional period. It must be recognised that approvals of nuclear co-operation agreements are sequential to the recognition by the IAEA that the UK safeguarding standards are sufficient. Although these NCAs may be progressing, their ratification will necessarily take some time and may spill over into any transition period. We endorse the sentiments behind Amendment 9 as crucial to maintaining the UK as a credible internationally recognised nuclear state operating to international standards.
Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, would insert a new clause stating that before leaving Euratom the Government must publish a report detailing agreements reached with Euratom to ensure compliance with international non-proliferation agreements and lay appropriate regulations to give effect to their implementation. We understand and are in unison with the importance noble Lords on all Benches place on the highest standards, the nearest equivalence, the closest association, with any necessary transition period, to replicate the regime currently operated under Euratom. We support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that says the Government must keep Parliament informed regarding the ongoing UK status with Euratom. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has also said that it is far from clear where we will be in March 2019, when timing is such a critical issue.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to address this important set of issues around the UK’s future relationship with Euratom. As my noble friend Lord Henley said, the EU and Euratom are uniquely legally joined. Noble Lords will be aware that when we formally notified our intention to leave the EU, we also commenced the process of leaving Euratom. I repeat my noble friend’s assurances, however, that the Government want to maintain the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and other international parties when we leave the EU.
The first half of the proposition of Amendment 4 —that,
“it is no longer possible to retain membership of Euratom”—
has already passed. On 29 March 2017 the Prime Minister notified President Tusk of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from Euratom. We are withdrawing from Euratom but we want a close relationship with it in the future. I believe that it would be deeply irresponsible of Parliament to pass an amendment which, quite explicitly, prevents us from using the powers in this Bill until we have attempted to do exactly the opposite of what the Article 50 letter says we are doing. That leaves the second half of the proposition: that we achieve, “an association with Euratom” that means that it is Euratom rather than our own regulator, the ONR, that carries out safeguarding in the UK after we leave the EU. To reiterate the point made by my noble friend, while the Euratom treaty allows for the conclusion of association agreements that allow third parties to participate in some Euratom activities, these agreements have so far been limited primarily to research and training activities.
This amendment would require us to have explored every avenue and concluded that,
“it is no longer possible”,
before we make regulations to enable the UK’s own domestic regime. That presents enormous timing difficulties and will introduce a risk of the one thing I believe everyone agrees we must avoid—being left with nothing in place from day one of Brexit. I do not believe that the industry would support such a position. We simply cannot await the outcome of the future relationship discussions before we use the regulation-making powers in the Bill. Of course, it may all happen very quickly but, then again, it may not. It would be deeply irresponsible to put ourselves in a position where we cannot exercise the powers in the Bill.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s debut on the Bill. I am trying to make clear that I am not asking the Government to stop proceeding with the Bill; all I am asking them to do is to set out on a piece of paper the nature of their future association and relationship. The Front Bench keeps avoiding that issue. I do not use the words “associate membership”, I use the word “association”. I am willing to change it to “relationship”. What I am trying to get the Government to do is set out how they see their relationship with Euratom—because they have acknowledged that they will have a relationship with it in some way—and what that relationship will cover. If we could get some clarity from Ministers on that, we would not be having these endless discussions about the issue.
I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. I am on paragraph 11. I have many more paragraphs to go and I hope that in those paragraphs I will be able to keep him very happy indeed.
I understand and share the sentiment of wanting to maintain a close relationship with Euratom. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, mentioned this relationship and it could indeed include any of the things that he mentioned, but they are subject to the negotiations. However, we have already stated very clearly that the Government will seek a close and effective association as part of phase 2 of the exit negotiations with the European Commission. What we cannot accept is that the regulations must await a definitive outcome of talks which are by their nature uncertain in both timing and result. It is therefore vital that we continue to work to enable the set-up of a domestic safeguards regime, and to have ready the bilateral safeguards and nuclear co-operation agreements that we will need to function as a responsible nuclear state from day one of exit.
This approach will reassure the international community that the UK remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation, and will provide clarity to industry that it will continue to be able to move vital materials, parts and expertise once we leave Euratom. There can be no question of waiting until we know the outcome of the negotiations on our future relationship before we can put in place our own arrangements. The implications of not having the right systems operating from when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply are too serious for industry and for our position within the international civil nuclear community.
