Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Tyler of Enfield
Main Page: Baroness Tyler of Enfield (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Tyler of Enfield's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was pleased to add my name to Amendment 67 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, because it would allow the responsible body to specify the set of conditions on the deprivation of liberty to determine that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate and that those conditions are complied with.
Throughout the Bill’s stages, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, have been consistent on the importance of conditions. Of course, these things make the deprivation of liberty from the patient or cared-for person either tolerable—that is, understandable—or really horrible. I have been very impressed by some of the examples explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. It is important that these conditions are not only set, but met, monitored and changed when circumstances change. We seek assurance that the legislation, regulations and conditions will make that happen.
My Lords, I reinforce what has been said about the importance of conditions and the difference that they can make to both quality of life and the tolerability of the regime to which the looked-after person is subject. I read about how some of the conditions might be things such as helping the looked-after person to sit in the care home’s garden every day or be taken out once a week, as well as how vital these conditions are to ensuring that the decisions taken are the least restrictive. We can all relate to these important things. It is important that there is provision for such conditions to be set out.
I thank the noble Baronesses for introducing their amendments and giving us the opportunity to discuss this important issue. I will set out why the Government have taken a different approach and attempt to explain it.
It is not that we do not think conditions are important. The use of conditions should be baked into the care plan and the arrangements put forward for authorisation, rather than being added only at the point of authorisation. This is not to say that the conditions—let us call them the elements of the arrangements—pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and other noble Baronesses are not critical. Obviously, they are critical to making sure that the elements are the least restrictive. This is about when they are put in place in the care planning and authorisation process. I shall explain our approach, which I hope will satisfy noble Lords, but we can see whether further discussions are required.
I will deal with the amendments in order. Amendment 61 states that it should be determined by the responsible body,
“that the arrangements will continue to be necessary and proportionate for the period of time for which the arrangements are sought”.
We absolutely agree that this should form part of our model and I confirm that this will be considered by the responsible body.
Furthermore, under the Bill, the responsible body is required to specify a programme of regular reviews at the point of authorisation. In a sense, it gets to specify at the point of authorisation how frequently reviews should take place, to seek whether changes in arrangements or other changes have taken place. This means that the care home manager—or the responsible body, if it is carrying it out directly—will be continually required to consider whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. That is baked into the system we are introducing.
Amendment 67 specifies that conditions can be put on authorisations and, of course, conditions exist under the current DoLS system. However, with the backlog, by the time they come into force, it is often too late, because the person has been subject to the arrangements for some time before the conditions can be applied. In developing the liberty protection safeguards system, we have taken a different approach; for that reason, conditions have not been included in the Bill. Again, it is worth pointing out that this is consistent with the approach adopted by the Law Commission, which concluded that conditions, as currently provided for under the DoLS system, were not necessary under its new scheme. The Law Commission’s final report states on page 112 that, instead of DoLS conditions, the scheme,
“focuses on particular arrangements and what will be authorised are very specific arrangements. Further, it is only arrangements which result in the minimum amount of deprivation of liberty possible that will be authorised, otherwise the necessary and proportionate condition will not be met. So the arrangements will need to be described in a way which builds in any conditions”.
In other words, arrangements under the Bill can be detailed in such a way as to have the same effect as conditions. For example, the authorised arrangements could include enabling the person to be taken out on trips with one-to-one support, or their care plan could specify that additional staff should be provided to enable the person to be taken out more frequently.
It is our view that doing this provides greater protections for the person. This approach means that conditions—or, if noble Lords prefer, specific arrangements—are considered as part of care planning, before an authorisation is sought, rather than being bolted on afterwards. Rather than being something that happens after the person is deprived of liberty, they would be an integral part of care planning, with the proposed arrangements submitted to the responsible body for review.
