(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeNoble Lords will be aware that Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited, or SVB UK, was sold on Monday 13 March to HSBC. Customers of SVB UK are now able to access their deposits and banking services as normal. This transaction was facilitated by the Bank of England, in consultation with the Treasury, using powers granted by the Banking Act 2009. In doing so, we limited risks to our tech and life sciences sector and safeguarded some of the UK’s most promising companies, protecting customers, financial stability and the taxpayer. We were able to achieve this outcome—the best possible outcome—in short order, without any taxpayer money or government guarantees. There has been no bailout, with SVB UK instead sold to a private sector purchaser. This solution is a win for taxpayers, customers and the banking system.
SVB UK has become a subsidiary of HSBC’s ring-fenced bank. Ring-fencing requires banking groups that hold over £25 billion of retail deposits to separate their retail banking from their investment banking activities. The regime provides a four-year transition period for an entity acquired as part of a resolution process before it becomes subject to the ring-fencing requirements. As a result of this existing provision in legislation, SVB UK is not currently subject to ring-fencing requirements. However, HSBC UK, SVB UK’s parent company, remains subject to the ring-fencing regime.
To facilitate this transaction, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury laid in both Houses of Parliament on Monday 13 March a statutory instrument using the powers under the Banking Act 2009 to broaden an existing exemption in ring-fencing legislation with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is the first time that the Treasury was required to use these powers since the resolution of Dunfermline Building Society in 2009. I note that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has raised this statutory instrument as an instrument of interest in its 35th report, published on 30 March.
This exemption allows HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide below-market-rate intragroup funding to SVB UK. This was crucial for the success of HSBC’s takeover of SVB UK, because it ensured that HSBC was able to provide the necessary funds to its new subsidiary. HSBC has since stated publicly that it has so far provided approximately £2 billion of liquidity to SVB UK, money that it needed to continue to meet the needs of its customers. The Bank of England and the Prudential Regulation Authority fully support this modification to the ring-fencing regime as a necessary step to facilitate the sale.
In view of the urgency, and given that this statutory instrument was crucial in enabling the sale, the Treasury determined that it was necessary to lay this instrument using the “made affirmative” procedure under the powers in the Banking Act 2009. Parliament provided the Treasury with these powers for exactly these situations: recognising that exceptional circumstances can arise where the Government must take emergency action in the interests of financial stability, depositors and taxpayers.
The statutory instrument also makes a number of modifications to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in relation to the rule-making powers of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. Specifically, these rule-making powers are modified to ensure that the regulators can exercise them effectively, where these powers relate to the Bank of England’s transfer of SVB UK to HSBC and write-down of SVB UK’s shareholders and certain bondholders. The statutory instrument also waives the requirement for the regulators to consult on certain rule changes related to the sale.
In addition to the statutory instrument we are debating today, the Government will also lay a further statutory instrument to make further changes to the ring-fencing regime with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is to permit SVB UK to remain exempt from the ring-fencing rules beyond the four-year transition period, subject to certain conditions. Unlike the legislation we are debating today, this second exemption is not required immediately and will be introduced in due course. The second exemption was also crucial to the success of the sale of SVB UK, as it ensures that it can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business as part of the HSBC Group.
A clear determination was made by the Bank of England and supported by the Government that these amendments were crucial to facilitating the purchase of SVB UK by HSBC. The UK has a world-leading tech sector with a dynamic start-up and scale-up ecosystem, and the Government are pleased that a private sector purchaser has been found. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting this legislation. I beg to move.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a shareholder in UK banks which are subject to the ring-fencing regime. My husband and I hold shares in HSBC, which will benefit from this order, and in both NatWest and Lloyds, which are subject to the ring-fencing rules but do not derive a benefit from this order. I think my registered interests in this case probably cancel each other out.
I should say that I have never been a big fan of ring-fencing. The triple whammy of an electrified ring-fence, elaborate resolution planning and higher capital and liquidity requirements have imposed a very high set of costs on UK banks which can in the long run result only in disbenefits for UK bank customers —that is, all of us. I do, however, believe passionately in fair competition and level playing fields, and my concern about this order—and, more so, the one that we are promised that will come later—is that it distorts competition and creates an unlevel playing field by creating unfair advantage for one particular bank in relation to the ring-fencing rules.
I completely understand that the Bank of England had to operate under pressure to achieve a sale of Silicon Valley Bank over a weekend and that avoided having to place it into an insolvency procedure, and we owe the Bank a debt of gratitude for what it achieved over that weekend. But there are some aspects of the transaction—and therefore this order—which I find mysterious. I am also, as I said, concerned that HSBC has obtained an unfair competitive advantage compared with other UK banks, so I have some questions to put to my noble friend.
First, SVB UK is not a ring-fenced bank under UK legislation and it remains outside that legislation. Why did the Bank not agree to sell the bank to HSBC itself rather than to HSBC’s UK ring-fenced subsidiary? Had it done that, I do not believe that any special legislation would have been necessary. HSBC operates a narrow definition of ring-fencing—unlike other UK ring-fenced banks—such that the majority of its commercial customers are serviced within the non-ring-fenced part of HSBC. Why was it decided to place Silicon Valley Bank UK into the ownership of the ring-fenced bank? Would it not have been more appropriate to have put it somewhere else within the HSBC Group along with other commercial customers?
