Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020
Debate between Baroness Scott of Bybrook and Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I assure the noble and learned Baroness that, when the Government look at making these reforms, children will be foremost in their mind.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, can the Minister tell us what proposals the Government have to ensure that legal advice is available, particularly for those engaged in partnership separation who have children?
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I will give the same answer as before: children are extremely important. In future, before people look into divorce, all the advice will be online and support will be there.
Crime: Emergency Services Staff
Debate between Baroness Scott of Bybrook and Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, it is for public confidence. We consulted over the summer and there was a wide agreement that the tariffs should go to two years rather than the 12 months.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I associate this side of the House with the sympathy expressed to the families of Sergeant Ratana and Police Constable Andrew Harper. As we have heard from many of the questions asked, serious assault, not-so-serious assault, murder or manslaughter of any emergency worker should be attended by higher sentences. Can the Minister give an assurance that there will be a consultation about differential sentencing for those sorts of crimes, and that it will be published very shortly?
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I am very sorry that I cannot give an assurance on when it will be published but, as with all these things, there will be consultation, and it will be on everything from minor and major assault to murder and manslaughter.
Female Offender Strategy
Debate between Baroness Scott of Bybrook and Lord Falconer of Thoroton(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
The noble and learned Lord brings up an extremely important point. One of the biggest issues is to make sure that pre-sentencing assessments are done very well by very experienced and trained people. We are also working with the health community to make sure that, before sentencing, any health issues of offenders are dealt with in accordance with the new rules.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
The Female Offender Strategy was well received in 2018. The concern is about whether or not it is being effectively implemented. Paragraph 76 of the strategy says:
“We are committing to work with partners to develop a ‘residential women’s centres’ pilot in at least five sites across England and Wales.”
Could the Minister tell us how many of those five pilot sites are up and running, and what the plans for those that are not are?
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I think I answered the noble and learned Lord’s question earlier: no, we have not delivered the five, but we are in the later stages of delivering the first one, as a pilot in Wales, and we have put forward £800,000 to do that.
Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 2019
Debate between Baroness Scott of Bybrook and Lord Falconer of Thoroton(4 years, 3 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this a very clear example of it being for the UK legislature to decide, where there is an incompatibility, whether to change the law. It is not something that comes because of the European Court of Human Rights reaching that conclusion; it is because Parliament decides. I strongly endorse what he said in relation to that.
I strongly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the Government that Section 10(1)(b) and Section 10(2) of the Human Rights Act, which refers to legislation that is incompatible, do not contain any reservation for the Human Rights Act itself and therefore, as a matter of construction of Section 10, it is possible to use the Section 10(2) power in order to amend the Human Rights Act itself. I too have read Professor Ekins’s suggestion that that is wrong. Honestly, I do not think there was anything at all in the points he was making, and I agree with everybody else’s point in relation to that.
I have two concerns. I was very glad to hear the noble Baroness say that the Government were very concerned about judicial immunity. If you are a judge and think that you might be sued because of a decision you make in good faith—we are dealing here only with decisions made in good faith—that might inhibit the decision you reach. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made it pretty clear that a judge could, himself or herself—or themselves, if it is the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—be sued in relation to this. I would be very grateful to hear what reassurance the noble Baroness can give. She said that judges would be “properly protected” and so it would be very difficult to sue them in their own names, and that there would be no question but that—assuming that they had acted in good faith, because that is the only circumstance in which this applies—they would be indemnified if they were sued in person. Any reassurance the noble Baroness can give in that respect is very important.
The second issue I would like to raise is this. My understanding is that the reason judgment was found against the United Kingdom in Hammerton v United Kingdom is that the consequence of the judge not according Mr Hammerton legal representation was, as the High Court of England and Wales found, that he spent more time in jail for contempt than he otherwise would have. No appeal putting it right can compensate someone for spending time in jail when they should not have.