Notwithstanding this approach, I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is keen to have a statement from me about current practice, under which a DoLS lead, or best-interests assessor, can insist that deprivation of liberty is authorised only if stated conditions are made. We are not proposing to change the ability of the responsible body, whether the responsible body itself or an AMCP, to make conditions as part of an authorisation. It will still be possible for that to happen. We are trying to ensure that the decision on appropriate conditions is made earlier in the care-planning process, so that they are incorporated into the arrangements that are then put to the responsible body for review, rather than being added when the review takes place. Failure to comply with these conditions, specifically because they have been within the authorisation, would mean that the authorisation would cease to have effect, and must be reviewed. There we come to the ongoing important role that appropriate persons, IMCAs and others will have, in making sure the person is supported, so that if there are any changes in their condition, or their circumstances, a review is triggered.
I recognise this is a fiendishly complicated thing to describe, and I have probably done a fairly inadequate job of it. However, I strongly believe that, in making this change, we are not trying to remove conditions, but move the concept of applying conditions to earlier in the care-planning process. That is the right thing to do. The responsible body will continue to be able to add subsequent conditions if it feels it is necessary for an authorisation. I genuinely believe that is a better system. Clearly, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. On how this will happen in practice, there will need to be clear guidance and training to make sure that people are trained to do this, both at the care home, and in other NHS bodies, and to make sure that reviewers are capable of assessing such arrangements and making their own subsequent conditions, if they feel it is necessary. That guidance and training is something we aim to provide, of course.
I hope I have explained why we take the point the noble Baronesses made in tabling these amendments very seriously, and shown that the system allows for it. It puts this consideration earlier in the planning process, we hope with better effect. We have been guided by the Law Commission’s approach in this way. I hope this has been persuasive, but if further discussion and elaboration is needed, I would be more than happy to give it following today’s debate.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 142 and 144. My substantive Amendment 142 requires that the code of practice to the Mental Capacity Act and the government response to the independent review of the Mental Health Act must be laid before Parliament before the provisions of the Bill come into force. I shall focus on the latter, as we have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the code of practice.
The independent review of the Mental Health Act is due to report its final recommendations on 12 December. I know this because last week I attended a helpful briefing given by Sir Simon Wessely to interested parliamentarians, in which he outlined his broad findings. However, until that review is published, we cannot know how its recommendations will impact precisely on this Bill.
We know that the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act are the only two pieces of legislation that allow a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of care and treatment and that, as such, there will inevitably be cross-over between the two. I thank the Minister for confirming in Committee that these documents would be produced before the Bill is enacted. However, I am concerned that the Bill could have completed its parliamentary passage by the time the Government respond to the independent review. Therefore this important debate is taking place in a vacuum of information on how people with severe mental illnesses could be affected by the proposed LPS.
Sir Simon Wessely has indicated that his review will not consider the full fusion of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, which some people were advocating a while back, but there are none the less many outstanding questions on the interaction of the Bill with the Mental Health Act and, frankly, until it has reported they are impossible to answer.
Under the Mental Health Act, there is no capacity test and the capacity-based principles of the Mental Capacity Act do not apply to mental health care or treatment provided under the Mental Health Act. People without capacity are nevertheless detained and treated under the Mental Health Act. We know there has been a dramatic rise in recent years in the number of those aged over 65 being treated under the Mental Health Act. Indeed, the Care Quality Commission has highlighted that both the broadening of the definition of deprivation of liberty in the light of the Cheshire West judgment and the associated overburdening of DoLS, which is what we are talking about, are likely to have played a role in this.
As a result, there are still crucial questions about how the independent review of the Mental Health Act will address people who lack capacity and what the implications may be for those who fall under the LPS regime depending on where the dividing line between the two Acts is drawn. It is an incredibly complex picture.
Let me say a couple of words finally to highlight and paint a picture of that complexity. It is not possible for a person to be subject to the LPS when they are already detained under the Mental Health Act, even if they lack capacity. However, it is possible for people who are in hospital to be subject to the LPS if they are not detained. The LPS was not primarily designed for people with severe mental illness whose conditions are likely to fluctuate, improve or be contested more frequently than, for example, dementia. While I have focused on the needs of those with severe mental illness under the LPS, many of the same points apply in the opposite direction.
I could go on but I will not. I hope these illustrations of how the Mental Capacity Act is applied to mental health patients, and the Mental Health Act to people without capacity, in these two overlapping legislative frameworks have shown the necessity for this amendment so that the two can be finally considered together, a point which I and many other noble Lords have raised consistently since Second Reading.