Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie for introducing this group and setting the scene so eloquently, and to my noble friend Lady Penn for speaking to her amendment. I shall speak to the amendments in my name and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for lending her support to Amendments 129, 153 and 156. They follow on neatly from the other amendments about which we have heard. The Bill requires the Government to publish a report before the introductory regulations are brought into force to bring in the reserve powers, but it covers only how the financial interests of savers will be affected and the effect of the regulations on economic growth.

The purpose of my Amendment 129 is to set out additional items to be covered in the report, to ensure that the Government properly and comprehensively assess the impacts of any future regulations, such as, for example, the functioning of workplace pensions markets and impacts on the market of assets to be mandated and other requirements. What I am proposing in Amendment 129 is to test whether the Government have done enough to justify using such a drastic power. I am also suggesting, taking up the point of my noble friend Lord Younger, that the first report should be in less than five years: the first report should be after two years, because a lot of damage could be done in the first two years and even more damage could be done if there is no report for five years.

Amendment 156 continues on this theme, looking at a different part of Clause 40 for these purposes. Amendment 153 says that there should be a review, as I have mentioned, which should take place within at least two years, in addition to a review within at least five years. While the review in the Bill allows for mandation to be in place for five years before the Secretary of State must review its impact, I believe that that is too long and that it could potentially allow for negative effects to set in under the regulations under the Bill for affected default schemes. Taken together, Amendments 153 and 156 bring forward the review of regulations to take place within two years after those regulations have been in force, as well as after another three years to stop any further damage being done. We set out here what those reviews should look at

“the functioning of the market for Master Trusts … what effects the measures have had on that market … what effects the measures have had on the markets for qualifying assets”,

and so on, as set out in these amendments.

I hope the Minister will look favourably on these amendments, particularly since there is a mood on this side to coalesce around a review within the first two years.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group raise important issues. I hope that none of them will be necessary, because I hope that we will have got rid of the power from the Bill, so these will become irrelevant details. I have Amendment 130 in this group, which would modify the mandation power by removing new Section 28C(15). This subsection “overrides any provision” of a trustee or scheme rules that conflicts with the mandation power. Thus, if the scheme had been set up with investment parameters that, for example, ruled out investing in private equity, and the Government then specified private equity, the wishes of the employer expressed in the scheme’s governing documents would be completely overwritten. Since there is no requirement in the Bill, as I understand it, for the Government to specify more than one asset class, it is quite possible that the Government could specify a required asset class that conflicted with things that had been deliberately set up when the scheme was set up.

I can understand, of course, why the Government want to encourage pension schemes to consider investing in alternative asset classes. I do not think you will find much resistance to the concept of investing in alternative asset classes. But I simply cannot understand why the Government think they should have a power to force schemes to invest in a particular way, if a conscious decision has already been made not to invest in that asset class. The Government might not agree with that decision, but I hope we do not live in a world where the Government can simply ignore the clearly expressed wishes of those they govern. I hope that we still live in a free society. Subsection (15) seems to me to extend the powers of the state too far, and we ought not to go along with it.

Great British Energy Bill

Debate between Baroness Noakes and Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 51 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I also have four other amendments in this group. One of my concerns about the Bill is that Great British Energy is the last in a long line of unelected quangos, which have precious little parliamentary oversight and weak accountability processes. All the amendments in this group in one way or another seek to increase the role of Parliament, and thereby go some way towards remedying the accountability deficit that exists in the Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has already reminded the Committee, the Constitution Committee has called out Clause 5 as being disguised legislation. I agree with that. I do not agree with it in relation to Clause 6, which I will explain when we get to that clause. The important thing is that this underlines the need for strong parliamentary processes around Clause 5.

Amendment 51 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is important. If the Secretary of State delays setting out his strategic priorities, the company, Great British Energy, will be left rudderless and may start to spend taxpayers’ money in ways that are not in line with what the Secretary of State wishes to prioritise. Alternatively, a less generous perspective is that the Secretary of State might delay issuing the statement of strategic priorities in order to delay laying it before Parliament and thereby exposing it to public scrutiny.

There is no unanimity even among the green lobby as to what would amount to a good use of taxpayers’ money under the Great British Energy banner. Some of the things that the Secretary of State might choose to prioritise may well horrify some of the climate activists. We might expect nuclear to be one of those examples. The Secretary of State could probably get Great British Energy to act in accordance with his wishes without going through the Clause 5 process by using—or more likely, threatening to use—the Clause 6 power of direction, which we will debate later. He could thereby sidestep public and parliamentary scrutiny for quite some time.

