Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Maybe that would be a good thing. I am not convinced that the regulator pushing away from primary legislation to regulation is necessarily the way forward. I am not convinced that what has happened to date has failed. Therefore, I am not sure why we want to change this without adequate proof. The idea that the FCA wants to swallow up everything else is fairly normal in the gladiatorial forum that we have. I would like to see what the FCA and others have to say about this before we make a final decision.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to both Amendments 180A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Coffey, and Amendment 206, which stands in the name of my noble friend Viscount Younger of Leckie and myself. Both amendments address the regulation of pensions and how the regulation is best exercised in the interest of scheme members and future pensioners.

It was the intervention of my noble friend Lady Coffey at Second Reading that first prompted me to reflect more deeply on the role of regulators. As my noble friend argued then, and has argued again today in speaking to Amendment 180A, this Bill misses a significant structural opportunity by retaining two separate pension regulators. I agree with her. There is something inherently odd about the fact that very similar pension products can be treated differently depending on whether they fall within the remit of the Pensions Regulator or the Financial Conduct Authority. That observation is not controversial; it is simply a reflection of how the current system operates.

I recall clearly the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill in February 2020 and remember responding to amendments from across your Lordships’ House by explaining that personal pension schemes were regulated by the FCA, rather than the Pensions Regulator, and that imposing requirements on personal pension providers through that legislation would risk creating a patchwork of overlapping regulatory oversight. Providers, it was argued, would otherwise be required to respond to two separate regulators in relation to the same activity. That was the Government’s position at the time, and it illustrates that the existence of regulatory fragmentation in this area is not a matter of dispute.

A great deal of work has gone into managing the fragmentation, with strategic documents, dating back to 2018, seeking to grapple with the issue. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator have published joint regulatory strategies explicitly acknowledging the complexity that arises where their remits intersect and the need for close co-ordination. More recently, an independent review of the Pensions Regulator in 2023 again highlighted the challenges inherent in this divided regulatory landscape. Taken together, these developments point to structural issues in the regulatory ecosystem that can, at the very least, create confusion and the risk of inconsistency.

It was on the basis of that experience in government and of careful consideration since then that I sought to identify what might realistically be done in this Bill. I came to the conclusion that Amendment 206 represents a proportionate and pragmatic compromise. It would require the Government to establish a formal published protocol setting out clearly how the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator co-ordinate, how responsibilities are divided between them and how they communicate when regulating the pensions industry. The evidence shows that there is complexity, overlap and, at times, confusion between the two regulators. Stakeholders frequently complain of unclear lines of responsibility and the regulators themselves openly acknowledge that co-ordination is difficult, hence the repeated reliance on joint strategies and informal arrangements.

It was our sense that the problem is one not of outright contradiction but of opacity, complexity and accountability. Amendment 206 is, therefore, carefully targeted at the problem, which is clearly evidenced. It seeks to improve co-ordination and clarity without asserting a level of regulatory failure that has not yet been conclusively demonstrated. That does not place it in opposition to the argument advanced by my noble friend Lady Coffey; indeed, I would be very happy to work with her, as we did so constructively on previous pension legislation, to strengthen this area further.

In my view, a formal co-ordination protocol has three important virtues. First, it can evolve over time as the regulatory landscape changes. Secondly, it can be tightened if problems persist or new risks emerge. Thirdly, it can itself become the evidence base for any future decision to pursue more fundamental consolidation of regulatory functions, should that ultimately be judged necessary. For those reasons, I commend Amendment 206 to the Committee and urge the Government to see it not as an obstacle but as a constructive and proportionate step towards greater clarity, accountability and confidence in the regulation of pensions.

Women’s State Pension Age Communication: PHSO Report

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, but it does not, in my view, completely address directly the issue that lies at the heart of the anger felt by many WASPI women. I am assured that the maladministration identified by the ombudsman, and the associated question of a financial remedy, arose from decisions taken under a Labour Government that were the responsibility of Labour Ministers. In the years that followed, there was notable and sustained support from Labour Members for the WASPI campaign, including calls for compensation, voiced by individuals who now occupy the most senior positions in government.

Now that Labour is in power, that position appears to have been abandoned. The result is not merely disappointment, but a profound sense of betrayal. It is no wonder that WASPI women are furious. At no point in the Oral Statement, as far as I can see or understand, was this reversal acknowledged. Instead, attention was diverted towards general references to changes in the state pension age, which did nothing to address the specific findings of maladministration or the expectations that were so clearly raised.

There is a strong sense of frustration surrounding this issue, not only among Members of this House but, more importantly, among the WASPI women. Much of that frustration arises not simply from the substance of the decision but from the manner in which it has been handled and communicated by the Government. From welfare reform to the winter fuel payment, and now this, a pattern has emerged of poor communication and delayed decision-making. Too often, it is not the policy itself that causes the greatest anger but the uncertainty, delay and lack of clarity that surround it. Indecision is itself a decision. In this case, it has meant leaving people’s lives and expectations suspended for months.

In recent months, expectations appear to have been raised only to be lowered again. Following the ombudsman’s report, many campaigners believed that a different outcome was genuinely under consideration, only to be told once more that nothing had changed. The Minister will recall suggestions that decisions on this matter were left unresolved until after the general election in 2024. That is not entirely accurate. Statements made before the election set out the Government’s position with some clarity, which makes it legitimate for WASPI women to ask why more recent communications appeared to imply that the issue and situation remained open.