Secondly, what activities of Silicon Valley Bank UK would disqualify it from being housed within a ring-fenced bank? Commercial banking business can be satisfactorily included within a ring-fenced bank provided that the business within the ring-fenced bank is in effect plain vanilla business—that is, conventional lending and very simple derivatives, which are allowed. What does Silicon Valley Bank UK do which would disqualify it from being placed properly within the UK ring-fence of HSBC, and what policy grounds make it necessary to allow the ring-fenced bank to own this kind of business when it cannot carry out that business itself?
Thirdly, the Minister has said that the order was necessary to allow HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide funding out of the ring-fence at preferential rates to Silicon Valley Bank UK. Why was this funding not provided out of HSBC’s other, non-ring-fenced resources? Of course, I can see the attraction to HSBC of using the cheap funds that it has from its ring-fenced depositors, but the ring-fence regime was set up precisely to stop such funds leaching out of the ring-fence. Related to that, is there any limit on the amount of funding that HSBC UK can provide from within the ring-fence to Silicon Valley Bank in breach of the ring-fencing philosophy, and if there is not a limit, why not? Are there any limits to the generosity with which the ring-fenced bank can provide the funds, since it is going to be providing at rates below market rates? Will there be any limit to that degree of discount that it will allow, and again, if not, why not?
Fourthly, can the Minister confirm that Silicon Valley Bank UK will not be allowed to form part of HSBC UK’s Bank Domestic Liquidity Sub-group, or DoLSub, and that liquidity will be monitored separately for the ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced parts of HSBC UK? If that is not the case, can the Minister explain the position on how liquidity is to be managed and monitored within the ring-fenced bank and its new subsidiary?
Lastly, it is clear that the intention is to provide some long-term exemptions from the ring-fencing regime, and the Minister referred to this. I appreciate that the precise details may not yet be finalised, but will the Minister set out what exemptions are likely to involve? I believe that the Minister said that this would be in a separate statutory instrument and therefore Parliament would be able to look at that, but it would be good if she could confirm that. My main concern when we come to the second order is whether it will be fair and reasonable for ring-fencing exemptions to be provided on a long-term basis, which disadvantages other UK banks which have to operate completely within the ring-fence rules. Put another way, when considering the case for HSBC to be allowed special treatment, will the Government ensure that they consider the case for equivalent relaxations to be more generally available? I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response.
I am afraid I have to disappoint noble Lords and say that I have no further comment to make on the decision to purchase it by the ring-fenced bank. It was a commercial decision for HSBC.
My noble friend had some other questions on the use of the ring-fenced bank. She asked what activities SVB UK undertakes that are not allowed under the ring-fence regime. SVB UK provides lending to certain types of financial institutions, such as venture capital funds, which is not allowed under the ring-fencing regime. It also provides certain equity-related products in relation to its lending, which is also not allowed under the ring-fence regime. She also asked whether I could confirm that SVB UK will not be added to HSBC’s domestic liquidity subgroup. That is a matter for the regulator to decide.
All three noble Lords asked about the implications for competition and whether this move has given a competitive advantage to HSBC. The exemption is limited to the acquisition of SVB UK by HSBC, and was necessary to facilitate this acquisition—something I think all noble Lords welcomed. As Sam Woods explained at the TSC recently, a necessary condition of HSBC moving forward was that it could keep the entirety of SVB UK as one business. The value was in the integrated nature of the business, and HSBC could make that work only if it had it as a subsidiary of HSBC UK, the ring-fenced bank.
It is also worth reiterating that SVB UK remains very small compared to HSBC. Its assets amount to around £9 billion compared to HSBC’s $3 trillion group balance sheet.
To come on to the second statutory instrument and the permanent exemption from ring-fencing for SVB UK, the second exemption was also crucial, as it ensures that SVB UK can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business, as part of HSBC UK. It will be subject to conditions, which are intended to ensure that the exemption is limited to what was needed to facilitate the sale of SVB UK. We will set out details of those conditions alongside the second statutory instrument, which noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate. Alongside that, as I said earlier, the PRA outlined in its response to the Treasury Select Committee that it has a range of tools that it can and will draw on to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and the protection of retail deposits.
Can I just clarify something with my noble friend? I can just about understand why, for the transaction to happen over the weekend, HSBC was allowed to bully the other participants into breaking the ring-fence rules to allow it to be set up. However, allowing a permanent change means that the ring-fenced bank will be allowed to provide liquidity, and presumably capital as well, on advantageous terms to a bank which can be used as a growth vehicle within HSBC, thereby increasing the risk to ring-fenced funds. I understand why you might have to do that initially, to get the deal through, but I do not understand whether there are any limits at all on what can happen after the acquisition has happened. These permissions have been set up in a way, and are likely to continue in a way, that will allow Silicon Valley Bank to continue to operate in a way that is completely antithetical to the ring-fenced banking regime. As I have said, I am not a fan of it, but I have a strong objection to one bank being allowed to operate in a distinctly different way from other banks.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThe Government will make those changes only within the agreed scope set out in the Bill. That is perhaps why the DPRRC was content with the approach that they were taking.
Does my noble friend accept that the specification in Clause 3 allows for very significant changes to be made? There are many heads under which the Government could fit a change in policy, and that policy change could be significant in the context of the restatement of EU law.
