Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Sherlock and Baroness Finn

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in strong support of this amendment, so ably tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, and to which I am pleased to have added my name.

The amendment speaks across so many of the principles that have underpinned our debates and the position that we on these Benches have adopted throughout Committee and Report—fairness, proportionality, transparency and responsibility. This amendment is about finding this balance and ensuring that the recovery of overpaid public funds is carried out in a way that is both effective and humane.

We have been clear from the outset that we support the core objectives of this Bill. Public money that has been wrongly paid out, whether through error or fraud, must be recovered. We owe that duty to the taxpayer and the integrity of our public finances. Equally, it is a duty of government to ensure that such recovery is done in a way that is fair, measured and responsible, does not impose unnecessary hardship, recognises the realities of individual circumstances and upholds confidence in the system.

This amendment embodies precisely that balance. It would establish clear and necessary safeguards before deductions are made from a person’s benefits. It would require that the liable person be notified of the rate and the basis of deduction, and, crucially, that they be given the opportunity to make representations about affordability. It would insist that deductions should proceed only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that recovery will not cause hardship in meeting essential living expenses and that the process is fair in all circumstances, including where the overpayment may have arisen through official delay or error. Sensibly, it seeks to sets a six-year limit for recovery, in line with the limitation period that applies through the courts. In other words, this amendment would ensure that the state exercises its right to recover the money in a way that is just, proportionate and accountable, and would align the recovery of overpayments through benefit deductions with the very same principles of fairness and restraint that we have already built into Schedule 5 in relation to deductions from bank accounts.

Throughout our scrutiny of this legislation, we have repeatedly emphasised that good governance is not simply about having the power to act but about exercising that power responsibly. This amendment reflects that philosophy perfectly. It strikes the right equilibrium between fiscal responsibility and social justice and between protecting the taxpayer and those who may already be in vulnerable situations. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for bringing forward this thoughtful and well-crafted proposal. It would strengthen the Bill, give legislative effect to the principles of transparency, fairness and proportionality, and ensure that, in pursuing the legitimate goal of recovering public funds, we do so in a manner that remains worthy of public trust. This is a measured, sensible and responsible amendment and we are very pleased to support it. I hope the Minister will give welcome assurances on it.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their early and constructive engagement on this topic. I understand that the intent of Amendment 109 is to replicate some of the safeguards introduced in Schedule 5 for direct deduction orders for the recovery of universal credit and new-style overpayments by deduction from benefit. Although I understand clearly what the proposers of this amendment want to do, I cannot accept it. However, I hope I can provide some assurances along the way.

The DWP is committed to improving payment accuracy to prevent overpayments occurring through continuous improvement activity. Where overpayments do arise, the Secretary of State has an obligation to protect public funds and ensure that, wherever possible, money owed to DWP is repaid. But within that objective, we are clear that our aim is to secure affordable and sustainable repayment plans and ensure that safeguards are in place to protect vulnerable debtors.

As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, Amendment 109 applies not just to official error but to all universal credit and new-style benefit overpayments recovered from benefits, including debts arising from fraud. The DWP already sets out that fraud overpayments are subject to stricter recovery rules due to their nature and seriousness. To treat all debts the same would not be right; it would be unfair on those who obtained a DWP benefit in good faith. This amendment also applies only to debts being recovered by deductions from benefits. A key driver for the new debt recovery measures is to bring greater fairness to debt recovery, giving DWP the tools to recover debts from those debtors who are not on benefits and have the means to repay but choose not to. This amendment could undermine that important objective.

Taking each part of Amendment 109 in turn, proposed new subsection 8(a)(i) would require DWP to give an individual notice on the basis of the deduction amounts. Individuals receive a notification about the overpayment; setting out the deduction rate and basis for this would present significant challenges. Benefit awards can fluctuate month to month, and deductions for repayment of debt are calculated accordingly. The deduction rate will also depend on other deductions being taken. Therefore, a legal requirement to issue a fixed notice setting out a single rate of recovery may risk being inaccurate, confusing or even misleading.

