Civil Servants: Reduction in Numbers

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I repeat that the areas that need more resource will be provided with it, and the figures I gave on passports within 10 weeks and driving licences are absolutely correct. However, there has to be recognition that new ways of working demand that we look at our workforce and decide how it is best served to deliver for that organisation—for example, in the area of automation.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend has touched on working from home and trying to reach an accommodation with civil servants in this regard. Will she give us an assurance that civil servants who are working from home are not claiming and being paid a London weighting allowance?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

What I can say to my noble friend is that the reductions will be laid out in more detail in due course. I cannot give her an answer, because I suspect that there is not one at this time.

Passport (Fees) Regulations 2022

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank and congratulate my noble friend on bringing these regulations forward. I have just one or two points of clarification. The government website states that

“There is no backlog in passport processing as a result of the coronavirus … pandemic. However, we are now seeing unprecedented demand as more than 5 million people delayed applying for passports”.


First, presumably the Home Office would have been aware that, as there were no flights, people were not travelling and a lot of cruises had also been paused, travel would resume at some time and there would be the fluctuation we are seeing. At the end of 2021-22, say, what measures did the Home Office put in place to speed things along?

I have been corresponding on my second point through Written Questions to my noble friend. I will take this moment to explain the problem. My husband and I took our first trip abroad since coronavirus at the end of March to the beginning of April. My husband has one of the new passports—I think this is called the Brexit dividend—which is blue-faced as opposed to beetroot-faced and, sadly, is not made in this country. On our return, he was delayed by half an hour because the e-gate would not accept his passport. A host of others were in the same category, in addition to those who cannot go through if their young children do not have their own passport. The border guard informed my husband that they are aware of the problem; the passport page is simply too glossy and is not being read by the e-gates. I compared it to my passport and I could see why; the former passports have stuff over the photo that prevent it from being glossy.

There are two ways around this: ask whoever is making the passport to put something on it to make it the same as the old passports; or introduce, presumably at some considerable cost, a new machine to read these passports at existing e-gates. If, when our current passports expire, we all have to replace them with the new ones, that would be a good investment, because the existing gates do not work with the new passports. I understand the chip is working perfectly well—that is not the issue. The issue is simply that the photo page is too glossy. It is driving passengers and border guards to distraction, because it is causing queues. This was a quiet day and there was a 30-minute delay.

Is my noble friend is aware of this problem? I do not believe she is, but border guards and passengers are. Could we find a compromise to make sure this is speeded up? With those two points, I support the regulations before us.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, I echo some of those points. I used the blue passport through an e-gate in Brussels, and it was fine. It depends on the type of technology and the gates they are using at individual places. This is just to clarify that point.

My second point is also for clarification. We were told that a lot of the backlog was due to people who could have applied online but did not—they applied physically and there was an overload—but I am not sure about that and would like some clarification. There clearly has to be a presence. While a certain amount of work can be done online, such as processing, security is a huge element of sending out a passport to somebody, whether a new applicant or somebody who has changed their name, as they will need hard-copy documents. Is my noble friend satisfied that there are enough people working in the Passport Office, not from home, who are present to facilitate all this?

The backlog is now becoming quite appalling. People are missing business trips, losing money on holidays and various other things. Often, that will not be covered by insurance whereas Covid may have been. Something may have been put in the insurance for that, but you will not get travel insurance to cover your passport not being returned to you, particularly when you have put it in for replacement in advance.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations, and I note that the fee amounts are the same as those prescribed by the 2018 regulations. Overall, we welcome these regulations. I start by declaring an interest in so far as my husband lives in Norway, which involves me in frequent foreign travel to the extent that I will—if I can get an appointment—have to use the Passport Office premium service when my passport comes up for renewal next year.

Secondly, in case anyone uses the Official Report as a reliable source of information, in answers on an Urgent Question from the other place on 12 May, a number of noble Lords, including the Minister, stated that EU/Schengen area countries required there to be six months unexpired on a UK passport for entry. This is not the case. There must be three months left on a UK passport from the anticipated date of exit from the EU/Schengen area, in addition to the UK passport being no more than 10 years old. I am very grateful to the BBC’s “Morning Live” for confirming this. I looked online as well, and the passport must be valid for three months from when you intend to leave the EU/Schengen area, rather than three months from when you enter. So, you should be questioned at the border about how long you are going to stay, and they will then check that you still have three months left from when you intend to leave.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

If the noble Lord will permit, is he also aware that in any Schengen area country, for example in Denmark, if a British passport is not stamped at the point of entry, you are deemed potentially to have overstayed your welcome and gone above the 90 days that were permitted, purely by the fact that you have not had your passport stamped? This is clearly stated on the Foreign Office website—I commend the Government for that—but I think that many British people are potentially falling foul of this.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I have the converse problem, in that I am running out of pages in my passport, because every time I go to Oslo, I get a stamp when I arrive and a stamp when I leave, even though, because I have applied for a residence permit—which I have yet to receive—I am not bound by the 90 days. However, we digress slightly.

Can the Minister explain what the cost of the Passport Office is overall compared with the amount of money that it generates? How much profit does the Passport Office generate, and how does the last financial year compare with previous years?

Following up on the questions raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Foster of Oxton, again in answers on an Urgent Question from the other place, the Minister was asked whether the 1,200 extra staff at the Passport Office employed to deal with the unprecedented surge in demand for passports following the end of Covid restrictions on travel were agency or permanent staff. Does the Minister have an answer to that question now? Conversely, how many permanent staff were furloughed in 2020 and 2021, when there were 3 million and 2 million fewer applications respectively than predicted?

We need to know whether the Passport Office is providing value for money for both applicants and the taxpayer. What staff cost savings were made in 2020 and 2021 when demand was low? How flexible is the Passport Office workforce in the face of fluctuating demand? Presumably, demand is higher in spring and summer and lower in autumn and winter. Are additional temporary staff employed at peak times or are permanent staff sitting around for six months of the year not doing very much?

How much more than the cost of producing a passport are applicants charged? If applicants pay for a premium service that the Passport Office cannot deliver within the advertised timeframe, is the premium fee refunded?