Against that background, can the Minister explain how the Government now intend to communicate their position clearly and directly to WASPI women? Will letters be issued setting out the decision and the reasons for it? If so, when and in what form will that communication take place? Given the strength of feeling among those affected, this must be treated with the gravity it deserves. More broadly, there is a sense that poor managerial experience has characterised the handling of this matter, further undermining trust.

That damage has been compounded by the contrast between earlier rhetoric and the position now being taken. The Deputy Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary spoke of a cliff edge facing WASPI women. The Foreign Secretary said she was fighting for a fair deal. The Chancellor said she wanted justice. The current Secretary of State for Work and Pensions publicly associated himself with MPs campaigning for a better outcome. Those who once stood beside them now appear, in their eyes, to have turned away.

I know that the Minister referred to pension credit and the importance of take-up, and I completely share that with her. I did my very best when I was in her position to make sure that we did everything we could to ensure that pension credit was taken up and increased. I am not sure if progress has stalled or whether there has been any improvement, so can the Minister clarify the position on take-up of pension credit and whether this can be used to placate some of these genuine WASPI women?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to the House. The Government say the WASPI women should have known about the changes. I am reminded of a quote from the book The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy:

“But the plans were on display … you found the notice, didn’t you? … It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard’”.


Another relevant quote from the same book said:

“All the planning charts and demolition orders have been on display at your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for 50 … years”.


The issue here is whether these women were communicated with adequately. Some 3.6 million WASPI women have been badly treated. They were given some hope; we have an ombudsman who made a recommendation to provide some justice and pay some compensation. Can the Minister say why this recommendation has been ignored? We have heard apologies but no compensation.

If you were a woman who knew that, at a certain age, you would receive a pension you probably did not give it another thought that the rules had changed. Of course, lots of announcements were made, and lots of letters were sent—sometimes belatedly, as the ombudsman said—but the truth is that the messages were not received or understood. The ombudsman has recommended compensation of £1,000 to £2,950 per person. I ask the Minister, very bluntly, why this recommendation has not been implemented. It is not a question of justice, but a reluctance to spend money on a group of people who cannot fight back.

Can the Minister take back to her colleagues in the department that there is a feeling—I hope—across this House that the WASPI have been maltreated and that the least they should expect is for the recommendation of the independent ombudsman to be put into effect? It is not enough, in my view, but it has come from the ombudsman, and I would like to hear what reasoning the Minister can give for ignoring this. I hope that she will take back to her colleagues in the other House and in the department the feelings of this House that the ombudsman’s decision should be honoured.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As we know, this group addresses the use of scale, as measured by assets under management or monetary value, as a determinant of scheme quality.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, gave the example of the Orkney trust. I ask myself: what is the reason? Is it size? Personally, I think it is the calibre of the single malt whisky. Then we go to the other end of the country, to Guernsey. Is it because trusts are at the extremes of the country that causes the good benefits, or is it something else? You can always look for a reason: it could be size, location or anything else—or, indeed, the quality of the whisky.

We accept that scale can bring efficiencies, but there is a strong question over whether size alone is a reliable proxy for value. Amendments 91 and 95 recognise that some master trusts and group personal pension schemes deliver strong investment performance despite being below prescribed thresholds. Amendment 98 similarly acknowledges that innovation and specialism do not always depend on scale, location or whatever else.

We are also concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. Amendments 99, 101, 106 and 108 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, are concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. These amendments probe whether the figures chosen are evidence-based and future-proofed, or whether they risk being outdated—that is the point—as the market evolves. It is not cast in stone, and we should not try to see it as such.

Amendments 101, 104 and 108 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and others, raise an additional concern: the risk of mandating common investment strategies. Diversity of approach is a strength of a pension system. Forcing schemes into uniform strategies risks herding behaviour and systemic vulnerability. My question to the Minister is this: is the Government’s objective genuinely better member outcomes—which I believe we all want—or prioritising administrative simplicity at the expense of innovation, competition and resilience? All the amendments in this group tackle this problem, and those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, particularly stress that. I hope we will continue to push these through to the next stage of the debate on this Bill.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, today’s groups build directly on the issues explored in last Thursday’s debate. That discussion was both stimulating and constructive, and the contributions made, particularly on mandation, highlight the value of the scrutiny that this Bill continues to receive in Grand Committee. On this group, in the interests of brevity—I am sure that will please the whole Committee—I shall keep my remarks focused on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. A number of significant and related issues have been raised by other noble Lords, and we will wish to return to these later today. We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response to the points made on this group.

Amendment 98 would introduce a clear and proportionate innovation exemption for relevant master trusts under Clause 40, so that schemes delivering genuinely specialist or innovative services are not automatically required to meet the scale threshold simply because of their size. We have been challenged today not to be obsessed with size. We recognise the policy aim of improving outcomes through scale. However, as I said, size is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value: there are master trusts that are smaller by design yet deliver strong member outcomes through innovation, whether in investment approach, governance or engagement with particular workforces. As the Bill is currently drafted, such schemes risk being forced to consolidate or exit, not because they are failing members but because they do not meet a blunt asset size test.

Amendment 98 provides a sensible alternative route, recognising that innovation and specialisation can also deliver high-quality outcomes. This amendment simply ensures that size alone is not determinative. I hope the Minister will see this as a constructive amendment that supports innovation and choice while remaining fully aligned with the Bill’s objective of improving outcomes for savers.

