Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Thursday 8th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, it is evident that everyone around this House who has participated in the discussions on the Bill in effect wants the private patient and other private income to be of benefit to and contribute to institutions whose primary focus, not just their duty, is to public patients. That is what we have all been trying to achieve and it is a matter of finding the right words. Actually, I was going to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that I quite liked her Amendment 220. The amendment might not have the right wording but it encapsulates exactly the principle that we are trying to get into the Bill. The amendment is admirable.

I do not have any problem at all with Amendment 218A, which is about accounts, because foundation trusts already produce very detailed accounts in order to indicate to Monitor how near or far they are from meeting their existing private patient cap, which is carefully monitored. Those sorts of accounts are already there. The only difficulty is that accounts, being made up by accountants, do not always reflect which service line is supporting another service line. Therefore, I am not quite sure that requiring this great detail will do quite what the opposition Benches hope. However, in principle, I see nothing wrong with the amendment.

It is worth while remembering all the time during these debates that we are talking about a situation where the vast majority of hospitals—apart from a handful of internationally renowned specialist hospitals in London and the suburbs and in one or two other cities outside—have a private patient income of about 2 per cent. That is not likely to change very much. However, we need to add something that is reassuring because we all understand the anxieties out there. Amendment 220BZB, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, is an excellent solution. The change to a 5 per cent limit during the year means that there will be no great energy thrown at changing this area, which is the most important thing. We want the board of the hospital and the governors to focus on public patients. If they have some other income coming in from private activity, that is fine, but we do not want them suddenly to throw a lot of energy at it. Therefore, I think that 5 per cent is about right. I know that some foundation trusts have asked for 10 per cent, but 5 per cent is fine.

Requiring hospitals to warn everyone in advance what they are going to do is also helpful. I seek reassurance from the Government that that will still protect the confidentiality of plans, because I know that trusts have expressed anxiety about that. However, I cannot see any problem with it.

The reason that I prefer the amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to Amendment 220C is because his amendment involves the governors. Crucially, they are the people responsible for the institution, whereas Amendment 220C involves the much wider membership—often 10,000, 12,000 or 20,000 members. That is just too unwieldy a group to be seriously involved in the governance of an organisation. They are vital people in getting local communities to be involved in and have knowledge about the hospital but they would not be the right people when it comes to these sorts of changes.

I support much of what the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has said, but I am attracted to the Government’s amendment, which solves the problem that we are all looking for a solution to.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, this has been a good and constructive debate on NHS foundation trusts. It is right that we should focus on the removal of the private patient income cap, as I am acutely aware that that is where the majority of noble Lords’ concerns lie.

We need to focus on one core point at the outset. Fears have been expressed that removal of the cap could see foundation trusts increasing private income at the expense of NHS patients—in other words, that it could create a two-tier NHS, with those who can afford to pay going to the front of the queue. That is wrong and, I believe, alarmist. There are robust safeguards in place to prevent that kind of outcome.

Allowing a foundation trust to generate more private income does not release it from its prime duty to its NHS patients. Foundation trusts will still have to meet their legally binding contractual obligations on waiting times and provide the highest standards of care for NHS patients. Foundation trusts themselves are very clear about that. Removing the private patient income cap would allow them to bring extra investment in infrastructure and leading-edge technology to benefit NHS patients. Today, foundation trusts can be prevented by the cap from treating private patients who wish to be treated at the trust even when the income that the trust would earn would support its NHS services. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was absolutely spot on. The cap leads to the ridiculous situation where NHS consultants are forced to get into their cars to drive to independent providers to perform private patient work in their non-contracted hours. Removing the cap would improve clinical safety for all patients in NHS hospitals, because doctors would be more likely to remain on site for longer.

It may well be, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, pointed out, that most foundation trusts will not be affected at all by the removal of the cap. Many of them are earning below their caps at the moment. It is worth noting that NHS trusts, as distinct from NHS foundation trusts, which are not subject to a cap at all, are not earning proportionately more than corresponding foundation trusts. The point is that removing the cap gives the most innovative organisations the opportunity to boost income for NHS services.

I can also assure the House that we have put in place substantial safeguards to protect NHS patients. NHS foundation trusts will remain first and foremost NHS providers. Their principal legal purpose, to treat NHS patients, has been in legislation since 2003. I tabled an amendment in Committee to clarify its legal meaning. A foundation trust’s principal purpose requires it to earn the majority of its income from the NHS. That is very different from saying that 49 per cent of the work of foundation trusts will be with private patients, as some have misinterpreted it. The Bill does not mention 49 per cent, as I hope the noble Baroness is aware. Amendment 220A would remove the clause. That would be most unfortunate, because its effect would be to leave governors and local communities unclear that foundation trusts must remain predominately NHS providers.

