Financial Services Bill

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, my contribution is also entirely interrogative. I have a lot of questions. I shall put the matter in context. Before we started today's proceedings, I thought that this was all very straightforward and simple but I now realise that I did not understand any of it at all. I am not certain that I am alone in not understanding it. I shall go through my questions and give some examples to elucidate them. First, I may have missed the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, making the relevant statement, but can noble Lords assume that everything in these amendments has been agreed by Mr Wheatley and that he also agrees that they do every single thing that he wanted done? That was not said, but I assume that perhaps we are to take that for granted. My second question, which was not in my original notes, but I listened to what was said, is: do these amendments go well beyond what is in the Wheatley report? I would like an answer to that. My third question is: why are we talking about benchmarks? That was the first thing I scribbled when I saw the amendment. Why are we using this expression? It is so broad that it seems to me to cover all sorts of things that have nothing to do with LIBOR. My main puzzle is that I thought that this was all about LIBOR, exactly LIBOR, no more than LIBOR and no less than LIBOR, but it seems to me that it is about 101 other things.

In order to elucidate that, perhaps I may give some examples. I am sticking to the investment paragraphs, whereas my noble friend Lord Eatwell rightly says that benchmarks are used for all sorts of contracts, not just investment contracts. Let us stick with investment contracts. Suppose a firm issues a long-term bond which is specified in the following way: “This firm agrees to pay the holders of this bond 5% interest over its life”, say 25 years, “plus the rate of rise of the GDP deflator”. That seems to me to be a good way of issuing a bond and raising money. Does the GDP deflator, and do all those who set the GDP deflator, come into the scope of this Bill? I can see nothing that stops them coming into the scope of the Bill, but those people are the Office for National Statistics and if the Government manipulate the GDP deflator by subsidising certain key elements of it, the Government may face criminal charges. I have seen nothing in this Bill to stop that happening. I mention that because the GDP deflator happens to be my favourite price index as compared with the CPI and the RPI, but it would apply just as well to them.

Let us go further. In order to produce stability in its enterprise, suppose a firm says, “I will pay you 3% per annum over the lifetime of this contract, which we wish to last for five years, plus the rate of rise of the GDP deflator. Will you agree to that?”. That relates to a question that occurred in your Lordships' House yesterday. It is the kind of wage contract many of us would like to see used in order to stabilise the economy but I can see nothing that prevents such a contract coming under the scope of this Bill. To my noble friend Lord Eatwell, I say that it is not just a matter of commodities trading, but it seems to me there is nothing in the Bill that prevents almost anything that is index linked coming under its scope. Am I right that this goes well beyond LIBOR? I would take the view that it should not; that is not what we are here for.

Those are my contributions, they are all interrogative and I am perfectly happy to be told that I have misunderstood everything that is going on here. I do however agree with my noble friend Lord Barnett that I may misunderstand it, but the lawyers involved in this kind of activity will not and they are going to look for trouble. Has the Minister asked his officials to guarantee that no trouble can arise in that way within this part of the Bill?

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, I ask my noble friend a simple question, for which I apologise for not having given him notice. It is a question I had intended to raise in respect of an earlier amendment but for various reasons I was not here when that amendment was dealt with. It relates to the definition of financial crime. The FCA has, as one of its integrity objectives, the financial system not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime, and financial crime is defined in new Section 1H. An amendment moved by my noble friend earlier was to include terrorism financing in the definition of financial crime. It seems to me that the definition as it stands does not automatically include the new offences that are created in this rather large group of amendments, which we can shorthand as the LIBOR offences, because it would not otherwise have been within the remit of the FCA. I would be grateful if my noble friend would answer that point.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Wednesday 17th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, Amendment 190ZE is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith. This represents the last of the amendments in our joint names which respond to the first report of this Session by the Treasury Select Committee in another place.

Clause 57 provides a welcome power of direction that enables the Treasury to direct the Bank of England when public funds are at risk. The Treasury Select Committee initially recommended that such a power be created when the Bank notified the Treasury that there was a material risk to public funds. The committee regarded such a power of direction as a necessary corollary of the leading role of the Chancellor in any financial crisis. Unfortunately, the Bank of England sought to water this down to a power of direction operating only in relation to certain instruments of crisis management. Even more unfortunately, the Government have sided with the Bank and have restricted the power of direction to the three areas listed in Clause 57(2).

