Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today for their contributions on these important issues. As I have already made clear, I will keep my comments limited to the amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical and/or operational workability concerns.

On that basis, I will speak about Amendments 118 and 118B. Amendment 118, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, could prevent a person from accessing assistance where there is no clear connection between their individual circumstances and the crime that their close relative is under investigation for or has been convicted of, even if the said crime took place some years in the past. Amendment 118B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would expand the meaning of “close relatives” to include “friends”. It is not clear who would determine the meaning of “friends” in this context. I should also say that disclosure of personal data engages Article 8 of the ECHR and is regulated by the principles set down in the Data Protection Act. Detailed financial assessment of those connected to a person seeking assistance is likely to interfere with the privacy of those individuals, particularly where there are no signs of coercion. The necessity of doing so is difficult to assess in the round rather than considering this on a case-by-case basis.

I turn to Amendments 222 and 612, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. Amendment 222 proposes a new clause to oblige the Secretary of State to provide specialist psychological assessment and support for persons considering an assisted death and their families. It would also oblige the Secretary of State to establish bereavement support services offering psychological support before an assisted death to all persons concerned. The Bill does not require families to know about an assisted death in advance, so requiring the offer of psychological services to them could create an undeliverable obligation on the Secretary of State.

Amendment 612 would mandate the video recording of a person being assisted to end their own life. The amendment would also require the person to confirm in the video recording their identity, their wish to die of their own free will, their capacity and that they are acting without persuasion or coercion. The amendment would require that this recording is sent to the coroner within 72 hours of death and it would create a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State concerning the practical arrangements for the recording, storing and transmission of the recordings. Requiring that a person’s death be video recorded where they did not wish the event to be recorded could risk being a significant intrusion into their family and private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Since the Bill includes several safeguards, this intrusion is unlikely to be considered justified, and this amendment could also raise GDPR issues and concerns.

Amendment 460, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, specifies a range of actions the panel must take into account when considering a person’s psychosocial and safeguarding circumstances. It includes a requirement to offer immediate access to safe housing and financial support where abuse is disclosed. As the Bill is drafted, neither the panel nor the commissioner is provided with such a function and it is not clear how this would interact with local authority responsibility for housing provision.

As for the other amendments in this group where I make no detailed comments, although they may be deliverable, some would be challenging to implement. For example, Amendment 47 would require assessing doctors and the panel to assess a person’s state of mind or private thoughts. Amendment 58 would require an assessment of indirect structural disadvantage, including poverty or lack of care. Although I raise specific workability issues with only a small number of amendments in this group, noble Lords will be aware that the other amendments in this group have not had technical drafting support from officials. The issues raised by these other amendments are rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider and decide on, but I note that the way in which they are currently drafted means that they may not be fully workable, effective or enforceable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, in this debate we heard deeply personal information from the noble Lords, Lord Empey, Lord McCrea, Lord Watts, Lord Polak, Lord Griffiths, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Shinkwin, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Hayter and Lady Grey-Thompson. I express my profound respect for people being willing to share in that way. I make it clear that in nothing that I say do I in any way intend to disrespect any of what must have been quite difficult statements to make. I really treasure many of the things that have been said, whether for or against the Bill.

As all noble Lords engaged in the debate know, at the heart of the Bill—there is no dispute about this—the decision to have an assisted death has to be where the patient, to quote the Bill,

“has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and … has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.

There is no dispute in the Committee that there have to be appropriate and sufficient safeguards to ensure that there is no coercion.

The current safeguards in the Bill are as follows: first, a doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Secondly, a second doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Thirdly, a panel has to assess that the person is not being coerced. Fourthly, the first doctor—after a period of reflection, in signing a second declaration by the patient—has to be satisfied again that the person is not being coerced. Finally, the doctor providing the assistance has to be at the last moment satisfied that the person is not being coerced.

The two doctors who give the certificate at the beginning must both have had specialist training in domestic abuse, including training on identifying coercive control and domestic abuse, and including identifying the effect of financial control. The panel considering the matter must consist of a psychiatrist, a social worker and a senior lawyer. If either of the two doctors have any doubt about the position in relation to capacity, they have to consult a psychiatrist. Anybody who by dishonesty, coercion or pressure induces the patient to either execute a declaration that they want an assisted death or take the assistance is guilty of a criminal offence. If all that the person does by dishonesty, coercion or pressure is to induce the person to execute a relevant document, the maximum sentence is 14 years. If, on the other hand, if they induce the person to take their own life, then the maximum sentence is life.

The question before the House in this debate is whether those protections are adequate to ensure that there is not coercion. I have before me a number of amendments. Amendment 3 is proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay: she would like “independent” to come before “decision”. I wholeheartedly agree with her that the decision must be independent, in the sense that it is a free decision made by the person, unpressured or coerced in the way that I have described. I am always influenced by what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, says in relation to that; he said, “Reassure us”. There is no dispute between me and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that it has to be an independent decision. Is it clear enough in the Bill? With the deepest respect to both the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I point out that it specifically says that the person should have

“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and … not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.

With respect, I say that it is clear enough on the face of the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 45, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, which would insert “encouraged” in addition to “coerced” and “pressured”. I have thought very carefully about this, and I am against putting it in. The reason is that I see the reality: somebody who is thinking about an assisted death will want to talk frequently to those who love them. They may want to talk to the multidisciplinary team which is looking after them. Let us suppose somebody says, “I really, really want to go now. Should I take that opportunity?” If somebody says, “I encourage you to make the decision that is best for you,”, what the noble Baroness is proposing is that that becomes a criminal offence, potentially imprisonable for 14 years or for life. To me, that does not seem sensible.