I very much welcome the introduction of a booking fee for a priority service that is not refundable if the scheduled appointment is not cancelled by the applicant 48 hours or more in advance. Slots are limited—or, at the moment, non-existent—and applicants need to be incentivised to keep their appointments. However, I question whether the whole fee should be forfeited if a prospective passport holder fails to attend an appointment for their application to be administered under the priority services without giving prior notice. I understand that the Passport Office could have made a considerable profit were the applicant to have attended the appointment but surely the cost of producing the passport should be refunded to the applicant—that is, the profit element should be retained but the cost element that is no longer incurred by the Passport Office should not. In other words, if the person does not turn up, they will not be issued with a passport, therefore the cost of producing that passport is not incurred by the Passport Office. The additional fee for a premium service should therefore be forfeited but surely the cost of producing the passport should be returned to the applicant. Can the Minister say what the fixed and marginal costs are in the case of a missed appointment for a priority service?

We acknowledge the various fee waiver and fee reduction aspects of these regulations for specified groups, as well as the discretion to retain deposits and fees dependent on individual circumstances, but, as with all Home Office services in relation to the UK border, the question remains as to why the Home Office uniquely must be self-funding. With so many more people who require a passport other than our Armed Forces, diplomats and government Ministers having to travel abroad, whether on business or to support vulnerable relatives, for example, why is almost everyone charged a much higher price for a passport than it costs to produce it? I look forward to the Minister’s response, either now or subsequently in writing.

Licensing Act 2003 (Platinum Jubilee Licensing Hours) Order 2022

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2022 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move the instrument before the Committee today to extend the licensing hours in recognition of Her Majesty the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee. I am asking the Committee to support the instrument to extend licensing hours on Thursday 2 June, Friday 3 June and Saturday 4 June. Section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003 allows the Secretary of State to make an order relaxing opening hours for licensed premises to mark occasions of

“exceptional international, national or local significance”.

The Government consider the Platinum Jubilee to be such an occasion. This will be a period in which we celebrate Her Majesty the Queen’s incredible service and remarkable dedication, and many people will want to gather with their family and friends and raise a glass to mark this historic milestone.

The extension will apply to premises licences and club premises certificates in England and Wales, which license the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises. These premises will be allowed to remain open until 1 am without having to notify the licensing authority and police via a temporary event notice, as would usually be the case. Premises that are licensed to provide regulated entertainment will be able to do so until 1 am on the nights covered by the order, even where those premises are not licensed to sell alcohol. This includes, for example, venues holding musical events or dances as well as theatres and cinemas.

The order does not extend to premises which sell alcohol for consumption off the premises, such as off-licences and supermarkets. Premises which provide late-night refreshment, which is the supply of hot food or hot drinks to the public, between the hours of 11 pm and 5 am, but do not sell alcohol for consumption on the premises will not be covered by the order; such premises will only be able to provide late-night refreshment until 1 am if their existing licence already permits this.

The Home Office conducted a public consultation, which ran for a month and concluded on 26 January this year. The majority of respondents agreed with the extension for the three-day period and that it should apply to England and Wales. The consultation also received responses from numerous trade organisations, which were supportive of the extension of licensing hours. The National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Local Government Association and the National Association of Licensing and Enforcement Officers were all in agreement with the proposed extension to licensing hours for Her Majesty the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee.

I am sure the Committee will support this order to help celebrate a special and historic moment in our national history. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on bringing forward the order, which I entirely endorse. It recognises and reflects that there is a willingness, as we come out of the pandemic, to celebrate such an auspicious occasion. It has been a particularly tough time for the hospitality sector over the last two years or so.

I refer briefly to my chairmanship of PASS, the Proof of Age Standards Scheme, where I work closely with the hospitality sector. Not having to pay the TEN fee, as referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum, will be very welcome in saving not just the fee but the time that would have had to be spent.

I have one hesitation. I am sure my noble friend will be aware of the agent of change issues that have been flagged up. She will be aware that we are just concluding a follow-up report to our previous Select Committee inquiry on the Licensing Act 2003. I am not yet at liberty to say what our recommendations will be because we have not yet concluded that, but there is an issue where there may have been a recent application for an outlet in the hospitality sector to open its doors in an area that has previously been primarily residential. Is that something that both the Government and those acquiescing to these licences will be mindful of, given that it will be, as my noble friend said, a four-day bank holiday? That is my only reservation. Otherwise, I entirely endorse the order.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. If ever there was an occasion of exceptional national significance, surely it must be Her Majesty the Queen’s Platinum Jubilee. Therefore, we are generally supportive.

However, my concern is over the fact that the Government listened to the consultation that was run and, according to what they have published:

“Out of the 74 respondents, 58 agreed that the extension should only apply to on sales”,


not to off-sales. As a consequence, this instrument does not apply to off-sales.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

72: Clause 76, leave out Clause 76

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to Amendments 72 and 74, and I congratulate my noble friend on the honour of being appointed a privy counsellor. It is richly deserved, and we can all bathe, I hope, in reflected glory. I look forward very much to hearing from my noble friend how her Amendment 73 will impact, and possibly supersede, my Amendments 72 and 74.

Before that, however, I want to raise my concerns about the new powers included in Clauses 76 and 77, which raise a tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources. I do not disagree that there may be circumstances in which unnecessary costs arise, but it is a very dangerous precedent to set that a First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal may—as I understand it, for the first time ever—charge the participant. Without going into the details, which I am sure the House is familiar with, I will briefly set out my concerns, those raised by the Law Society of Scotland, and those of the Select Committee on the Constitution in its report published as House of Lords Paper 149.

In the view of the Law Society of Scotland, the reason that Clause 76 is “problematic, unnecessary and unacceptable” is that:

“The First-tier or Upper Tribunal is to be given powers to charge a person exercising rights of audience or rights to conduct litigation if that person is found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently. Under current statutory”


law—for example, the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980—

“and common law powers professional regulators have sufficient powers to deal with matters of professional discipline such as improper or unreasonable conduct. It is inappropriate that the determination of negligence should be included in the clause when that is properly the province of the civil courts. Furthermore, we note that any amounts charged under this clause for negligence are to be paid to the Consolidated Fund rather than to the client who may have suffered as a result of any alleged negligence. This appears to be a form of”

backdoor

“taxation rather than compensation for negligence.”

Through these two small amendments, I would like to understand better the thinking with which the Government have drafted these two clauses. Amendment 74 is consequential on Amendment 72, simply leaving out Clause 77 if the House was minded to remove Clause 76.

I am delighted to say that the House of Lords Constitution Committee, in its report of January this year, also quoted the Law Society of Scotland and said in paragraph 94:

“There is at least the potential that these new rules could discourage legal representatives and immigration advisers regulated by the office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, as well as applicants, from raising or engaging in legitimate proceedings.”


