Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise that I was not present during the Committee stage. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, knows that I have great respect for him. We enjoyed working together in opposition to the Government’s Internal Market Bill. He was courteous enough to ask me my opinion of his amendment before he put it down. I told him that I would be unable to support it. The reason is the answer to the question that he posed during his remarks, to which my noble friend Lord Lansley purported, but failed, to give an answer, which is: what happens if there is, as there could be—and no one in your Lordships’ House can suggest that there could never be—a revival of the circumstances in the House of Commons between 2017 and 2019? The position was that the Government could not properly govern because they did not have a majority for many of the things that they wanted to do. The House of Commons did not want them to govern and so was content with that stalemate position and that hobbled Government, which did no good whatever to Parliament or the country.

I do not understand why this is referred to as a messy Bill. It is a perfectly straightforward Bill, which seeks to restore the position as it was before the Fixed- term Parliaments Act. The Act was necessary for the course of the coalition Government, but it should never have been made permanent. I very much regret that I did not vote for an amendment in your Lordships’ House that would have made it temporary.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

Would the noble Lord acknowledge, as my noble friend has proved, that, in the circumstances about which he is talking, the Government had a majority for an election? Therefore, this amendment would not have created the difficulties that he is suggesting.

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

The noble Baroness and her friends cannot possibly give an assurance that a circumstance will not arise not precisely the same as that which occurred between 2017 and 2019 but in which a simple majority could not be obtained for an election, because a majority of the House of Commons was content to stymie and hobble the Government and keep them in place in that paralysed state, which was what we saw in that unhappy time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I promised I would look up my personal record on that Bill. I have not done so, but I would be surprised if my name featured very heavily. Anyway, it is being done away with now, and I think the noble Lord and I agree that it should be done away with, whatever follows.

A vote in the House of Commons has created paralysis in a number of contexts and could create paralysis in many contexts. Some noble Lords have spoken on this, including my noble friends Lord Bridges and Lord Howard of Lympne, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. There could be minority Governments or situations where parties, Parliament or the nation have divided.

The kernel of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and others is that their approach offers simplicity. In fact, it adds a complication to a Bill which is simple. Without going over the same ground, we saw that painfully in 2019, when the Labour Party was three times presented with the opportunity to force an election, and Mr Corbyn thrice denied the election to the Prime Minister and the British people by sitting on his hands. So do not tell me that there cannot be circumstances in which an Opposition would seek to prevent a general election. We have lived that system and I believe that my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, were absolutely right to warn that these circumstances could recur.

In Committee, I set out the negative consequences for the fundamental conventions on confidence. Simply put, the privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an executive function enjoyed by virtue of the ability of the Government to command the confidence of the Commons. Our contention is that this simple process should not be unduly constrained by the type of process that the noble and learned Lord puts before us; it could be disruptive and unhelpful at times when expediency is essential.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is talking about the use of executive powers. Is he concerned—I assume he is, because of Clause 3—that the courts might get involved in this and that that could cause serious constitutional conflict? Surely if the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was accepted, that would reduce the need for the ouster clause in Clause 3?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think it is an either/or question. If I may use a phrase that was once popular on the Benches opposite, there is third way, which is to have neither of those amendments and to return to the simple and proven practice of the past.

When we send an amendment to the other place, we are always adjured to be careful what we send and to show how we reflect and are thoughtful. I would like to consider some of the practical working of the proposition that the noble and learned Lord puts before us. There is little about that, despite its immense significance potentially for our constitution, and indeed its reversal of the Government’s manifesto commitment to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

For example, the noble and learned Lord proposes that there should be a Motion that

“this present Parliament will be dissolved.”

How would this parliamentary process be sequenced and when would it apply? How would it relate to confidence? Would it also apply following a loss of confidence? Would a Prime Minister have to go for a further Motion? Could anyone put before the House of Commons the Motion proposed by the noble and learned Lord, or would it be only the Prime Minister and the Treasury Bench? If the Motion is passed, is the Prime Minister bound to seek a Dissolution—for example, a sudden tactical alliance could trigger a general election—or could he seek to retain the confidence of the House of Commons? Even if there were such a Motion as the noble and learned Lord has proposed, when would the Prime Minister have to dissolve Parliament?

In even more extraordinary circumstances, given such an amendment, could a Government procure such a Motion on the first day after the end of the debate on the gracious Speech? Could they pass such a Motion

“that this present Parliament will be dissolved”,

and then wait for the rest of the Parliament? After all, it says “will”; it does not say “when”.

