Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have not signed any amendments in this group—I was not asked, and I was not quick enough to get my name down. All of the issues have been covered absolutely amazingly by other noble Lords, so I will restrict myself to talking about the politics. The politics of this particular Bill are extremely interesting. I support all the amendments in the first group, simply because they are sensible and practical, and I like practical outcomes. But, at the same time, we ought to throw the whole clause out, and I do not see any option to do that. We want a democracy when we have finished voting on the Bill and, if it goes through as it is, we will not have one.

I will ask two political questions. First, why do we have the Bill at all? Quite honestly, it is terrible piece of legislation that is absolutely outrageous. In the 10 years I have been here, I have almost never had a glimmer of sympathy for the Government. But, having seen the Bill, I do: it is like the last gasp of a dying creature, and that dying creature is the popular Tory party of 2019, when it actually had some credibility and popularity, as I said. That has seeped and ebbed away, to the point that it is now in the most extraordinary position and putting forward legislation like this. It is an ideological monstrosity that caters to the worst parts of the right wing of the Tory party, and it will not have support.

I think the Conservative Party expects to run out into the streets and say, “We did it—we got rid of all EU law. Brexit has finally happened”. But, of course, that is simply not true: a lot of this is not EU law but British law. I am sure that the Minister himself had a hand in producing some of it, as a Member of the European Parliament. For anyone who has been in the European Parliament to say that this is pure EU law is complete nonsense. I do not want to accuse the Minister of telling lies, but it is nonsense. So why is it here? Is it here because the Conservative Party wants to get some sort of popularity or something? Why is it here? It is not a worthwhile Bill; it is a ludicrous Bill to bring here. There has been so much learned opposition, but still the Government insist on pushing it through.

My second political question is: what happens afterwards? Of course, it is all very well to put this through, but what happens when Labour is in government? Will the Conservative Party really be happy that Labour has these powers and can just whip out a piece of legislation and give Ministers all these powers? It is not a democracy when you give so much power to Ministers. That is not what Brexit was about—and I say that as somebody who voted for Brexit. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that he is perhaps a rejoiner now, not a remoaner—sorry, I mean remainer. It is perhaps time we understood that the damage has been done and this just creates more damage. It is time to drop the Bill. We will not have a democracy if it goes through.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased that everybody who has spoken in this debate is pulling in the same direction, which is an effort to rescue the Government from themselves. It is not only former diplomats and civil servants, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, who applaud the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom; I am afraid to say to the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, that it is also Liberal Democrats as well, which might be even more upsetting to him. But we are all, at least partially, on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, and I do hope that we will be able to rally round a single powerful amendment for Report, based on elements of all of the laudable amendments in this group.

What has been brought out in the debate are the contradictions and hypocrisy of criticising the EU legislative process—which I happen to believe was democratic, but I will leave that there. But, even if you do not, introducing rule by executive diktat does not seem a very intelligent response to your criticism of EU lawmaking.

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who cited the report of the Constitution Committee; I think we are all grateful not only to that committee but to the Delegated Powers and secondary legislation committees—we have with us the former chair of the SLSC, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who supervised the work for that committee’s report on this Bill before he stepped down. The DPRRC not only described the Bill, as we have frequently said, as “hyper-skeletal” but noted that approach taken by the Government

“contradicts pledges by the Government since 2018 that Parliament would be the agent of substantive policy change in these areas”.

Instead, they have made the Bill

“a blank cheque placed in the hands of Ministers”.

That is our objection. The Government would be wise to go back and think about what they are doing in this Bill. We are trying to put some order and reasonableness into the way it is being done. We are having to do a lot of the work that should have been done before the Bill was introduced. All the amendments, whether the one led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and supported by my noble friend Lord Beith, or those led by my noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, in one way or another seek to avoid the deletion of unidentified law unintentionally and to allow Parliament rather than Ministers control in a considered, explained, transparent and accountable way. Seriously, what is not to like about those two objectives?

We heard some nice phrases in the debate. It was said that we wanted to avoid the “unannounced repeal” of legislation, which was translated perhaps in a rather more blunt, northern way, if I may say so to my noble friend Lord Beith, as “washing stuff down the plughole”. We heard about a “circular economy” of the law from the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I might recycle that—oh, dear—at some point. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, described the processes in the Bill as “bizarre” and “constitutionally improper”. Several amendments, including Amendment 42, led by my noble friend Lord Fox, seek to avoid the default loss of laws that our citizens will not even know they have lost—various speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned the effect of that.