I would like to think that this was not the intention behind the government thinking, but I would very much like to hear reassurance from my noble friend the Minister that this is indeed the case.

To conclude, in the view of the Law Society of Scotland this clause is “unnecessary”; there are already existing statutory and common law powers for the appropriate regulators to deal with such issues as “matters of professional discipline” following existing complaints procedures; and it is therefore

“inappropriate that the determination of negligence should be included in the clause when that is properly the province of the civil courts.”

I also set out the Law Society of Scotland’s and my objection to the fact that this would be

“paid to the Consolidated Fund rather than”

towards reimbursing

“the client who may have suffered as a result of any alleged negligence.”

With these few remarks, I beg to move. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Baroness McIntosh of Pickering for explaining her amendment. Government Amendment 73 is a technical amendment to Clause 77. It does not change the policy; it makes a minor revision to the drafting of subsection (1) of Clause 77 to ensure that it matches the rest of the clause in only making provision in relation to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This change will prevent any uncertainty arising about the jurisdictions in which this clause should be applied, and it gives the Tribunal Procedure Committee complete clarity about how to approach drafting the rules to enact these measures.

I turn now to Amendments 72 and 73. The Government are committed to making the immigration and asylum system more efficient, while also maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. To achieve this, we need all representatives involved in these proceedings—whether they are acting for the appellant or for the Home Office—to play their part in ensuring that appeals run smoothly. Representatives do not just have a duty to act in the best interests of their client; they also owe duties to the courts and to the public interest, which include acting with integrity, upholding the rule of law and supporting the proper administration of justice. We are aware that there are concerns about the behaviour of some representatives in immigration proceedings, which can waste judicial and tribunal resource and lead to delays in the tribunal process. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours which have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. These have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules through, for example, abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications. As with the current costs orders regime, the policy will apply equally to the representatives of both parties—in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. This will include the Home Secretary when represented by presenting officers. To further ensure fairness, the paying party will be able to make representations before any order is made, and the tribunal retains absolute discretion as to whether a charge should be made in each case.

As I explained in Committee, tribunals can currently make wasted and unreasonable costs orders which relate to the legal costs of the parties. However, these mechanisms are generally only considered at the request of the other party and are infrequently employed. Clause 76 creates a new power for tribunals to order a party to pay an amount which represents a portion of the tribunal’s costs which have been wasted as a direct result of that party acting unreasonably, improperly or negligently. This power applies across all tribunal jurisdictions and is subject to the Tribunal Procedure Committee making rules for its application in a particular tribunal. It will allow the tribunal to make an order in relation to wasted tribunal resources in the same types of circumstances which would currently warrant a wasted or unreasonable costs order. An order can be made against “relevant participants”: this means legal and other representatives exercising rights of audience, and the Secretary of State where they are a party and do not have legal representatives. I hope that this goes some way to reassuring my noble friend.

To encourage increased consideration of whether to make costs orders, Clause 77 provides a duty on the Tribunal Procedure Committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This will lead to judges more regularly considering whether to make a wasted costs order, an unreasonable costs order or a tribunal costs order under the new Clause 76 provision. This will ensure that circumstances and behaviours which have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. While the requirement in Clause 77 is for the TPC to make rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, it is at the committee’s discretion to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate. Specifically, Clause 77 requires procedural rules which identify circumstances or behaviours which, absent of reasonable explanation, the tribunal will treat as warranting consideration of the making of a costs order. The rules thereby introduce a presumption that requires the representative, or other relevant party responsible for such circumstances or behaviour, to explain themselves and why such a costs order should not be made. This will ensure the regular consideration of costs orders by the tribunal. More importantly, however, the tribunal will retain absolute discretion as to whether to make an order in all cases.

Noble Lords have asked whether this will mean fewer representatives willing to take on immigration work. The Government think it right that representatives should explain themselves if they are responsible for circumstances to be set out in the rules as warranting consideration of a costs order. However, where there is a reasonable explanation, no order would be expected. The tribunal continues to have full discretion as to whether to make the order. Therefore, these changes should not impact legal representatives who fulfil their duties to the court, remain committed to their work and ensure justice for their clients.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why these changes are being made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and not in other jurisdictions. Obviously, the Nationality and Borders Bill as whole is focused on reforming the asylum system. Clauses 76 and 77 are part of a programme of reforms designed to streamline immigration and asylum appeals. There has been judicial concern, and a recognition that a problem exists with the behaviour of some legal representatives and other relevant parties in immigration proceedings. It is at the discretion of the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate.

For the reasons I have outlined, I hope that my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down: I asked a specific question as to why the money raised will be paid into a consolidated fund. I listened carefully and I do not think I heard him respond on that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I will have to come back to the noble Baroness on that point.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken. I detect the mood of the House is not to support these provisions but the hour is late, and we have a lot more business to come, so am reluctant to test the opinion of the House. At this stage—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry for interrupting, but I have just been informed that the answer to the noble Baroness’s question is that it is standard practice.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am most grateful. If that is the case, I am surprised that the Law Society of Scotland is not aware of that, because it certainly did not respond in that regard.

I am grateful for the opportunity to raise my concerns. I would like another opportunity at some future date to pursue this further, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

83: After Clause 78, insert the following new Clause—
“Fees
(1) Section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (9), insert—“(9A) Notwithstanding subsection (9), in setting the amount of any fee in relation to registration of British citizenship the Secretary of State—(a) must not set that amount at a level beyond the Secretary of State’s estimation of the administrative costs of the function to which the fee relates,(b) must have regard to the need to promote British citizenship as the nationality of all persons connected to the United Kingdom and British overseas territories citizenship as the nationality of all persons connected to the British overseas territories, and(c) may have regard only to—(i) the costs of exercising the function,(ii) fees charged by or on behalf of governments of other countries in respect of comparable functions, or(iii) any international agreement.” (3) After subsection (10), insert—“(10A) Fees regulations must provide that no fee is to be charged for—(a) the registration of any child who is looked after by a local authority, or(b) the registration by statutory entitlement of any person to correct any historical legislative unfairness.””

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to move Amendment 83. I say at the outset that I shall neither speak to nor move Amendment 84. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for their support for this amendment.