Amendment 102 is, again, a probing amendment. Clause 40 gives the Secretary of State the power to determine by regulations the method for calculating a master trust’s total assets for the purposes of this provision. That is a potentially significant power, because the way that total assets are defined and measured will determine which schemes fall within scope and which may benefit from exemptions.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on having a group of nine amendments all on her own. We normally share groups rather than have them all on our own. This group considers how scale requirements interact with default pension arrangements where most savers remain invested. I have listened to the debate and, having spent a large part of my career in accountancy and advising clients, I know that the trouble is that the majority of clients are not expert enough to know what they should do with their pension. They seek advice from various organisations on what they should do. We should make sure that the quality of the advice they get suits their position in life. As other noble Lords have said, we are concerned about the overly rigid scale test, which could unintentionally narrow choice within defaults and push schemes towards one-size-fits-all designs.

Amendment 97 highlights the importance of allowing defaults that reflect members’ differing ages, health conditions, retirement plans and risk profiles. Amendments 97A to 101B probe—this is the point—whether the authority can take account of the combined value of assets across multiple default arrangements, rather than assessing each in isolation. Without this flexibility, schemes that offer well-designed cohort-based defaults could be penalised simply for tailoring provision.

Amendments 168A and 170A reinforce this point, seeking to ensure that schemes are not excluded from the market for moving beyond crude uniform defaults. Our concern is that defaults should be designed around member needs, not regulatory convenience. I hope the Minister will explain how the Bill avoids pushing schemes towards uniformity at the expense of suitability and long-term outcomes.

I hope the Minister does not regard the series of amendments in this group as combative. They are meant to try to help pensioners or future pensioners. It is wrong if the Government look for a simple process but do not look at the benefit for the people concerned. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, who talked about what happens in gilts and the like. I come from a period in the chartered accountant profession when you always went into gilts in what you thought were the last few years of your working life. Now, things have changed. We have to look at what you do and when you do it, and those things depend on the people involved.

I hope the Minister will see that these amendments are trying to say that things should not be too prescriptive. They are not against what the Government are trying to do, which is look after people. But are doing it on a one-size-fits-all basis, which does not work in the real world that we are in. I hope the Government go back and think about this a little more so that, when we come to Report, we can be a little more innovative.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in support of this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann. She has once again demonstrated her expertise and the value that she brings to our scrutiny of these important issues. Most importantly, she explained the spirit in which these amendments were tabled.

Throughout our proceedings on this Bill, a consistent theme across the Committee has been the need for proportionality in the steps we are taking on scale and value for money, and for definitions that are sufficiently comprehensive to reflect how the market actually operates in practice. I do not intend to repeat the points already made by the noble Baroness or ask the questions she has posed, but we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on these issues.

Clause 40, as drafted, risks applying the scale test in an overly narrow and mechanical way by requiring the regulator to assess each default arrangement in isolation without regard to the wider context in which it is offered. That approach is not necessarily proportionate; nor does it reflect the economic reality of how master trust providers operate. This amendment would allow the regulator to take into account the combined assets of several non-scale default arrangements offered by the same provider. In doing so, it would not dilute the principle of scale; rather, it would ensure that scale is assessed in a comprehensive and realistic way, focusing on the resilience, governance and efficiency of the provider as a whole.

That matters because, without this flexibility, we risk forcing consolidation for its own sake and potentially requiring well-run, well-performing defaults to be wound up simply because they fall on the wrong side of an arbitrary threshold—even where the provider clearly operates at scale overall. This amendment therefore speaks directly to the principles that we have already raised in Committee: that regulations should be outcome-focused rather than box-ticking, and that they should avoid unintended consequences that could undermine member confidence rather than enhancing it. For those reasons, I believe this is a sensible and proportionate refinement of Clause 40, and I hope the Minister will give it serious consideration.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as has been expressed, this group establishes the foundation of the value-for-money framework. We welcome the ambition to improve outcomes for savers. However, the effectiveness of value for money will depend on how it is defined, measured and implemented, and I welcome the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer, which elaborated on these points.

I shall concentrate on Amendments 49 and 54 and I hope I can persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that they are of value. These amendments will extend the scope of the Bill’s value-for-money provisions. They ensure that they apply not only to defined contribution schemes but defined benefit occupational pension schemes as well.

The arrangements make it clear that regulations can make different provision for different types of scheme. Critically, however, all schemes must be covered by the value-for-money assessment, with a proper value-for-money rating. Members of DB schemes deserve the same transparency and assurance about value for money as members of DC schemes. DB schemes still represent a significant part of the pensions landscape. Excluding them risks creating an uneven playing field and less scrutiny where it is still needed.

A single, consistent framework across occupational pensions improves comparability, avoids regulatory gaps and ensures that all savers benefit from the same standards of accountability. The two amendments in my name would ensure that the Bill delivers on its promise of value for money across all pension schemes. The measure is simple: every saver in every scheme, whatever its type, deserves value for money. Other noble Lords have expressed this in detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke about pensions jargon. We are here in a very rarefied atmosphere, where people have some knowledge—I have less than many in the Room—of what pensions are about and what phrases such as “default pensions” mean. We need to make it clear to people who have no interest in pensions other than receiving a cheque at the end of the month at a certain age what it all means. Some people need to be clear about the choices they make, and we need to do as much as we can. These amendments, both those that have been spoken to already and the two in my name, seek to protect people’s interests.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we come again to a varied group. I shall focus my remarks on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I welcome the contributions from other noble Lords and I look forward to the Minister’s response. We have a few amendments in this group: Amendments 50, 51, 52, 53, 57 and 74, and the Clause 13 do not stand part proposition.