So we are trying to establish default retention and to build in specification of objectives for any revocation. A lot of the amendments are sister amendments to those debated on Tuesday in an earlier group—we had Amendment 48 on consultation and reporting. All of them aim to introduce a reasonable, considered, parliamentary way of doing things which will not surprise all the businesses, unions, consumers, employees and so on, who will not know what on earth is going on.

I realise that Amendment 50, which proposes a super-affirmative process for revocation, may offend the reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and my noble friend Lord Beith about amendable SIs, but I am sure that, with the skill of both those very experienced parliamentarians, we will be able to think of a better way of drafting everything. But I think that all the aims that we have debated in this group are worth pursuing.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

I interject to make a point that perhaps I did not get over clearly enough earlier. In moving Amendment 42, we would be doing nothing but trying to help the Government and help good governance.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord.

[Baroness Crawley (Lab)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support this group of important amendments. In particular, I support Amendment 43 in the names of my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington and the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Through it, only legislation identified and approved by Parliament could be revoked, and that is the responsible, democratic and considered way to proceed.

Amendment 43 would put responsibility for a timetable of revocation back with Parliament, so that the Government cannot claim that it is an open-ended approach. It also begins to answer the very important questions around the complete lack of executive accountability raised by our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. So many sectors and people are affected by the Bill and do not want Parliament to be taken for granted, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, put it.

I will concentrate for half a minute on consumer protection. As the vice-president of the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, I will reflect some of the fears raised with me over the past weeks and months.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I apologise for my enthusiasm causing a truncation of the Minister’s response. Does he at least understand, if he does not accept, that as long as the Government resist suggestions such as come through in these amendments, whereby a list of the laws that are covered by the Bill is laid before Parliament and officially and definitively made available—not a catalogue, as we have been promised but a definitive and complete list, of the sort of laws that not only the noble Baroness but all of us feel passionately about—we are bound to be fuelled by distrust?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the Minister replies, I add that what the Minister is saying now directly contradicts the letter we had the other day from the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, which we discussed. The distinction is made by the Government between an authoritative catalogue and a comprehensive list. The Government admit that the dashboard is not comprehensive, so how can each department possibly know all the EU law it is responsible for? As anyone can, I can give examples—and I am grateful to the organisation Justice, of which I should declare I am a vice-president, for giving two examples of direct effect treaty articles and directive clauses which are not on the dashboard, which cites only 28 in that category. That is Article 157 of the treaty and a clause of the habitats directive. They are not on the dashboard, so how are we meant to believe that departments know exactly what law they are dealing with?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I just explained that point in my earlier answer. The noble Baroness can look at Hansard and come back to me if she is not satisfied with that explanation.

To go back to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, let us accept for the purposes of making his point that, as he said, huge swathes of vital REUL will somehow accidentally disappear. The Government do not accept that; we think it is extremely unlikely. However, I understand the point he makes. I refer him to the answer that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe gave to a similar question yesterday. We understand the point that noble Lords are making, we will reflect on that issue and, if necessary, come back to it. Without making any promises, we will reflect on whether that is possible. Obviously, being a member of the Government, I trust them, but I accept that other noble Lords may not have the same faith in what we are doing. It is essentially intended to be a constructive process.

Moving on, Amendment 44A seeks to omit the sunset from the Bill and allow the repeal, revocation or amendment of retained EU law to be carried out only via primary legislation. Currently we are unable to keep retained direct EU legislation up to date with new advances, precisely because of that problem—because some of it is regarded as primary legislation. For those who still wish us to reflect EU law, we cannot even update it in line with any EU changes or new advances because, if we decided to do so, we would need to do it through primary legislation, and parliamentary time does not allow for that. This is creating more legal and business uncertainty, as regulations become more and more out of date and burdensome. The Bill is therefore designed to rectify this issue. This amendment, however, would instead maintain the status quo, which we do not believe is either helpful or beneficial to anyone. Again, I understand that, if people wanted to undermine the fundamental purpose of the Bill, they would support that amendment.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment led by and spoken to by my noble friend Lady Humphreys. I also support the amendment to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, just spoke. As I said on an earlier group, these Benches fully support respect for a union which is built on trust, which is what we feel is lacking here. I also want to speak to Amendment 136, in the name of my noble friend Lord Fox, who had to be absent for the moment.