The attraction of this amendment is that, after this matter was raised in Committee, it marries together two separate ideas—one pressed so eloquently by a long-standing campaigner on these issues, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and the other by me in a separate amendment. I say how delighted I am that we have the support of the Constitution Committee of this House in its HL paper 149 of January this year. Paragraph 15 states clearly:

“Clause 1 provides that a person is entitled to be registered as a British overseas territories citizen if a number of conditions are met. This clause corrects the historical inability of mothers to transmit citizenship. It is unclear what fees will be charged for registration applications under this clause and similar provisions”


in later clauses. It goes on:

“In a recent case the Court of Appeal held that a fee of £1,012 for certain registration applications by children was so high as to be unlawful.”


In paragraph 16, the Constitution Committee therefore requests:

“The Government should clarify its intentions on the amount of fees to be charged under clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7.”


Amendment 83 deals specifically with Clause 1. In the amendment, we state that no fee can be set above the cost to the Secretary of State of registration and that the cost must be set having regard to the vital importance of rights to citizenship by registration, securing the shared connection of all British persons; can be set only having regard to the specified principles; must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of

“any child who is looked after by a local authority”;

and must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of any person under a statutory provision specifically intended to correct past legislative discrimination or injustice that had wrongly excluded that person from citizenship.

It is clear from the Explanatory Notes—I entirely endorse this—that the purpose of Clause 1 and the whole of Part 1 is to correct a historical wrong, saying:

“This clause creates a registration route for the adult children of British Overseas Territories citizen … mothers to acquire British Overseas Territories citizenship”.


The wrong is that:

“Before 1 January 1983 children could not acquire British nationality through their mother. While registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify this issue for the children of British citizens (section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981), this was not changed for children of”


British Overseas Territories citizens.

I am sure your Lordships would agree that charging £1,012 for a child and £1,126 for an adult to be registered as a British citizen is prohibitively expensive when the cost to the Home Office of registration, as estimated by the Secretary of State, is only £372. It could lead to many in this position not seeking registration because they cannot afford the fee. I ask my noble friend the Minister to tell us, in summing up the debate, where people—particularly children but also adults—will be expected to find the fee.

The remaining £640 in the case of a child, and more in the case of an adult, is money raised by the Home Office from the process that these British children and adults must go through to secure their citizenship rights. I do not know whether that is an unintended consequence of the way the fees are structured, but it does not seem fair to me.

In the case of PRCBC and others v SSHD, in February 2021, the Court of Appeal emphasised that for many

“children of a single parent on state benefits. it is difficult to see how the fee could be afforded at all.”

In its judgment handed down on 2 February 2022, the Supreme Court emphasised that these findings are not disputed. The court has similarly emphasised the importance of citizenship to a person’s identity and sense of belonging, and to their capacity to fully participate in social and political life. The Supreme Court Justice ruled that this a political decision, and I put it to the House this evening that it is now for us to rise and respond to the challenge and make sure that, as this is a matter of policy that is for political determination, we put it right this evening.

In conclusion, this is a very modest amendment. It seeks simply to remove the power to use the function of registering British people’s citizenship to raise money to pay for the immigration system and to restrict any fee that is charged to cover the estimated costs of registration. It does this by amending the powers in Section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 to clearly distinguish rights to be registered as a British citizen from the many and diverse Home Office immigration functions to which those powers also apply. These people have lived their whole lives in this country and essentially have nowhere else to go. I do not believe that it is right that this fee should cause a barrier to them obtaining full citizenship, which, in my view, is their right.

As I said earlier, the amendment also precludes registration fees being charged in two specific cases. Local authorities should neither be charged nor discouraged from acting to secure the citizenship rights of British children whom they are looking after. Further, where a right of registration is provided to correct this historic injustice in British nationality legislation, the only fee should be to cover the process of that application.

With those remarks, I hope that this amendment will find the favour of the House and not just of those have who co-sponsored it, thereby correcting a historic injustice and ensuring that those who are entitled to this will actually be able to afford it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for tabling these amendments. I welcome her to the noble band of terriers who have been snapping at the Home Office’s heels on the issue whenever the occasion arose.

In Committee, the Minister, who to be fair is new to the issue, tried some of the old, discredited arguments. Notably, he referred to the

“sustainability of the system and fairness to the UK taxpayer.”

When challenged, he acknowledged that the system to which he referred was the migration and borders system. Once again the Home Office is conflating citizenship with immigration. We still await a convincing reason as to why children who were born or who have grown up in this country should be subsidising the migration and borders system. Moreover, the distinction between this group and taxpayers is simply not valid, as the children’s parents are already taxpayers and the children will be in future and may already be paying indirect taxes.

The Minister also tried to reassure us that there are a number of exceptions to application fees which protect the most vulnerable, including young people who are in the care of a local authority and applying for limited or indefinite leave to remain. However, the exceptions apply only to leave to remain, and when challenged he accepted the distinction between citizenship and leave to remain, saying:

“There is no arguing about that at all.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 469.]


When challenged again later, he assured me that he would not try the argument again today. Now that both he and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, have accepted that that argument will not wash in this House, and the importance of citizenship has been a thread running through the debates on the Bill, I hope he will not attempt to use the argument again this evening.

In Committee, the Minister also promised to write in response to a number of questions on the best interests review, for which we have been waiting, like Godot, for a good year since the Court of Appeal ruled that the current fee is unlawful because of the failure to take account of the best interests of children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. I am grateful to him for the letter, although I found it a bit confusing. However, as the noble Baroness said, at least we now have the Supreme Court judgment, which did not dispute the best interests finding, and the Minister’s letter confirmed that the best interests Section 55 review will be published. My understanding is that it will be published by early May. Can he confirm that and say whether it will include a race and disability equality assessment? Can he also give an assurance that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the review report?

It is difficult to believe that a fee of over £1,000 is in the best interests of any child who has to pay it, given the evidence of the insecurity, alienation, exclusion and isolation it can cause, as noted by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court judgment found that, best interests aside, as the noble Baroness said, it is for political determination to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion in setting the fee level. The Bill gives us the opportunity to so determine politically.

Noble Lords have frequently cited the former Home Secretary Sajid Javid, who described the fee as “huge”. Less well known is that, just shortly before becoming the current Home Secretary, Priti Patel also questioned the level of the fee, according to a Times report, and indeed the Minister accepted that it is “a lot of money”. We have an opportunity this evening—or rather, this morning—to end the long-standing injustice created by this huge fee that has served to exclude thousands of children from their right to register as citizens. I hope we will take it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for tabling Amendments 83 and 84, concerning the fees that may be charged in relation to registration of British citizenship. Please be in no doubt that we recognise the strength of feeling on this subject, which I know is of particular importance to my noble friend, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I say at the outset that the Government recognise that the acquisition of British citizenship is a significant life event and offers particular value to those able to obtain it, particularly children. All noble Lords agree with this point and have observed it.