The intention is to allow for the restatement within EU law or to adapt it to a situation or circumstances within the UK. As I have said, in undertaking that work the Government will seek to undertake a combination of formal consultation and informal engagement appropriate to the changes being made. As set out in the Government’s policy statement on the repeal of retained EU law in financial services, the Government aim to balance the need to deliver much-needed reforms with the need to consult industry and stakeholders. They will take the decision on the approach to this on a case-by-case basis.
I wanted to address my noble friend’s specific question on the prospectus regime. The Government intend—
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard for his support; I was not expecting the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to support my amendment, because she and I have discussed the FOS in the past.
There is a potential problem in the relationship between the FCA and the FOS with the introduction of the new consumer duty. I think that is particularly concerning people: we are going a little into the unknown. We know that if regulatory pressures get too difficult for firms, their natural response is, ultimately, to leave or severely curtail the elements of the market that they are prepared to operate in. We need look only at the availability of advised investment to see what can be the consequence of heavy-handed regulatory action. If the new consumer duty becomes a nightmare, with individual cases being settled on particular circumstances but then having to be read across because of the FCA handbook, which requires cases to then be followed by firms, we could end up with a very confused understanding of what the consumer duty involves. That was the main burden of my tabling the amendment, but we may just need to see what happens when the consumer duty operates in practice to see whether those harms genuinely emerge.
As for the second leg of my amendment, which should have been a separate amendment, I was very interested to hear what my noble friend said about the case having been made. What I am not quite clear about, which she may be able to clarify, is on what timescale she believes the Government will be looking at this, because not many financial services Bills come along to get things done in.
I will have to write to the Committee to clarify the timescale for the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I look forward to that letter with great anticipation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, although I have not been following the detail of that Bill, I am aware of the provisions in it. As part of looking at this question, one question asked is, in our broader ecosystem of the checks and balances that we have on our politicians and people defined as PEPs—the other requirements of disclosure that they are held to and the other tools that we have at our disposal—how they influence the risk assessment has been done. I reassure noble Lords that that question has been asked. I should also reassure noble Lords that I am seeing the Security Minister tomorrow to discuss economic crime, but also that issue. We are seeking wherever possible to ensure that there is join-up across government in our assessment of the risks and the tools available to deal with them, ensuring that where we have measures in place they remain proportionate. That is something that I continue to engage with, with the Security Minister and others across government.
I shall just try to answer the point on the Financial Action Task Force, the difference between domestic and foreign PEPs, and the requirements within that, as I understand it. I commit to following up in writing if it remains unclear or if anything I say is not correct. The requirement for automatic enhanced due diligence applies to foreign PEPs. However, within the FATF guidance on recommendations 12 and 22—I think that this is particularly around 12—there is still the need to take steps to identify whether someone is a domestic politically exposed person and then review the relevant risk factors. So they need to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP, then determine the risk of the business relationship in that context—and then, in low-risk cases, there are no further steps to determine whether a customer is a PEP. In other words, there is still a requirement to identify whether someone is a domestic PEP or not and to look at the risk around that.
Where there is a difference, in my understanding, from the Financial Action Task Force requirements, is that for foreign PEPs you need to apply automatic enhanced due diligence. Under the EU regulations, that also applied to domestic PEPs—and we therefore ensured that automatic enhanced due diligence applied to domestic as well as foreign PEPs was a system in our regulations. The review we did last year into all of our anti-money laundering regulations did not conclude that on this matter no further action was to be taken but that we needed to look at the risk profile and risks associated with domestic PEPs before determining whether those requirements of automatic enhanced due diligence remained appropriate, now that we had the ability to vary our money laundering regulations, having left the EU. So that was a further piece of work that needed to be done after the review was published last summer of our money laundering regulations overall. That further piece of work has been undertaken, and I have undertaken to write to noble Lords with further details if I can provide them on that risk assessment, but that concluded that it was appropriate to maintain automatic enhanced due diligence for domestic PEPs.
Did this review involve the FCA? When the FCA reissued its guidance in 2017 it was very clear about domestic PEPs being low risk, but it was constrained by the regulations, which said that you had to do enhanced due diligence. It was within that context. There seems to have been a shift between the FCA’s apparent position on the risk profile of UK PEPs and what my noble friend the Minister is now saying that she is being told by the security services, which will always try to find things that can go wrong. It is quite easy to construct a case that we are potentially capable of being corrupted by whoever and involved in money laundering, but they are not involved in the money laundering processes; the FCA is. I am getting a bit confused about how robust this risk assessment is in the context of money laundering.
I believe that it aimed to get relevant information from all those involved and take a holistic view. I appreciate and agree that we need to ensure that, when these measures are put in place, they are proportionate to the risk faced, so it is entirely right to interrogate that risk assessment. I also appreciate that it is a slightly frustrating process when the sensitive nature of some of these issues means that we cannot always go into all the details noble Lords want at this time. I have tried to explain the context as to why domestic PEPs are viewed as having sufficiently high risk so that enhanced due diligence should still apply. I have the FCA guidance in my pack but I will not go through it, but it is also true to say—this is another point that I checked—that although the risk is sufficient to have enhanced due diligence measures, it is lower for domestic PEPs than for foreign PEPs. That assessment still applies.
Others are involved in looking at the risks of money laundering in counterterrorist and proliferation financing, which I believe are subject to these regulations.
