Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Stroud

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 128C in my name, I shall also lend support to many of the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 128B in the name of the right reverend Prelate, which he has just outlined and to which I have added my name.

Amendment 128C is very simple. It places a duty on the Government to do what they say they want to do and are going to do anyway. This amendment imposes a duty on the Home Secretary to create additional—I emphasise “additional”—safe and legal routes by 31 January 2024, six months after the anticipated passage of the Bill, under which refugees and others in need of international protection may come to the UK lawfully from abroad.

The whole purpose of the Illegal Migration Bill is to shut down unsafe and illegal routes and its whole narrative is to ensure that genuine asylum seekers and refugees can then come via safe and legal routes. If that is the motive for the Bill, as the Government have repeatedly communicated, this amendment will not be difficult for the Minister to accept.

I have been asked why I believe it necessary to establish a duty on the Government to create these routes: why is it not enough for the Government just to be required to lay before Parliament a report detailing the safe and legal routes that they intend to introduce? There are pages of the Bill weighted towards eliminating illegal and unsafe routes, but only a few sentences indicating an intention to create legal and safe routes—and then only to lay a report before Parliament detailing the Government’s intention to create safe and legal routes.

This is simply not certain enough. If the Government are genuinely seeking to establish safe and legal routes, they would do so with the same weight of legislation as is committed to the abolishing of unsafe and illegal routes. I have the greatest respect for the character and integrity of my noble friend the Minister but, with the all the best will in the world, many assurances have been given and many reports written that have never delivered on the well-meaning and well-intentioned promises of Ministers. For this House to be certain that the abolishing of unsafe and illegal routes will genuinely lead to the creation of safe and legal routes, a legal duty set out in the Bill is what is required to balance the Bill and make good on the Government’s intent.

When announcing the Bill, the Home Secretary told the other place:

“Having safe and legal routes, capped and legitimised through a decision by Parliament, is the right way to support people seeking refuge in this country”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/23; col. 170.]


This amendment would simply create a duty to have these safe and legal routes, capped and legitimised through a decision by Parliament, as the Home Secretary so eloquently laid out. Indeed, in December the Prime Minister announced that through the Illegal Migration Bill:

“The only way to come to the UK for asylum will be through safe and legal routes”,


and he indicated that that would be through the Illegal Migration Bill. He promised that

“as we get a grip on illegal migration, we will create more of those routes”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/12/22; col. 888.]

The Government assure us that the Bill will swiftly get a grip on illegal migration so this amendment provides assurance that the Government will deliver on the Prime Minister’s stated intent of creating, through the Bill, safe and legal routes. Vague promises for establishing safe and legal routes towards the end of 2024 or commitments to establish safe routes after we have stopped the boats are not sufficient. A duty is required in the Bill that the Home Secretary must, by 31 January 2024, make regulations specifying additional safe and legal routes.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to follow the noble Baroness and the right reverend Prelate. Amendment 130 is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Kerr and Lord Dubs, to whom I am very grateful for their support.

First, I must apologise for inadvertently misleading your Lordships’ Committee in the early hours of Tuesday morning, when referring to age-assessment data from Full Fact, at col. 1805. Although, in the absence of transparent published data there remains a big question mark over the Immigration Minister’s claims about the percentage of adult males pretending to be children, and similar ministerial claims, the Full Fact data were not in fact comparable and had been misinterpreted by a journalist. Clearly, I should have checked my facts rather than relying on a newspaper report. I apologise for that.

The amendment provides for a visa scheme that would allow those with viable asylum claims who meet specified conditions to travel safely and legally to the UK to make such claims. Before providing a more detailed explanation, I emphasise that the proposal is based on the premise that unites us, so clearly articulated by the right reverend Prelate: a desire to stop unsafe travel to the UK, be it by boat or other routes, such as hidden unsafely in a lorry. As such, it would damage significantly the people smugglers’ business model—again, a goal that unites us. Where we differ from the Government is in our belief that the way to do this is not by, in effect, ending the right to claim asylum in the UK. There is a clear distinction between deterring people from making dangerous journeys and stopping them claiming asylum.