These questions are practical and unanswered. I submit that it is not a responsible role for a revising Chamber to send this amendment down to the elected Chamber with none of those issues worked through. They were carefully considered by the Joint Committee, which arrived at a conclusion. This is constitution-making on the hoof.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Lansley, is about the constitutional location of power today and for the next 80 to 100 years. It is not about where, historically speaking, power in Parliament used to rest. It is about now, at the beginning of this century, after at least half a century in which the powers of the Prime Minister have been accreting at an alarming and chilling rate. I will not go through the endless efforts I have made to draw your Lordships’ attention to that fact, but it is a fact.

I was not able to speak at Second Reading but the issue of troublesome prerogative powers relating to Dissolution and Prorogation formed the basis of my contribution to the debate on the Queen’s Speech. I know that I am not taking the Minister by surprise because he and I have had many rather interesting discussions about the constitutional issues. It is important that I add this too: when I made that speech, the present Prime Minister was riding high in the polls. This is nothing to do with the fact that he has troubles abounding at the moment—Prime Ministers always run into trouble at some time. It is not about the present Prime Minister; it is about the person, whoever that might be, who holds this office not being given further power, as the Bill proposes.

We should not have a fixed-term Parliament. We all agree on that. There should be a maximum period. Five years is what is proposed and it makes perfect sense. What did not make sense last time was the proposal that a two-thirds majority was needed in the Commons for that term to come to an end. It did not make sense because of something that should have been absolutely obvious to everybody. I am sorry to say that to those who advocate for it. Just about every important piece of legislation enacted in Parliament has required a bare majority. Nobody set about trying to have two-thirds majorities; a bare majority would do. The Great Reform Act had a majority of two. The Habeas Corpus Act, where all our freedoms were determined, passed because the noble Lord acting as a Teller for one side counted a big fat Peer as 10 and so it was carried. That is what our liberties have turned on. My point is that a two-thirds majority is an aberration.

The question is: how do we replace the legislation? We have had the beginning of a fascinating discussion: do the current proposals revive the prerogative power? Fun—the noble Lord, Lord Norton, can get his students to write endless essays, all getting Firsts if they agree with him, on this subject. But this is the point: whatever the theory might be, the reality is that the power of Dissolution will now be based on statute—this statute, which might be changed. Prerogative power does not get elevated out of thin air; it is founded on the statute.

In answer to one or two of the matters raised in the noble Lord’s Amendment 1, whether the theory is that the Prime Minister gives Her Majesty—the monarch, rather—advice or a request, it seems to me, and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, absolutely impossible to understand that the monarch of the day would be prepared to enter into tempestuous political controversy, threatening the very existence of the monarchy, if the prime ministerial advice or request was rejected. It seems inconceivable. It might have been possible when the Lascelles letter was written to the Times in 1950. It was never put to the test; it never arose. In my view, it is inconceivable. If my view is right, here in the 21st century, the current legislative proposal in this Bill is that the decision whether Parliament should be dissolved would be vested exclusively in the Prime Minister of the day. Today, in a modern democracy, an uncurbed power to have Parliament dissolved—it is rather astonishing to think about it.

Of course, as was said in an earlier debate, it is perfectly true that the Prime Minister, in making his or her decision, has to be mindful of the possible adverse reaction of the electorate if they choose to think that his or her idea of having an election is a bad one. Of course it is, but whether the public do or not, general elections are about the next five years. The election arrives and a decision is made on the health service, the education system, the Armed Forces. It is not just about this single decision made by the Prime Minister. So I go this far with the argument against me: okay, the Prime Minister would take into account possible adverse reactions from the electorate if the electorate do not want an election. But this is not a principle; it is simply a matter of prime ministerial judgment. It is not constitutional control; it is the Prime Minister making a purely political decision: “Where does the balance of advantage to me and my party lie?”

It will also be suggested—it has been suggested to me and I have read it pretty frequently—that recent events in the Commons in the context of Brexit underline the need for this prime ministerial power. The Brexit debates were hardly a model of clarity but let us remember what they reflected: a huge parliamentary and, indeed, national divide, splitting parliamentary parties themselves, in the context of the constitutional aberration of a referendum, with the Dissolution process itself governed by the requirement for a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority, which, as I said a moment ago, altered parliamentary processes and, indeed, strategies. In constitutional terms, the Brexit shambles demonstrated the folly of a two-thirds majority being superimposed on the result of a referendum that was not welcome to a majority in the House of Commons. That is not a sufficient justification for reviving or creating—it does not matter what you call it—this unrestricted power over the length of the life of the Parliament for the Prime Minister of the day.

These arguments overlook something so obvious that it is not merely in danger of being overlooked, it is being overlooked. I am not going to let it be overlooked. The Dissolution of Parliament eradicates the choice made by millions of citizens when they cast their votes at the previous election and chose who would represent them in the House of Commons. That sounds over- dramatic, but I invite your Lordships to think about it, because that is what it means.