Before I turn to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, I will say a few words about the value-for-money framework that sits at the heart of the Bill. The introduction of a value-for-money framework has the potential to be genuinely transformative for workplace pensions if it is designed and implemented well. We support the principle of value for money. However, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the framework is designed, applied and enforced.

As drafted, the provisions are relatively skeletal, despite the pivotal role that value for money is expected to play. If value for money is to drive real improvement rather than box ticking, it must be transparent in its methodology, robust in its metrics and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be the determining factor. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns does not represent good value for money for savers. Comparability will be key. Without clear, standardised metrics, there is a risk that value for money simply reinforces price-chasing behaviour rather than improving outcomes. My amendments are therefore intended not to oppose the concept of value for money but to strengthen it, to ensure that it is implemented in a way that improves saver outcomes, respects fiduciary duty and avoids unintended consequences.

I turn to the amendments in more detail. Amendments 50 to 53 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted in the case of Amendment 53, are probing amendments that go to the heart of whether the value-for-money framework established by Clause 11 will operate as a genuinely effective tool for improving saver outcomes.

Clause 11 creates a very broad enabling power. It allows for the creation of a value-for-money framework, but is largely silent on what value for money should actually consist of. Given the centrality of value for money to the Bill as a whole, it is important to test the Government’s intentions on the minimum elements that will underpin the framework.

Amendment 50 would require value-for-money regulations to include publication of a fees-to-returns ratio. The purpose here is straightforward: cost on its own is not value. As I have said, a scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns cannot sensibly be said to offer good value to members. If value for money is to be outcome-focused, it must show what savers are receiving relative to what they are paying, rather than allowing headline charges to dominate decision-making.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

These are obviously probing amendments. They are all to do with the jargon: if we are arguing about the jargon, how much more confused will the normal punter be in trying to understand the jargon. This group focuses on how value for money is expressed, enforced and communicated.

We support the principle that members should be able to understand whether their scheme is performing well. However, value-for-money ratings also carry significant power. They will influence trustee behaviour, in particular, as well as employer decisions and market structure. That makes proportionality and precision essential.

I am particularly concerned about overreliance on short-term performance metrics. Saving for a pension is, or certainly should be, inherently long-term. Schemes should not be penalised for temporary underperformance driven by market cycles or responsible long-term investment strategies.

We also question whether compliance mechanisms become blunt instruments. Labelling schemes “poor value” without clear context may drive consolidation for the wrong reasons, reducing competition without improving outcomes. Clear language matters—I use the word “jargon” once again—but so does nuance. Members need information they can trust, not simplified labels about market complexity.

I have some questions for the Minister. How will this regime distinguish between persistent structural failure and short-term variation? How will it use this intermediate rating? How will it encourage genuine improvement rather than defensive behaviour by trustees? Trustees are meant to be very careful; they will be cognisant of the intermediate position. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, again, this is a substantial group. I will not detain the Committee for too long but, before I turn to my amendments, I briefly welcome those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. As she set out so clearly, her amendments seek to simplify the language used in value-for-money assessments so that they are more readily and intuitively understood by scheme members. This goes to a point that has arisen repeatedly during our discussions in Committee: many of the concepts in this Bill, as well as the language used to describe them, are dense, technical and difficult to grasp. A considerable level of prior knowledge is often required simply to understand what is being proposed, let alone its practical effect. I am reminded of a remark attributed to Joseph Pulitzer. He said that information should be put before people,

“briefly so that they will read it, clearly so that they will understand it … picturesquely so that they will remember it, and, above all, accurately”.

Surely that is the standard to which we should aspire, in not only this Bill but more broadly in our legislative work. Clarity, intelligibility and accessibility should be central objectives. The language we choose and the way in which we define key terms in legislation are fundamental, yet they are too often treated as secondary concerns.

I therefore warmly welcome the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, precisely because they address this issue head-on. Jargon is easy to reach for, but it is also, in a sense, lazy. When we are constructing a value-for-money framework whose purpose is to communicate value for money, we must be vigilant about terminology that obscures rather than illuminates and about euphemisms and phrases that sound authoritative but fail to convey real meaning. Many noble Lords will be familiar with Eric Blair’s essay, Politics and the English Language, and the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness serve as a timely reminder of some of the lessons it contains.

The first amendments in this group to which I have added my name—Amendments 60 and 61—would remove sub-paragraph (ii) from Clause 15(1)(b) as well as subsection (2). These amendments speak to a simple point: where responsible trustees or managers have determined that a scheme is not delivering value for money, that judgment should be sufficient to justify a rating of “not delivering” without the need to satisfy additional statutory conditions that risk being overly prescriptive.

Trustees already sit at the centre of this framework. They are charged with assessing investment performance, costs, charges, service quality and long-term member outcomes. They are subject to fiduciary duties and regulatory oversight. It is therefore entirely reasonable to trust their professional judgment when they conclude that a scheme is failing to deliver value for money. As the Bill is currently drafted, that judgment must be supplemented by one of a series of defined conditions, whether persistent intermediate ratings, a lack of realistic prospect of improvement or regulatory non-compliance. While well-intentioned, those conditions risk turning what should be a principles-based regime into a mechanistic one, encouraging trustees to focus on meeting thresholds rather than acting decisively in members’ best interests.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Monday 19th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for putting these amendments down and speaking in detail about them. We also heard good words from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I almost thought, “Is there any point in getting up and speaking?” but I am a politician.