As far as financial institutions are concerned, all of those are dealt with by the FCA, not the security services or any other shadowy agencies that seem to be involved in this latest risk assessment, so I am struggling to see what wider issues could possibly have been taken into account.
The Government believe that the decision about the scope of the money laundering regulations is best taken by, and should remain with, the Government, rather than being delegated to the FCA.
I turn to Amendment 224 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. This would require the FCA to consult with consumers with regard to its functions relating to PEPs. In the discussion—
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeIn Committee, we are discussing the different proposals that have come from noble Lords to solve these problems. I am trying to set out where the Government have previously considered these questions and the thinking behind our approach in the Bill, demonstrating that where we have been able to, for example in the introduction of Clause 37, we have made amendments to the Bill further to take into account some of these issues. When it comes to the specific proposals we are talking about, it is right that I set out that this has been considered by the Government, including through public consultation.
I was not going to speak on this group in order to have a speedier debate, but I completely failed in that aim, so I think I am allowed to say something now. Can my noble friend explain to what extent these two consultations actually address the issues that have been raised by the amendments of my noble friend Lord Bridges? From memory, neither of the consultations examined the idea of having some kind of independent scrutiny of the regulators; they merely proceeded on the basis of what the Government wanted to do and did not seek to analyse the benefits of an alternative solution.
That is a similar question to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and it is probably because I did not answer it satisfactorily that it has come up again. Noble Lords are right that there was not a question on those specific proposals in those consultations. I endeavour to point out, however, that does not prevent the respondents to those consultations, where they believe it to be a good idea, to use them to put forward their support for such an approach. Perhaps I could write to noble Lords specifically on the areas within both those consultations that touched on accountability measures.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeOn that point, the noble Baroness referred to the Government responding, but we are broadly discussing the committee’s scrutiny of the regulators and the Government’s role as well. The Bill provides a specific power to ensure that the regulators respond to representations made to them by parliamentary committees in response to their consultations. That clause is not limited to the Treasury Select Committee but applies to any parliamentary committee that makes a representation.
I look forward to debating the next group, which continues the theme, but for now, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate—with the possible exception of my noble friend the Minister.
I think we were pretty much at one in this Committee on the importance of setting up proper accountability arrangements for the financial services sector. I make no apology to my noble friend Lord Forsyth for trying to design a Rolls-Royce solution. The financial services sector is the biggest contributor to the national economy. What regulators in the financial services sector do has a huge impact, not just on the players in the financial services sector but on the whole economy. For that reason, we have to take this extremely seriously. It is at this point, when we are about to make a very radical change in the scope and responsibilities of those regulators, that we should consider this all very carefully.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, is absolutely right: this is about the importance of accountability to Parliament, and we must not forget that. That is what we have been trying to do.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI suggest that I triple-check that for the noble Baroness and write to her. The provision to enable the implementation of MRAs included in the Bill does not enable the Government to change the clear hierarchy of the regulators’ objectives, only to specify the areas in which regulators should make rules to give effect to an MRA. If, after I have written to the noble Baroness, she wants to discuss the Government’s interpretation of international standards, or if my noble friend wants to discuss her points further, I will happily meet them if that would be helpful.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, can withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not move theirs when they are reached. The Government, of course, support Clause 24 standing part of the Bill.
My Lords, I think my noble friend is confusing me with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI would like to share the noble Lord’s optimism. We need to have the consultation on the secondary legislation, which we are expecting very shortly, and then progress as quickly as we can to lay the regulations after we have completed that consultation. I completely accept the point from the noble Lord and the Committee more widely that there is a desire for swift action in this area. We understand that there are concerns about the pace of the delivery of this secondary legislation. This is a new and developing market, and it is important to get the regulation right. We need to ensure that it is proportionate and that lenders can continue to offer a useful form of interest-free credit to consumers responsibly.
While work continues to bring this fully into regulation, I should stress that buy now, pay later borrowers already benefit from wider consumer protection regulation. This includes standards on advertising, rights concerning the fairness of contracts and regulations to protect consumers from unfair commercial practices. However, to reiterate, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and other noble Lords in the Committee that they can expect to see draft legislation very soon and that we are committed to progressing this as quickly as we can.
I therefore hope my noble friend Lady Noakes will withdraw her amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, will not move his when it is reached.
Will my noble friend say how she sees the timetable going forward? I think she said that the Treasury is at the first stage of consultation, but it would be interesting to see the outline timetable that my noble friend thinks the Government will work to on this. It has taken a long time even to get to this stage, and it would be very useful to have an idea of when something tangible might be expected.
I will do my best, but I am afraid it will disappoint my noble friend. We expect to publish a second-stage consultation in due course, and it is likely that the FCA will also consult. Implementation of the final approach will require primary legislation, which will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I hope she draws some comfort from the fact that this process has started and that this reform is under way. We heard from everyone that this legislation is long overdue for reform, but we also heard a desire from the Committee that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny be applied when the Government bring forward proposals for reform.
I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, especially those who supported my amendment. I freely concede that, as I said in my introductory remarks, more parliamentary involvement would be required before any proposals were finalised.
Consumer groups have already been heavily involved. There are problems because the Consumer Credit Act focuses on paperwork and processes and not on whether it produces good outcomes. For example, it has no concept of vulnerable customers. There are real, good reasons for progressing this into law.