[Noble Lords]

He is behind you.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Oh, has he come back? I am not doing too well. I am getting tired; I expect we all are.

Amendment 136 would give Parliament some power over the use of the delay to sunset powers in Clause 2(1), where powers are conferred to delay the sunsetting under Clause 1. Clause 2(1) allows Ministers by regulations to postpone the date when any retained EU law, unless expressly saved, is automatically revoked. However, as our Delegated Powers Committee has said:

“Use of this power is apt to be highly significant but is subject only to the negative procedure.”


As is well known, Parliament hardly ever overturns government proposals in a negative procedure—I believe that the last time it happened in the House of Commons was in 1979; I am subject to correction there, but it is not exactly every day. The power for Ministers in Clause 2(1) is not constrained by any requirement for consultation, any criteria to be met or any preconditions to be satisfied. We do not even know from the Bill, because no indication is given, whether the postponement would be exceptional or the general rule—we have no idea what the Government’s intentions are for delaying sunsetting. The DPRRC reminds us that the delegated powers memorandum states that

“the power is not intended for wide usage”,

but how do we know? How can we know? The memorandum also says

“Ministers have confirmed that they do not intend on allowing the usage of this power without collective agreement”.

We might think, “Oh, whose agreement does that mean? Does it mean consultation with businesses, unions, et cetera? Does it mean some kind of consensus?” No, says the DPRCC,

“this is merely a statement of the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility rather than an effective constraint on the power contained in clause 2(1)”.

We might get excited by that phrase, but “collective agreement” just means collective ministerial responsibility.

The power in Clause 2(1), combined with the scale of the task of determining which pieces of retained EU law are to be retained, revoked or amended, gives rise, in the words of the DPRRC, to

“significant uncertainty as to what the sunset date will be”.

It concludes:

“Given the importance of the power, we consider that its use merits affirmative procedure scrutiny.”


In the light of our debates today, the way that Parliament is just being cut out of this whole exercise is totally at odds with the claims made during the referendum that it would be put back in control and in the driving seat. Two years later, the EU withdrawal Act was accompanied by lots of promises about how Parliament would be the one to decide when to revoke, retain or amend retained EU law.

The point of Amendment 136 is its continuity with, in particular, the amendments we debated in the last group and on Tuesday, which set out that Parliament cannot be ignored in this process—which it will be, in effect, if there is only a negative procedure. I hope that the Government will agree that Parliament should be in the driving seat on the question of whether to delay the sunset.

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I hope, therefore, that the Government will be prepared to put people’s minds at rest that they are not going to simply let regulations or laws in those areas fall as of 31 December. That will at least ensure more detailed consideration beyond that date, if necessary. I hope the Minister can take at least that aspect into account. I also say to him that regulations in those areas are, by and large, popular; they are popular with business as well as with the people whom they directly affect. The Government would be alienating everybody if they allowed them to fall at the end of this year.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 62, on which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I will also mention Amendment 67, which is about Ministers being able to extend the sunset for the matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5, which at the moment is lacking. There are such powers for Clause 1, but there are not similar powers for the very important matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5. Amendment 137 is a consequential amendment and introduces our familiar theme of the affirmative procedure.

I want to concentrate on Amendment 62, because it is about removing

“the automatic deletion by the sunset clause of the rights, powers, liabilities etc currently recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 4 of the”

European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The amendment calls for no abolition until these rights, powers and liabilities et cetera have been identified, and subjected to consultation and to a report laid before the relevant legislature—Parliament or the devolved ones—detailing the consequences of abolition. We do not have a huge amount of time, so I will not laboriously go through the text of the amendment, which is before noble Lords, but they will recognise the structure of it. On these Benches, there is a pattern to the amendments that we have tabled—Amendments 48, 42 and others which escape my memory at the moment—which are all about this considered way of making decisions.

The point about Amendment 62 is that it reflects one of our consistent objections. When I say “our”, I think I can say that right across the House, at Second Reading and in three days of Committee, there is a concern that it would be almost impossible to know what domestic law would actually look like after the end of this year. This offends key principles of the rule of law, including the requirement of legal certainty, human rights protection and other matters. The risk that this amendment is designed to address is that retained EU law will be revoked unknowingly; it is particularly prevalent for Clause 3 as the dashboard is far from comprehensive on this non-legislative form of law.