This group goes to first principles. What is a defined benefits pension surplus and what is it for? For us, DB surplus is not a windfall or an accident, as I think others have said. It is a result of long-term assumptions, member contributions, employer funding decisions and investment outcomes—all those—but above all, it exists within a framework of promises made to members in return for deferred pay. We are therefore concerned about renaming—we keep on coming back to this—“surplus” as simply “assets” available for redistribution.

Language matters here because it shapes both legal interpretation and member confidence. Treating surpluses as inherently extractable risks weakening the fundamental bargain that underpins DB provision. Our position is not that surplus should never be accessed, but that it should be considered only after members’ reasonable expectations have been fully protected. That includes confidence in benefits security, protection against inflation erosion, and trust and accrued rights not being retrospectively interpreted. I have always thought that with DB pensions you need prudence. How far do prudence and good governance go?

Finally, the question for Ministers is whether the Bill maintains the principle that DB schemes exist first and foremost to deliver promised benefits or whether it marks a shift towards viewing schemes as financial reservoirs once minimum funding tests are met. In that case, one has to think, “What is the minimum for the funding tests?” We shall come on to that in an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has put down later in the Bill on where companies fail. It is a question of when those surpluses are available, if they are ever available.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, when I entered the department in July 2019, defined benefit pension schemes did, on occasion, report surpluses. However, those surpluses were neither of the scale nor the character that we are now observing. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century and beyond, it is evident that both the funding position of defined benefit schemes and the methodologies used to assess that funding have changed materially.

The surpluses reported today are not simply large in absolute terms but different in nature. They are measured against significantly more prudent assumptions, particularly in relation to discount rates, longevity and asset valuation, than would have been applied historically. It is therefore right that these emerging surpluses are examined with care and transparency. Bringing them into the open is necessary, and I say at the outset that the Government are right to have raised this issue explicitly in the Bill.

That said, we consider that the Bill does not yet fully reflect a number of the practical and operational issues faced by both trustees and sponsoring employers when seeking to make effective use of those provisions. In that respect, our position is not materially distant from that of the Government. Our concerns are not ones of principle but of application and implementation. We recognise that issues relating to potential deadlock between trustees and sponsors are important, but we are content for those matters to be considered at a later stage in the Committee’s proceedings. Our immediate focus is on understanding how the proposals are intended to operate in practice, how decisions are expected to be taken within existing scheme governance arrangements and how these new powers interact with established trustee fiduciary duties and employer covenant considerations.

This is a busy group, and noble Lords have done a sterling job in setting out their reasoning and rationale. I shall, therefore, not detain the Committee further by relitigating those points but will speak to my Amendment 25 in this group. Like a number of our amendments in this part of the Bill, it is a probing amendment intended to seek clarity. Clause 9 inserts new Section 36B into the Pensions Act 1995. The new section gives trustees of defined benefit trustee schemes the ability by resolution to modify the schemes’ rules so as to confirm a power to pay surplus to the employer or to remove or relax existing restrictions on the exercise of such a power.

The clause contains one explicit limitation on that power. New Section 36B(4) provides that the section does not apply to a scheme that is being wound up. In other words, wind-up is the only circumstance singled out in the Bill in which the new surplus release modification power cannot be used. Amendment 25 would remove that specific exclusion, and I want to be clear that the purpose of doing so is not to argue that surplus should be released during winding-up; rather, it is to test the Government’s reasoning in identifying wind-up as the sole circumstance meriting an explicit prohibition in primary legislation.

By proposing to remove subsection (4), the amendment invites the Minister to explain whether the Government consider wind-up to be genuinely the only situation in which surplus release would be inappropriate or whether there are other circumstances where the use of this power would also be unsuitable. If those other safeguards are already captured elsewhere, it would be helpful for the Committee to have that clearly set out on the record. Equally, if wind-up is used here as a proxy for a broader set of concerns, the Committee would benefit from understanding why those concerns are not addressed more directly.

Surplus release is a sensitive issue. The way in which the boundaries of this new power are framed therefore matters. Where the Bill chooses to draw a line in the legislation, it invites scrutiny as to why that line has been drawn there and only there. This amendment is intended to facilitate that discussion and to elicit reassurance from the Minister about how the Government envisage this power operating in practice and what protections they consider necessary beyond the single case of wind-up. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response and any clarification she can provide to the Committee.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to make this quick. Proposed new clause in Amendment 45 requires the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses on the clawback provisions, particularly in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.

Why is this review needed? State deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness and transparency and a disproportionate impact, particularly on lower paid staff and women. It ensures members, regulators and Parliament have clarity about the origin, rationale and effects of these provisions.

The review will examine the history and rationale for state deduction in a Midland Bank staff pension scheme and assess clarity. It will be conducted by a person or body independent of HSBC and associated schemes. We will also try to ensure that it must consult affected scheme members, employee representatives, pension experts and stakeholder organisations. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we are broadly supportive of the purpose behind this amendment. It raises an important set of questions about whether members of defined benefit schemes have been given clear, timely and accessible information about state deduction or clawback provisions, and whether the rationale for those provisions has been properly explained to them over time.