To ensure continuing democratic involvement, to ensure that we live in a democracy and to enable us all to reflect on where power should lie, of course there has to be a finite time for each Parliament. That is a necessity in a democracy. But when the Dissolution is not a consequence of the effluxion of time but is simply based on a unilateral prime ministerial decision, the votes at the earlier general election are wiped out. The earlier democratic decision is revoked. One vote trumps millions of votes. To me, in a democracy there is a certain level of absurdity about such a principle. If this Bill passes unamended, the effect of those votes will be revoked by—and I am choosing a word used recently by the Delegated Legislation Committee—diktat. If you do not like “diktat”, call it decree, call it command, call it whim, call it fancy. I do not mind what you call it. but it is one person’s decision—unconstrained and unrestricted—by an assessment of political advantage.

Surely in the 21st century the exercise of power to change and to ditch the democratic vote should at least be subject to a modicum of control. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, offered the possible control of the monarch and, for the reasons I have given, I respectfully suggest that that is not sufficient. Surely we should rest some responsibility on the House of Commons of the day—the elected representatives. That is what the Commons is there to do: to control and to keep an eye on the Executive and to keep a particular eye on the accreting power of the Prime Minister.

This is something that we cannot just accept on the basis that a prerogative power is being revived. This is going to be a statute.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord True, and he is right that this is an important Bill. I very much welcome the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—I was never a fan and I am pleased to see it go.

I hesitate to disagree on any occasion with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but I am not sure that I follow his logic entirely. Maybe that is because of the political experience that some of us have seen and felt when Prime Ministers have not always got these things right and have not always chosen the right minute to have an election. My noble friends Lord Grocott and Lord Rooker will well remember 1978 when Jim Callaghan did not have an election at a time when people thought it might be advantageous and subsequently lost a few months later. Gordon Brown did not have an election in 2009 and subsequently lost a year later.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is right that this is about the constitutional location of power, but it is also about the role of the Executive and the legislature. Yes, the legislature is there to hold the Government to account—a very important function. If I was in the House of Commons at the moment, having been given a vote by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act I think I would have wanted to hold on to that vote to say whether an election should take place. I thought that that might have been one of the compromises that was reached during the consideration of this Bill by the Government and when the Joint Committee looked at it. I am surprised that the Commons gave up so easily the power to have a say and to sanction the calling of a general election.

It would not necessarily have been a simple thing to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned the two-thirds majority that was clearly just part of the political fix of the original deal between the Conservatives and the Liberals after the 2010 election, and that is a non-starter. However, I wonder whether he would say that the majority had to be 50% plus one of those voting on the issue or 50% of the whole House plus one. What would the Motion be and what would the role of the Speaker be in terms of a tied vote? We have to consider all those arrangements. I do not think it is a simple issue although, had I been in the Commons when this Bill was going through, I would have been very reluctant to give any say whatever in terms of when an election should take place.

Downing Street Christmas Parties

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 9th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the rules of the House of Commons are for the other place. As far as I am concerned, every Minister acts on his or her honour to be truthful to whichever House they are a member of.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, would the Minister confirm that anybody who works in No. 10, or elsewhere in government, who was or was not invited to that party, will not have their career prospects jeopardised by giving evidence to the courts, the police or indeed this inquiry?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I sincerely hope that that would be the case. Obviously, the Cabinet Secretary is responsible for the conduct of the inquiry. He is the senior civil servant and will own the responsibility to which the noble Baroness referred. I should make it clear—following on from something that I did not reply to from the noble Lord—that the terms of reference, which I will lay in the Library of your Lordships’ House later today if they are not there now, will make it clear that where there are credible allegations relating to other gatherings, these may be investigated.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 30th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the Bill. I was never a fan of the Fixed- term Parliaments Act and, indeed, never a fan of fixed terms, whatever the manifesto said at any particular time.

We should start by reminding ourselves of how we got that legislation in the first place. It was a simple, blatant political fix between the Conservatives and the Liberals, between Cameron and Clegg—I do not know how many other people were consulted. As a former Chief Whip I have no problems with a political fix, but please do not dress it up as some constitutional principle because it was never that in the first place.

The Constitution Committee, which I currently chair, was very temperate in its language at the time. It said, as the Minister reminded us, that the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

“owed more to short-term political considerations than an assessment of constitutional principles.”

I think that is the polite way of saying “a political fix”. Clearly, the committee was quite right in assessing the longevity of that legislation. As we have seen, it was proven that it was possible for a Government—for a Prime Minister—to get around the provision, so the Minister was quite correct when he said it was a political experiment that failed.

So, here we have the withdrawal of that legislation and, as I say, I welcome that. However, the repeal is the easy part—we can all agree that that is simple; we are now entering new territory. In the Constitution Committee’s report we say that it

“touches the bedrock of the constitution, particularly the precise balance between the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament.”