Apart from allowing a child to apply for a British citizen passport, British citizenship gives them the opportunity to participate more fully in the life of their local community as they grow up. It also offers specific practical, legal and intangible benefits, including the right to vote on reaching adulthood, of course, and the particular sense of identity and belonging that results from knowing that the country that you have grown up in is your own.

Please let me also reassure the House that the Government are actively considering fees in this space. Following the Court of Appeal judgment in the case brought by the project for the registration of children as British citizens last year, the Secretary of State committed to reviewing the fee in line with her duties under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. While I recognise that the House has been very patient, waiting for the outcome of that review as though waiting for Godot, it is the Government’s view that it was important to allow the Supreme Court to give its view on the questions raised by a separate ground in this case, which considered fundamental questions around whether the powers that underpin the setting of fees had been lawfully applied, before concluding that work. Following the Supreme Court judgment of 2 February, the Secretary of State is currently considering her policy response to the review, and I hope to update the House by early May. I cannot give a specific date.

Furthermore I reiterate that, as regards the new routes introduced by the Bill to correct instances of historical legislative unfairness, it remains the Government’s intention not to charge in instances where there has been historical unfairness and/or discrimination. This is in line with our approach to other instances of historical unfairness, where waivers and exceptions were introduced in fee regulations, as is appropriate for provisions of this nature. The Government are currently exploring options in this regard for the routes introduced by the Bill. I hope that this reassures my noble friend to some extent.

However, it is important to consider the legislative history of the fee-setting regime, and the intent that has underpinned it. Since the establishment of the current nationality regime in the British Nationality Act 1981, registration of British citizenship for those who either have an entitlement under the provisions of that Act or who are applying on a discretionary basis under Section 3(1) has been contingent on payment of a fee. Current fee-setting for British citizenship is underpinned by the powers set out under Section 68(9) of the Immigration Act 2014 which, as the Supreme Court has affirmed in its recent judgment, were explicitly authorised by Parliament and empowered the Secretary of State to set fees at a level that reflected the costs of exercising the function, the benefits that accrue to an applicant as a result of acquiring that British citizenship, and the wider costs of the borders and migration system. Parliament also explicitly authorised the maximum amount that may be charged in relation to an application for British citizenship registration at £1,500, through the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016, which sets the framework for the current fees set out in secondary legislation.

The wider application of these principles and the powers to set immigration and nationality fees have underpinned the Government’s policy over the last decade of moving the borders and migration system to an increasingly self-funded basis, reducing the reliance on the UK taxpayer. Accordingly, fees across several routes, including nationality, have increased to support those broader funding objectives.

However, it is important to be clear on the role that these fees play in supporting the essential work of the border and migration system and particularly in funding the critical activity that supports and safeguards the interests of the people in the UK. These activities, which include ensuring that the UK’s borders are secure from threats and illegal activity, the effective operation of resettlement schemes to support those who are in greatest need and the management of a visa system that attracts the best and brightest to contribute to the UK’s prosperity, are essential to the delivery of the department’s wider mission and objectives.

Any reduction in income from fees must therefore be considered in terms of its impact on these activities, with the likely result being that activity in those areas will be reduced or income must be recovered through other means. This funding includes support for front-line operations that keep the country safe. A need to secure funding through other means may impact on fees for economic routes where the department’s objective is to attract visitors and skilled individuals to support the UK’s economy, which in turn benefits all those who live in the UK, or it will place an increased reliance on the taxpayer to fund these activities, which may in turn reduce the funding available for other important government work.

As such, there is a complex balance of considerations that the Secretary of State must take into account when setting fees, and, in line with the charging powers established by Parliament through the 2014 Act, these have informed the current fees structure. Fees charged are kept under review, as they are in other countries, and, as I have stated, there are ongoing considerations regarding fees charged for citizenship registration specifically, the outcome of which we will share in due course.

Additionally, I emphasise that elements of the amendment, such as the requirement to except fees for children in local authority care, although of course well intentioned, would more appropriately be set out in fees regulations and should not be introduced in primary legislation. In addition, it is not appropriate for a duty to have regard to the need to promote British citizenship in primary legislation that is setting fees. I therefore request that the noble Baroness withdraw her amendment for the reasons that I have outlined.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am humbled by the level of support expressed in the House this evening and outside the House from the Law Society of Scotland, the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens and Amnesty International UK. I pay tribute to the long-standing work of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the support that I received this evening from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. Very seldom do the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I agree, but on this occasion I am delighted to have her support and that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and others. I am particularly pleased to welcome the support of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, who speaks with great authority on these matters. As he described it, the Government are going in the right direction, but I argue that, this evening, I do not believe that they have gone far enough. Therefore, regrettably, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 83.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the circumstances in which British citizenship may be removed were keenly debated in Committee. This group concerns a narrower issue: whether it should be possible to remove someone’s citizenship without giving them notice of it at the time and, if so, in what circumstances. Clause 9 struck me as so problematic that, in Committee, I tabled a stand part notice; that is echoed today by Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. In Committee, I asked the Minister to take Clause 9 away and challenged her, if she could make the case for such an extraordinary power, to come back with a version of it that is far more limited in scope and subject to proper safeguards and accountability.

The Minister responded to that challenge as positively and wholeheartedly as I could have hoped. I pay tribute to her, to her fellow Minister, Tom Pursglove, to the Bill team and to those at the Home Office and in agencies with whom I have discussed these issues—and I pay no less tribute to the NGOs and individuals who have impressed on me the dangers of Clause 9. The result, after what I think I can fairly describe as very considerable movement on the part of the Government, is the first six amendments in this group, together with Amendment 85, which concerns commencement. They have been pulled into proper shape by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, and I hoped that they could be tabled last Monday as government amendments, with my support, but an extra day was needed to conclude our discussions, so they appear under my name. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for adding their support.

These amendments achieve four important things. The first is a far more restricted range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld. The original Clause 9 would have allowed the Secretary of State to withhold notice whenever that appeared to her to be in the public interest. Amendments 15 and 16 remove the subjective element and provide that notice may be withheld only if the Secretary of State does not have an address for service, or if she reasonably considers it necessary on one of the four exceptional grounds specified in Amendment 16.

