Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Thornton
Main Page: Baroness Thornton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Thornton's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord Phillips. We are talking about two types of union which are entirely different: different in the way in which the union is manifested, in the obligations that flow from that union, and in the sanctions that can be obtained if one party defaults.
At Second Reading my noble friend Lord Jenkin missed the point entirely, which is very rare for him. He did not think that lumping together these two unions was redefining marriage, and said that it was not going to redefine his marriage. With respect to my noble friend, that is not the point. What about those coming up to marriageable age who are contemplating whether to marry? Might not this mishmash of traditional marriage and the union of two people of the same sex, with the accent no longer on family, make some people wonder whether to go ahead? What will they feel when denied the opportunity to have a traditional marriage?
One of the strangest assertions I have heard during this debate is that marriage will be strengthened if we go ahead with this Bill. There is not a jot of evidence to support that proposition; in fact, all the evidence is to the contrary. Some of us may have heard Dr Patricia Morgan when she—
Since the noble Lord thinks there is not a jot of evidence that marriage will be strengthened by this Bill, what evidence does he have—apart from his assertion—that this Bill will put people off getting married?
I was just getting to the experience of other countries, and it does seem that some people have been put off. Dr Patricia Morgan produced evidence to show that since gay marriage was introduced in Spain in 2005, the decline in heterosexual marriage has been precipitous. It has been just the same in Holland since 2001, and also in Scandinavia. There is not one example of this change going ahead and marriage increasing. The result has been exactly the opposite.
My Lords, I, too, am a trustee of the Marriage Foundation, which I should say is totally neutral on this subject. In any case, I am speaking personally.
To pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, about children, when I was a family judge I tried cases where I placed children with gay couples, male or female. I had the utmost confidence that those children would be extremely well brought up. Nothing that we are discussing today, or indeed in this Bill, leads me to believe that whatever a same-sex couple’s relationship is called would have anything to do with the excellent way in which very many children are brought up by lesbian and homosexual couples. That is my own personal experience, sitting as a judge.
I did not speak at Second Reading; I thought that 90 speakers were enough. Like others, I have received more than 100 letters which my secretary has so far replied to, and many more e-mails. It might interest the House to know that 98% were opposed to this Bill, but the 2% in favour were also extremely persuasive. Listening to the earlier speakers, it seems clear to me that the word “union” will not be treated by those seeking marriage as the equivalent of “marriage”, for the reasons that have already been given. Since it is clear that this Bill is going through, it is time for us to try to find the best way forward.
Those who support the Bill are—to use the colloquialism—hooked on the word “marriage”. That we have to accept, but the Government need to recognise the strength of feeling of those who are opposed to the use of the word “marriage” simpliciter as recognising the marriage of couples of the same sex. We must find a middle way. I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, because this House urgently needs to seek reconciliation and find a compromise, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, said earlier. Somehow we have to allow the word “marriage” and somehow we have to distinguish between different sorts of marriage.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has pointed out—and I aim to say in later amendments to this Bill—this is a question of equality but it is not a question of uniformity. You cannot have uniformity in this Bill together with what you get in the marriage of opposite-sex couples. One only has to look at Part 4 of the Bill, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has done, to see that there are differences. There is nothing wrong with differences in equality. As the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury said at Second Reading, there is a danger of equating equality and uniformity in this Bill.
I cannot see how Amendment 2 can be objectionable to people. The “marriage” word is used and those who are in any marriage are equal, but the amendment recognises that there are differences. You cannot say that marriage for same-sex couples has in any way a lower status than marriage for heterosexual couples has. For goodness’ sake, at the end of the day we are legislators, if I might respectfully remind the House, legislating for what people on the ground will actually be doing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, pointed out, there are all sorts of marriages: those who wish to marry; those who are already married—I have to confess that I have been married for very nearly 55 years, and to the same man; and marriages for the second or third time. We have to recognise this, but we also have to recognise that there is a difference, and although the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about different sorts of marriage, the different sorts of marriage that she mentioned were actually between male and female, because in those days they could be nothing else; they were all male-female.