Before I go into the conflict and the details, particularly Clause 3, I say at the outset that we should all welcome the clarity of a five-year term for any Parliament; I think most of us will be happier with that. In respect of other parts of the Bill, it is not a case of being happy with them so much as hoping that they are workable.

There has been a lot of discussion about whether it is possible to return to the pre-Fixed-term Parliaments Act provision. Can a prerogative that has been abolished be reinstated? In some respects the Government have adopted a belt-and-braces attitude: they have a statutory provision and the ouster clause. That aspect of Clause 3 is clearly causing not just academic concern but concern on all sides of this House, and it will have to be addressed in Committee.

I think we all agree that we need to keep the Monarch out of all the potential political considerations. I remind the House what the Constitution Committee said about Clause 3, because it is extremely relevant to the discussions we will have later:

“The use of ouster clauses to restrict or exclude judicial review of executive decisions touches the bedrock of the constitution, particularly the precise balance between the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament. On the one hand ouster clauses should provide legal clarity about the ability of the executive to make decisions which may be considered more appropriate to political rather than judicial deliberations. On the other hand, judicial review”—


this is important—

“should provide a backstop against exceptional use of an executive power which significantly erodes a fundamental principle of the UK constitution.”

We go on to say:

“There is a risk that a Prime Minister might abuse the power of dissolution if the courts are unable to exercise control over the limits and extent of this power, particularly in exceptional circumstances.”


To build on what the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was saying, the experience of the last few years tells us that exceptional circumstances and events are not as exceptional as we might have expected. We need to consider how to make sure that the balance that is required is maintained and workable. There are dangers there. They have been highlighted in the debate today, and they will be looked at in great detail in Committee.

There are just three other points that I want to make. The most important concerns the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Grocott. I was very surprised that the House of Commons gave up any say whatever in the calling of an election. As I say, I did not like the Fixed-term Parliaments Act but it did give MPs that power and that say—although not to the extent that many people suggested—so I was surprised that the House of Commons did not reinstate at least some kind of confirmatory vote in the House, should the Prime Minister decide to call an election. I am not sure how much difference it would have made, but in the exceptional circumstances that we can all perhaps envisage, it could have been possible.

Secondly, I welcome what the Minister said about taking on board the concerns of the Scottish and Welsh Governments about possible clashes of election dates. That needs restating and underpinning in some way because it could create some significant problems.

Thirdly, in early September the Constitution Committee published a report on the need to review and update the Cabinet Manual. The Minister indicated when he will respond to our report on the Bill, but he has not yet responded to that report. The Government’s response is significantly overdue, and I hope we can get some indication of when that review will take place. But it is also important that we get an acknowledgment that Parliament and parliamentary committees should have some say on the content of the Cabinet Manual. It is important that the Dissolution principles we have been discussing on the fringes of this debate are part of that, that they can be discussed by Parliament and that Parliament can have some influence there.

Finally, I remind the House that the Constitution Committee has long emphasised that constitutional change should be able to stand the test of time. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act did not do that. I hope this House can make sure that this Bill is in a fit state to pass that test.

Government: Leadership Training

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Norton, on this debate. I look forward to the quality of the answers the Minister will give to the questions he raised. Indeed, while he was speaking I recalled the preparations made in the 1990s for the then shadow Cabinet, and indeed the whole of the Front Bench. We were involved in seminars, training and away days at Templeton College; that was very good discipline and preparation, especially for a party that had so few people who had ever been in government before. I am not sure how long that approach lasted, and much of what the noble Lord said is an entirely timely reminder for everyone about what needs to happen.

I also recall that every time I became a Minister—several times—I was given a great deal of paperwork about my obligations and the way to behave, but I was also spoken to by the Permanent Secretary, and perhaps that was more important in outlining ministerial responsibilities. That approach might still exist, or exist in theory, but I am not sure how successful it is for Ministers’ obligations to Parliament. The noble Lord referred to that.

I will emphasise not the nature of the training that should take place but why it is so important that we have a new approach at this time. As I see it, the basic problem is the lack of respect for Parliament on the part of Ministers. We see that in the dismissive answers given to Parliamentary Questions and in announcements being made outside the House. The Speaker in the other place has tried to get the Government to behave more appropriately.

It is also a very significant problem in the way Ministers approach legislation. For the last number of years I have been a member of the Constitution Committee of this House. During that time, I have become increasingly concerned, and indeed alarmed, at the extremely unhealthy trends that I think are accelerating—trends in what government Ministers think they can get away with without properly consulting Parliament, in an attitude that I can describe only as cavalier. Time and again, the Constitution Committee has looked at Bills coming before the House and expressed very significant concerns at their skeletal nature and the vast number of Henry VIII clauses giving Ministers great delegated powers, allowing them to create offences and even to give effect to an international treaty by statutory instrument, as opposed to an Act of Parliament. Almost every time the committee examined a major Bill, we expressed serious concerns about the Government’s approach.