Let me illustrate my understanding of how those exceptional grounds could arise in practice. A terrorist may be living in a safe house here, or more likely abroad, without realising that his whereabouts are known to the authorities. To require a notice of citizenship deprivation to be served on him at that address would reveal to him that he is the object of covert surveillance, contrary to the interests of national security: proposed new sub-paragraph (i). The same may be true of a participant in “organised or serious crime”—the phrase being taken from Section 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which defines the remit of the National Crime Agency: proposed new sub-paragraph (ii). If intelligence as to location was supplied by a foreign liaison partner which does not wish its cover to be blown, notification at that address could jeopardise our intelligence relationship with that country: proposed new sub-paragraph (iv). The person in question might be, for example, with a dangerous armed group in a failed state. To require a courier to travel to such places to serve notice, at great personal risk, would be wrong: hence proposed new sub-paragraph (iii).

I do not believe that these grounds will be commonly advanced—it seems that, with a degree of ingenuity, workarounds have been found in the past—but neither, I suggest as a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, should they be dismissed as fanciful. It may be relevant that the laws of two of our closest allies are, if anything, more broadly drawn than this amendment. The New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977 allows for notice of deprivation to be dispensed with if it would be for any reason “not practicable” to serve it on the subject. The Australian Act of 2020 allows the Minister to determine that notice should not be given if it could prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia or Australian law enforcement operations.

The second feature of these amendments is to introduce powerful safeguards for conducive grounds deprivations that were entirely absent from the original Clause 9. In New Zealand, they have judicial scrutiny of these decisions. In Australia, they have regular ministerial review. Elements of both those safeguards are contained in the new Schedule 4A, which is set out in Amendment 14 and referred to in Amendments 17 and 19.

The judicial safeguard is in paragraph 1 of the schedule. If the Secretary of State wishes to withhold notice, she must apply to a superior court of record—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—in advance or within seven days. SIAC will examine her reasons and decide, applying judicial review principles, whether her assessment is obviously flawed. That is the same test that is applied to the making of terrorism prevention and investigation orders under the TPIM Act 2011. SIAC will no doubt develop similar rules to deal with it, which might, in an appropriate case, provide for the appointment of a special advocate. If she does not succeed on her first attempt or on a subsequent application, which must be based on material change of circumstances or further evidence, the Secretary of State must either give notice in the normal way or revoke the deprivation order altogether.

The review safeguard is in paragraph 2 of the schedule. The Secretary of State must consider, three times a year for two years, whether the reasons for non-notification remain valid. If, after the sixth review, she still resists notification, she must make a further application to SIAC, which will, once again, give independent scrutiny to her decision.

The twin requirements of judicial approval and regular review will place a significant burden on the Secretary of State in any case where she wishes to exercise this power. I make no apology for that. Under the Immigration Rules, as they stood between 2018 and 2021, it was easy—far too easy—not to give notice but simply to record it on the file. That path was taken in no fewer than 29 of the 45 conducive grounds deprivations, mostly related to national security activity abroad, that were made in 2019, 2020 and 2021. These amendments not only require non-notification to be a last resort on paper; they make it hard work in practice. They should ensure that, in its own interests, the Home Office will take this exceptional course only when there really is no possible alternative.

The third feature of these amendments relates to appeals. Of course, a subject cannot appeal against a notice of deprivation until he has become aware of it. But Amendment 18 provides that time for appeal will begin to run only once notice has been given. It will not, therefore, be necessary to rely on the discretion of the court to extend time for appeal in cases where deprivation has not been notified at the time.

The fourth and final feature is in the proposed new subsections 5(c) and (d) inserted by Amendment 18. Any person whose citizenship was removed without notice must be informed of that fact, with reasons and information about appeal rights, as soon as they make themselves known to the Home Office, whether within the two-year review period or thereafter; for example, this might be by seeking consular assistance or a fresh passport.

Amendment 18 has another significant and, I would suggest, highly beneficial effect. The point has been well made by other noble Lords that upstanding citizens of this country, notably dual citizens, may be anxious about the removal of their citizenship without their knowledge. Amendment 18 provides such people with a means of reassurance. They have only to contact the Home Office to be told whether this has happened or whether, as will almost always be the case, it has not.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, challenged the House to

“find a way forward on Report that takes away the genuine fear from millions of people who believe—erroneously, but they believe it—that Clause 9 as drafted and the implementation of further measures will put them and their families at risk”.—[Official Report, 27/1/2022; col. 518.]

These amendments rise to that challenge. They should ensure that non-notification is confined to those rare cases where it is truly necessary, and they are subject to strong safeguards, including regular review, judicial scrutiny and a right to be informed on request.

I come finally to subsections (5) to (7) to Clause 9, which seek to limit the effect of the D4 case by providing that an unlawful failure to notify a pre-commencement deprivation order should not affect the validity of that order. I will listen carefully to my noble friend Lady D’Souza develop her manuscript amendment to remove those clauses, but in the meantime, to assist our deliberations, I ask the Minister to give two assurances relevant to that amendment. First, will she confirm that anyone subject to a pre-commencement deprivation order will be informed of that fact if they contact the Home Office, by analogy with proposed new subsections (5C) and (5D), as inserted by Amendment 17? They would then be in a position to proceed with any substantive appeal. Secondly, will she confirm, by analogy with Amendment 18, that the Home Office will not suggest that any of these people are out of time for appeal as a consequence of the interval between the decision to remove their citizenship and the giving of notice?

If my amendments are accepted, and those assurances given, I believe that we will have played our part as a revising Chamber and achieved a broadly acceptable balance. Opinions on citizenship removal will, of course, continue to differ, but the aggravating factor of removal without notice will be strictly confined and properly safeguarded for the future, as it was not in the Immigration Rules as they stood prior to the D4 judgment of last year, and as it was not under Clause 9 as it was passed by the Commons. I beg to move my amendment and, if necessary, I will test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her support in drafting these amendments, and I hope that she will give an assurance that the Government do, indeed, support these amendments. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for addressing many of the concerns that I raised in Committee, particularly those expressed to me by the Law Society of Scotland, which was extremely dissatisfied that, in the original Clause 9, the Government had not fully justified the removal of citizenship without notifying the affected person. It asked that this clause be reconsidered, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for doing so.