This amendment would be a compromise in an otherwise deeply divisive Bill. I have to say to those who have been talking about the children, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that perhaps most important of all—
I should like to ask the noble and learned Baroness a question. I have wanted to ask this of other members of your Lordships’ House who were speaking about the matter of calling a same-sex marriage a same-sex marriage rather than distinguishing it from what people are calling a traditional marriage. What is the noble and learned Baroness’s view about the fact that anyone who has a same-sex marriage would have to identify their sexuality by definition? Why should they have to do that?
You have to recognise the truth of it. The most reverend Primate pointed out the importance of truth. It is different. We have to look at some stage, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out, at how we deal with the children of a couple who cannot have their own children as a couple.
I beg the noble and learned Baroness’s pardon, but in other parts of our legislation—in our equalities law—we protect people from having to declare their sexuality, because we think that that is the right thing to do. It is not a question of the truth or not the truth.
My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate, but I will make two brief points. First, I am very uncomfortable with the references we have heard to a new definition of marriage. As I understand it, the aim of the Bill is to enable same-sex couples to share in the existing understanding and status of marriage. My understanding of my marriage is not primarily gender-based; it is based on the fact that I love my wife and wish to stay with her for the rest of my life. That has nothing to do with gender.
Secondly, I would love to find a compromise—I am a compromising sort of person, and I very much welcome the recognition of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss that the word “marriage” is essential in whatever we end up with—but I find it extremely hard to imagine any compromise that would not formalise the idea that there are two different forms of marriage. Therefore, I tend to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alli, that it is either one thing or the other.
My Lords, we have had a long and interesting debate about the definition of marriage and about this group of amendments. I accept fully that noble Lords are, with the best of intentions, trying to find a way through. However, we on these Benches think that the effect of all the amendments in this group would be the same. All, in different ways, seek to enshrine in law a distinction between what is referred to as “traditional marriage” or “matrimonial marriage” and the new, statutory definition of marriage that will be created under the Bill, which encompasses the union of both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. Whether those who tabled the amendments intended to or not, they were in effect making two classes of marriage. Trying to find different definitions—and in some cases, I fear, jealously guarding the word “marriage” for heterosexual couples—suggests that one form of marriage is inferior to another and that flies in the face of the Bill.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, was quite right in his remarks, as were other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Dobbs and Lord Black, the noble Baroness, Lady Richardson, my noble friend Lady Turner, the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, in her excellent speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. They all appreciated that while those who tabled the amendments have a strong personal belief about marriage, in some cases rooted in their religious faith, their amendments would undermine the purpose of the Bill.
It is important to make a distinction between something that has the effect of undermining a belief or an idea and something that undermines an individual’s ability to hold such a belief. I find it difficult to believe that, when the Bill becomes an Act and same-sex marriages are a routine matter, as they will be, the noble Lords who have been so nervous today will feel that something important or precious has been removed from their faith or their strong belief in marriage.
Article 9 of the Convention on Human Rights clearly enshrines an individual’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. We must be absolutely clear in our protection of these rights. The Bill seeks to do that. The Bill does not in any way undermine those rights for individuals in relation to their belief about the appropriate nature of marriage. As the noble Baroness, Lady Richardson, said, its purpose is to provide for the state to recognise equally the relationships of couples, regardless of whether they are between members of the same sex or of opposite sexes, who wish to make a loving and lifelong commitment to each other.
By inserting a distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex marriage back into statute, whether by describing one as a “union”, as Amendment 1 would do, or as matrimonial marriage requiring special privileges, as Amendments 46 and 57 do, or by setting up a separate register, we would undermine the purpose of the Act, which is to remove the distinction in law between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships. Therefore, we on these Benches have no sympathy with, and do not support, any of the amendments in this group. I ask noble Lords not to be seduced by what I regard as the lethal combination of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York. The way they described what they wish to achieve was seductive, but it would have the same effect on the Bill.