The Treasury Select Committee remains unhappy with this and believes that if the legislation is to stand the test of time, it should not be restricted to the specific tools listed in subsection (2) but should be capable of being exercised in relation to tools not currently considered appropriate; for example, those tools that would be available to the Financial Policy Committee or other tools that have not yet been developed. The Treasury Select Committee believes that this power should be broader and future-proofed.

Amendment 190ZE seeks to achieve this by saying that the direction can relate to any of the powers or functions of the Bank of England, leaving the three specified tools as a non-exclusive list of such powers.

I am told that the House could not hear me in my previous position so I have moved.

[Lord Peston]

Start again.

[Baroness Noakes]

This is a probing amendment for today, not least because I think that it is too wide. For example, it would allow the Treasury to direct the Bank in relation to monetary policy functions, which would not be appropriate. Section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946, which took the Bank into public ownership, has a general power of direction, which puts monetary policy out of scope. I believe that any Clause 57 power should similarly be constrained but I cannot see that there needs to be any further restriction on the Treasury’s power of direction when public money is at stake.

When my noble friend the Minister replies, can he also explain the relationship between the 1946 Act’s power of direction and the new powers of direction in Clause 57? The 1946 version is very broad and, monetary policy apart, seems to cover everything that is in Clause 57, and more. I do not believe that the 1946 Act power is being repealed or otherwise amended in this Bill, so I am puzzled as to the relationship.

I am aware that general powers of direction have rarely been used in practice, because their force lies mainly in the threat of their use rather than their actual deployment, but I hope that my noble friend the Minister can say what effect Clause 57 has on the existing power of direction. I beg to move.

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, this is a most interesting amendment, which enables us to clarify one or two aspects of the Bill. I literally did not hear the first part of what the noble Baroness was saying, so I was not joking when I suggested that she started again and she may well need to repeat what she said at the beginning.

This amendment brings into focus the relative power of the Bank of England in the areas that the Treasury is concerned with. This has worried quite a few of us throughout the proceedings on the Bill. To put it too simply, the question that emerges is: who really is in charge of the stabilisation process? Before I press that a little bit further, I take it that when in this part of the Bill we are talking about stabilisation powers, we are restricting ourselves to stabilisation powers within the financial services sector and not discussing a subject to which I have devoted most of my academic life; namely, powers to stabilise the whole economy—or, if people had followed my advice, probably destabilise the whole economy. We are not discussing the general question of the theory of economic stabilisation here. We are discussing just stabilisation.

Can the Minister throw some light on the simple question here? Who really is in charge? The noble Baroness includes in her amendment “not limited to”. However, unless this was part of what I did not hear, I do not think she said what else she had in mind that might then arise if it was not limited to these things. It may well be that she did say it and I missed or it may well be that she would like to say it now.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, first, I support my noble friend Lord Barnett in his remarks about this Joint Committee of both Houses, about which we had a great row last week and were even divided on. We would certainly like to know when it will be set up and when it will appear in detail in the business statement. Having said that, I have two or three questions.

My noble friend is quite right to use the word “experiment”, but I hope he will agree that the whole Bill is an experiment. We have not had anything like this placed before us in this form, certainly in my quarter of a century here. That does not mean that it is an experiment that should not take place, but it does mean that we must be immensely careful when it comes to implementation. In particular, the one thing that we do not want to do is what I am afraid all Governments do: look at the past and then repeat the errors of the past willy-nilly. This is not a party political point; it is part of the nature of our political system. We need to make absolutely certain that we do not repeat the errors of the past.

One slight point which my noble friend knows I will disagree on is the phrase,

“subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee”.

I would always want to add “and the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House”, but again we have had that argument before, and the cliché “flogging dead horses” is not my stock in trade.