I was not surprised but somewhat disappointed by my noble friend’s response; it is a big step to take a big Henry VIII power when dealing with anything other than EU law. Normally, of course, the Committee would be criticising such a power, but I was particularly disappointed not to get a sense of the real urgency from my noble friend. Having a secondary consultation in due course is the kind of timetable beloved by Governments who do not really want to do anything. I hope that my noble friend will go back to her department, the Treasury, and say that this issue must be progressed. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI was interested in what my noble friend said about a forward look. Can she explain a little more what this forward look is and where one might find it?
In short, the approach is set out in Building a Smarter Financial Services Framework for the UK, which was published alongside the Edinburgh reforms. A number of those reforms set out where our priorities are. They set out where we have already done consultations and will be ready to move forward with new secondary legislation or regulator rules. They set out where we are starting consultations or calls for evidence in a number of areas where we seek to make changes. They also give a forward look at some of those other areas where we seek to make changes but have not yet published our consultation or call for evidence.
Does that represent a comprehensive analysis of what the Government expect to happen to all the retained EU law covered by the powers in this Bill?
No, it does not. This comes back to the point about prioritisation. It represents the Government’s initial prioritisation of the measures where they think that making amendments or using the powers under this Bill to repeal the retained EU law and put in place regulator rules under our new model would have the biggest or most important effect. There will be subsequent work to do after what is set out in that vision, but in sequencing it is important that we direct our efforts and resources to measures that will make the most difference.
My noble friend asked how the regulators and the Government can be incentivised to complete the replacement of EU law in a timely way. We are working closely with the regulators to co-ordinate the programme to deliver the rules and legislation that will be necessary to enact the repeal of retained EU law. Where necessary, the Treasury could use the power under Clause 28 of this Bill, which sets requirements on the regulators to make rules in specific areas of regulation. So there would be that option within the powers in the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, asked about the difference in approach in this Bill from that in the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill. Unlike the approach taken in that Bill, this Bill repeals retained EU law in financial services, as set out in Schedule 1. The Government will continue to repeal and replace the contents of Schedule 1 until we have an established a comprehensive FSMA model of regulation. It will take time for regulators to make, and for industry to adapt to, technical and less important rules, as well as delivering major reforms. The Treasury developed a bespoke approach to financial services, given the existing role of the regulations to preserve that and bring the regulatory regime into line with the FSMA model.
I hope I have addressed the points about the desire to complete this work in a timely way, the need to balance that with resources for regulators and, indeed, industry to adapt to this change, and the importance that the Government place on therefore prioritising the work so that those reforms that have the biggest impact will take place earliest.
I turn to the government amendments in this group, Amendments 20, 28, 29, 242 and 243, which are all in my name. The Treasury undertook an extensive exercise to identify retained EU law relating to financial services to be repealed by this Bill, listed in Schedule 1. Late last year, the National Archives identified additional pieces of retained EU law across the statute book, some of which relate to financial services. The Government have also, through their own work, become aware of a small number of additional pieces. Amendments 2 to 20 make changes to Schedule 1 as a result of this. Government Amendments 2 to 16 and 18 add a number of statutory instruments, and Amendments 19 and 20 place three provisions in FSMA into Schedule 1 to be repealed. Amendment 17 removes one statutory instrument from the schedule, which was included in error, due to containing a small amount of retained EU law alongside largely domestic legislation.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that every effort has been made to identify all legislation that should be repealed though this process. If he looks at the balance of what we have identified and what is in these amendments, it was a comprehensive job. None the less, to be as transparent as possible, when we find further measures that would be provided for under this Bill, we have sought to include them by way of amendment.
Amendment 28 clarifies the legislative effect of Clause 3, ensuring that the Government have the necessary tools to create a comprehensive FSMA model of regulation. It does so by clarifying that the Treasury can use the powers in Clauses 3 and 4 to create powers to make further regulations. Under the FSMA model, the Government are responsible for setting the regulatory perimeter via secondary legislation. There may be times in future when, for example, the Treasury will need the ability to update key definitions that sit within legislation restated under Clause 4, to clarify what sits within the UK’s regulatory perimeter.
Amendment 29 makes a technical fix to the explanation requirement in Clause 6, requiring the Bank of England to explain how updates to its rules are compatible with its new regulatory principles, introduced by Clause 45.
My Lords, Amendment 36 would delete some subsections from Section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946, the only nationalisation legislation that made any sense. Indeed, it was surprising that the Bank of England existed outside the public sector for as long as it did—the best part of 250 years. Section 4(3) says:
“The Bank, if they think it necessary in the public interest, may request information from and make recommendations to bankers, and may, if so authorised by the Treasury, issue directions to any banker for the purpose of securing that effect is given to any such request or recommendation”.
Subsection (6) says that a banker is any banking undertaking that the Treasury declares to be a banker for the purpose of Section 4. That is quite a sweeping power in relation to all kinds of banks: retail banks, commercial banks, investment banks and so on.
This is a probing amendment to find out why on earth this power is still on the statute book, given that we have a highly defined system of prudential regulation laid out in extensive detail in FSMA. In addition, the various Bank of England Acts deal with the Bank’s other functions. Collectively, the legislation gives extensive powers to the PRA, the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Bank of England itself. There is no deficit in powers related to bankers, as anyone operating in the financial services sector will attest.
Why does Section 4 retain these powers? How often have they been used? When was the last time they were used? If my noble friend cannot make a case for these powers still being needed—if they were ever needed—I invite her to agree to their removal from the 1946 Act. I beg to move.