Can we actually make this clear? I have not heard anyone in this Committee saying, “Please, Her Majesty’s Government, do not do anything until this thing is finished”. We are not asking for anything to be delayed, we are saying, “Please get on with it”, but we need some information on the way; we have to have some idea of the destination, and Brussels wants some idea of the destination by 22 March and then in October. If it does not happen, what are the contingency plans? We are not asking for anything to not happen now. I do not think the Minister understands that. Did I hear anybody say that?
I thank both noble Lords for their interventions. I will make a little progress because I think I will be able to make them both a little happier—although I am fairly sure that I will not get all the way.
I recognise the importance of providing Parliament with clarity on our future relationship with Euratom. The Written Ministerial Statement of 11 January includes a commitment to provide quarterly updates on progress.
I turn now to Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, which would require the Secretary of State to seek a transition period in the event that the UK is unable to secure new international agreements with the IAEA and nuclear co-operation agreements—or NCAs—with key third parties by 1 March 2019. I will address NCAs first. It may be helpful for me to set out that the UK does not itself have any requirement for NCAs to be in place for trade in nuclear-related items to continue—but some of our key trading partners do. In the US it is a legal requirement; in Japan, Canada and Australia it is a very strong policy commitment. That is why those four NCAs are our priority. It is quite right to stress how important this is: an NCA must be in place before such trade with these countries can take place. Each of these four countries recognises the importance of putting in place bilateral NCAs to ensure uninterrupted co-operation and trade in the civil nuclear sector, following the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom.
There are also a number of countries, in addition to the four priority ones, with which we wish to discuss our ongoing nuclear co-operation to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place to allow continuity of trade. But in those cases—
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I suspect that she is now on paragraph 15, but she is not answering this debate, which is about whether Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to provide specified information to Parliament on certain criteria. What she is telling us would all be very interesting if we had not heard it many times before, but it is a dissertation on the roles of different organisations. Can we please have an answer to this debate? It is 4.32 pm on a Thursday and I would have thought that it could be answered in a few paragraphs—maybe numbers 47 to 50.
I was happy with the answer that the Minister was giving about NCAs.
With the greatest respect, I did not interfere in the writing of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I will crack on a bit further to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, as I too think this bit is very interesting. We are talking about these additional countries because we are obviously going to have to set up NCAS with them, too, for trade to continue. I assure noble Lords that discussions on the four priority NCAs started a while back and are progressing well. They are on track to be completed before the UK leaves the EU. I can also assure noble Lords that this Government, as part of their planning process, have factored in the time necessary to seek parliamentary ratification of the agreements both in the UK and in third countries. This will enable the NCAs to come into force from the moment that Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK.
I turn now to the UK’s discussions with the IAEA. Noble Lords will be aware that the UK began formal discussions with it some months ago to conclude new safeguards agreements that would replace those between the UK, IAEA and Euratom when the Euratom arrangements are no longer applicable. These discussions, which began some months ago, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe mentioned, have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I can be a little more specific: formal negotiations started last September and there were several rounds of preliminary meetings before that. There have been two rounds of negotiations so far, which have made substantial progress. I hope that that is helpful.
The amendment asks that the IAEA should recognise the ONR as the approved safeguards authority in the UK, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I will make it clear that the IAEA’s focus in respect of the UK’s safeguards lies with the voluntary offer agreement and additional protocols rather than with the domestic legislation underpinning the domestic regime or the UK Government’s arrangements for fulfilling their commitments. However, as I have set out, the Government have already held productive and fruitful discussions with the IAEA on the UK’s future safeguards agreements and understand what the IAEA requires of us in setting up the system. It is not necessary to consult on the detail of legislation or on the ONR’s readiness to implement the new regime with the IAEA.
As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy set out in his Statement to the House in September last year, the Government are seeking new agreements with the IAEA that follow exactly the same principles as the existing ones. This will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.
In addition to this, the Secretary of State set out on 11 January the Government’s intention to update the House on our overall progress with Euratom, including on the EU negotiations and other important matters such as international agreements. I trust that these reports, the first of which we expect to provide in a few weeks’ time—indeed, just before the Easter Recess—will reassure noble Lords that significant and substantial progress is being made. Indeed, noble Lords will be able to see it for themselves and will no doubt bring it back to the House to discuss, should they wish.
Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, inserts two new subsections and seeks to require that, by 29 March 2019, the Secretary of State must present to Parliament a substantially detailed report, along with draft regulations implementing any agreements reached with Euratom relating to safeguards, and have such regulations approved by both Houses. Amendment 14 seeks to prevent the substantive provisions of the Bill coming into force until regulations under Amendment 15 to implement safeguards agreements with Euratom have been approved. While I have sympathy with the noble Lord’s aim of ensuring robust parliamentary scrutiny, the process set out in Amendment 15 would not be appropriate. As we have already discussed in our deliberations on this Bill, I am confident that there are appropriate processes in place to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the substantive powers in the Bill. Noble Lords can be assured that the regulations establishing a UK safeguards regime under the powers in the Bill will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
I turn now to the report proposed in this amendment. We have been open about our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom. In the Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January, we outlined a twofold approach under which we are seeking a close association with Euratom through our negotiations with the European Union. I refer noble Lords to the Written Ministerial Statement. It goes into some detail about our specific objectives in relation to a close association with research and training, continuity of open trade arrangements and close and effective co-operation on nuclear safety. This is a very broad ambition of ours, and it goes much further than the nuclear safeguards that we are specifically talking about today. Simultaneously with these discussions about our broader relationship with Euratom, on which we will report to your Lordships’ House every three months, we are putting in place measures to ensure that we can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
As noble Lords will be aware, we are planning negotiations on a possible implementation period. The Government have confirmed that they intend to include Euratom matters. This implementation period will start after the date that we leave the European Union. This must be taken into account. We are being open with our plans for a domestic regime, and we have been clear on our intentions for the new domestic regime. As made clear in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government intend to be able to put in place a robust regime equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to that currently provided by Euratom. To put this more clearly, and for the avoidance of doubt, we would be meeting IAEA standards on day one and working our way to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. A key but inevitable difference will be that reporting and assurance activities would be carried out by the ONR rather than Euratom.
The approach of using a domestic body rather than a supranational one to operate a domestic safeguards regime is common among other non-Euratom countries, such as the US and Canada, whose safeguards regimes consist of a state regulator, with the IAEA providing independent international verification. This approach necessitates some differences in the approach of the regime but we do not consider it to necessitate a reduction in standards. To be absolutely clear about independence, it is the international oversight provided by the IAEA and the inspections carried out by its inspectors that underpin the independence of nuclear safeguards around the world. As I have already mentioned, we have committed to providing Parliament with quarterly reports on progress from across the Euratom programme. These reports will include a section on ONR capacity and readiness as well as on research, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Before I close, I want to return to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the meeting that he attended with officials. I want to flesh out the Government’s consultation strategy on this because I fear he thinks it is narrower than is truly the case. The Government continue to have discussions with the nuclear industry on the future of the nuclear safeguards regime. In addition to official-level engagement, Richard Harrington, the Minister for Energy and Industry, held a representative industry stakeholder forum in September. There have been further forums since then and the next one will take place on 5 March. The Government have provided the industry with pre-consultation drafts of regulations that we propose to make, and in late February we held a technical workshop on the draft regulations with key nuclear operators.
I hope my explanations have provided sufficient reassurances to noble Lords, and that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I would like to catch the Minister before she sits down, if that is possible. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, and I have mentioned research and development. Resources to sustain that research and development come through Euratom. Have the Government said anything about how these resources are going to be sustained in future?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Broers, for that comment. I did have a little more flesh on that particular bone so I shall share it now. On the question of research, the Government’s objectives are set out in our recent future partnership paper, Collaboration on Science and Innovation. We are seeking a close association with the Euratom research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, or ITER, projects. The Government have already guaranteed our share of the funding for the Oxfordshire-based JET fusion reactor until the end of 2020, demonstrating our commitment to continued collaboration.
My Lords, I found part of the Minister’s statement extremely useful and I thank her for that, particularly on the NCA question.
However, there is an issue on which I would like clarity; I think it is very straightforward, and I ask this in a very positive tone. It is the Commission and the EU 27’s offer and negotiating position on transition that the whole of the Euratom acquis is also included in the broader EU transition agreement. Are the British Government in line with that, and will they go down that route as well? I do not hear that we are rejecting it. We have potential issues with the initial situation over residents and people on the EU side, but are the Government saying they are going to have the Euratom acquis as part of the transition that will be agreed, whether that is until the end of 2020 or the two years? If they were saying that, it would take a lot of pressure off what we are talking about as long as the IAEA was happy with it. That seems a very straightforward question and I presume there is a government policy on it. In the response today to Barnier’s negotiating position I did not see any contesting of the Euratom side of it, so I presume we are going ahead and agreeing that transition in March.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for that interesting question. If it is okay, I shall write to him, because I should like to find out more information about what we are allowed to say at this time.