The more significant problem is not the issues in each individual Bill but the underlying trend we are seeing of moving away from Parliament making our laws and Ministers increasingly taking powers to change the rules, regulations and guidance. This has obvious dangers for a parliamentary democracy—the Government must be accountable to Parliament and Parliament must make our laws—but it is also dangerous for Ministers. Ministers are much more likely to get legislation that is right, workable and not open to legal challenge if there is appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. We have seen this time after time.

The situation has been made worse in recent years. During the Brexit negotiations, and subsequently, the Government’s brinkmanship meant that vital legislation had to be fast-tracked through Parliament. That was not inevitable. It was the Government’s choice in their tactics with the EU, and their tactics in handling Parliament and minimising parliamentary scrutiny. We have also seen with Covid that the Government have taken unprecedented extra powers, using statutory instruments to change rules, regulations and guidance frequently and often very late in the day.

I think there is a very real danger that Ministers, and indeed civil servants—and maybe even parliamentary counsel—will think that this is a new norm and that the Government can actually get away with anything; that bouncing Parliament and riding roughshod over important conventions is the way the Government can operate in the future. That is very dangerous and should be resisted by this House. It is also why this kind of training for Ministers, civil servants and everyone involved—including Members of Parliament, who do not always understand this House—is absolutely essential. People have got to learn not just the principles surrounding parliamentary democracy but how a functioning democracy actually works best. That is why I am very pleased to support the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Norton.

UK Government Union Capability

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 1st July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on obtaining this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, on the work he did in his report. I wish that we could congratulate the Government on their response, but, while it was right to commission the Dunlop review, they have not taken on board the basic problems that exist, and there is little evidence that they understand the basic concept of devolution.

The Dunlop review was commissioned to ensure that the UK Government were working in the best possible way to “realise the benefits” of the UK. This was considered particularly pertinent post Brexit. However, the Government continue to insist that they alone always know best. If they had been working properly with the devolved institutions, we would not have seen their dismissive approach to the problems of the Northern Ireland protocol, referred to already. If the Government had been working properly with other people, we would not have seen problems of the severity that we saw when we were passing the internal market Bill. There is a very long way to go before anybody can have any confidence that the Government actually respect the devolved institutions—that is part of the basic problem.

The Dunlop review gave an analysis that most would agree with and made some serious recommendations, many of which I agree with. But even if Ministers were to turn around and tell us now that all of those recommendations were going to be implemented, along with some other ideas that have been mentioned, that would not be sufficient or the end of the problem. Structural changes will take us only so far; what is really needed is a deep-seated change of attitude on the part of the Government, including the Prime Minister.

European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I speak as chair of the Constitution Committee and I say at the outset that this Bill elevates to a new level our concern about the way the Government present legislation to Parliament. The Bill fails all the tests for achieving good-quality legislation. It is long and complex and gives significant new powers to the Executive. We have not had anywhere near enough time to scrutinise the Bill as we would wish, and in any other circumstances the Constitution Committee would issue a detailed, thorough and critical appraisal of it. However, the committee did meet yesterday, and we published our immediate response. We acknowledged that the fast-tracking of the Bill is now necessary, but only because of the Government’s own actions ahead of the cliff edge of 31 December.

On the substance of the Bill, we noted that a prominent argument for the UK leaving the EU was to take back control of our laws—for laws to be determined by the UK Parliament, rather than the EU’s lawmaking bodies. Asserting the sovereignty of the UK Parliament was considered of such importance that it was included in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. It is regrettable that the Bill, which determines how the UK’s future relationship with the EU will be implemented into UK law, was published less than 24 hours before parliamentary scrutiny was due to begin. This does not allow Parliament much by way of control. This is the core of our concern. If, as the Government say, powers are coming back from the EU, where do those powers go? Are the Executive taking all these to themselves? What does this mean for the relationship between Parliament and the Government? Can this House fulfil its constitutional responsibilities?

In the Explanatory Notes, the Government say:

“The Bill is not suitable for post legislative scrutiny”.


We very much disagree, because the content of the trade and co-operation agreement cannot be amended by Parliament, but the mechanisms used by the Bill to rewrite UK domestic law to implement this have significant and potentially long-lasting implications, particularly for the role of Parliament and for the devolved arrangements. The Constitution Committee therefore recommends that the House consider how best to conduct post-legislative scrutiny as soon as possible. We believe that the quality of such scrutiny will be an early and substantial test of whether or not Parliament possesses a significant tranche of returned powers. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, this is what increased parliamentary sovereignty requires.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) (Abolition of By-Elections) Bill [HL]

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 8th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard (LD)]

My Lords, “It feels like ‘Groundhog Day’,” is an expression that is bound to be used as we debate this issue again. I certainly feel like Bill Murray, who played the weatherman in that film who finds himself inexplicably living the same day over and over again. As the US Congressman Mo Udall once famously commented, “Everything has been said, but not everyone has said it”. I expect to hear the same arguments over and over again, as little has changed since last December, when the House clearly expressed the view of its Members that a Bill such as this should be allowed to make progress and be considered by the House of Commons.