My Lords, my noble friend has just described what Amendment 36 probes and the power it is seeking to look at, so I will not repeat that. What I will say is that the power is designed to be used only when it is necessary to do so in the public interest, such as in an unexpected or emergency scenario.
The Government looked at some of my noble friend’s questions. We are not aware that the Bank has ever used this power, but it could be useful in some scenarios—for example, for the Bank to require certain actions from troubled firms during a period of financial crisis. As we saw in 2007-08, such crises can develop quickly and create novel policy challenges that may not be anticipated in advance. As such, the Government consider the power to be a useful potential backstop. Any changes to this power would require careful consideration and consultation before acting.
I have been brief, but I hope that I have answered my noble friend’s questions, at least in part, and that she feels able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I rather thought I would get that answer—that the power has never been used—because I certainly could not recall any situation when it could have been used. My noble friend the Minister has put up a good case for keeping something that has been there since 1946—which is rather a long time—and has never been used but might be needed in an emergency, notwithstanding that, certainly for the last 20 years, we have been legislating on financial services and banks in extenso and there exists a range of powers that any intelligent person involved in this area thought that the Bank or the PRA would ever need to use. I think the case for removing these powers is unanswerable. I hope that my noble friend the Minister might think a little more about that between now and Report. It would be a good thing for the Government to bring forward something that would clean up our statute book. I beg leave to withdraw.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had a short but important debate on this principle. There is nothing fundamentally dividing us on the underlying principle; the issue is how we implement it. I continue to believe that we should search for wording that we can be comfortable with. I accept criticism of the current wording, which I lifted largely from the framework document, and I accept that it is difficult to encompass the shades that you will encounter in real transactions, which often have sequencing involved in them, in determining whether there is an adequate supply or provision of private sector finance.
I am uncomfortable about leaving this simply to the strategic plan, partly because there is no role for Parliament in it. There is a role for the Treasury in relation to conversations with the UK Infrastructure Bank, but not for Parliament. There is a need to understand how best to phrase the principles without getting into the detail—but I accept that the devil will be in the detail in this Bill.
I am very grateful for the offer from my noble friend the Minister of further discussions, which I—and, I suspect, other noble Lords—will be only too keen to take up between now and Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments all relate to the reporting on the bank and the content of any statutory review of the bank. Amendment 42A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, seeks to ensure that the bank’s annual accounts and reports will contain a statement on the extent to which the bank has achieved its objectives. I hope I can provide some reassurance that UKIB already has obligations to publish in its strategic plan details of how its strategic objectives are being fulfilled, as well as how its activities meet its operating and investment principles.
There were also a number of amendments detailing what the statutory review of the bank should look into. Amendment 55, from my noble friend Lady Noakes, Amendment 56, from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and Amendment 65, from my noble friend Lord Holmes, all relate to the additionality of the bank and how it will work to crowd in private investment, not crowd it out. In response to my noble friend Lord Holmes, I am happy to restate that it is our expectation that the bank will crowd in £18 billion of finance from £8 billion. The evidence to date is that £300 million could have unlocked £500 million of private finance.
As I said previously, how effective the bank has been in meeting its objectives, including additionality, is a really important point and one I would expect the statutory review to look at. I also re-emphasise to noble Lords how seriously additionality is taken by the bank itself. As I mentioned, I would expect to see in the bank’s strategic plan, published later this month, a list of KPIs that it will use to measure its impact. One of those will be on the private finance it has brought in.
On Amendment 57, from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the bank takes its obligations to providing regional and local economic growth across the UK, including to rural communities, very seriously. As I mentioned, the bank will have a number of KPIs to ensure that it is meeting its objectives and will detail these in its upcoming strategic plan. I appreciate that I have not seen the strategic plan either, but if the right reverend Prelate would like to discuss that further having seen it, I would be very happy to do so.
Amendment 64 is on the review of inclusive infrastructure. The bank carefully considers the impact of its decisions on those sharing protected characteristics, in line with its legal obligations and its strong commitment to promoting fairness. It has a rigorous process in place to ensure that it complies with its legal requirements under the public sector equality duty in the Equality Act 2010. Impacts on protected characteristics are appropriately flagged and assessed before the granting of loans.
Amendment 66 is on reporting of the bank’s lending. The bank can already determine the level of its own investments in line with its capitalisation and annual limits that are agreed in its framework document. The bank will report on its lending in its annual report and accounts, which will be published and laid before Parliament.
Amendment 67, from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, suggests that we conduct a review of the bank to ensure it continues to meet the aims of the national infrastructure strategy. I can provide the noble Baroness with some assurance that this is precisely what the Government will do when they review the bank as part of the arm’s-length body review in 2024-25. Further to this, the National Infrastructure Commission will publish its second national infrastructure assessment next year, and the Government will consider future updates to the national infrastructure strategy in view of this assessment. We will continue to ensure that the bank is made aware of how its work can complement the Government’s long-term infrastructure strategy, including through the statutory strategic steers, powers for which are contained in the Bill.
I therefore hope that, at this stage, my noble friend Lady Noakes can withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not move theirs.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for that response. We have had an interesting, short debate. This is rather a varied group of amendments. There is only one link between them, in that they are all about reporting. Apart from that, a lot of different issues are raised—not all of which I will comment on, because they were not covered in my own amendments.