These rights encompassed by Clause 3 were originally recognised domestically by Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act and were retained by Section 4 of the EUWA. However, the potential effect of Clause 3 is arguably more serious than that of Clause 1. This is because identifying retained EU law to be deleted by Clause 3 is even more difficult than for Clause 1. We have been extensively through the difficulties of identifying retained legislation. Clause 3 is not a cataloguing of legal instruments. It requires legal research, often into case law of UK courts and the ECJ, to identify which EU treaty or directive articles have been found to contain directly enforceable EU rights and obligations. There may be further rights which are so obviously directly effective that they have never been litigated, and that provides a further challenge to identifying them before the deadline.

The Government have hardly started. Of the 3,800 pieces of REUL identified so far on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers et cetera caught by the Clause 3 sunset have been identified, and there is no power to extend the Clause 3 deadline if Ministers run out of time. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has amendments to that effect, as we do in Amendment 67. To delete all those which are not saved by Ministers by the end of this year is reckless and unnecessary, so I am sorry but I am going to take a little bit of time. Unfortunately this group comes at the end of the day, and we are all tired and we all want to get home, but these are really important matters.

I have two examples which have not yet been identified on the famous dashboard so have not been subject to any consultations with affected individuals, organisations or businesses and could have a very severe impact if they are deleted by Clause 3. The first example is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TFEU. This goes much further than the right to equal pay under the Equality Act 2010 because it is less restrictive with regard to comparators. For example, under Article 157, a woman teacher can compare herself to a man employed by a different education authority. They do not need to have the same employer. That type of comparison is not possible under the Equality Act. It requires comparison with a man employed by the same employer—it is usually a man; it could be the other way round but, let us face it, it is a normally a woman claiming equal pay with a man—so it has had a pretty revolutionary impact on the ability of women to get equal pay. However, Article 157 is not on the REUL dashboard as a directly effective right, so it would be repealed as a directly enforceable right by Clause 3 at the end of the year and women’s equal pay protections will be severely weakened as a result. Frankly, every woman in this country should be bombarding the Government with that fact. The Government have told us recently everything they say they are doing for women. I welcome anything that they are doing, but this drives a coach and horses through those claims.

The second example is Article 6 of the habitats directive. We have heard quite a bit about that directive, which is about the conservation of natural habitats and fauna and flora. One of the obligations in that directive has been found to be directly enforceable. It is the obligation of the competent authority, in our case the Environment Agency, in special areas of conservation and sites of international importance to habitats and species to

“take appropriate steps to avoid … the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species”

et cetera.

This is a proactive and preventive obligation. It is not enough to react to deterioration once it has happened; it requires anticipatory protections to prevent deterioration and disturbance of habitats and species. That obligation has not been fully transposed into our domestic legislation. There remains in domestic law only a weaker duty on the Environment Agency to have regard to the habitats directive, which has been found not to impose a direction obligation, as article 6 of the EU directive does. So neither the habitats directive nor the case law on it appear on the REUL dashboard.

I hope that in his reply the Minister can address those two specific examples, which are not airy-fairy but very practical and significant. As things stand, this obligation will fall off the radar at the end of the year and the requirements on competent authorities to protect special areas of conservation proactively will be weakened. I must confess that I would like to have the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, here and to hear what he thinks of that.

Lastly, I recall that among the matters that Amendment 62 would require consideration of is the effect on our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland. That is a consistent point that we need to make from these Benches.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I take this opportunity to say a few words about Clauses 3 to 5 more generally.

I spoke at Second Reading and, although I have not so far burdened your Lordships by speaking in Committee, I have watched much of the first two days’ proceedings with what I can describe only as horrified fascination. Reference has been made today to the recklessness of the Bill. I hope to explain as briefly as I can that this recklessness is not confined to Clauses 1 and 2 but reflected just as strongly in Clause 3, as the noble Baroness just said, and indeed in Clauses 4 and 5.

The Prime Minister does not strike me as a reckless man. We do not know his view of the Bill but perhaps we can take something from the fact that when he was Chancellor, he was careful to ensure that the rules for which he was responsible were excluded from its ambit.

A constant theme of the committee debates on EU-derived legislation was what I think of as the warning lights on the dashboard: a catalogue of retained EU law that is not comprehensive, a hole of uncertain size where devolved legislation should be and, however much Ministers may wish to reverse the presumption of revocation, its application by default to any provisions that have fallen down what has been referred to as the back of the national sofa.