However, noble Lords are making an important point, and while I cannot accept the amendment, I commit to the House that in response I will explore how we might notify individuals more clearly about forthcoming deductions within the existing legal framework. I intend to do this as a part of the commitments I have made to review our communications to those with debts.

Proposed new subsection (8)(a)(ii) seeks to replicate the representation stage for direct deduction orders where recovery takes place by deduction from benefits. These processes are intentionally different because when deductions are made from benefits, DWP already holds accurate information about benefit payments, existing deductions and in some cases income from other sources. Crucially, there is also no ambiguity about ownership of the funds. Notifications already make it clear that at any time, the individual can contact DWP to discuss the affordability of the deduction.

By contrast, for the DDO process, DWP may know little or nothing about a person’s financial circumstances because they are not on benefits or in PAYE and they have refused to engage with us. This is why the Bill makes provision for DWP to obtain bank statements as an important safeguard. However, we recognise this may not give DWP as complete a picture as we have for benefit claimants. It is therefore right that individuals and any joint account holders can make representations about information that may not be apparent from statements alone before a deduction is taken from a bank account.

Nevertheless, in line with my previous commitment, I will commit to look at what more we can do to make our communications as clear as possible on how claimants can contact the department at any time to discuss repayment. I will also look at the timing of these communications.

Turning to proposed new subsection (8)(b), I agree that deductions from benefit should not cause unintended hardship and should be fair. This Government are committed to the principle of debt repayment being affordable; that is why processes exist to achieve this. Protections are in place to prevent excessive deductions. Regulations set out the maximum rates of recovery from benefits for fraud and non-fraud debts. For those in receipt of universal credit, as my noble friend Lady Lister mentioned, the fair repayment rate policy, which this Government introduced on 30 April, reduced the total amount that can be deducted from universal credit from 25% to 15% of the standard allowance in most cases, and I am grateful to her for acknowledging that. Crucially, there is also a priority order for deductions taken from universal credit to ensure that debts such as housing arrears are taken first to prevent people facing eviction and thus causing hardship. Recovery of overpayments is a long way down the list of priority order.

Moreover, there are robust processes in place to support the vulnerable and those struggling with debts, such as referrals to the Money Adviser Network for free and independent and impartial money and debt advice. I again stress that individuals can and should contact DWP at any time to discuss repayment terms. Where individuals make contact, DWP can reduce or temporarily suspend recovery depending on the circumstances. In exceptional cases, DWP can consider waiving recovery of the debt entirely.

I turn now to the question of fairness in this amendment. The extension of whether the act of recovery itself is fair differs from the provision in Schedule 5, which is limited to consideration of the deduction being fair in the circumstances as known to DWP. Every overpayment decision has existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights, and these are the right routes to challenge whether the overpayment should be recovered.

Although Amendment 109 is specific to recovery by deduction from benefits, it risks creating uncertainty as to whether it was fair to recover by other methods too, such as by deductions from earnings, or voluntary repayment plans.

Finally, proposed new subsection (8)(c) would limit the commencement of recovery of any overpayment of UC or new-style benefits from deductions from benefits to six years. The existing framework under Managing Public Money provides enough flexibility to forgo the recovery of historic debt where appropriate. Imposing a statutory time limit on commencing recovery would have consequences that may not be intended; for example, DWP could be prevented from recovering money obtained through benefit fraud where we could not reasonably identify the fraud until six years after the payment was made.

It is important to distinguish DWP recoveries from those by other creditors through court orders, for which a limitation period might otherwise apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, indicated. DWP recovers benefit overpayment debts one at a time, beginning with the oldest. Due to the protections that I outlined earlier, we recover by deductions from benefit at a much lower rate than other creditors typically would, and we rightly prioritise deductions for certain debts, such as housing or utilities arrears, over benefit overpayments to prevent hardship. That means that recovery of a UC or new-style benefit overpayment could rightly take place some time after the initial overpayment has been notified to the individual. A blanket limitation would risk undermining the integrity of the process, could create hardship for individuals and could significantly reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Sherlock and Baroness Finn

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th June 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for introducing Amendment 122D and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his contribution. It is worth saying at the outset that the noble Baroness’s comments ran quite wide, encompassing some of the broader issues that we discussed in previous debates on the Bill.