There have been worries that the internal governance of foundation trusts will not be strong enough to exercise the requisite control in that area. I hope that I can provide reassurance on that point. As the local community's representatives, it is the responsibility of the governors to hold the board to account for its management of the trust. The governors should also consider whether the level of private activity is in the best interests of their organisation. The Bill will ensure that governors are better able to do that. It strengthens their arm by giving them new powers to hold directors to account and, if necessary, to remove the chair and non-executives of the board of directors. It would be entirely appropriate for the governors to use these powers if they felt that non-NHS activity was not operating in the interests of NHS patients.

At this stage, I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for setting out a very persuasive case for adding to governors’ powers to oversee a foundation trust’s private income. I have tabled an amendment, which I hope will address his concerns, requiring directors to detail in the trust’s annual plan—that is, the forward look—any proposals to earn private income and the income that they expect to receive. By law, directors already have to take into account governors’ views in preparing this plan, but this amendment would place an explicit duty on governors to consider the plan and be satisfied that any proposals to increase private income would not significantly interfere with their foundation trust’s principal legal purpose to treat NHS patients.

With regard to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, a plan to increase private income substantially—that is, to increase by 5 percentage points or more the proportion of total income earned from non-NHS activity—must secure agreement by a majority of governors in a vote. For example, governors would be required to vote where a foundation trust planned an increase in non-NHS income from 2 per cent to 7 per cent or more of its total income, or from 3 per cent to 8 per cent or more. To make it quite clear, the vote would be triggered by plans for large increases in non-NHS income. Other matters, such as significant transactions, are for foundation trusts to decide. These proposals would complement the amendment that we introduced in Committee to require directors to explain in a foundation trust’s annual report how private income had benefited NHS patients.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Tuesday 6th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, this is a disparate group of amendments. I support the principles that underline Amendments 164, 165 and 166. The Bill has been amended since the Committee stage and may address some issues, and that is one of the difficulties when we discuss competition, collaboration, integration and co-operation. We will have yet another amendment later today or on Thursday from the Government on the duty of co-operation that will further strengthen the role of Monitor in regard to these issues. That, I think, will meet some of the arguments.

My feelings are consonant with those of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. I am furious at some of the debates in the press about whether we are marketeers or pro-NHS. In fact, the vast majority of people in this House steer a course in order to do what is in the best interests of patients in terms of competition, collaboration and integration. I acknowledge that many of us must feel the same as the noble Baroness in her frustration about that.

The intervention of my noble friend Lord Adebowale was helpful in that it reminded us of how competition has worked in mental health services and substance misuse services. For many years collaboration between organisations to deliver services in both acute care and for long-term conditions has been helpful. I have no difficulty thinking of dozens of situations where commissioners have decided to commission services in areas where there has been collaboration between a group of service providers. They may involve social care services, residential care homes being run independently and so on. Commissioners might seek to put together an improved ortho-geriatric service especially for people with multiple disabilities in later life. There are examples of successful collaborative services which have been competitively tendered for. However, I do not want to take up the time of the House at this stage by mentioning too many examples.

I have a question to ask of the Opposition in relation to Amendment 163BA. This is the first amendment in the group, and perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, could help me in one respect. I am not quite clear whether this amendment would return Monitor to the position it is in now—where we would continue with the two-tier system of foundation trusts and other trusts with a simple economic regulator for foundation trusts—and would rule out the rest of the new economic regulation functions. If it has that effect, it would seriously wreck the main purpose of the Bill. However, I may well be reading it incorrectly, so before I decide which way to go, I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, could reassure me that that is not the purpose of the amendment.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there is a clear purpose to Part 3. It is to strengthen sector regulation of healthcare in England by building and improving on Monitor’s existing role as the regulator of foundation trusts. It does that in three main ways. First, it makes clear that Monitor’s overriding duty would be to protect and promote patients’ interests. Secondly, it makes sector regulation more comprehensive by extending Monitor’s remit to all providers of NHS services. Thirdly, it makes sector regulation more effective in realising benefits for patients; for example, by monitoring the NHS Commissioning Board setting fairer prices for NHS services. Fair pricing is important for a whole host of reasons: to strengthen incentives for improvement, to enable better integration and to reduce the risk of cherry picking.