On 9 December last year, the amendment aimed at blocking the progress of the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, was defeated in this House, as he said, by 95 votes to 26, with 78% of us voting to make progress on the Bill. My first point is simply that every speech made on this subject, on every side of the debate, references respect for this House. Therefore, the will of the House should now be respected and we must put an end to the practice of holding by-elections to maintain a substantial hereditary presence in the House indefinitely, long after those hereditary Peers chosen to remain in 1999 have passed away.

My second point is that almost every Peer who speaks in this Chamber says that we must also respect the primacy of the House of Commons, yet a small number of Peers seek to block the House of Commons from being allowed even to debate the Bill. The principle of it has already been voted on by the elected House: the principle of ending the by-elections to top up the number of hereditary Peers was voted on by MPs in January 2010, when they supported the measure as it was proposed in the then Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill. They did so overwhelmingly, by 318 votes to 142. The House of Commons has already voted in support of exactly what is in this Bill, by a majority of 176, or by 66% to 34%—again, an overwhelming majority.

Those who are defending the rights of hereditary Peers to vote to elect more hereditary Peers to be a part of this legislature, should perhaps take note of the previous votes of this place and the other place on this very issue. They should allow this Bill to go forward to the Commons, without further filibuster bringing about further damage to the reputation of this House.

Thirdly and finally, I want to challenge those suggesting that a deal seen as a temporary measure, and secured by the votes of both Houses in 1999, must be binding for all time. Some noble Lords regard those votes as being irrevocable, but I believe that those same noble Lords also subscribe to the principle that one Parliament cannot bind any successor Parliament; for if it could, what would be the point of our meeting to consider much of the legislation that we do consider, if an issue has been decided in the previous Parliament, let alone one five Parliaments ago?

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Does he think it significant, as the previous speaker said, that Lord Weatherill himself tried to change this situation later?

[Lord Rennard]

I am grateful for that intervention; that is a highly significant point. It is very clear that some of those most involved in the negotiations of 1999 would not favour our being where we are today, and would favour this Bill making progress. The argument that we cannot discuss this issue or make progress, because of an agreement in 1999, is absurd in terms of parliamentary democracy.

What, for example, would be the point of our debating the EU withdrawal Bill, if the European Communities Act 1972 had been binding on successor Parliaments? Would the noble Lords fighting to preserve hereditary by-elections also be arguing that we cannot consider leaving the EU, because of votes by both Houses ratifying a treaty 45 years ago and subsequently confirmed by the 1975 referendum? I suspect they will not make that argument.

Parliamentary Proceedings: Statistics

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that the pressures on Members of Parliament these days in terms of constituency work, emails and so forth are quite astonishing. That is part of the problem and I do not think that family-friendly hours have helped.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Butler, on initiating this debate and go along fully with what he suggests regarding transparency and information. The figures he gave about the number of Bills and the fact that the amount of time has not expanded in the same way are significant. I am sure that the nature of the legislation is also important—not just the number of Bills but the number of pages and clauses in them—but I know he would not suggest that we look just at the amount of time spent, because you can spend your time well or not very well.

I want to defend the concept of programming legislation—timetabling by another name. I remember the days when, as an opposition spokesperson, I would spend hour after hour on Clause 1 in Committee to force the Government to have a guillotine. I would gain some political kudos, but we would not make any progress in terms of getting every bit of that Bill debated. However, it was an important political ploy and a method of putting pressure on the Government. I admit culpability for our having programming, because when I was Leader of the House of Commons I chaired the Modernisation Committee and we came up with the idea that, as an alternative to the incentive of dragging out the first clauses of Bills, we should have a system whereby the Government and the Opposition—the usual channels—sat down together and decided which were the major issues and which required the most detailed scrutiny. The Opposition were given priority as to the debates they wanted, in exchange for the Government knowing when a Bill would come out of Committee.

That system is in principle a good one, but it has been quite significantly abused over the years and probably needs revisiting. But however good the system of scrutiny, if we do not assure the basic quality of legislation coming to us, Members of Parliament in either House are faced with an impossible task. I do not want to say too much about what should be done on the quality of legislation, because as a member of the Constitution Committee with the noble Lord, Lord Norton, I know that is something we are looking at.