The one area where I would be interested to know what the Government say is what happens when a court order leads to the disclosure of information that might be in breach of Article 8—where information that should be kept private as a matter of Article 8 is then made public as a result of a court order, but, if we assume that the court order is then reversed in the Court of Appeal, the information has been made public as the result of a judicial act. What do the Government say is the position in relation to that? Assuming that the judge of the court has acted in good faith in the circumstances I posit, is that something in respect of which there would be no remedy at the moment? Is that something the Government are looking at, or is there some effective remedy under Article 13, and therefore one would not need to worry about it?
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will try to answer as many questions as I can and if I have missed anything, we will look through Hansard tomorrow and make sure that noble Lords get a written response, a copy of which I will put in the Library.
A number of themes came out of this debate, the first of which was using primary legislation rather than a remedial order. A number of noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that this is exactly the type of situation that the Section 10 power was created for: where very narrow and targeted amendments are being made to address incompatibilities that have been identified by the courts. I would also say that the JCHR has scrutinised the draft SI and agrees that it is an appropriate use of the power to make a remedial order. It is for Parliament, of course, to decide whether or not to approve it. While I am talking about this, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and others who were on the JCHR and who had to look at these orders twice: the Government appreciate their work and we thank them for their recommendations.
The second theme that came up, and related to that, was the power of the Secretary of State. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay brought up the Secretary of State having vires to amend the HRA itself via remedial order. The Government have considered this question very carefully and are confident that this is an appropriate use of the remedial order-making powers.
The power is unusual in that it requires a court decision and it is intended for, and limited to, removing an incompatibility identified either by a domestic court or by a Minister having regard to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights. I hope that helps my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern to understand that, as I am sure he does.
The scope of the remedial order came up a number of times. The noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Massey, asked whether it was too narrow. The JCHR’s first report recommended the Government consider redrafting the order to make the damages available for any breach of human rights caused by a judicial act where otherwise there would be a breach of Article 13, whether or not that leads to detention. This is why the Government redrafted the remedial order with a slightly wider scope; we accepted that other situations could arise outside the committal proceedings, where a judicial act made in good faith could amount to a breach of Article 6, where that breach could result in the victim spending longer in detention than they should have done, and where damages would be unavailable, contrary to Article 13.
Any widening of those circumstances in which a remedy in damages is available in respect of a judicial act done in good faith should, we consider, be approached with caution because of the risk of the erosion of the principle of judicial immunity, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, brought up very strongly, as did my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern.
In the report on the redrafting of the remedial order, the committee welcomed our acceptance of its recommendations and it has recommended that it should go through Parliament. This was very welcome.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, had a question on the violation of convention rights by judges and hoped that this would not happen again, as in Hammerton v United Kingdom. I assure the noble Lord that training and guidance are available to the judiciary; the Judicial College has published an Equal Treatment Bench Book, which builds on judges’ understanding of fair treatment. That should put the noble Lord’s mind at rest that we are doing something.
The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, brought up again the question of whether this should be in primary legislation or an approved remedial order. I hope noble Lords will accept that this is exactly the type of situation that the Section 10 power was created for: making an order to address incompatibilities.
There was quite a lot of debate about judicial independence and immunity, particularly, and understandably, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Judicial immunity is a key aspect of our judicial independence. He is quite right: an independent and impartial judiciary is one of the cornerstones of our—or any—democracy. One of the practical ways in which this is given effect is by giving judges immunity from prosecution or civil proceedings for any acts they carry out in performance of their judicial function. If he would like me to, I am very happy to write from the department about exactly what effect this will have and to put his mind at rest. We can do that after this Committee.
I think that is all that I had to specifically respond to. I reiterate that this order is the right way to implement the judgment; it reflects a pragmatic approach. I think that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others, agreed that this reflects a pragmatic approach and ensures that we meet our international legal obligations—which we have to do—while still upholding the principle of judicial immunity. I therefore commend the order to the Grand Committee.