I shall deal with a simple point. Monitor will continue as the regulator of NHS foundation trusts. The Bill makes that crystal clear in Chapter 1. However, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for highlighting the need for greater clarity on what intervention powers Monitor would have over foundation trusts on an enduring basis as against what would be transitional. I shall say more about that when we come to debate his amendments in a later group.

Before going on, let me address Amendment 167 from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on the specific issue of patients’ rights to refuse consent for treatment in the NHS. I can absolutely assure the noble Lord that these rights must be protected and nothing in the Bill would change that.

Returning to Part 3 and the role of Monitor, its overarching duty will be to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of healthcare while maintaining or improving quality for the benefit of patients. I underline those last words. This is the single overarching purpose for which Monitor would carry out all its functions, including its continuing functions under the NHS Act 2006 as the regulator of foundation trusts. Monitor’s overarching duty is clear, unequivocal and focused on improving outcomes for patients. I stress that point since as this is its guiding principle for resolving potential conflicts, there is no need to separate Monitor into two organisations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, proposes in her amendment. I suggest that she has raised an issue that in reality is not a substantive one.

Let me briefly address Monitor’s role in ensuring that where there is competition in the provision of healthcare it operates in the interests of patients. We will have an opportunity to consider this issue in more detail later. Decisions on whether and when to use competition will be a matter for clinical commissioners. As I have already said, there have always been private and voluntary providers in the NHS. Anyone who reads Part 3 will see that it does not create markets for NHS services, despite what some others have said. This is not the same Bill as that which was debated in the Committee of the House of Commons in March 2011. It has changed significantly as a result of amendments tabled by the coalition in response to the NHS Future Forum.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, I have added my name to four of the amendments in this group and I am wholly content that the Government have addressed them satisfactorily.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, for their comments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has said more or less what I was going to say. It seems to me that if you remove price setting from the regulator of healthcare, you do not have an economic regulator. From my experience of watching prices and types of funding formula go up and down over the past 20 or 30 years, it is crucial and admirable to remove it into a system that can be independent and transparent.

As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, says, after the Future Forum amendments, we have a system now whereby the shape of the tariff and the bundling systems, if you like, which will enable the sort of integration and co-ordinated care to be effective, will be firmly with the national Commissioning Board, and Monitor will respond to those design structures. I think that working together will be very healthy indeed. I do not underestimate the difficulties of getting it right; it is an ongoing developmental programme. Nevertheless, I think it is a good way forward. I do not like the idea of removing the price setting from Monitor.

I will briefly say that I am quite attracted to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. One cannot not be if one wants value for money. I remember seeing the noble Lord’s face when he first realised that there was going to be no competition on price, and having a good deal of sympathy for where he was coming from. However, the matter is one of transition, and of when the public will feel confident that the way that the Bill intends to introduce competition on the basis of competitive tender will improve quality.

I worry about the response that the media could make to a significant change of this kind, even though I agree with the noble Lord that some services—as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said—are overpriced and that there are opportunities for driving down these prices. That may come through the way that the national Commissioning Board and the regulator together set prices. After all, the price of a tariff will be a moving thing; it will be negotiated; it will change over time; and we will be able to address areas where there is obvious overpricing. I am attracted to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and it may be that eventually we will need to introduce something of the sort. However, I would be nervous of doing it at the moment in this form, even though it seems quite sensible.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the case for regulating prices for NHS services is strong. Many academics agree that competition should be on quality and not price and that this will increase the standard and quality of healthcare services and protect patients’ and taxpayers’ interests. This requires prices to be fixed. Therefore, it is vital that there is an effective system of price regulation that can deliver these improvements and help sustain a universal and comprehensive NHS, free at the point of use. However, a number of problems with the current system have been identified, including by the previous Administration, which mean that it is not as effective as it could be.

In particular, I will mention two things. First, prices are subject to potential political interference. This means that providers are more risk averse. That inhibits investment and innovation in the sector. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, the methodology for setting prices is not transparent. This makes the system unpredictable—again, inhibiting investment and innovation. Secondly, prices can be inaccurate and may not always reflect best practice models of clinical service delivery. This may result in cherry picking and may hinder providers from expanding and improving quality. Therefore, the case for change is clear and compelling. The Government’s vision is for an independent, fair and transparent system of NHS price regulation that reflects best practice and extends the scope of the tariff when it is in the interests of patients; that ensures that competition is based on quality and choice, and not on price; and that addresses the problems of cherry picking. To deliver this vision, prices will continue to be regulated through a national tariff. This will build on and improve the system of payment by results—which the previous Government said that they would improve but failed to do so.