Equally, in Committee, I raised the concerns expressed to me by the European Network on Statelessness in its briefing. It was very concerned that Clause 9 as drafted would

“have severe impacts on the rule of law and on a person’s fundamental rights”,

and that, as drafted, Clause 9

“disregards many of the UK’s international obligations, including the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, the obligation to avoid statelessness, and the right to a fair hearing.”

In its view, the UK Government

“has not provided any justification as to why such a restriction on fundamental rights is needed.”

I pay tribute to the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich; many of my concerns have been addressed. I support the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and support the reasons that he has given. The restrictive range of circumstances has been greatly reduced in which a citizen’s rights could be taken away. I support the powerful safeguards he set out as to why a citizen could be deprived of their citizenship, the rights of appeal, the provision that a citizen must be informed that their citizenship is going to be removed and the reassurance that he set out that could be given by condition C at that time. I support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

25: Clause 11, page 13, line 33, leave out “a refugee is a Group 1” and insert “a person is a”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures equality of treatment by removing the distinction between Group 1 and Group 2 refugees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, when I tabled these amendments, I had sought to seek a greater reassurance from my noble friend the Minister than I achieved in Committee. Obviously, I realise, given the result of the last few votes, it may be that Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others, will find greater favour with the House. However, I shall take this opportunity to set out my opposition in principle to what the Government are seeking to do here: it is not just the fact that two groups are being created, but the way in which those two groups will be treated differently.

Perhaps the most offensive provision in Clause 11 is subsection (5). The Explanatory Notes refer to it as

“differential treatment of refugees based on their group. Differences may, for example, apply in terms of the duration of their permission to remain in the UK, the availability of routes to settlement, the ability to have recourse to public funds, and the ability of family members to join them in the UK. There is no obligation for these powers to be exercised and discretion may be applied.”

The greatest difficulty that I have is that it is not clear that there will be discretion or, indeed, how that discretion will be applied.

I hate to say it to my noble friend, but I find it offensive that this differential between groups 1 and 2 has been created. In taking the two groups out and substituting the general term “person”, I draw attention to Amendment 27, which asks for “reasonable discretion” to be exercised. I believe that is the key to all the amendments before us. This comes directly from the advice that I have received from the Law Society of Scotland as to how the provision will apply, if the original clause is left unamended. It says:

“We take the view that how a person enters the UK should not impact on family reunion. Safe and legal routes have been reduced since the UK left the European Union with the removal of the Dublin III Regulation. This provision appears to be actually reducing the prospect of families using one of only the two safe and legal routes the Asylum seeker has i.e., refugee family reunion – the other being UNHCR resettlement. Fewer safe and legal routes are likely to result in more unsafe and perilous journeys.”


Given the new situation arising daily in Ukraine, and the dreadful humanitarian crisis that we see there, I hope that the Government will resist the provisions in the clause and look favourably on my amendments and think again—but I fear that perhaps the House will favour the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. I beg to move.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but we need to do a belt-and-braces job here. I am afraid we have to go back to the issue of compatibility and “Oh yes it is; oh no it isn’t.”

In Clause 11, we are introducing something entirely new. This two-class categorisation of refugees—the real refugees who came direct and the class 2 refugees who did not—is not anywhere in the refugee convention. None of that is in the refugee convention. The Government say that it is all perfectly compatible with the convention and assert that it is our right to interpret the convention in this new way, differently from the way that it has been interpreted up to now by our courts, differently from the way that the UNHCR, the custodian of the convention, interprets it in its authoritative judgment on our Bill, and differently from the way in which 146 signatory states interpret it.

We did the “Oh yes it is; oh no it is not” game at length in Committee and the Government stuck to their view, but I think it is fair to say that the Committee found it rather hard to understand the Government’s view. I wondered whether the Minister perhaps let the cat out of the bag when he told us:

“It may … be”—


to be fair, he did put it tentatively—

“that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1463.]

Tonight, we heard the Minister seeming to hint that it might be time to review the convention as if it was in some way out of date. I could not disagree more.

I refute the Minister’s contention in one word: Ukraine. Life itself—zhizn’ sama, as a Russian would say—refutes the Minister’s contention. In the world of 2022, we see these hundreds of thousands of people—now over 500,000, the UNHCR says—abandoning their homes, trudging the motorways, crowding on to the trains, fleeing the tanks and rockets, and streaming into Poland and Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova and Romania. Are they refugees? Yes, of course they are refugees, just like the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968. Are they entitled to refugee convention rights? Yes, of course they are. But if the Bill, including Clause 11, is enacted or had been enacted, any of them who wanted to come to this country could be only group 2 refugees, without full convention rights, because they had not come directly from Ukraine and could have asked for asylum in Poland or Hungary. That is even though there are no direct flights from Ukraine, and even though we say Ukrainians have to have visas to come here—although we do not issue visas to asylum seekers.

The key point for the House tonight is that there is nothing in the convention or, as I understand it, subject to correction from the legal authorities round me, anywhere in international law requiring an asylum seeker to apply in the first safe country they reach. This, the rationale for Clause 11, is a Home Office invention. The convention sets only one test: not how the refugee got here, but why. What was it that drove him to come here? Was it a well-founded fear of persecution back home? That is the question. But if Clause 11 is approved, that question or test becomes redundant and irrelevant because, no matter what horrors he is fleeing from, if a refugee did not come here directly he could be only a group 2 refugee, subject to the harsher regime, detention and offshore processing set out in all the subsequent clauses that we are also going to have to look at closely, in my view. This just will not do.

My concern is with the refugees but also for the reputational damage we do to ourselves, if we go down this road, and the practical consequences for the refugee convention. Suppose our new invention caught on and other countries started following suit. Well over 20 million refugees are in countries contiguous to their homelands—just across the border—and nearly all these countries are developing countries. Suppose the convention were in future to be interpreted by all and sundry to mean that the exiled Syrians and Iraqis must always stay just across the frontier in Lebanon or Jordan, and that the Afghans must always stay in Pakistan, but the developed world can wash its hands of these problems and leave it to the Jordans and Pakistans, because the refugees could never move on and obtain asylum elsewhere. The only places they could obtain asylum were in the Jordans and the Pakistans.

What would the consequences of that be? They would be disastrous for the first host country; there are 1.5 million people in Lebanon from Iraq and Syria, and more than that from Afghanistan in the camps around Peshawar in Pakistan. We would be saying that Pakistan and Jordan are going to be stuck with that for ever, as far as we are concerned. It would be disastrous for the refugees, too.