New Section 80F, inserted by Clause 95, allows any reasonable costs incurred by DWP in recovering debt to be added to the total debt owed, and therefore for them to be collected through any means of recovery available to DWP. As drafted, the amendment would permit the Secretary of State, but not the bank, to recover any costs incurred by the bank as though it were part of the debt owed to DWP through methods of recovery such as deductions from benefit, et cetera, but without any requirement to pass any money recovered to the bank. I realise how hard it is to draft amendments in opposition—I have been there—so I believe it is possible that the intention of the amendment was to allow a bank only to recover any cost it had incurred when complying with its obligation under Schedule 5, so I shall address the amendment on the assumption that was the intention.

Officials have engaged extensively with key representatives from the finance sector, including UK Finance, and we are seeking to work collaboratively to ensure that the legislation enables banks reasonably to meet their legislative obligations without causing problematic burdens for them or unintended consequences for individuals. Indeed, changes have already been made to the Bill based on that engagement and feedback.

I agree that banks should be able to recover administrative costs associated with implementing a direct deduction order on behalf of DWP. These costs should be reasonable, providing some protection to debtors and consistent with existing legislation. In line with existing Child Maintenance Service recovery regulations, therefore, DWP will set the maximum limits for costs associated with implementing regular and lump sum deduction orders that banks can recover. Paragraph 24 of Schedule 5 further requires DWP to consult persons who represent the interests of the bank and any other appropriate persons in making the regulations.

On safeguards, banks are able to deduct any reasonable costs they incur when complying with a direct deduction order. In practice, that prevents a bank charging the debtor more than its costs. Paragraph 24 of Schedule 5 allows us to make provision about the administrative charges that can be imposed by banks. That power will be used to introduce a cap on the charges that can be imposed under this clause that can be adjusted in line with inflation to ensure that the charges remain reasonable at all times. I think we made that clear.

The code of practice spells out specifically what we will do in this area. I assure the noble Lord that we are discussing with the banks what is reasonable. This works in other areas. The code of practice says that banks may deduct any reasonable costs and that the costs that they can deduct will be limited by legislation and taken into consideration when the terms of the deduction order are done, to ensure that it remains affordable. I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response. In closing, I want to reiterate that the Bill asks a great deal of banks, in terms not just of compliance, but of active participation in delivering government policy. That comes with real operational and financial demands, especially for smaller institutions, plus the opportunity cost for the time and resources that banks might be required to dedicate to these non-profit-making activities. I hear what the Minister says about the code of practice, but there is a difference between the code of practice and having something in the Bill. It makes an important change to ensure that banks, like public authorities, can recover the costs they incur when carrying out duties placed on them by legislation. We believe that it reflects a basic principle of fairness and partnership, which is a principle that we have returned to throughout this Committee.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his support. He made the important point that oversight must be proportionate and transparent.

If we want this framework to work effectively and sustainably, we must ensure that those we rely on to implement it are not left bearing disproportionate costs. That should be absolutely clear. This is not about profit but about ensuring that compliance is feasible, resourced and built on mutual trust. I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of the amendment and the principle behind it. Those helping to enforce the law must be supported, not just expected to comply, and that should be in the legislation rather than the code of practice.

I appreciate the Minister’s remarks that discussions are ongoing with banks about how the demands will be incorporated and developed operationally. Can she confirm to the Committee whether this matter has been raised in the discussions and what assurances the Government have to date been able to give banks on this important question?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have been talking to the banks about everything but this is one of the less complicated parts. We are simply talking about the cost of making a deduction order. Banks are used to making deduction orders in relation to the Child Maintenance Service. On that, we agreed a fee and the banks can deduct reasonable amounts. We simply put a cap in. If anything has come out of the conversations that is relevant, I am happy to add it to a letter I give the noble Baroness. I should expect the matter we are discussing to work in a way analogous to how it has worked for the CMS, without difficulty.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Sherlock and Baroness Finn

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this short debate. I hope that I can answer the questions that have been raised.