Of course, safe and legal routes are part of the answer, and here I support in particular Amendment 128B, to which I have added my name, and Amendment 128C. Personally, I am unhappy with the idea of a fixed cap on the numbers entitled to enter on safe and legal routes if it is what the JCHR describes as a “hard” cap. The right reverend Prelate makes an important point in excluding the listed schemes from the cap, on the grounds that these schemes are not currently capped. I also support the Children’s Commissioner’s recommendation that children should be excluded from the cap. I would be grateful to know the Government’s response to that. It should also be noted that she emphasises that

“safe and legal routes must be agreed in parallel to the passage of the Bill”,

which is relevant to Amendment 128C.

But however generous the safe and legal routes option is, the UNHCR makes it clear that it is not a substitute for the right to claim asylum under the refugee convention. As my honourable friend Olivia Blake said when she spoke to a similar amendment in the Commons,

“as it stands … there is no way for the many thousands of people who have already started their journey to get on to a safe and legal route … You cannot reduce the number of boats if the people who are going to try to make that journey are already on their journey and have no alternatives to come to the UK”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/3/23; col. 754.]

This proposal offers a means of reducing significantly the numbers arriving by boat or other irregular and unsafe means. It does so by retaining the right to claim asylum, but in a way that, in effect, opens up another safe and legal route. I thank Care4Calais and the PCSU —two organisations working on the front line—for all the work they have put into it. When a similar amendment was proposed in the Commons, the Minister did not grace it with a response, so we are giving the Government an opportunity to do so today.

The proposal builds on the Ukraine model of safe passage, for which, for all its difficulties, the Government can take credit. I hope that they will learn and apply lessons to other groups with a strong case. It is no coincidence that no Ukrainian has, to my knowledge, crossed on a small boat or used people smugglers. Where the proposal differs from the Ukrainian scheme is that, on arrival in the UK, applicants holding a safe passage visa would enter the normal UK asylum process —speeded up considerably, I hope—and if, at that stage, they were found not to be eligible for asylum, they would not be allowed to stay in the UK.

A safe passage visa would typically be claimed online, as in the Ukrainian scheme, although provision would be made for applications also to be made at existing visa centres. I am assured that NGOs would undoubtedly help those with literacy problems. To qualify for a safe passage visa, a person would have to be in the EU—although, if successful, it could be expanded at a later date—not be a national of the EU, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland, and have a viable asylum claim. The viability of the claim would be determined in a similar way to the initial screening interview that currently takes place at the first step in the asylum process in the UK. This would ensure that clearly unfounded claims would be turned down at this point. Successful applicants would be sent an electronic letter that they could use to enter the UK lawfully. On arrival, they would be required to visit a UK centre to provide biometric data.

An initial fear that I had was that well-founded claims might be turned down as a way of reducing the numbers entering the UK, and that, although legal aid would be available on appeal, an applicant not in the country would clearly be at a disadvantage. The point was made to me, however, that the scheme relies on it being applied in good faith. It will work only if it is seen to work fairly—if claims are processed in a timely manner and a realistic number receive visas. If the Government are genuine in their claim that their primary motivation with the Bill is to stop unsafe journeys on flimsy boats, they have a real incentive to make it work.

I know, too, that some fear that this represents an open-borders policy, so I emphasise that it does not. The reverse is the case: it offers a way of replacing the current chaos in the channel—the Government’s attempts to regulate that have failed—with managed and controlled borders, where we know who is making the crossing. As I said, safe passage visas would be available only to those with viable asylum claims. Those refused a visa would receive a clear personal communication explaining that they do not have a viable claim, nor, therefore, the chance of a safe future in the UK were they to try to reach it by irregular means. Surely that would be a more effective deterrent, consistent with our international obligations, than the Bill—the deterrent effect of which is at best uncertain.