Of course, individuals must take responsibility for managing their own finances and retirement planning. But that responsibility can only be exercised meaningfully if people are properly informed in advance about what will happen to their pension, when it will happen and why. When changes or reductions are triggered at state pension age, members need adequate notice so that they can make sensible and informed financial decisions. In that context, a review of the adequacy of member communications, the transparency of the original rationale and the accessibility of this information is welcome. While we may not necessarily agree with some of the more precise parameters and timetables set out in the amendment, as a way of posing the question and prompting scrutiny, it is a reasonable approach.

That said, we have spoken to someone who has intimate, working knowledge of the Midland Bank pension scheme and has experience of the workings of the scheme. They confirmed to us that they were fully aware of this provision, because it was in all the literature they were sent when they were enrolled. Given this, can the noble Lord give some more insight into why he thinks some members of this scheme were aware, and others not, and how could this be addressed?

I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she has any initial views on the issues this amendment raises. In particular, how accessible is this information to members in practice today, and what steps, if any, would the Government or Department for Work and Pensions take if it became clear that these arrangements are not well understood?

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open today’s debate on the remaining groups of amendments relating to the Local Government Pension Scheme. We are conscious that Ministers have already undertaken to write to the House on a number of points, and we do not wish to add unduly to that correspondence or set exam questions. However, we hope that today’s debate may allow some of these issues to be addressed in real time.

Let me be clear at the outset that this is a probing stand-part notice intended to seek clarity from the Government. Clause 6 is striking in its brevity, but the power it confers is anything but modest. It would allow scheme regulations to provide for the merger explicitly, including a compulsory merger, of local government pension funds. Compulsory merger is a significant and, in many cases, irreversible intervention. It has profound implications for governance, funding positions, local accountability and, ultimately, the retirement savings of millions of scheme members and the obligations of employers. We are dealing here with very substantial sums of public money and the livelihoods of millions of people.

Before such a power is afforded to a Secretary of State who may have little or no specialist expertise in pensions, it is only right that the Committee understands clearly how this power will be exercised and what safeguards will apply. The clause itself, however, tells us very little. It provides no indication of the process that will be followed, the criteria that will be applied or the protections that will be in place for members, employers and administering authorities. I therefore hope that the Minister can assist the Committee on a number of points.

First, on expertise and decision-making, pension scheme governance is highly complex and technical. What confidence can the Government offer that the Secretary of State is the appropriate decision-maker for imposing compulsory mergers, particularly in the absence of any requirement in the Bill to obtain independent expert pensions advice?

Secondly, on process, what precise procedural steps will be required before a compulsory merger can be ordered? Will there be a statutory consultation and, if so, with whom? Will affected scheme managers, administering authorities, employers and scheme members have a formal opportunity to make representations before a decision is taken?

Thirdly, on safeguards and accountability, what independent checks and balances will exist to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot act unilaterally? Will decisions be required to meet defined tests, such as necessity or proportionality, and to be supported by evidence? Will there be any right of review or challenge where a fund believes a compulsory merger is not in the best interests of its members?

Fourthly, on financial risk, given the scale of the assets involved, what assurances can the Government provide that members’ savings will not be exposed to undue risk or that decisions will not be influenced directly or indirectly by political or short-term considerations rather than long-term fiduciary interest?

Finally, on precedent, does the Minister accept that conferring such a broad enabling power sets an important precedent for ministerial intervention in pensions governance more widely? If so, how do the Government justify that approach, and why are the limits of this power left entirely to secondary legislation?

We ought to have answers to these questions before the conclusion and passing of the Bill. Clause 6 confers wide discretion in a highly technical and sensitive area, with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is therefore entirely appropriate for the Committee to press the Government to explain how this power will be exercised, what safeguards will be in place and how the interests of scheme members will be protected. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as has been stated, this clause introduces compulsory mergers of Local Government Pension Scheme funds, and the word “compulsory” worries me. We on these Benches accept that consolidation can sometimes improve efficiency and governance, but compulsion—I emphasise this—is a serious step that demands strong justification and clear safeguards, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, stated.

At present, the Bill establishes the power without clearly setting out the criteria, process or routes of challenge. That sequencing matters. Trustees, employers and members need confidence that mergers will occur only when there is compelling evidence of benefit to the people—that is, the pensioners themselves. We on these Benches are concerned that forced mergers, if poorly handled—and some may well be poorly handled—could undermine trust rather than strengthen it. Before endorsing compulsion, which we are asked to do, Parliament should understand how decisions will be made, how dissent will be treated and what protections exist if a merger proves detrimental.

At this stage, it is quite right that there should be probing as to what is behind all this and what will happen in all the various circumstances that need to be in place to protect members of the Local Government Pension Scheme. I wait to see further information as the Bill progresses.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I have always reckoned that the duty of pension fund managers is to the members. What we are trying to do now is say that they have other duties; however, it is not very clear where the borderline is.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

I know how frustrating it is when Members keep getting up to ask questions, but I have to do this. The Minister referred to a backstop. For what purpose? In what circumstances would it be used? Can the Minister help us understand that?

Welfare Reform

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for the repetition, but for 32 years I dedicated my working life to helping people into work, not just by finding them jobs but by opening their eyes to the opportunity, purpose and dignity that meaningful employment brings. I do not rise today to lecture the Minister on the challenges that her department faces, nor do I believe that it serves this House to relay political refrains about the past 14 years, which do little to address the pressing realities we face.