What troubles me much more is that I cannot see how what is said in the Bill does not lead to clashes with the MPC and what it seeks to do. There is an enormous blurred area of who is responsible for what. After all, if one knows any monetary economics, one knows that the MPC’s role is certainly to produce financial stability. That is the whole point of a correct monetary framework, yet there are these other bodies doing the same thing. I know that we went through this again last week and were told that the governor of the Bank—I add the now mandatory remark, “whoever he or she may be”—will be chairing both committees, but it is still a Herculean task for the governor to ensure that two different committees do not have a decision-making process that leads to conflict.

My last question is due to my ignorance of parliamentary procedure. Could the Minister say a bit more about what the phrase “by order” means? Does it mean putting an order before both Houses that is not amendable by us, or not? Apart from that, as I say, my support is strong.

[Baroness Noakes]

I may be able to help the noble Lord, Lord Peston, with his last question. In two groups’ time, we will be discussing precisely the nature of the procedure that will accompany these new tools. The noble Lord might like to wait until then.

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Monday 6th December 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Peston]

May I interrupt the noble Lord? I am totally puzzled now. The noble Lord uses the word “requirement”. The people who comprise the OBR will not be idiots. They are going to be experts and qualified economists. Quite independent of what is in this Bill, if the forecasting is not working well, they will ask themselves why they got it wrong. There is no need for a requirement here unless you assume that a bunch of morons is going to be appointed to the OBR. If you get a forecast wrong, you immediately ask why you got it wrong. Why is there a need for a requirement to do something that would be a normal way of working?

[Baroness Noakes]

I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Peston, that it is not so much the requirement to do the assessment as the requirement to publish it that is important.

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes]

Is this a letter that only the noble Lord has received from my noble friend the Minister?

[Lord Peston]

We have all been given one. They are over there.

[Lord Higgins]

Has my noble friend now got a copy?

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Lord Peston

Monday 29th November 2010 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes]

I have been listening to what my noble friend has been saying. He seems to be saying that we cannot have the words relating to economic policy because we want this to relate to fiscal policy only. If we step back, it seems to me that the economic policy of the Government ought to be as capable as the fiscal policy of being subjected to the transparency objectives that the Government have set out. Indeed, one of the things that the Government are to be genuinely lauded on is their approach to transparency, not only in relation to the Office for Budget Responsibility but also, for example, in relation to the publication of expenditure amounts over £25,000.

Transparency has been one of the watchwords of our Government, but we come to the Bill and, for some reason, we are saying that the Office for Budget Responsibility will be required to look at our fiscal policy mandate only, not at our economic policy objectives. It seems to me that there is a transparency deficit if we are saying that we have to exclude economic policy, as it seems directly related to what the OBR will be doing. The only reason that my noble friend has given is that the Government have decided not to include it. Like other noble Lords, I am struggling for the rationale for excluding the Government’s economic policy.

[Lord Peston]

Before the Minister rises, I shall raise a point of order. I was under the impression that, when we meet in Grand Committee, we do not divide the Committee at all, so withdrawing amendments is totally irrelevant. I have no intention of withdrawing my amendments, but I am not going to divide on them. Rather like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I want to hear the Minister give some reasoned answers including that he would like to think about it a bit more. He does not have to agree with us, but I thought that the whole point of meeting in Grand Committee was to behave non-politically, if I may say so, and co-operatively to clarify the Bill in order to make progress when we go back into the Chamber, when, no doubt, we will divide the House. I am beginning to get very irritated with the repetition of “withdraw the amendment” because I do not think that we are here for that purpose. We may withdraw it formally, but that is not the point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Peston]

There is no problem on the formalities. I am someone who has become a great advocate of Grand Committees as a way in which to deal with almost all our Bills, because I interpreted these Committees as a place where there could be a meeting of minds and where the Minister thought about things rather than writing down, as my noble friend Lord Myners said, “Reject, reject, reject”. If that is really what we are going to get, I do not know whether I personally will bother to waste my time with him. I regard it as outrageous if we are going to get rejection after rejection on the next amendment and the one after it. If that is going to be his style, because essentially that is what he has been told to do, why are we here?

[Baroness Noakes]

If the noble Lord does not ask for the amendment to be withdrawn, it will be agreed.

[Lord Peston]

It is not the formalities that I am talking about but the style.