Nor does the evidence support the fear that this would attract more asylum seekers to the UK. Research suggests that immigration policies do not drive asylum seekers’ destinations. The introduction of the Ukrainian scheme, on which the safe visa scheme is modelled, did not lead to the great majority of those fleeing Ukraine seeking refuge in the UK. We know that the great majority of those seeking asylum in Europe do so in other European countries and there is no evidence to suggest that they will not continue to do so.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Stroud

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, while supporting all the amendments in this group, I speak to Motion D1 in my name, taking up the baton from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, whom I thank for her persistent commitment on this issue, which remains undimmed. As previously, the amendment would give asylum seekers the right to work in any occupation after six months, but it introduces a review after three years—rather than four, as previously—to assess whether government fears about such a right creating a pull factor are founded.

The Commons reason for not accepting the previous amendment states that

“the Commons consider that asylum-seekers (save in limited circumstances) and their adult dependants should not be permitted to work while a decision on their claim for asylum is pending”.

This is the equivalent of a parent telling a child that they cannot do something “because”. It is not a reason.

During the debate in the Commons—such as it was—the Minister reiterated concerns about undermining the economic migration scheme, and our old friend the pull factor. But there is no reason why a right to work after six months should undermine the economic migration scheme, and, as Sir Robert Buckland pointed out, he and others

“have said on many occasions that there is simply no evidence to suggest that a limited right to work is a pull factor.”—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/22; col.240.]

In fact, the academic evidence suggests the opposite, and the Migration Advisory Committee has expressed considerable scepticism.

The other argument put by the Minister in the other place, which was repeated by the Minister here, was that the Government want to see claims settled within six months. However, when he was asked by one of his Back-Benchers to confirm that the Bill and other measures

“will mean that there should be no asylum seekers still in a state of limbo, waiting for their asylum status to be determined, after six months”,—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/22; col.253.]

thereby making the amendment unnecessary, answer came there none. It would be wonderful if the amendment proved to be redundant, so that there were no longer 62,000 people awaiting a decision for more than six months, but the Government’s resistance to it suggests they are not confident that claims will be settled within that timescale. The Minister this afternoon suggested that the amendment would create significant operational costs for the Home Office. I am not quite clear what those costs are, but presumably there are savings from asylum support, and calculations have been done, which I know are contested but suggest a considerable fiscal saving overall from the amendment.

If we believe in integration, for which, according to MAC, the right to work is a key foundation stone, in preventing poverty and in protecting mental health, we should not give up on this amendment. In the Commons, 11 Conservatives, including a number of former Ministers, supported its previous iteration and 53 abstained. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, in this House, emphasised that, on basic Conservative principles concerning paid work, current policy fails dismally. Public support has been growing steadily to a point where the latest poll last month showed that at least four in five support the reform, regardless of political affiliation.

Once more, I would like to give the final word to asylum seekers themselves. MIN Voices, which I recently had the pleasure of meeting virtually, in its call for the right to work, asks us to

“remember that we are human beings and we have dignity”.

I fear that, in its refusal to countenance change, the Home Office is failing to remember. Let us, at least, accord to asylum seekers their humanity and dignity by asking the Commons to think again.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment D1, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her eloquent introduction to the amendment. This is a common-sense change. It would be a boost for the Treasury, for recruiters and, not least, for asylum seekers themselves. They often wait years for a decision on their claim while battling poverty, isolation and mental ill-health. However, the Government appear to want to maintain a ban on employment for asylum seekers, even after the introduction of their offshoring policy. They say that giving people the right to work will still encourage more people to come to the UK.

This pull-factor argument, however, is simply not supported by the facts. Evidence for it remains unclear, unshared or—as many suspect—non-existent. A challenge to Ministers from the Government’s own Migration Advisory Committee to show proof of a link between the employment ban and a pull factor has so far gone unanswered. Publicly available and up-to-date figures show no correlation. If such a correlation, or even causation, existed, asylum migration would look very different from how it does today. Certainly, 28,000 refugees would not have risked their lives crossing the channel in boats in 2021 to come to the UK, where they cannot work; they would have headed to Sweden, which received just 10,000 applications for refugee status, even though asylum seekers can work after day one.