Perhaps it would be helpful for me to explain in a bit more detail how the Bill will support this vision. In other healthcare systems around the world—for example, in the Netherlands—Governments have delegated price setting to independent organisations. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, cited another example: that of Germany. Such bodies create a transparent and stable environment for pricing.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord’s final point.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, this has been an extremely valuable short debate on Part 4. I hope it will be helpful if I explain briefly why I feel that the provisions of this part of the Bill are so important.

They are very much part of our overall vision of modernisation and improvement to meet the needs of changing circumstances: changes in demands, in resources and in innovation. They are about ensuring that foundation trusts are accountable, transparent and autonomous in the way they operate so that they can innovate and provide high-quality and responsive patient care.

Part 4 of the Bill will reform the legal basis of foundation trusts to bring them in line with the new system of sector regulation. Protecting patients’ interests will be at the heart of the system and we will strengthen the governance of foundation trusts to ensure that this happens. We are also taking steps to ensure that all trusts become foundation trusts as soon as they are able. This will mean that all patients can benefit from services provided by organisations that put them first and provide high-quality, accessible care. It will also mean that all NHS providers would be able to take their own decisions on organisational change, such as mergers, acquisitions and separations, based on what is best for patients.

To ensure the best use of taxpayers’ money and the continued delivery of high- quality services, we will make the financing system more transparent and rules-based. Foundation trusts will be required by Monitor to report separately within their accounts their NHS and private-funded income and expenditure, increasing transparency about whether private patient activities are making a profit or a loss. We intend that foundation trusts should decide matters such as which partners they will invite to appoint their governors and how best to equip their governors with the skills they need for their role. Foundation trusts should develop their own good practice to ensure that their governors have the training they need and build up close working relationships with the board of directors so that governors have the information they need to hold the directors to account on behalf of the members whom they represent: the public, staff and patients.

I understand the intention of my noble friend Lady Williams in proposing that the NHS Commissioning Board should appoint a governor to each foundation trust, but I agree with my noble friend Lord Mawhinney because I believe that the right kind of close partnership working between foundation trusts and their commissioners can be achieved in a whole lot of ways and that trusts should be able to develop this relationship in the way that best works for them. To mandate an arrangement such as the one that my noble friend proposes would not be the right way to do it. I also quite agree that it is important for the provision of integrated services that foundation trusts should work closely with their partners in local authorities and other healthcare sectors. However, again, foundation trusts should be free to set up the most effective ways of doing this, including executive and professional collaboration. Similarly, we would not want to prescribe governor attendance at all parts of the directors’ board meetings. It is for foundation trusts themselves to decide how to deal most effectively with discussions and decisions on sensitive and confidential matters so that the trust’s interests are best served.

I also feel strongly that it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to become involved in the approval of mergers and separations of foundation trusts. Foundation trusts are themselves best placed to decide what will work well for their patients and staff, and to involve the Secretary of State would be to add an extra layer of bureaucracy for no good purpose, in our view.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, seek to preserve the current position where foundation trusts can be subject to terms of authorisation applied by Monitor and, if they fail to meet their principal purpose, they can be de-authorised and returned to central control. The obvious point to make about this idea is that it would be incompatible with our proposal to repeal NHS trust legislation once the foundation trust programme has been delivered. The more deep-seated objection is that these amendments would depend on an infrastructure which we propose to replace with a comprehensive new regulatory system. There would be no obvious body to manage the performance of reverted NHS trusts, including measures for dealing with providers at risk of becoming unsustainable. We have looked at this from a different angle. Our proposed system would shift the emphasis from maintaining the existence of an unsustainable provider, often at great cost to the taxpayer, to ensuring continuity of essential services to local populations. That is surely what matters. It is surely right for the system to be geared towards continuity of service provision.