We all recognise the scale of the task ahead, which is why yesterday’s events were so concerning. In response to widespread unease across Parliament, key elements of the Bill were withdrawn. The result is a significantly weakened piece of legislation that now faces serious questions about its purpose, scope and impact. Even with those changes, more than 40 Labour MPs felt compelled to vote against it. That should give us all cause for concern and cause to pause. It reflects not just concern with the process but discomfort with the overall direction.

I genuinely do not envy the Minister. Ministers were asked to defend proposals that have since been fundamentally altered. In the process, the Government have not only damaged their credibility but opened a £4.5 billion hole in their fiscal plans.

These Benches are clear: urgent welfare reform is necessary, but it must be long-term, evidence-led and considered. Reforming PIP or any other benefit should never be reduced to short-term savings driven by arbitrary fiscal targets. We were told that the Bill would reform personal independence payments, but this approach to welfare has been crude and alarmingly hasty. Both the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Resolution Foundation confirm that the revised proposals will deliver no net savings this decade. This is not just a missed opportunity but a collapse of any clear policy.

Welfare is a vital lifeline for people facing illness, disability or disadvantage. Reform must focus on strengthening this support, securing long-term financial sustainability and maintaining public confidence. This starts with asking the right questions. Is the current system sustainable? No. Are eligibility criteria fair and effective? No. Why are 3,000 people entering incapacity-related benefits each day? How do our costs compare internationally and are those differences justified? How do we strike the right balance between compassion and cost? These are not questions for headlines or quick fixes; they are serious questions about complex and long-term governance, requiring thoughtful cross-party collaboration.

This also highlights the limits of top-down approaches. Tackling entrenched unemployment, or an ever-increasing PIP bill, requires more than a new set of policies; it requires moral leadership, cultural awareness and deep community engagement. If we are to tackle the welfare challenge, policy must be person-centred, culturally intelligent and grounded in the lived experience of the communities it seeks to serve. Real fiscal gains come from reform: a smarter, outcome-focused approach that helps people to move into work. That is how we reduce the welfare bill: not by crudely cutting support but by reducing the need for it, while protecting those with serious health conditions.

I urge Ministers to take stock. Do not confuse speed with strategy. Do not mistake cuts—much needed as they are—for reform. Go back, reflect, consult widely and return to Parliament with a plan that meets the scale of the challenge, with the care and responsibility it demands.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for introducing questions on the Statement. She quite rightly talks about missed opportunities of not only the current Government but the previous Government.

Welfare provision is a broken system. We should not proceed until we hear from the Timms review. I hope the Minister will comment on that. There is no doubt that we are abandoning valuable members of our society. People within the leadership of the Labour Party who described PIP as “pocket money” should know better. We are enshrining in law that we have a system that all disabled people are equal, but some are more equal than others—this is an early proclamation by the pigs who control government in Animal Farm; the phrase is a comment on the hypocrisy of Governments.

Let us be clear: the proposals are a leap in the dark and not even the Ministers know where they are going to land. The proposals are ill thought-out, rushed and continually amended. As days, weeks and months pass, we will see the unedifying and unintended consequences.

The access to work scheme for those with a disability needs to be urgently fixed. Could the Minister tell the House what consultations have been made with carers about this legislation?

The Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill sends a message to disabled children that those who have gone down the path of their disability degenerating to the extent that they can claim PIP will be over the line, but those youngsters who know they have a degenerative condition can look forward to no PIP under the Bill.

PIP is a passport to other levels of support, such as blue badges or railcards, which give people the opportunity of getting out and living their best lives. Perhaps the most passported benefit from PIP is the carer’s allowance. On these Benches, we have grave concerns about the Bill’s impact on those families who will no longer benefit from carer’s allowances. They will be robbed of up to £12,000 a year.

We recognise the benefit system is broken and needs resolving, but it needs to be co-designed with disabled groups and carers groups to make sure that we get it right for our people.

The root of the problem, sadly, is the NHS, which is where a lot of these problems start. We really need to sort out the National Health Service and social care. They are part of the problem and the solution. This so-called reform sticks a piece of sticking plaster over it, pats it on the head and says, “Now leave it to Auntie”. Sadly, Auntie has not a clue.

Winter Fuel Payment

Debate between Baroness Stedman-Scott and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I rise with a sense of relief, although not without regret: relief that the Government have chosen to reverse a policy that has caused distress and fear among our oldest and most vulnerable citizens, and regret that such a policy was every pursued in the first place. This reversal gives us cause to reflect on the true value of the winter fuel payment. For pensioners on modest incomes it has never been a luxury, and it has supported the most vulnerable through the darkest and coldest months of the year.

Although we welcome the Government’s decision to U-turn, we must not lose sight of how we came to this point. In December last year, I stood at this Dispatch Box and warned the Minister about the very consequences we are now discussing. At the time, I made it clear, and I reiterate today, that withdrawing the winter fuel payment from all but a limited group of recipients dealt a serious and unjust blow to millions of older people across the country. We made our position clear from the outset: the Government were wrong to scrap the winter fuel payments for millions of vulnerable pensioners.

These Benches opposed that policy on three key principles. First, it would have left millions of older people worse off during the coldest months of the year. Secondly, it reflected a misplaced set of priorities, favouring above-inflation pay rises for public sector workers over the needs of those in later life. Thirdly, it was introduced without transparency, with no reference to such a significant change during the general election campaign. We urged the Government to listen to the concerns raised across the House and consider alternative approaches to fiscal responsibility that did not come at the expense of those who can least afford it. This House raised those concerns. We reminded the Minister of the Conservative’s record on support for pensioners, with the triple lock, the warm home discount and the winter fuel payment itself.