The 62,000 people who claimed asylum in Spain last year, where they must wait for six months to work, would have simply crossed the border into Portugal, whose 1,300 asylum applicants can get a job after one week. The people who applied for asylum in France—over 100,000 of them—where they must wait six months to work, could have just stopped in, or headed to, Italy, where they can work after two months. That some countries with stricter labour access laws often receive more asylum seekers, while, in many cases, fewer refugees go to countries with more relaxed rules around work, shows the lack of link between application numbers and employment rules. As we have repeatedly said in these debates, what the overwhelming evidence does point to as pull factors are those things that make almost all of us feel safe: our families, our friends, our communities, our language, a sense of shared history, and a country with a stable Government and respect for human rights.

We have an environment in which Ministers are nervous of appearing soft: I understand that. They are so nervous that even a widely beneficial, evidence-based, common-sense policy such as the right to work has yet to be accepted because it might make Britain a magnet. But I believe that this is wrong, and, while the negative and costly effects of this ban might not seem obvious, they are real. The ban costs the taxpayer an estimated £210 million a year. It leaves asylum seekers in poverty and institutionally dependent; it leaves businesses up and down the country without extra hands at a time of record job vacancies; it takes a terrible toll on people’s mental health; and it damages any attempt at integration and future employment success.

It should not be so hard to reach agreement on a policy that has so much cross-party support and so many benefits. I spent years at the DWP, as a Conservative special adviser, working to support people into work and off welfare, only to be hindered from advancing the same opportunity to those who have sought the protection of this nation.

The instinct to work, to contribute and to provide for one’s family is universal and integral to who we are as human beings. It is what it means to be human, each one according to their talent, gift, capacity and capability. We damage people when we forbid them to contribute. I urge the Government to keep thinking and to think again.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Stroud

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 30 in my name aims to introduce the right to work for asylum seekers who have been resident in the UK for more than six months. The arguments for the right to work have been well articulated in Committee and earlier, but I will summarise them so that we are clear.

I will begin with the economic arguments. The latest figures show that 125,000 people are waiting for an asylum decision. Every study shows that the net benefit to the state would be tens or hundreds of millions of pounds every year in improved tax-take. The UK economy is recovering after Covid and a lot of jobs have been created, but this has, in turn, created labour shortages. It makes no sense that asylum seekers who can drive HGVs or serve in our NHS are forced to sit around doing nothing for more than a year while they await a decision from the Home Office.

The second argument is one of integration. There is considerable evidence that the right to work has a large, positive impact on the integration of asylum seekers. The Government’s Migration Advisory Committee itself recently underlined that shorter waiting times had a large, positive impact on long-term employment outcomes for asylum seekers. Indeed, discussing refugees’ access to the UK labour market, one leading academic in asylum and refugee policy refers to what she calls the

“inherent contradiction between UK refugee integration strategies that focus on employment, and restrictive government policies that negatively affect access to the labour market.”

There is also the argument of public support for this policy. The policy is overwhelmingly popular with the public: 73% of red wall voters support the right to work, according to recent polling. Business leaders back easing the ban on the right to work, with the Survation poll showing that two-thirds of business leaders back it. It is rare to find a policy that has these three characteristics: economically advantageous, socially advantageous and politically advantageous.

There is one final reason why this is an amendment that the Government should accept. There is also a basic human dignity argument for this policy. We believe that every individual should be able to support themselves and their family. In fact, we would go further and say that, as Conservatives, we believe that every family has a personal responsibility to do so where they can. We have repeatedly, as a party, made the argument that work is the best route out of poverty, so the intention of this amendment is to ensure precisely that. Let people support themselves and create their own pathway from poverty to prosperity while they await a decision. The lack of the right to work makes people vulnerable to exploitation, declining mental health, poverty and modern slavery.