I think that the noble Baroness suggested that my amendment was designed to undermine the Bill, although I explicitly made clear that it was not. What would she think about giving ordinary members of the public the assurance that they can use certain phrases, by putting them in the Bill, to protect themselves against undue political correctness? My amendment has nothing to do with the substance that she has addressed so far in her speech.
I think that noble Lords’ concerns about free speech will be addressed at a later stage in Committee, in the next group of amendments but one. I am certainly happy to address those concerns. This group of amendments is about the substance and purpose of this Bill. The Government have addressed the freedom of speech issues; indeed, they are covered in this legislation and in the legislation that is already in existence.
Is the noble Lord aware that the Equality Act 2010 does all of this? I recommend that he reads the guidance that accompanies that Act. The legislation received cross-party support in this House. It is a carefully balanced Act that already offers all the protections that the noble Lord mentioned.
The point I would make is that the Equality Act is shot through—I am sorry, I shall retract that. The Equality Act attracts a mass of legislation in which actions are taken against individuals who are said to be in breach of the Act. These amendments will put into statutory form the words,
“worthy of respect in a democratic society”.
I suggest that they will cap off a large number of those actions. Putting it in simple terms, the Equality Act is not proving to be as watertight as it was first imagined to be.
Would the noble Lord care to tell the House what he thinks is a reasonable limit to the view that that gentleman should express? For example, if one substituted the word “black”, would that view then be reasonable? The policeman is publicly expressing his feelings about something. What does the noble Lord think is a reasonable way to do that? What would he think if, for example, he had used “black” instead of “same-sex marriage”? It seems to me that there must be a limit to what our public servants can express and cannot express. I would be interested to know from the noble Lord where he thinks that limit sits.
I am happy to answer that point. Any freedom of speech should be open. It should be there, but it should not be the freedom to denigrate anyone. That is the boundary. You can express an opinion, but if you denigrate other people that is wrong.
My Lords, it is absolutely necessary that some of these amendments should be on the Marshalled List. They have been discussed at length today and will be discussed further. But the fact remains that there is a perception that people will be restrained from expressing their views about marriage as a result of this Bill. The correspondence that I and many others have received show that there is a very considerable concern that people will be denied the freedom to criticise same-sex marriage when this Bill goes through—I say “when this Bill goes through” because it quite clearly will go through. Therefore, it is right and proper that this House should ensure that there are proper provisions to ensure free speech. There have been instances where free speech has been guaranteed by Ministers but not carried out by people in other walks of life and other areas of employment.
People are also concerned at the speed with which this Bill was introduced and is being rushed through Parliament. They feel that there has been insufficient public discussion of this very important Bill, which alters parts of our constitution, and that it is being rushed through and their views are not being properly taken into account. After all, we must recognise that the percentage of gay couples is 1.5% and therefore 98.5% of the population has to be taken into consideration as well. If people disagree with this Bill, they must be able to express their opposition after the Bill has been passed without fear of being dismissed or otherwise harmed by their employers or having a policeman knock at the door because they have made some off-the-cuff remark.
My Lords, we have had another interesting and informative discussion.
I wonder how much confusion there is about the fact that when we disagree with each other, that is okay; that it is okay to disagree with each other quite vehemently; and that it is all right to express those vehement disagreements. Our view on these Benches is that the law recognises that that is exactly right. It took me back to the passage of the Equality Act 2010, when the interventions of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, made precisely the point that needed to be made about the protections that existed. Those protections do exist. The fact that they are tested from time to time, and that people on both sides do silly things with them from time to time, does not mean that they are not valid protections; they are very valid protections indeed.
We believe—and the Commons agreed in its debates—that there is no need for additional protection under the Equality Act 2010. It is not necessary. There is already protection for people’s religious beliefs in law, which encompasses views about marriage. It would also be invidious, because it would make the only specific belief that has protection under this part of the Equality Act one that defines marriage as being between a man and a woman. I will return to that.