As Churchill once remarked, a man who does not change his mind cannot change anything. As we rightly warned last year, removing the winter fuel payment was an appalling blow for pensioners. Today, the Government have done the honourable thing: they have listened, reflected and acted. Admitting a mistake is never easy, but correcting one is a mark of leadership. On this occasion, the Government have finally listened to your Lordships’ House. Is this a taste of things to come—that they will listen to the serious concerns we are raising on the most damaging elements of their policy platform? Will they row back on those parts of the Employment Rights Bill which will devastate small and medium-sized businesses? Will they finally act to protect our farmers from the punitive family farm tax? Will they halt their assault on the best schools in our country in the schools Bill?

This reversal is not only welcome but essential. It reaffirms our commitment to the millions of pensioners who depend on this support and upholds the integrity of our social contract with those who have worked hard and paid taxes all their life. Let this moment serve as a precedent that the voices of the vulnerable must be heard, that fairness must not be sacrificed for short-term savings and that the dignity of older citizens is not negotiable. That said, it is deeply regrettable that this reversal was ever necessary. The original decision was ill-conceived and caused needless anxiety and hardship for some of the most vulnerable in our society.

Although we welcome the change of heart, we are entitled to ask how it is being paid for. The Government have said that this U-turn will cost around £1.25 billion; if the economic outlook has not materially improved, as the Chancellor’s own figures suggest, then where is this money coming from? Are tax rises now on the table? If so, which taxes and on whom? Will the Minister confirm whether His Majesty’s Treasury intends to raise revenue through stealth taxes or whether further departmental budgets will be cut elsewhere to fund this reversal?

What of the administrative burden? Will pensioners with incomes above £35,000, in particular those with non-taxable income, now be required to complete tax returns? What guidance will be issued to those who may find themselves unexpectedly caught in a new reporting requirement? Further, will the Minister explain what happens to a pensioner who is widowed, inherits a pension and then finds themselves with an income over £35,000?

This House has a duty to speak out when the vulnerable are at risk. Today, we have fulfilled that duty. The Government have listened, but we must remain vigilant. I say to the millions of pensioners left in uncertainty this past winter: you were heard. I say to the Government: let this be a reminder that the strength of a society is measured not by how it treats the powerful but by how it cares for the vulnerable.

Although we welcome this change of heart, we need to understand how the Government have suddenly found the money to pay for it. In the end, the savings achieved by this policy may be as little as £50 million. Will the Minister tell the House whether it has been worth all the pain and aggravation? Will he apologise now to the millions of pensioners who struggled to get by this past winter?

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, this surely must be the Government of unintended consequences. When this policy was first mooted, I asked the Minister whether there would be any financial gain from it because, with the further uptake in pension credits, the actual money saved is miniscule. It is nothing like what the Government said they would get, so we have gone through all this pain and people have suffered, all for a strange bit of ideology.

Following on from what the noble Baroness on the Conservative Front Bench said, reports in the media suggest that winter fuel payments will be made automatically as a universal benefit this winter. Money will then be reclaimed when higher-income pensioners fill in their tax returns. Can the Minister say how the Government will ensure that the new system does not mean that the bereaved families of tens of thousands of dead pensioners—not only widows and widowers but dead pensioners—will be pursued by tax officials to recoup the payments? The Government of unintended consequences strike yet again.

Although the Chancellor has finally acknowledged the failure of this policy—thanks to sustained efforts by the Liberal Democrats and others—the scale of the distress created must not be forgotten. Do the Government intend to uprate the £35,000 threshold in line with inflation in future years?

This has been a disastrous policy. It has not raised the money we were told it was intended to raise. There will be further distress down the line while they try to sort out this mess.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for their questions and comments. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for welcoming this change of policy, and I thank both speakers for the consensus that now exists across the House on the current policy position.

The noble Baroness began by asking how we got here. We got here, of course, because when we came into office, we had to make a number of very urgent decisions to put the public finances back on a firm footing. That involved us taking some very difficult decisions on welfare, tax and spending, including means testing the winter fuel payment. I am very grateful to her for noting that we have now listened to the concerns raised, inside and outside this House, about the level of the means test.

The noble Baroness asked about the savings that will be generated from this policy. As she rightly said, we expect the policy to cost around £1.5 billion a year in total, including £1.25 billion in England and Wales, by the end of this forecast period. She asked about the savings that this would generate. It is estimated to save around £450 million a year, compared to universal winter payments.

The noble Baroness asked when and how this would be paid for. We are setting out these changes now to ensure that more pensioners can receive support this winter—that is the right thing to do. There is now just one fiscal event a year, so, as is normal, these changes will be fully funded at the next fiscal event, which is the Autumn Budget. This will ensure that final costings and funding decisions come alongside a full forecast from the OBR, and we will ensure that the fiscal rules are met at all times.

The noble Baroness also asked about the other policies we are pursuing. It was appropriate that, ahead of tomorrow’s spending review, she reminded us that the party opposite has not supported a single policy that we have put in place to stabilise the public finances or to raise money for public services. When we have tomorrow’s spending review, it will be very interesting to hear from the party opposite that it now supports all the spending we are doing, even though it did not support a single one of the difficult measures we took to raise money for public services. It is very interesting that she opposed the Employment Rights Bill, because we again see that her party does not support a single measure to improve the lives of working people.