I will deal with the issue of crowding out or crowding in. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond have a concern around this. My noble friend said that the report under Clause 9 would cover this, but the report under Clause 9 is about how well it has achieved its objectives. The objectives are very clear in Clause 2: to help tackle climate change et cetera, and to support regional and local economic growth. It is not an objective to achieve a crowding in or avoid crowding out. That has been the heart of one of the problems. I hope that when we have our further discussions on crowding in and crowding out, which we have already established that we will have before Report, we can cover this aspect. This is part of the whole problem of how to express the additionality requirement and then how to measure it and report on it. It is part of the same theme, so I will not labour it further now.
My Amendment 42A was about having something in the annual report and accounts on how well the bank is achieving its objectives. I am not at all clear that this is met by what my noble friend said, which was something to do with the strategic plan and the KPIs. Tomorrow I will read carefully in Hansard what she said, because I probably did not concentrate quite as hard as I should have. I do not think she answered the question, and I may well want to return to it either on Report or with her before Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.
I will be happy to go away and check on that point. I think that the intention is that they would be, but I will double-check.
The period of 10 years has been chosen to allow for a fuller analysis of the infrastructure funding that the bank has undertaken and to see the real impact of its investment in the context of delivering against the missions set out in the levelling-up White Paper and the progress towards the Government’s net-zero target.
I will note one further point. As I confirmed at Second Reading to my noble friend Lady Noakes, UKIB will be subject to external audit by the National Audit Office, including on an annual basis as part of the statutory powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
Amendment 63, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, seeks to mirror the arrangements of the Green Investment Bank by having a company shadow the bank to ensure that it is meeting its objectives. He is clearly knowledgeable on this subject as he sits on the board of the Green Purposes Company. However, he will note that the Green Investment Bank did not need this function when it was part of government because there were already other routes of accountability, including directly to Parliament in relation to the bank’s use of public money.
This legislation sets out quite clearly the objectives of the bank so, if there is any deviation from that, the Government can compel it to change its course or there will be a challenge in the courts. Further to this, Ministers are accountable to Parliament on the performance of the bank, so I dare say the noble Lord would provide adequate challenge should he think that the bank was not performing against its objectives.
To tidy things up, my noble friend Lady Noakes asked a question on the bank appearing before Lords committees. There is no barrier to that. Indeed, the CEO and the chair of the bank were before the Economic Affairs Committee on 17 May as part of an energy supply session.
I hope that, in laying out those reasonings from the Government at this stage, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not move theirs when they are reached.
My Lords, I expect that my noble friend the Minister knows that she is batting on a rather sticky wicket. While she has valiantly sought to explain her reasonings, I think I can probably speak for the rest of the Committee when I say that we are not wholly convinced by them. I can see no particular point in detaining noble Lords in this Committee much longer other than to say that we have to record that clearly both the independence and the time period of the review are areas that we will need to return to on Report if we do not satisfactorily deal with them before we get to that stage. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before I move on to what I will be doing with my amendment, could I ask one factual question? During my noble friend’s response, she said that the UK Infrastructure Bank had a borrowing limit of £7.5 billion. I understand that the source of that borrowing limit is this framework document. Could she confirm that? If that is the case, I think it is going to make the status of the framework document and its interaction with the statute a very important issue for the conduct of this Committee. The question posed to her by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, becomes particularly important for us to have a proper understanding. Will she respond on that specific point?
I think that the framework document sets out those limits and they are put in place, as it were, by the Treasury. That is my understanding of that interaction.
I thank my noble friend for that, I think what we take from that is that the framework document needs to be well-understood in its scope and effect for many aspects of the debates in this Committee.
In relation to my own amendments, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has raised some important issues, in particular those related to whistleblowing by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I hope that she gets answers to the questions she has raised because they are important.
I had not appreciated that Parliament approved an exemption for the UK Infrastructure Bank last week. My noble friend did not tell me that at Second Reading, but these things pass one by when dealing with financial services regulation. We were asleep on the job when that came up, but now we have this Bill so we have the opportunity to revisit that question.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that I am not entirely convinced by the argument that, because there is no issue of protecting depositors, there is no systemic risk from the UK Infrastructure Bank, and it should therefore be exempt from the panoply of oversight and supervision banks are ordinarily subject to, whether or not they are small banks. We should not dismiss lightly the areas that have been raised: whistleblowing; the senior manager and certification regime; and financial crime. There are some very important issues which would get attention at the moment, if this were not a state-owned bank, from the FCA/PRA. Without that, nobody is looking at them. I do not think that is a very safe way to set up this bank. I hear what my noble friend says about reviewing it in 2024, but there is a question of whether it is sensible to run the risks until 2024. For today, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, as I just said to the right reverend Prelate, the UK robustly supports the BEPS initiative being taken forward by the OECD’s inclusive framework group, which includes more than 100 jurisdictions and ensures that less economically developed countries have an equal say in developing international solutions. I assure the noble Lord that the UK Government also put resources into developing countries to help them to build the tax resources they need, so that they can ensure the effective enforcement of rules and collection of taxation.
My Lords, a lot of the attention has been on the minimum tax rate announced as part of the agreement—I hope the Government will not be tempted to go above the 15%—but more important than the rate is what will be taxed. Does the Minister agree that the UK must not allow global rules to override our freedoms to incentivise investment through things such as freeports and super-deductions?