It is worth saying that Amendment 19 would make a particular viewpoint on marriage, which could be held by people with or without religious beliefs, the only belief that was expressly protected from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, elevating it above any other belief. This could have exactly the opposite effect to that intended by the noble Lord, Lord Singh, since a person who believes that the definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman is wrong would also be protected. Therefore, it may do exactly what the noble Lord does not want it to do.
As I said during the debate, the Equality Act 2010 is a carefully considered piece of legislation, which balances the rights of one protected group against those of another. Sexual orientation and religion or belief are both protected characteristics under the Equality Act, meaning that it is illegal to discriminate against someone on the grounds of their sexual orientation or their religion.
The Equality Act already takes care to provide protections for the beliefs of those with a religious faith, including on issues of sexual orientation and marriage. For example, guidance accompanying the Equality Bill, states:
“In the case of Ministers of Religion and other jobs which exist to promote and represent religion, the Bill recognises that a church may need to impose requirements regarding sexual orientation, sex, marriage and civil partnership or gender reassignment if it is necessary to comply with its teachings or the strongly held beliefs of its followers”.
It is completely clear that the law already exists to protect those views and their expression. Religion and belief are protected characteristics under the Act. It means that we cannot be discriminated against for holding or expressing those beliefs. On these Benches, we did not think that the government amendment was necessary, as my noble friend Lord Alli mentioned, but we understand that the Government are acting in good faith on a commitment made by a Minister in another place. Therefore, we accept that the Government are bringing the amendment forward with the best of intentions and that it certainly does no harm. If it gives people peace of mind, that is only to be welcomed.
I will not go through the rest of the amendments because I suspect the Minister will do that extremely well—and it is nearly dinner time.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this very important and helpful debate. May I say first that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alli, for repeating what I said at Second Reading? The Bill absolutely makes it lawful, and continues to make it lawful, for people to believe that marriage should be only between a man and a woman. It is their right to express that belief and the Bill does nothing to change that. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lord Lester for what they said about the Equality Act protecting people who have a range of religions beliefs but in this context hold the belief that marriage should be between a man and a woman and are free to express that belief. It is important that I continue to make that clear.
I also recognise, however, that people are looking for reassurance and want to know that it is perfectly legitimate to continue to hold the beliefs that they have always held, and that they will not be in any way disadvantaged because of these beliefs—or, indeed, that it would be unfair for people to criticise them in any way, although clearly it is free for anybody to express an opinion that is contrary to that view.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, mentioned, the Government are bringing forward an amendment to the Public Order Act. I will speak to that in a little more detail when I take the amendments in turn. We felt that it was important for us to do this as we recognised the need for assurance and because it was possible to make that amendment to the Public Order Act without causing any detriment to anybody. We really do understand that people are looking to us for assurance.
The amendments have clearly enabled us to explore issues of conscience in relation to the Bill, and it is right that we should do so. Let me start with Amendment 5, which was moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. He seeks to explore how the Bill could impact on those seeking appointment to a public office—such as appointment to the board of a non-departmental body. The amendment seems to be based on the premise that, should the Bill be enacted, anyone expressing a belief that marriage should only be between a man and a woman might somehow be excluded from appointment to public offices.
I can reassure noble Lords that this is certainly not the case. This Bill is not about forcing people of faith to change their religious views, practices or teachings about marriage. The belief that marriage should be between a man and a woman is, and will continue to be, mainstream and entirely lawful. Indeed, the Bill explicitly makes clear that such a belief is legitimate and mainstream through the specific protections it provides to ensure that religious organisations and their representatives who do not want to participate in same-sex marriage ceremonies cannot be compelled to do so.
Public appointees, like anyone else, are and will remain free to express their religious or philosophical beliefs as long as this does not affect their ability to do their job.