Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Tyler of Enfield
Main Page: Baroness Tyler of Enfield (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Tyler of Enfield's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(3 days, 21 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I join others in congratulating the committee on producing a first-class report, which is frankly more prescient than I expect its members could ever have imagined in their wildest dreams, or perhaps I should say nightmares. To say that the world has turned upside-down at a dizzying pace in recent days is an understatement, but the report’s recommendations remain completely relevant. In essence, we need a completely new response and quickly.
I will say a few words about the current situation before turning to several of the specific recommendations. While I join others in saluting the tireless efforts of the Prime Minister, who has played a critical role on the world stage, I do not believe that we can rely on the USA to be a strong and dependable ally. Indeed, Trump has made it clear that he does not accept a continuing responsibility for the security of Europe. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, made clear, that has a wider resonance in the USA. Article 5 of the NATO agreement—the glue we have relied on for so many years—is no longer anything like as secure as it was. We are in a new and dangerous situation and our response must take account of this.
The response that the Prime Minister has adopted to try to broker re-engagement between the US and Ukraine while seeking to put together a coalition of the willing to defend Ukraine is to be welcomed. It is clear that the UK and our European allies will have to accept a step-change increase in resources for our own defence, as the report we are debating makes crystal clear because, once one strips away the rhetoric, the reality is this: Trump is imposing huge pressure on a so-called ally to agree to a surrender/ceasefire on America’s terms, which are to cede territory to Russia and mineral resources to the USA without guarantees to ensure Ukraine’s future security. It has paused military aid to and suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine. It is widely reported that Defense Secretary Hegseth has instructed the US Government to pause all offensive cyber operations against Russia. Ukraine is meant to be grateful.
The key recommendations and conclusions of the report, which I reread last night, are stark and commendably clear. I wholeheartedly endorse them, particularly the focus on a whole-of-society approach.
I turn to a couple of specifics. First, on strengthening industrial partnerships, the report talked about the Government facilitating a broad church of industry engagement to bring in non-traditional defence suppliers such as start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises and tech companies. It also argued that the Government would need to mitigate the risk of collaborating with commercial partners that lack previous experience in defence. It is currently very difficult for new entrants to the UK defence market to establish and prove the required safety, security, quality, et cetera, to the MoD and regulators. New entrants may also have to work for many years at their own expense before they start generating revenues.
An existing model that could be considered is based on UK advanced manufacturing research centres, involving scientists, engineers, researchers and technology specialists working together to develop innovative technologies, systems and products. This approach could be used for innovative defence for the UK Armed Forces, where the role of government would be primarily twofold: to work with the scientific and research community and lead industrial partners to set up and fund these advanced defence manufacturing research centres; and, crucially, to put in place risk-sharing framework contracts with lead industrial partners to co-finance the development and industrialisation of the most promising concepts. Can the Minister say what thinking the Government have been doing in this area?
One area not really covered in detail by the report is undersea cable attacks. A recent BBC in-depth article set out the extent of Russia’s shadow fleet, used to carry embargoed Russian oil products, and the extent of suspected seabed infrastructure sabotage in both the Baltic Sea and closer to home. Twice in recent months, the surveillance ship “Yantar” was spotted gathering intelligence about the UK’s underwater cable network as part of its hybrid warfare on this country’s critical infrastructure. The UK has around 60 undersea cables that come ashore on its coastline, particularly concentrated around East Anglia and the south-west. Only yesterday, the Times reported that Russia had sent a warship into the English Channel to escort a suspected arms shipment in a sanctioned cargo vessel from Syria for possible use on the front line. These are all very worrying developments. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, on which I sit, recently launched a new inquiry into how vulnerable the UK is to undersea cable attacks. Will the Minister say what assessment the Government have made of this current threat?
I conclude by repeating that assuming the US will side with Ukraine to provide a backstop and security guarantees is a fundamental misunderstanding of Trump’s position. Trump has a huge agenda with Russia, and many suspect that he is looking to strengthen US bilateral relationships with Russia to deliver what he believes to be huge economic and security benefits to the US and also, potentially, to strengthen Russia’s focus and reliance on China. What update can the Minister give us on the use of Russian frozen assets to augment our immediate defence spending, not simply the interest but the capital sums? Is fast-track legislation being considered? Ideas have been circulating for an international rearmament bank that would facilitate access to private sector capital for Ukraine’s ongoing struggles. Do the Government plan to pursue this? On the longer-term move to 3% of GDP for defence spending, what plans do the Government have to set up cross-party discussions to see whether a consensus can be reached on how this might be funded?