Whichever analysis is the correct one, it is clearly important that we ensure that there is a public statement of priorities as soon as possible. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, generously allows for six months after the Act comes into force. I could easily argue for less time, but six months is good enough for today’s debate.

On the question of timing, I also note that in Clause 3 there is no time limit for the Secretary of State to lay his statement after he has prepared it. Amendment 51 concentrates on a time limit for the preparation of the statement, but similarly does not have a time for when it has to be laid before Parliament. That is another defect in this clause that we will need to seek to remedy on Report.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has already referred to some of my amendments. Amendment 119 is another way of making sure that the strategic priorities statement is pursued quickly. It allows Clause 5 to come into effect immediately after Royal Assent, but the rest of the Bill cannot come into effect until the statement is laid before Parliament. Importantly, that means that Great British Energy could not make any practical progress until the statement of strategic priorities had been dealt with in accordance with Clause 5.

Amendment 52 tackles a different problem, namely the toothless involvement of Parliament in the statement of strategic priorities. As we have heard, under Clause 5 the Secretary of State merely has to lay a copy of that statement, or any replacement statement, before Parliament. That is it. Parliament has no say whatever. My Amendment 52 gives each House of Parliament 40 sitting days to resolve not to approve it, and in that event the Secretary of State has to withdraw it and have another go. That is the procedure adopted, for example, in relation to the national procurement policy statement published under Section 13 of the Procurement Act 2023. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has suggested, it is probably the lightest of the parliamentary procedures that are available to give Parliament some opportunity to challenge the Secretary of State’s priorities.

The amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, is in similar territory but would require the Secretary of State to table a Motion. It does not, however, specify what that Motion might be or the consequences if the Motion were not agreed. There could be other formulations for parliamentary oversight of the strategic priorities. The important point is that it should not be a “take it or leave it” situation when Parliament is given the statement of strategic priorities. Parliament is entitled to some substantive involvement in the priorities.

My Amendment 128 is a companion amendment to Amendment 52. It is similar in structure to Amendment 119 so that the commencement of the Act after Royal Assent, other than in relation to Clause 5, would be delayed until 40 sitting days had passed. That would ensure that GBE could not be operationalised until Parliament had had an opportunity to consider the statement of priorities. That is a belt-and-braces addition to Amendment 52.

Lastly, my Amendment 58 in this group is also intended to enhance Parliament’s oversight of Great British Energy. Under Clause 5(8), Great British Energy’s articles of association have to ensure that GBE will publish its own strategic plans and act in accordance with the statement of strategic priorities. My Amendment 58 goes further and would require GBE to send a copy of the plans to the Secretary of State, who then has to lay them before Parliament. It is clearly insufficient for Great British Energy simply to upload its strategic plans to its website. There needs to be a formal communication of those plans to Parliament. That is all that my amendment is aimed at, and I hope that is not controversial.

The broad thrust of all the amendments in this group is effective parliamentary engagement. The Minister might not like the detail of the amendments, but he ought to subscribe to the notion that effective parliamentary engagement in the work of quangos is necessary. I hope he will see that the parliamentary involvement allowed for in the Bill falls short by some way. I am sure the whole Committee would be delighted if the Minister were to take this issue away and bring forward government amendments to achieve proper recognition of the role of Parliament in Great British Energy’s scrutiny. If he is unable to do that, I am sure we will need to return to this aspect on Report.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I will speak to Amendments 53 and 90 in my name. Before I do, I lend my support to the two authors of the other amendments who have spoken. In particular, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on his amendment and on setting out the problems of Clause 5.

I am a fan of the National Wealth Fund. I have been watching the Norwegian series on BBC Four, which ended at the point when Norway set up its sovereign wealth fund with the proceeds from oil and gas in the North Sea. I could not quite understand why we did not do the same when we were receiving all the profits that we did. We have fallen behind Norway in living standards in that time.

The points from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about the relationships of GBE and its ability to raise funds, were very well made. Previously in Committee we have questioned what its relationship to the National Wealth Fund will be. This goes to the heart of what the national transition plan for the National Wealth Fund will be. We keep hearing that there will be a transition plan, but I would be interested to know what that plan will be and what its relationship with the National Wealth Fund and GB Energy will be.

When will we see the sector-specific road maps for the five priority sectors? Will they be in the impact assessment or come at a later stage? Some clarity in this regard would be good, as well as some greater engagement at this stage between investors, both those of the National Wealth Fund and GBE, to raise these new funds, and to have local authorities develop projects and propositions which are investable as well. I lend my support to the amendments in this group in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend Lady Noakes.