Clause 3 has attracted only a small fraction of the public attention devoted to Clauses 1 and 2 but is, if anything, even more productive of uncertainty. So far as I can work out, that uncertainty comes in three varieties.

The first uncertainty derives from the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, no definitive list exists of the rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Clause 3 or, in all probability, is even capable of being prepared. The rights, powers and liabilities referred to include all those provisions of EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer rights directly on individuals, together with directly effective rights from EU agreements with third countries and directly effective rights in EU directives, subject to qualifications. All those rights had been preserved by Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act in the interests of legal continuity. All are now to be removed in a single big bang moment at the end of the year, with no provision equivalent to Clause 2 for extending that sunset to a later date, as highlighted in the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. These measures do not bear the brand “direct effect” on their foreheads; no one has ever made a full list of them. It is quite certain that the 28 directly effective rights listed in the dashboard, one of them repealed, can be only a tiny proportion of the total. No one has counted them, consulted on them or assessed the impact of their imminent removal.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will talk to the lawyers and attempt to get the noble Lord an answer to his concerns.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned the habitats directive. I am slightly loath to go back there, after the long discussion with my noble friend Lord Benyon on Tuesday, but let me restate again for the benefit of the record that the Government have been clear about the importance of environmental protection across the UK, not least through the Environment Act, which includes a legally binding target to halt the decline of nature by 2030. As I emphasised earlier in the debate, we are committed to meeting this target and we will of course not undermine our obligations to the environment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise to the Minister, but that is not the point I was asking about. I am no expert on the habitats directive, but a specific clause has been interpreted in case law as imposing a preventive, proactive duty—in our case, on the Environment Agency. Will that be retained?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Case law is being retained. Case law is not being abolished, it will still exist, and courts will still be able to take account of it. Removing the complex and opaque legal gloss associated with Section 4 of the 2018 Act will improve the clarity of our domestic law. It would be, in our view, inappropriate, to leave these provisions on our statute book, and we wish to end them as soon as reasonably practicable. We consequently also oppose Amendment 137, which specifies that any regulation made under the power conferred by Amendment 62 would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I do not think he said that; he said that there has to be an end to EU supremacy in UK law. While we are all swapping letters, perhaps the Labour Party might want to write us a letter to clarify what he meant. I am not being serious, of course; it is not the Labour Party’s job to do that.

Amendment 142 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, seeks to clarify that this Bill does not disturb Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That section makes the rights and obligations in the withdrawal agreement available in domestic law. It also provides that domestic legislation must be read and given effect subject to those rights and obligations. I can reassure the noble Baroness that this Bill will not disturb Section 7A of the 2018 Act. I can also assure her that the Bill provides powers to restate rights and obligations required for Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol as needed. The Government will ensure that all necessary legislation is in place by the Bill’s sunset date to uphold all the commitments made under Article 2.

Amendment 100, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh, would remove the sunset date for the compatibility power in Clause 8. It is not necessary to have a power to specify legislative hierarchies beyond 23 June 2026, by which time the Government will have exercised the power as needed.

I move on to Clause 5. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has given notice of his intention to oppose the question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. General principles of EU law were developed in CJEU case law, with which EU institutions and member states must comply. I submit that it is clearly no longer suitable for our status as an independent nation outside the EU—however much the Liberal Democrats wish that not to be the case—for these specific principles to continue forming part of UK law. The powers in the Bill allow the Government to codify clearly any necessary effects to bring clarity to our domestic statute book.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but that remark was gratuitous. The point is about legal certainty. It is not about whether we as a party, or anybody else, would have wanted to remain in the EU—it is clear that we would. It is about whether the law will be clear, and whether the judges will be able to operate it, and whether businesses, unions and whoever will know what they are supposed to be doing. That is the point that we have been trying to make over four days on this Bill. Brexit is irrelevant to this discussion, and I do not believe I have used the word once in these proceedings. What is important is whether the law will be able to be operated with certainty, clarity and predictability.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

That is fair enough; it was a slightly gratuitous point. I actually agree with the noble Baroness—we want the law to be as clear and accessible as possible. That is why we do not believe that the general principles of EU law, which of course were developed by the CJEU for use primarily by EU institutions and member states, should be relevant to the UK now that we are an independent nation, whatever our differences of opinion might have been on that.