I reassure my noble friend that the UK Government’s freeports will not be affected by this announcement. Freeports are not about corporation tax directly but are designed to support a wide range of businesses with a wide range of tax offers focused on local regeneration, such as full relief from SDLT, enhanced capital and building allowances, business rates relief and NICs relief.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as this debate has illustrated, when you hear about Libor it is hard not to think about the benchmark’s manipulation in the wake of the financial crisis. However, since then there has been substantial reform to the regulation of benchmarks and significant improvements have been made to the governance and controls around the submission and administration of Libor itself.
As a result of declining activity in the wholesale lending market that Libor seeks to measure, in 2015 the Financial Stability Board recommended a transition away from certain interest rate benchmarks including Libor to alternative rates based on active and liquid underlying markets. As Andrew Bailey remarked in his speech on Libor wind-down last summer,
“Public authorities and market participants … have … been working together to transition away from reliance on Libor for a number of years.”
It remains of the utmost importance that firms continue to prioritise the move away from the use of the Libor benchmark where possible. We need to reduce the number of contracts that refer to the Libor benchmark as much as possible before the agreement between the FCA and panel banks to continue submissions to Libor to facilitate this transition ends. For most Libor currencies, that is the end of this year.
However, it has been clear for some time that there will be certain tough legacy contracts that will not be able to transition away from Libor in time. In May 2020, the Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates highlighted the need for legislation to support these contracts. Without government intervention, parties to these contracts would be left without a means of determining contractual obligations when panel bank submissions cease, resulting in significant disruption.
Shortly after that, the Government announced their plans to give the FCA the powers to manage an orderly Libor wind-down through this Bill in a manner that protects consumers and market integrity. This includes legislation to deal with these tough legacy contracts. The UK was the first country to set out an appropriate regulatory framework to manage the wind-down of critical benchmarks, and this legislation has been very well received by industry.
My noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, asked about synthetic Libor. The proposed legislation does not prescribe what a synthetic benchmark might look like but allows the FCA flexibility and discretion as to what methodology change it might choose to impose. For example, the FCA could use this power to direct a change to Libor’s methodology so it is no longer reliant on panel bank submissions. The FCA has recently consulted the market on its proposed policy approach to using this power.
Turning to the amendments, Amendment 44 would require that where the FCA has used the powers given to it in this Bill to impose a change in the methodology of the benchmark, that new benchmark must be interpreted as the same benchmark in any contracts which reference the original benchmark. Amendment 45 seeks to reduce the scope for litigation where the FCA has exercised this power.
Since the introduction of this Bill, the Government have received representations from some key industry participants, highlighting a residual risk of disruption and potential litigation that they are concerned would remain even once the FCA has exercised its powers under this Bill. This risk is separate from the wider risks and impacts on markets that would materialise if the Government had not introduced legislation under this Bill, and it is this potential residual risk that these amendments seek to address. I appreciate noble Lords’ interest in this important issue and I reassure them that the Government are committed to looking at it and, if necessary, providing industry with any reassurance it needs. But I will now turn to the two fundamental reasons why we are unable to accept these amendments.
First, critical benchmarks such as Libor are widely used in a diverse range of products and contracts across the economy, so any action of the kind proposed in this amendment would affect a wide range of individuals and businesses. This must be taken into account before determining whether and how to act. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, have described, this would impact people outside the financial services industry.
Secondly, these amendments would intervene directly in private contracts, restricting the ability of contractual parties to seek legal redress were they to disagree with the imposition of synthetic Libor. I am sure that noble Lords agree that any such interference would need to be carefully considered and designed to be as narrow and targeted as possible while achieving the intended effect. It is therefore critical that the Government consider to the greatest extent reasonably possible the full range of Libor-referencing contracts and the impact any legal provisions, such as the ones proposed in these amendments, would have on parties to these contracts before deciding how to proceed on this issue.
For example, I am concerned that Amendment 45 would provide wide legal protection to parties using the revised benchmark against all forms of claim or causes of legal action associated with the exercise of the FCA’s Article 23D(2) power, as opposed to a more targeted form of legal protection. I have not yet been convinced that such a wide-ranging legal protection is appropriate, and it could have serious and significant unintended consequences.
For these reasons, the Treasury published a consultation specifically on this matter on 15 February, which is currently open for responses. This will allow us to properly consider these issues with the benefit of feedback from a broad range of Libor users. As the consultation is still open, I cannot say at this stage whether the responses provide evidence that a provision of this nature is necessary, or how such a provision should be structured, but I reassure noble Lords that the Government take this matter very seriously. Guided by the evidence gathered through this consultation, the Government will be well placed to decide if an intervention along the lines that these amendments intend is appropriate. I therefore ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords for taking part in this debate; I think all have supported my Amendment 44 on continuity of contract, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, expressed some concerns in relation to Amendment 45, which dealt with safe harbour.
It is worth re-emphasising a point made by my noble friend the Minister: we should not confuse what happened with the Libor manipulation scandal—which was dreadful and affected not just the London market but the New York and other markets—with the reasons for withdrawal of Libor. As my noble friend has said, these were much more technical reasons regarding the suitability, durability and stability of Libor as a benchmark going forward. It is a more technical issue than harking back to the fact that it had been manipulated prior to the very significant improvements in benchmark administration that came about as a result of the benchmarks regulation.