The first and most important piece of information is to remind the Committee that in the Commons my honourable friend the Minister for Transformation made it clear that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services will be commissioned to inspect the DWP’s criminal investigation powers for England and Wales and HMICS for Scotland. I hope that that is helpful. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that the reason why we chose HMIC is that for more than 160 years it has been carrying out independent scrutiny of law enforcement in England and Wales, including the police. There is no danger whatever that it will be any kind of box-ticking exercise, if HMIC is doing it. I am sure that she can be reassured on that front.

I hope that that shows the level of commitment that we have to the level of scrutiny. If we want to do it properly, HMIC is the body to scrutinise powers of this seriousness. But we have worked closely with HMICFRS and HMICS. We intend to operate in the same way as other law enforcement agencies that are subject to inspections by those bodies. What will happen is that, prior to each inspection, the DWP and the inspectorate body will mutually agree the period that the inspection will cover. That is to make sure that the inspection can cover all necessary activity that has been undertaken, which is a common way of operating. We have no reason to believe that it will not operate well in this case.

We understand that sharing information is essential and will obviously not seek to misrepresent or hold back any relevant information. The legislation as drafted allows us to share all relevant information. But it is essential that the Secretary of State retains discretion—for example, being able to choose not to provide information that may be particularly sensitive and where sharing it could have a detrimental impact, such as on the outcome of an active case. The DWP will fully support and co-operate with the inspection bodies and its reports will make clear if we did not do that. But we want to do so, to make sure that we can deliver on these powers to the right standard.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for answering one question for me. There will indeed be inspectorates. HMICFRS will cover England and Wales and HMIC will cover Scotland to enable us to have a different reviewer in the two places. I hope that, given those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will not press her amendments.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. As we draw this debate to a close, I return to the fact that these amendments are rooted in the core values of fairness, transparency, independence and accountability. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Palmer, for their support, although I know that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has not supported Amendment 99C.

The independent review mechanism outlined in Clause 88 should be one of the central safeguards of the Bill. It should ensure that the powers conferred are used proportionately, effectively and in the public interest. As it currently stands, that mechanism risks being weakened by loopholes and discretionary clauses that leave too much power in ministerial hands. I note the response about HMIC, but it still goes to the core that we want this Bill as a standalone and that those loopholes are necessarily closed.

Amendment 99A speaks to a fundamental concern: the right of the Government to define the terms of their own scrutiny. That is not a mark of confident democracy. A review that can only examine certain timeframes selected by the very people being reviewed is not a genuine safeguard; it is a managed narrative. True independence means giving the reviewer the authority to follow the evidence wherever it leads, not wherever the Secretary of State allows.

Amendment 99B is in many ways even more foundational. What is the value of appointing an independent person if that individual can be denied access to the very information that they need to do their job? We cannot have effective oversight if it depends on the good will of the department being examined. I take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said. There is a huge difference, as I know well from my own time in government, between the words “may” and “must”. “Must” is a minimal expectation if we are to uphold the principles of openness and integrity. Anything less risks turning independence into theatre and accountability into a form without substance.

Amendment 99C is about consistency. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, considers it unnecessary. However, if fraud knows no borders between England, Wales and Scotland, neither should scrutiny. We cannot rely only on the Secretary of State’s discretion to decide whether an independent review happens in one nation but not another, because that creates potential confusion and disparity and the appearance, if not the reality, of selective transparency. This is a probing amendment and I appreciate what has been said, which I will pick up on later. What we are aiming for is a duty to appoint independent reviewers across the devolved nations so that trust is not patchy but uniform across the United Kingdom.

When taken together, these amendments must represent a clear and coherent vision that government power must be matched by government accountability. That review must be more than just process. It must be meaningful, showing that we do not fear scrutiny but welcome it, because it is through scrutiny that public trust is earned and retained. The Government have rightly set out to tackle fraud and protect public money, but if the public are to believe that this effort is both rigorous and fair, the checks that we place on those powers must be equally robust. These amendments deliver that balance, not to obstruct but to uphold the values that any confident, responsible Government should share. I urge the Minister to consider the purpose and principle that these amendments seek to preserve. Let us not pass up the opportunity to make this legislation stronger, fairer and more trustworthy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Sherlock and Baroness Finn

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to this group of amendments, beginning with the Clause 74 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In our view, Clause 74 is not only necessary but foundational. It establishes the power to issue eligibility verification notices, which enable authorised officers to request information relevant to verifying a person’s entitlement to public funds or services. This is not an ancillary function; it is a mechanism that enables the Bill to work.