The pressures on Parliament today are intense. The pressures on Members of Parliament are desperately intense and people expect quick solutions to complex problems—I fear we will see that on Brexit as well. We all have a responsibility to do what we can to scrutinise where we can, but government has a responsibility to look again at the quality and readiness of the legislation it brings forward in both Houses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for this debate and for the array of big hitters he has tempted away from the long table. With some double-counting, we have a professor of government, a Cabinet Secretary, a Clerk of the House of Commons, three government Chief Whips, the Convenor of the Cross Benches, a Lord Chief Justice, a Lord Chancellor, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, two Leaders of the Commons, the Leader of the Opposition and a Lord Privy Seal. Between us, we could provide the entire cast for “Iolanthe” and “Trial by Jury”.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler, has long been associated with initiatives to promote better scrutiny of legislation, and he and I have spent many weekends at Ditchley Park, with others, as part of the Better Government Initiative considering reform in this area. In the words of Sir Humphrey, it would be a brave Minister who refused to consider a proposal with the impressive pedigree of the noble Lords who have spoken this evening.

I want to reverse the normal order in which Ministers respond to these debates by addressing head-on the specific and narrow proposal from the noble Lord and then considering the broader context in which it is placed and addressing some of the other points raised in the debate.

The noble Lord asked whether the Government had any plans to include in the Explanatory Notes statistics on the time taken to debate each part of a Bill. The short answer is that we do not—but that does not, of course, rule out further consideration of the proposition put forward so eloquently this evening by him and others. The reason we do not is, first, because the Explanatory Notes are designed to help the readers of legislation understand its legal effect. Secondly, the notes to Acts already include the Hansard column references to debates at each stage, so the Act is permanently accompanied by a record of how each House scrutinised the legislation in its various stages.

The raw data which the noble Lord is after on the actual time spent on each part, which goes beyond what is currently published, are already available in the public domain, as he said, since Hansard includes the times when consideration of each part of the Bill begins and ends. So, against the background of what I have said about the Government’s proposals, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Butler, as a first step might want to ask the authorities in both Houses to conduct a pilot to publish the data he is after in respect of some suitable Bills.

Another option would be to see whether the Hansard Society might produce some historical data, and we could then see whether this adds value to the legislative process or produces the outcomes that the noble Lord seeks in terms of influencing behaviour. I will certainly bring to the attention of colleagues in government the proposition we have been considering, and I noticed the veiled threat that if action is not taken a whole series of Parliamentary Questions might be tabled to elicit, at some cost, the information that he has asked to be included in the Explanatory Memorandum.

I shall add a health warning at this stage and echo some of the points made by others as the publication of these data may give an incomplete picture of the time spent. A Bill that has been published in draft first, that has been extensively considered and amended and has had the wrinkles ironed out may need less time than a Bill not published in draft. Key clauses in a Bill may have been considered elsewhere, for example in an opposition day debate, or may have been examined in detail by a Select Committee. A good example of this was the work of the Home Affairs Select Committee into the Psychoactive Substances Bill when the Bill was before Parliament. Simply taking at face value the time spent on a specific Bill might underestimate the volume of scrutiny that it had attracted.

I turn now to some of the broader issues that were raised. In doing so, I recognise the force of many of the criticisms that have been made about how legislation is considered. I am sure that your Lordships will agree that this Prime Minister’s aspiration to publish more Green and White Papers can only be a good thing—a point underlined when my right honourable friend the Leader of the House of Commons recently gave evidence to the Constitution Committee and said he was keen to see more legislation preceded by Green and White Papers. That committee is currently conducting an inquiry into the legislative process, and two members of it have spoken in our debate today.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

Three.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

Three members. Again, I will ensure that members and officials note the contributions that have been made in this debate. Were the Constitution Committee to be persuaded by the arguments that have been put forward this evening and to include that in its final report, that would of course be a significant step forward.

At the same evidence session, the Leader also expressed his support for pre-legislative scrutiny. So far in this Parliament, we have seen several major pieces of legislation published in draft, including the Wales Bill and the then Investigatory Powers Bill. It is the Government’s intention to publish legislation for pre-legislative scrutiny wherever possible. The draft Public Sector Ombudsman Bill was published only last month, following hot on the heels of draft tax legislation at the Autumn Statement.

I endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and others have said about the value of scrutiny by your Lordships’ House, which the Government value enormously. I recognise that it may be possible to make further progress, and I will deal with some of the suggestions in a moment. I know that many of your Lordships are concerned that Bills are not subject to enough scrutiny in Parliament, particularly in the other House. I just ask your Lordships to remember that each House has its own style, and we should be diplomatic in discussing how the other place conducts itself, not least so we do not precipitate a domestic dispute and retaliatory action from down the Corridor.

I would like to address my noble friend Lord Ryder’s concerns about programming. Like him, I would not support the use of the guillotine by any Government unilaterally to curtail discussion on controversial Bills in an overprogrammed legislative Session. This is what has happened in the past, and I have voted against such Motions. But here I find myself in agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, in that this does not mean that it is wrong for business managers to seek agreement among themselves and then to put to the House a proposal for the passage of a particular Bill. This can avoid wasting valuable time on procedural Motions and enable the House do to its job properly.