I turn to Amendment 46. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asks for “influenced” or “encouraged” to be added. I have dealt with “encouraged”. With regard to “influenced”, the multidisciplinary team or the person’s loved ones may well—with the best motives—influence somebody to go ahead with it. I do not criticise them for that if that is what the person wants and if it helps. It seems to me, again, wholly inappropriate to go beyond “coerced or pressured”.

On Amendment 47, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, suggests that it should be “external or internally” pressured that one is concerned with. We can understand external pressure—that is, somebody pressurising someone else to do it, and pressure carries with it an inappropriate degree of influence—but how does one in practice deal with an analysis of what would make me, for example, want my life to end? My noble friend Lady Merron also referred to that. The pain, the lack of dignity, the sense that I am not the person that I was in front of my own children is internal pressure. It might include me thinking, “I do not want to go on with this; in part, I’ve only got two or three weeks to live, and I want it to end”. The internal pressure is making me come to that conclusion. It is impossible to ask people, in particular the law enforcement authorities, to investigate what is going on in my mind. I have thought very carefully about that. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, that I have given each of these amendments very careful thought, because they are important, but, again, I do not think that is a practical solution.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure it would be expected that safety is absolutely paramount. The point I am making—and I look forward to hearing from my noble and learned friend—is that our position in government here is not to deal with matters of policy. As I have said, we are restricted to areas to which any Government would be restricted.

We will absolutely work with the Welsh Government, NHS England and the NHS in Wales to understand the impact of any changes to the law and the provision of healthcare services in Wales, during the coming stages of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I make a declaration of interest: I have an assistant who is funded by Mr Bernard Lewis and who helps me on this Bill. I make a declaration that Dignity in Dying paid for the printing of the material that was circulated to Peers in my name before this process commenced.

I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on the short way that she introduced the important issue. I very much hope that I can put to rest most of the misconceptions that were expressed during this debate.

As everybody agrees, criminal law is not devolved to the Welsh Senedd. Therefore, any change in criminal law has to come from the UK Parliament. You cannot proceed with assisted dying without changing the criminal law. Therefore, the UK Parliament has to provide a legislative change for that.

Healthcare is rightly devolved to the Welsh Ministers and the Senedd. The Bill makes provision in England for Ministers to produce regulations on how assisted dying will be implemented and regulated in England. Clause 42 requires Ministers to produce such regulations. It is wrong, as part of the devolution settlement, to require Welsh Ministers who are responsible for health in Wales to do that. It is for the Welsh Government to decide what provision to make. Unlike Clause 41, which relates to England, Welsh Ministers are given the option to introduce such regulations as they see fit. Those regulations will permit the assisted dying process to be introduced in Wales, in the National Health Service, and for Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government to provide whatever provision for it in regulations that they see fit.

The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, asked why we are legislating for England and Wales but not Scotland at the same time. It is because we are doing exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked me to do—and I am so glad he did—which is to respect the devolution settlement. Will the noble Lord let me finish? Then I will come back to him.

The way this structure works is that, first, we in this Parliament determine whether the criminal law should be changed. Secondly, the Welsh Government are given the power to introduce regulations. That power should normally be given to Welsh Ministers by an Act of the Senedd. Therefore, a legislative consent Motion has been proffered by the Welsh Government for the Senedd to decide whether it would be willing to give us consent to legislate in an area that would normally be legislated for in the Senedd.

The LCM—legislative consent Motion—in the Welsh Senedd covers the following. I give these details for noble Lords to consider them at their leisure: Clause 40, which gives Welsh Ministers power to issue guidance; Clause 42, which gives Welsh Ministers power to regulate how this is to be introduced in the health service in Wales and with what regulations; Clause 51, which gives the Welsh Government power to talk about and make regulations about the Welsh language; Clause 54, which gives them a general power to make regulations; and Clause 58, which gives the Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government power to introduce certain of the provisions.

The sponsor in the other place and I have discussed this arrangement with the Welsh Government, and by that I mean Welsh Ministers and Welsh officials. We have done what the Welsh Government would wish us to do to respect devolution. We have taken these powers in the Bill, subject to Parliament, so that there is not a position where, after this Bill is passed, Welsh Ministers lack the power to introduce regulations if they choose to do so.

I have listened to this torrent of points about Wales saying it has not been thought out. I say with suitable humility that we have thought it out and sought to reflect what good devolution practice would require. I do not invite people to come back, but please think about what I have said and consider—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the insightful contributions that have been made to this debate. I will be very concise on the point. In summary, it is our view that workability concerns are less significant, although the Government are unable to confirm at this stage that the current drafting is fully workable, effective or enforceable. As noble Lords will understand, the amendment has not had technical drafting support from officials.

On this point, if the amendment is passed in isolation, it is likely to have minimal legal effect, as Clause 1 is essentially declaratory rather than operative. The remainder of the Bill would refer to the capacity to make a decision, which, as noble Lords will be aware from the Bill, is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

I anticipate coming later to discussions on amendments to Clause 3, as noble Lords have referred to, as those amendments would change the operation of the Bill. I will comment on proposals when we come to the relevant debate. These issues are, of course, rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider, deciding which test is to be used.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:

“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.


The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—