If the human dignity arguments do not convince Ministers, this amendment should also be viewed as purely pragmatic. Reforms to the asylum system proposed through the Nationality and Borders Bill will take time to come fully into effect. In the interim, while asylum cases are being processed, the asylum system continues to be under considerable strain. By offering asylum seekers the right to work, the Government will take pressure off themselves. I anticipate, however, that the Minister and other colleagues might be inclined to dismiss this amendment, using the argument that the right to work could be a so-called pull factor. So, before I finish, I want to address the reasons I believe this is not the case.

First, push factors, such as war and famine, as we are seeing in Ukraine, drive refugee flows far more than pull factors do. Secondly, as I have said before in this House, the real pull factors are our language, our culture, the rule of law, democracy, historical ties through the Commonwealth, family connections and liberty—and we are not about to sacrifice any of these, thank goodness. Thirdly, it is worth noting that the UK is currently an outlier in enforcing a 12-month wait period for work and then placing strong restrictions on which employment can be taken up. No other nation, whether any across Europe, the States, Australia or Canada, has such stringent requirements. It is worth asking why they have not considered the right to work to be a pull factor. Finally, this view is backed up by the experts. The Government’s own Migration Advisory Committee underlined that there is no evidence in academic research that people decide to claim asylum based on these kinds of factors. The Home Office itself commissioned a study that showed little evidence of a link between economic rights and the destination choices of those seeking asylum, and, to my knowledge, it has never produced evidence to the contrary.

All of this is to say that I believe that the Government could quite legitimately, without any nervousness and in line with their own poverty strategy of families working their way out of poverty, adopt this amendment that allows asylum seekers to work after six months of being in the UK. I will be listening carefully to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 30. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government’s opposition to the right to work was based less on the pull factor argument than on the impact on the integrity of the labour market. That is just as well. As the noble Baroness said, we have yet to see convincing evidence of the pull factor any better than the selective and somewhat misleading quote from a study that the Minister offered in Committee. She mentioned an impact assessment on that, which I believe is yet to materialise. When can we expect it?

If we consider the numbers involved, it is difficult to see how labour market integrity will be compromised. Indeed, the combination of the effects of the Bill and the welcome promised speeding up of applications, to which Amendment 53 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker should add some teeth, should reduce the numbers affected significantly. I imagine that the Migration Advisory Committee will have considered the integrity of the labour market before recommending the right to work after six months and in any occupation. Yet the Minister did not even mention the MAC report raised by a number of noble Lords in Committee.

Neither did she mention the MAC’s argument, and one central to the case I made, concerning the impact of the ban on working on integration, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, which supposedly remains a government goal. Nor did she acknowledge the statement I read out from MIN Voices, made up of asylum seekers, who said that not being able to work made them feel less than human and corroded their self-respect and dignity—again, echoing what the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said. As the chair of Surrey Heath Conservatives pointed out on ConservativeHome —my new favourite reading—this very much chimes with Conservative values, so that in his view the ban is “fundamentally un-Conservative”.

I conclude by repeating the plea of MIN Voices’ plea to

“see us as human beings not a number. Let us build our life and future and not waste our time and skills”.

I should also mention the article by Sarah O’Connor of the Financial Times, who ended her recent analysis of the labour market implications of the ban by saying that

“if people want to work, we should let them”.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Stroud

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is me again, I am afraid. I rise to move Amendment 46, and I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Stroud, my noble friend Lord Blunkett—who had to leave—and the British Red Cross and Praxis for their support.

Again, this is a probing amendment. Together with Amendment 54, it would delete reference to the “no recourse to public funds” condition from the listed ways in which group 1 and group 2 refugees and their families could be treated differently under Clause 11. In other words, it would remove one source of potential discrimination from the list of examples of the discriminatory treatment of group 2 refugees. It is a probing amendment because while I am totally opposed to Clause 11 standing part of the Bill, it is important that we have more information about how the “no recourse to public funds” condition will be applied.

In fact, questioning the application of the no recourse condition reinforces the case against Clause 11. UNHCR makes it clear that denying refugees recourse to public funds is a clear violation of Article 23 of the refugee convention, which states in unambiguous terms:

“The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.”


Given that Ministers constantly claim that the Bill is compatible with our international obligations, does the Minister believe that UNHCR is wrong, and if so, on what grounds?