A further amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, proposes that abolition of NHS trust legislation and repeal of Monitor’s authorisation powers should not happen before 2020. We are taking a stronger, more testing and more transparent approach than before to managing the foundation trust pipeline, and we expect the vast majority of NHS trusts to become foundation trusts by 2014. This would give patients a clinically and financially sustainable NHS provider system, by definition, because otherwise the trust would not have been authorised as a foundation trust. I am afraid that the noble Baroness’s amendment would not support the change in momentum and mindset that is now evident within the NHS. I very much agreed with the cogent points raised on that topic by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, quoted the HSJ saying that some foundation trusts plan to make major reductions in staffing. I have not read my HSJ this week yet but I think that foundation trusts themselves are best placed to make decisions about how to provide services efficiently and effectively, which includes ensuring that they have the right levels of staff. What matters are those services. It is always regrettable if front-line staff posts are reduced, but if the service can be maintained in as good a way or better, that is surely what should matter in the end.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

Thank you very much indeed. I just want to comment briefly on the amendments on licensing. Some of them are asking quite a lot of the licensing procedure, but there may be other mechanisms that achieve what they want to achieve. I am sympathetic to people’s desire to add these conditions, but I think that it is important to see the licensing arrangements as part of the system, in conjunction with registration with the CQC. It enables Monitor to approve the compliance arrangements to achieve good governance and the information requirements needed to monitor that the organisations are delivering the right standard of care.

The threat of licence revocation enables Monitor to pick up at an early stage the problems of quality and finance which other people have spoken about. Obviously the providers will be very concerned to hold on to their licence, which seems to be a very powerful and potent tying-in of organisations to the ethos and objectives of the NHS. We must be very careful not to regard the licensing process as something within which to impose too many conditions, but as a basic framework that ties the licensees into the system. That is particularly important when organisations start to go wrong. We will discuss later how they are rescued from those predicaments. However, it seems to me that this creates a basic level playing field, and that it would be a mistake to use that process to do much more than tie everyone into the basic system. It sort of replaces the old authorisation process on compliance and quality that was operated by old Monitor, but it is a way of going forward as new organisations come into the NHS as providers of NHS services. I just wanted to add those comments because I think that these amendments might be adding a bit too much to the responsibilities of the licensee.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, licence conditions will be the mechanism through which Monitor will be able to prevent potentially anti-competitive behaviour and enable service integration, where this is what commissioners want. Monitor would also use licence conditions to collect the information it would need to set prices, and to help identify at an early stage—at an early stage—if a provider was at risk of financial distress. If that was the case, it could work with the provider to address potential problems, as well as supporting commissioners to ensure continuity of services. I completely understand the concerns in that area.

First, I think that I need to make clear that all providers of NHS healthcare services will be subject to the requirement to hold a licence. This includes providers of primary medical services, which is the question posed in Amendment 279A. Furthermore, where a provider is providing services that carry a requirement to be registered with the Care Quality Commission, that registration will be a prerequisite to being granted a licence by Monitor. We all want to see close operational links between Monitor and the CQC. The Bill emphasises this by placing duties of co-operation on both organisations, not just in matters such as information sharing, but also in the development of the joint application mechanism for providers seeking registration from both bodies.

We are also clear that regulation must be proportionate, and impose the minimum of additional burdens on those being regulated, while still safeguarding the interests of patients and the public. To that end, the Bill makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations establishing an exemptions regime, so that licensing can be targeted towards those parts of the health service where there is the greatest need for regulation. While we are clear that there must be an exemptions regime, we also recognise the importance of making sure that we get the scope of it right. To that end, we are already committed to consulting fully next year on our proposals for the exemptions regulations. Noble Lords may also be aware that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House has recommended that the first set of exemption regulations should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. We agree, and both Houses will have the opportunity to debate them before they come into force.

The Bill provides for Monitor to attach conditions to licences. While the Bill sets a framework for the scope of those conditions in Clauses 95 to 97, we are clear that it will be for Monitor itself to develop the detail as the sector regulator. The intention is that the conditions will support Monitor in exercising its functions and that Monitor will be best placed to know how they should be framed to achieve that. Therefore, including large numbers of mandatory conditions on the face of the Bill, as some noble Lords have suggested in certain amendments—for example, Amendments 283, 285ZA and 287A—would undermine the Monitor’s independence, which we do not think is desirable if it is to be a robust and vigorous sector regulator.