We broadly support Amendment 79B, which proposes the addition of a reasonableness test to the Secretary of State’s power to issue eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3. Throughout this Committee stage, we on these Benches have consistently returned to a set of core principles that should underpin the powers granted by this Bill: proportionality, accountability and clarity in the exercise of discretion. This amendment is very much in keeping with those principles. It would not constrain the function of the powers in question; instead, it would help to ensure that they are used lawfully, wisely and in a way that retains the confidence of both the public and those institutions asked to assist in their implementation.

Specifically, this amendment would require that the Secretary of State be “reasonably satisfied” that issuing an eligibility verification notice is both necessary and proportionate to the objective of identifying incorrect benefit payments. That is, by definition, not an unreasonable bar. It is not designed to frustrate the aims of the Bill or delay the work of the Government. On the contrary, it would simply formalise the expectation that the powers conferred under Schedule 3 should be exercised with care and justification.

This point is particularly relevant when we consider the position of banks and other financial institutions, which may be required under this provision to provide customer information. For those institutions, it is critical that the system is seen to be operating within a clear and lawful framework. They are being asked to co-operate in a sensitive and complex process. Ensuring that the Secretary of State is “reasonably satisfied”, and that this standard is explicitly in the Bill, would help to provide clarity, legitimacy and protection for all parties involved. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made clear on the previous group of amendments, legislation needs to be made for the future and, as such, reasonableness safeguards must be on the face of the Bill.

Moreover, this amendment would reinforce public confidence in the system. When members of the public know that strong powers, such as those that allow government access to eligibility-related data, are being exercised only after a specific, documented and reasonable assessment of necessity and proportionality, they are far more likely to view those powers as legitimate. Trust, as we know, is a critical currency in any enforcement regime.

This amendment would not obstruct the use of eligibility verification notices. It would simply require that they be issued on the basis of reasonable grounds, with a clear and proportionate purpose. It would bring consistency to the Bill, reassurance to the institutions involved and greater credibility to the broader anti-fraud effort that we all wish to support.

We oppose Amendment 80, which would substantially limit the exercise of eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3 to the Bill by requiring that they may be issued only where the welfare recipient is already suspected of committing a DWP offence. I suggest that this amendment risks undermining the core function of eligibility verification and, in so doing, would weaken the entire framework that the Government are proposing to put in place to detect and prevent fraud. Let us be clear about the purpose of the eligibility verification power: it is not primarily an enforcement power but rather a tool of assurance and risk management, designed to help to identify cases where payments are being made incorrectly.

The core problem with this amendment is that it conflates suspicion with verification. It assumes that an authorised officer must already suspect a DWP offence before reviewing financial data. In practice, however, it is often the financial data itself—the information provided in an account—that gives rise to that suspicion in the first place.

I turn to Amendment 89. We support the principle behind this amendment, which seeks to ensure that the powers contained in this Bill—substantial powers, we must all acknowledge—are exercised only in relation to the specific benefits explicitly listed in the Bill. This is not a wrecking amendment, nor one that seeks to undermine the Government’s legitimate goal of strengthening our response to fraud and error. Rather, it is about ensuring that when we legislate new powers, they are accompanied by a clear, democratic mandate and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The provision that this amendment seeks to remove would grant Ministers the ability, by regulation, to extend the application of these powers to further benefits beyond those originally listed. I submit that such an extension should not be done by regulation alone but rather with the explicit consent of Parliament through primary legislation or a tightly scrutinised process.

The powers outlined in Schedule 3, including access to personal financial information, the issuance of eligibility verification notices and the ability to act on suspicion of fraud, are not minor administrative tools. They represent a significant expansion of state capacity to inquire into private affairs in the name of public interest. That may well be justified in many cases, but it is only right that Parliament retains control over when and how these powers are extended to new areas of social security.

