Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Dubs

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 44A, which is on a different point from the one the noble Lord made about Northern Ireland. The point is simple. There is a long-standing convention that the United Kingdom Government do not legislate for the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man without seeking their consent before doing so. I had a letter from the Government of Jersey asking me whether I could raise this on Report. I understand that, on this occasion, no consultation took place with the Government of Jersey before the Bill’s introduction, and I do not have any evidence of whether the Government of Guernsey and the Isle of Man think the same as the Government of Jersey. All I know is that the Government of Jersey do not consent to this permissive extent clause.

In the event, neither the Rwanda treaty nor the Rwanda memorandum of understanding apply to Jersey, and any extension would be complex given that Jersey has its own Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. I am not sure whether this is an oversight by the Government in their haste to get the Bill through or whether something else is going on that I do not understand, but I would very much like the Government to explain why they have not sought the consent of Jersey, whether they have sought the consent of Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and what they propose to do to rectify this position.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will say a couple of things about Northern Ireland, following the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, although I suspect from a very different perspective. First, as I pointed out in Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights asked for a full explanation before Report. We are almost at the end of Report and, as far as I am aware, despite all the talk of imminence, we still do not have the Government’s response to the JCHR’s report. I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said about that earlier—it really is not good enough.

I turn to the disapplication of human rights and the implications for the Good Friday agreement and the Windsor Framework. I know I will not change the Government’s mind on this, but I say this partly to amplify what was said earlier and put this on the record. The cases that the noble Lord referred to have been brought to my attention. In their revised fact sheet—and in almost identical words in a letter to me—the Government said that

“the bill does not engage the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, including the rights chapter - those rights seek to address longstanding and specific issues relating to Northern Ireland’s past and do not extend to matters engaged by the bill”.

But the cases to which the noble Lord referred made something absolutely clear. The 28 February decision in the 2024 case of Dillon and others—NIKB 11 —referenced the overarching commitment to civil rights in the relevant chapter of the Belfast Good/Friday agreement. It said in paragraph 554:

“A narrow interpretation of ‘civil rights’ undermines the forward-facing dimension of the non-diminution commitment in article 2(1)”.


It says it is “future-facing”; it is made clear that it is not looking just to the past.

Similarly, in Angesom, which was also referred to by the noble Lord, the decision said:

“The court rejects the submission by the respondent that the rights protected by the relevant part of the GFA are frozen in time and limited to the political context of 1998. The GFA was drafted with the protection of EU fundamental human rights in mind and was therefore intended to protect the human rights of ‘everyone in the community’ even ‘outside the background of the communal conflict’”.


So I do not think that what the Government have come up with so far is good enough in explaining why they believe that the disapplication of the Human Rights Act does not apply and will not affect the Good Friday agreement and the Windsor Framework.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Dubs

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I again refer to my membership of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We have produced detailed reports on many aspects of the Bill, including on this matter.

It is surely a basic right that nobody should be stateless. This is fundamental. Stateless people have fewer rights—they have virtually none—and they are vulnerable. I have tabled this amendment to avoid statelessness.

As things stand, stateless children born in the UK are covered by this provision in the Bill. Prior to the British Nationality Act 1981, all children born in the UK were British under jus soli. As I said earlier, I served in the Commons at the time—indeed, I was on the Public Bill Committee which dealt with this Bill for many long weeks—and we had a long discussion about jus soli, and I only hope that the position I took then is the same as the one I am taking now—in other words, in opposition to the provision. I think I can claim that I have been consistent over 40 years; I hope so, but if anyone wants to look it up in order to disprove it, I will listen to them.

Clause 10 has a new requirement that will make it more difficult for stateless children to acquire British citizenship. It puts another hurdle in the way of acquiring that citizenship. The onus will now be on children—or, if they are very young, the people responsible for them —to produce the evidence, unless the Home Secretary is satisfied that the child is unable to acquire another nationality. The provision will effectively mean that a child born in the UK, or their parents or carers on their behalf, will have to prove that they could not reasonably have acquired another nationality—so the onus is on the child, or the parents or carers, to prove that. That may be quite a difficult point to prove, and the onus is switched in allocating the burden of responsibility. That could be especially hard for children who do not have significant support or access to the relevant documents. For example, the children of refugees might find it very difficult to have the necessary documentation or to be able to produce the evidence, so it would put a significant additional burden on them.