Nevertheless, I would like to reassure the Committee that there will be proper oversight of Monitor’s proposals for conditions. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State will have the power to veto the first set of licence conditions. We are clear that Monitor must be able to operate freely and autonomously within the legislative framework established by the Bill. We have built in reasonable checks and balances through requirements for key products, such as the licensing criteria and conditions, to be subject to approval by the Secretary of State. Although I understand entirely the reasoning behind amendments tabled by noble Lords which would increase the level of the Secretary of State’s involvement in provider regulation—for example, Amendments 281A, 282A and 282B—regrettably, I feel that these go a step too far in limiting Monitor’s independence.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked me quite a number of questions to which I feel I should write in response. In particular, however, she asked whether Monitor will have the role of resolving disputes and whether all disputes would go to court. The answer to both of those questions is no. The NHS standard contract already provides for contractual disputes to be resolved through arbitration and this will not change. Licence holders have to agree special conditions or modifications to conditions. If the provider disagrees and Monitor then wants to proceed, it must refer the matter to the Competition Commission for consideration.

My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke to Amendment 281A. I want just to comment briefly on that. The amendment would increase the minimum length of notice period during which representations could be made following publication of a notice of proposed exemptions. I am grateful to my noble friend for that. The Bill is clear that the notice period should be not less than 28 days. It could therefore be much more than that, and our expectation in most cases is that it will be. But there will be times when the Secretary of State needs to act quickly, so being locked into a notice period of not less than 90 days could be detrimental to a particular provider or group of providers.

My noble friend Lady Williams spoke to two amendments, Amendments 287EA and 287EB, where the purpose is to ensure that licence conditions on providers of NHS services restrict the income they can earn from private patients and the number of private patients they treat, as well as that funds provided for NHS care are not used to subsidise private treatment offered by foundation trusts, with various conditions attached. I understand my noble friend’s concern about this. However, the amendments would be impractical, and in particular for licence holders who are not NHS bodies they would be highly undesirable. Foundation trusts’ principal purpose—we will come to this in a later group of amendments, when we discuss the private patient income cap—is to provide goods and services for the NHS in England. It means that they must earn most of their income, over 50 per cent, from NHS services. We are tabling a government amendment to make it clear that the majority of every foundation trust’s income will continue to be from NHS service provision. Foundation trusts must comply with their principal purpose or they will be breaking the law. They could be at risk of successful legal challenge if they fail to meet their principal purpose. We are tabling a second government amendment to require foundation trusts to show in their annual reports how income earned from private activities has impacted on the provision of NHS services. Using NHS income to subsidise private patient work would lead to foundation trusts breaching the NHS constitution. The Government also gave a commitment that foundation trusts will have to produce separate accounts for their NHS and private-funded work.

Finally, I want to mention briefly the amendments that will fall to me to move in relation to licensing: Amendments 280A, 281B, 284A to 284C, 285A, 286B, 287C and 287D, and 288A to 288F. These are without exception minor tidying-up amendments to improve the drafting or clarify meaning, and I hope that the Committee will accept them when they are moved. I hope, too, that the Committee feels reassured by my explanation of how we envisage licensing to operate and that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw her amendment.

Health: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Wednesday 17th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right. We have been working with the breathe easy groups and the British Lung Foundation to ensure that the good work that they are doing, along with that of the newly appointed strategic health authority respiratory leads, will improve outcomes for those with COPD and asthma. I agree with him fully that this is a very good example of the big society in action.

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, patients with COPD are classically those who do not get access to palliative care services at the end of life. Will the Minister tell us what the Government will do to improve the access to palliative care of patients with COPD and other chronic conditions at the end of life?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that an enormous amount of work is going on with palliative care services, and a great deal of money is being directed towards them. I share her concern that hospices tend to focus above all on patients with cancer, to the detriment of those with other conditions. This is an area that we are looking at very closely.

Mental Health

Debate between Baroness Murphy and Earl Howe

Wednesday 10th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to address mental health factors in their public health agenda.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, mental health is recognised as an integral part of public health. The public health White Paper will set out a new approach to public health, giving mental health the same prominence as physical health conditions such as cancer and heart disease. The Government recognise that there is no public health without public mental health.

[Baroness Murphy]

I thank the Minister for that encouraging reply. Of course, he will recognise that there is a long way to go. Some 50 per cent of all smoking related deaths in this country are attributed to people with mental disorders, and in fact those with mental illnesses account for almost half of all the tobacco consumed. People with schizophrenia and other mental illness have by far the worst outcomes in terms of mortality, losing on average 20 years of their lives. Will there be specific targets in the forthcoming White Paper around the physical health outcomes in terms of mortality and morbidity of those with serious mental disorders?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, yes. We know that people with severe mental illness die on average 20 years sooner than others and that the majority of these deaths are smoking related. Improving public health is at the core of the Government’s health policy, as I expect the noble Baroness is aware. We will make clear our priorities in this area when the public health White Paper is published.