If this doctrine caught on—if it were the general reading of international law that first hosts had sole responsibility—anyone seeking to flee persecution would find the gates of freedom clanging shut in their face. If we leave Clause 11 in the Bill, we do not just betray our values and trash our reputation, we could kill the refugee convention, sadly, though we need it in the world of 2022 as much as ever. I propose that Clause 11 be deleted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, obviously I am disappointed that my Amendments 25, 26 and 27 have not found favour with the Minister or the House. My noble and very good friend Lord Horam said that he hoped that France and Belgium would take some of the asylum seekers and refugees back. That would indeed have been the case if we had managed to negotiate that we stayed within the Dublin III convention—so that is another source of disappointment.

My right honourable friend the Prime Minister stated yesterday in a very holy place that the UK would be very generous with Ukrainian refugees, but I regret to say that I do not hear how that is going to be applied in what I heard from the Front Bench this evening. However, I shall not press my amendments, because I believe that Amendment 28 carries more favour, so I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 25 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

25: Clause 9, page 11, leave out lines 33 to 36
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deletes the proposed new sections 40(5A)(a) and (b) in the British Nationality Act 1981.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 26 in this group and I look forward very much to hearing other noble Lords speak to their amendments in this group, which are very much on the same theme.

My amendment is perhaps a little more radical than some in this group, so, for the purposes of clarity, I am seeking to delete from the amendment to Clause 9 that was carried in Committee in the other place the proposed subsection (5A), which states that the notice to be given to a person to be deprived of citizenship, thereby notifying that their citizenship is to be withdrawn,

“does not apply if ... the Secretary of State does not have the information needed to be able to give notice under that subsection”

or if it is not

“in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country”.

I will set out my reasons for doing this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, what I think I have tried to explain today—and it will be obvious that are clearly differences between us—is that, where the highest harm individuals can rely on another citizenship, the Home Secretary has within his or her power the ability to remove that citizenship. Of course, the one citizenship that is protected is when someone is only a British citizen and of no other territory.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, this debate has been very moving in parts and extremely thoughtful, and I thank everybody across the House who contributed.

I, for one, am not unsympathetic to what the Government are trying to do. To tackle my noble friend Lord Hunt full on, I think he said that if Parliament does not accept Clause 9 then the Committee, or Parliament, will try to stop the Government from doing it. From what I have heard from the debate today, I think that is precisely the mood of the Committee and the conclusion that we have reached.

There are a number of alternative amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, have come to blows, if you like, as to the purport of Amendment 27. There are parts of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that I find attractive, in particular removing the whole of Clause 9.

White Ribbon Campaign

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Thursday 25th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The collection of data is obviously crucial. It is something we talked about a lot during the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act. I go back to the original point that the noble Baroness makes about repeated offending. One of the things we have tried to do through the Act is to stop the cycle of offending through DAPOs and other interventions and, returning to the original point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, to make men own the problem of repeated violence against women.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I congratulate my noble friend on her bravura performance last night and during the whole of yesterday. Does she recognise the figures that, in the past year, one-third of women have suffered sexual harassment and that one in eight crimes involves domestic abuse? Against that background, does she believe that the current legislation is fit for purpose?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I certainly think the current legislation is fit for purpose because noble Lords and Members of the other place helped to take it through. It is a very good piece of legislation. We said at the time that it was the start, not the end, of the interventions that we had to make to prevent violence against women and girls, but I am very proud of what we have achieved.

UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Foreign Workers

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I will not add to what I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but our departure from the European Union will not diminish the UK’s engagement with the Council of Europe. We are committed to the European Convention on Human Rights and to improving the effectiveness of its court. We are a leading player, a founder member and one of the five major financial contributors, having given €34.2 million this year. We use the Council of Europe to hold member states to their human rights obligations and deliver messages to them, in public and in private.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that foreign workers or their employers coming to fill vacancies as lorry drivers, forklift truck drivers, nannies or au pairs have to pay for their visa? Is that not proving to be a barrier to them coming to the UK, and will this be reviewed?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I do not agree with my noble friend. We do not have any shortage of people who want to come here. We do have shortages in certain sectors due to supply chain issues and we are remedying that.

Metal Theft

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

We at the Home Office carried out a review of the Act in 2017 and found that it had been effective in addressing metal theft and should be retained, but now on top of this we have the NICRP, and I hope that the combination of the two will help drive down what is in many cases the very dangerous activity of metal theft, given the types of metal that they target.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I declare an interest as I sit on the rural affairs group of the Church of England. Does my noble friend share my concern that the theft of lead from church roofs has literally gone through the roof? I know this is a matter that she takes incredibly seriously. Lead has a special significance on church roofs, as it protects many historic buildings, and the cost of the damage in rural areas of restoring and repairing the building is great. Will my noble friend use all the resources available to her to ensure that we can find out at what point this metal is entering the market? The Act, as the noble Lord said, is simply not fit for purpose at the moment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I say to my noble friend that the various measures I have outlined today have helped to tackle these types of thefts, but also the sentencing guidelines on theft highlight that, where theft is of a heritage asset or causes disruption to infrastructure, this should be taken into account when assessing the level of harm. I say to my noble friend, as I said at the beginning, that the market for different types of metal is changing and therefore theft patterns are changing. That is why catalytic converters in particular, which contain precious and rare metals, are being targeted at this time.

E-scooters

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the number of e-scooters currently being used illegally in London; and what steps they intend to take to address such use.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, enforcement of road traffic law in London is an operational matter for the Metropolitan Police, according to local policing plans. The Government will continue to support the police by ensuring that they have the tools needed to enforce road traffic legislation, including relating to electric scooters.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Does my noble friend accept that it is totally illegal to use e-scooters in public areas in London at this time, yet they are widely used on pavements, in parks and on roads, risking casualties and deaths? The law is simply not being enforced. Will she use her good offices to ensure that before the pilots start in June for rental scooters in London, the use of e-scooters—which are illegal when owned and used in public places—is properly regulated and policed as a priority, and that the law is enforced? Is she aware that as they are not currently regulated and insured, dealing with any casualties will be a drain on the resources of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I totally share my noble friend’s concerns. Of course, there are two categories of scooter: the rental scooter, which can be insured, and the privately owned scooter. It is perfectly legal to purchase them, but they cannot be insured. Trials have been going on all over the country, but I hope the trials going on in London will clarify the situation once and for all and prevent the problems my noble friend outlines.