It is an anomaly that when children become adults they can apply. It remains an oddity that a child can remain stateless for some years until they become an adult, when they can then apply. What is the advantage to anyone of having a child stateless for that period? It certainly cannot be in the best interests of the child, and that surely must be the bottom line. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child always talks about what is in the best interests of the child; Article 7 says that a child should be registered as having a nationality immediately after birth. That is fairly clear. Furthermore, it says that a contracting state shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. With this clause, the Government are going against these provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

It is difficult to see how Clause 10 complies with the United Kingdom’s obligations under both the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is an unnecessary measure that makes things even more difficult. I can see no argument, not even the security arguments that the Minister advanced in the previous debate, for putting this hurdle in the way of children who might otherwise be stateless. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Dubs and the proposal that Clause 10 should not stand part of the Bill. I put on record my thanks to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for the very helpful work that it has done on the Bill, with a whole raft of very useful reports. According to ILPA and the Bar Council, this clause contravenes the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and that should give us pause for thought. Research by the European Network on Statelessness shows how some children in very vulnerable circumstances will be affected, as my noble friend said, and found that there can be good reasons for delays in registering a child’s nationality.

To my mind, the justification that the clause is needed because there has been a significant increase in the number of registrations of stateless children smacks of the culture of disbelief and suspicion criticised by Wendy Williams in the Windrush report. Surely it is to be celebrated that more children are exercising their rights—no thanks to the Home Office, which has been dilatory in making children and their parents aware of these rights and in removing the barriers to registering them. It is thanks to the hard work of organisations such as the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens that more children and parents have become aware of the right to registration. As I say, this is to be commended, not cracked down on as if it were some kind of crime.

As the JCHR observes, and Amendment 31 addresses —a point made also by my noble friend Lord Dubs—it is difficult to see how this clause is compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. While the Home Hoffice human rights memorandum states that it has considered the best interests of the children affected, it is not clear from it how such a clause is in their best interests, so can the Minister spell out exactly how this clause meets the best interests of children affected?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Dubs

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 8 and 9 about good character. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I am particularly concerned about its application to children and those whose conduct when a child—and we are talking about children as young as 10—is used to deny the right to register as a citizen, which would otherwise be theirs.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has voiced its concern, not just with regard to this Bill but in a 2019 report, where it pointed out that

“half of the children denied their … right … to British nationality on good character grounds have not even received a criminal conviction (having merely received a police caution)—let alone been prosecuted for ‘heinous crimes’.”

The Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, of which I was a member, expressed considerable concern about the good character requirement. The committee called for a review of its use and description and of the age from which it applies—which is, as I said, 10. The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, of which I am a patron, and Amnesty International, which have been campaigning on this point for some years, say:

“That some British people are required to satisfy the Home Secretary that they are ‘good’ for their citizenship rights to be recognised is divisive and alienating.”


I am not sure how many politicians would come out well as having “good character”, but I shall leave that as it may be. The good character condition is relatively recent in nationality law. It certainly should not be extended; ideally, it should now be scrapped.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard, the Joint Committee on Human Rights spent quite a lot of time considering this and related issues. I should perhaps say at the outset that when I was in the Commons, I served on the Public Bill Committee dealing with the Bill that became the British Nationality Act. I am trying for the life of me to remember some of the details of the discussions. I have not had time to look them all up, but we certainly spent many weeks and many sittings on that Bill, but I do not recall this issue arising. I do not think the good character requirement existed then; I think it was brought in later.

The issue is that in the process of trying to get British nationality, there has been some discrimination, or there would be discrimination if the good character requirement were to apply. I am thinking of somebody who should normally have been able to get British citizenship but was unable to do so and, when applying now, if this is passed, will have to meet the good character requirement. That seems a little odd. I hope I have understood that correctly; that was certainly how we looked at it on the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Perhaps the best thing I can do is to quote from the committee’s report, because it states it very clearly. This is from paragraph 41:

“We reiterate concerns made by this Committee in previous Parliaments that requiring good character when considering applications resolving prior discrimination risks perpetuating the effects of discrimination for those previously discriminated against. Moreover, we also share the concerns raised by the JCHR in 2019 about the appropriateness of the good character requirements being applied to children, particularly children whose main or only real connection may be with the UK. It is difficult to align this requirement with the obligation to have the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.”


That is the case for this amendment.