Supporting this amendment means drawing a line in the sand that the list of benefits to which these powers apply is not open-ended and that any extension should come back before Parliament for proper consideration. If, in future, a compelling case is made to include additional benefits, let that case be made here, in public, with scrutiny and accountability. That is how we ensure confidence in the law, in enforcement and in our broader welfare system.

This is not about resisting action on fraud but about ensuring that the tools we use to combat fraud are clearly grounded in public consent, which gives the system legitimacy. It is about protecting the balance of power between executive action and legislative oversight.

We have made the argument throughout Committee that clarity, transparency and accountability must be woven into the fabric of the Bill. This amendment speaks directly to those principles. It ensures that the powers in this legislation are not allowed to expand by stealth but only by clear, deliberate parliamentary decision.

I hope that the Minister will see this not as a restriction but as an opportunity: to reinforce the legitimacy of the powers the Government seek and to show that we are committed not only to effective fraud prevention but to the principled governance of that process. For that reason, we support this amendment.

Finally, in addressing the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on Schedule 3, we understand that this is an area of concern for many noble Lords across the Committee, but we do not feel that removing the schedule from the Bill is necessarily the most constructive way to go about this in Committee.

I appreciate that this is probing, and we therefore hope that the Government will use this opportunity, in responding to the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to address the concerns that we and many other noble Lords have raised in Committee, even if we do not support the noble Baroness’s stand-part notice.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke on this. I promise not to speak for long on this but, since it is the first time we have discussed the eligibility verification measure, I will, for the record, try to explain how it works, and, I hope, help the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I apologise for my failure to explain it to her hitherto. I will have a go at doing that, and I will talk to the amendments as we go.

Clause 74 introduces new Section 121DB and Schedule 3B to the 1992 Act. They contain the provisions for the eligibility verification measure, which enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice, or EVN, which will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system. Ensuring that the right person is paid the right amount at the right time will help prevent both fraud and genuine errors, meaning that people do not accidentally build up debts, with all the concern that that causes.

As I set out at Second Reading, this is a data-requiring measure. It will enable the DWP to ask for data from banks to help identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It is about requiring banks to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts they have identified that match the eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. Just to clarify, we will ask the banks to look at accounts into which we make benefit payments, and we will give them the criteria, which clearly can only be things related to eligibility for the benefits under question.

That limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet eligibility criteria for the benefits they are receiving. Getting access to information is key to addressing the whole fraud and error challenge. But if your Lordships think about other areas, we have seen how the DWP getting access to data such as earnings information from HMRC has massively reduced income-related overpayments. In fact, if you look at people on PAYE and universal credit, earnings-related fraud and error have pretty much been wiped out by getting access to earnings data directly from HMRC.

I will speak to Schedule 3 in a few moments. Let me look first at Amendment 79B from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which seeks to ensure that an EVN may be issued only when the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so to achieve the aim of identifying incorrect benefit payments. This is the nub of it. Clearly, I agree that the power must be proportionate and necessary before we use it. We are bringing forward the legislation because we believe it is necessary, and we have already taken enormous steps to ensure that it will be used proportionately.

The reason it is necessary is that taxpayers deserve to know that every pound of their money is being spent wisely, and that benefits are being paid to those who need them and are legally entitled to them. This measure will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help verify entitlements, to ensure payments are correct, and to stop overpayments building up and debt accruing.

The National Audit Office made a telling point in the Commons at the evidence stage, basically saying, “If you want to enforce the eligibility criteria that Parliament has set, such as capital limits, you have to provide the DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking people”. We do not know of other ways to get the necessary information to be able to pursue the kind of overpayments and fraud that are out there. However, I just remind the Committee that the measure has been designed with hugely strict safeguards, most of which are in the Bill, and they are supported with further detail in the code of practice, of which noble Lords have seen a draft, to ensure that the power is being used fairly and proportionately. The legislation sets out the benefits in scope, of which more later, and the type of information that can and cannot be shared under the power, and includes provisions to bar financial institutions from sharing transaction information or special category data.