I had to sit opposite the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, on the right-to-buy legislation, I think, discussing at length the timetable Motion in Committee. I think we would both agree that that was not the best use of time for either of us. Indeed, as shadow Leader of the House in the other place in the late 1990s, I added my name to some programme Motions tabled by the noble Baroness where I thought adequate time had been proposed, as did the then shadow Leader from the Lib Dems, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Both MPs and stakeholders outside value the certainty that programme Motions deliver, so that they know when particular measures will be debated in a Bill and can plan their lives appropriately. That is the model that has been put in place for the last five years and is in marked contrast to my earlier years in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to the 2005 Finance Bill, and I very much hope there will be no recurrence of what happened then.

No programme resolutions have been divided on since the 2012-13 Session. Although I was either Leader or Chief Whip for part of the time, the credit goes as much to opposition parties for not making unrealistic demands. Nor was it the case that this is all a Front-Bench stitch-up between the major parties. Back-Benchers, who are more independent than at any time previously—as I know to my cost as a former Chief Whip—could have forced a Division on these programme Motions, as could have the minor parties. But they did not. The fact that this and the previous Government have relied less on draconian programme Motions is testament to the more mature approach now adopted in the other place, exemplified by the lack of Divisions on those Motions. Things have changed since my noble friend left the House in 1997.

Following on from this, the Government have consistently allocated a more generous amount of time for Bill stages in the Commons. If we look at the current Session, three Bills had multiple days for Report in the other place, something which was previously very rare. On the 12 Bills which have had Report in the Commons, all groups of amendments were reached. Twelve Bills have been committed to Public Bill Committee, and all but one Bill has reported early. Only the Public Bill Committee on the Digital Economy Bill was still debating new schedules when time ran out, but all the other provisions in the Bill as proposed by the Government had been scrutinised. No knives have been used to control debate in Public Bill Committee in any programme resolutions since the 2012-13 Session.

Time spent is the subject of this debate and, by the end of last year, the amount of time spent in this Session in the Commons scrutinising Bills in Committee was 151 hours and six minutes. Oral evidence has been heard from 124 witnesses, in eight Public Bill Committees. By the time Parliament rose for the Christmas Recess, it had spent a total of 472 hours and 15 minutes debating the Government’s legislative programme. This averages out to more than 23 hours per Bill. Although exact comparisons between the two Houses are difficult, your Lordships may be interested to know that the Whips estimate that the Commons spent 247 hours and 22 minutes debating government legislation, while your Lordships’ House spent 224 hours and 53 minutes.

We should not forget that the other place has often been more innovative and introduced reforms that have aided parliamentary scrutiny. These include carryover Bills, which in practice mean that Parliament has more time to scrutinise such Bills, but also public evidence sessions before Commons Committee stage, which have been popular with stakeholders and MPs.

A number of issues were raised, which perhaps I can deal with briefly. A number of noble Lords referred to the legislative process and delegated powers, as well as to Henry VIII. My right honourable friend the Leader of the House has written to the Constitution Committee in connection with its inquiry a letter headed “The legislative process: delegated powers”. It is a six-page letter and Henry VIII features quite prominently. I hope that in due course the letter will get into the public domain because it addresses some of the issues raised in this debate about the scrutiny of secondary legislation and Henry VIII powers.

On the volume of legislation, in the 2014-15 Session there were 26 Bills, while in the current one there are also 26. Looking back, in 1997-98 there were 53 and in 2001-02 there were 39. We are actually at the lower end of the spectrum. In terms of pages there is similar progress: in 2014 there were 2,640 pages but in 2000 there were 3,865. So it is not the case that there have been a huge number of extra pages of legislation when one looks broadly over the last 15 years.

I am conscious that I am already into injury time. I would like to write to noble Lords to deal with some of the issues that have been raised. I recognise that there is scope for improvement and I am interested in many of the suggestions that have been made in this debate. Once again, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for instituting this very agreeable exchange of views.

EU Referendum: Voter Registration

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Wednesday 8th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

The noble Lord speaks with a lot of experience on these things and makes a good point. I agree wholeheartedly with the principle that reducing the number of duplicate applications would certainly ease the burden on citizens and electoral administrators. We are open to all options for reducing duplicate applications. That said, we must guard against any solution which results in whole swathes of data unnecessarily being held centrally.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister now relook at the problem of registration in terms of the boundary review? We have been told that many more people are now registered, yet the figures are the old figures. We know that many are still not registered. Surely, it is wrong to press ahead with the boundary review when registration has caused so many difficulties.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

The Government’s position is as I set out a moment ago.