Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Baroness Mallalieu Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I briefly support the amendment by echoing the words that have already been quoted—those of the Lord Chancellor, who said:

“access to justice is a hallmark of a civilised society”,—[Official Report, Commons, 15/11/10; col. 659.]

and those of my noble friend Lord Pannick, who has said repeatedly that access to justice is a vital constitutional principle.

At Second Reading, I regretted that the word “rehabilitation” had been replaced by the word “punishment” in the title of this Bill, and I fear that the proposed denial of legal aid to some for whom its provision is a vital part of their rehabilitation suggests that there are some in government who are allowing an uncivilised concentration on punishment to supersede their duty to protect the public. I know that this is a hybrid Bill and that Part 3 will concentrate on rehabilitation, but I wish I felt the same of Part 1.

[Baroness Mallalieu]

My Lords, I wonder whether others felt, as I did, that what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, just said was music to the ears.

Of the amendments currently tabled to this Bill, I regard this amendment as by far and away the most important, and it is one that I strongly support. It provides the litmus test of what the Government are really trying to achieve with legal aid. This part of the Bill has been presented to us as a cost-saving measure that, in today’s climate, is hard to oppose, but as it stands it is far more than that. As others have said, Schedule 5 to the Bill repeals the fundamental principles of legal aid, which appear at present in the Access to Justice Act 1999. By removing them under Schedule 5, the Government have removed their obligation to supply legal services, to make sure that they are available and to make sure that the means of accessing them are available to those in need. They are, in effect, casting away two of the most vital parts of our constitution and essential ingredients of a just society. They are, first, equality before the law and, secondly, the principle that no one should be denied access to justice through lack of means. The omission of an overarching statement of principle at the start of this Bill signals that the Government no longer wish to honour that obligation. If the obligation does not rest on the Government, it does not in reality rest, or exist, at all.