Similarly, the JCHR points to a violation of Article 24 of the convention, which specifically cites the right to social security. It argues that the differentiation policy, including specifically restrictions on recourse to public funds

“raises serious questions of compatibility with Article 14 ECHR—the prohibition on discrimination in the enjoyment of other Convention rights.”

It concludes that the policy is

“arguably disproportionate to achieving the stated aims.”

In fact, as the committee notes, the aim of dissuading asylum seekers from travelling to the UK other than by safe and legal routes ignores all the research, including that of the Home Office, which indicates that it is rare for asylum seekers to know what support is available.

To repeat something that my noble friend Lord Rosser said, UNHCR warns:

“The adverse consequences of a ‘No Recourse to Public Funds’ condition will fall not only the refugees themselves, but also on their families, including on any children who travel with them, are able to join them later, or are born in the UK. These consequences have been documented in numerous studies as well as in the context of litigation. They include difficulty accessing shelters for victims of domestic violence, denial of free school meals where these are linked to the parents’ benefit entitlement”—


—although this is currently suspended, and a very long review is taking place; this policy has been under review for 15 months now—

“and de facto exclusion from the job market for single parents (largely women) who have limited access to government-subsidised childcare, as well as significant risks of food poverty, severe debt, sub-standard accommodation, and homelessness.”

It also notes that public funds include payments specifically for children, such as child benefit, and for those in particularly vulnerable circumstances, such as carers and disabled people. It warns of the adverse consequences for integration and for local authorities which may have to pick up some of the tab for children and those with care needs.

Its conclusions chime with evidence from a range of organisations, including a recent Citizens Advice survey that documents the severe poverty and destitution caused by the rule, with children, women and people of colour disproportionately affected and with what it describes as a “devastating impact” on mental health. Likewise, the BMA has raised concerns that the rule’s effects can compound physical or mental health conditions among those with particular vulnerabilities fleeing violence or trauma.

There are real fears now that the Bill will increase significantly the numbers affected by the “no recourse” rule. There is also a lack of clarity as to whom among group 2 refugees it will be applied, both in the short term and each time their status comes up for renewal. I hope that the Minister will provide some clarity and not fob us off with the response that details will be set out in the guidance and rules that follow, as was said in the Commons.

What was made clear in the Commons was that those already in receipt of Section 95 asylum support will not face restrictions on access to public funds. However, this is not made clear in the Bill itself. Can we be confident that most asylum seekers will have been in receipt of Section 95 asylum support? What about those refugees who face destitution but were not receiving Home Office support, such as those who choose not to enter the asylum support system and rely instead on informal networks of support because of accommodation being allocated on a no-choice basis? What about those who fall into destitution after being granted refugee status, which will be a greater risk as a result of this clause?

It is currently difficult to get the “no recourse” rule lifted on the grounds of destitution because the concession applies only to a minority of those affected and involves a difficult, complicated process. Citizens Advice warns that

“in our experience these limited exemptions for destitution give too little help too late”,

with a decision typically taking more than four weeks, according to the Minister in the Commons. Can the Minister tell us who exactly among group 2 refugees will in practice not be subject to the “no recourse to public funds” rule? What is the Government’s estimate of the proportion of group 2 refugees who will be subject to it? What will happen when their status is up for renewal? Will the destitution exception be open to any group 2 refugee or only to certain groups, as is the case now? Will access to the concession be made easier than it is currently?

In recent oral evidence on the “no recourse” rule to the Work and Pensions Committee, the Minister, Tom Pursglove, refused to answer questions about the Bill’s implications, stating that policy work is ongoing. This elicited the response from the committee chair that, given that the Bill had already completed its passage through the Commons, surely we ought to know what its implications are—indeed. Surely by now the Home Office should be able to answer what are some pretty basic questions about how Clause 11(5)(c) and (6)(d) will work. It is crucial that we have this information should Clause 11 continue to stand part of the Bill, although I fervently hope that it will not, not only because it contravenes the refugee convention but also because it will spell hardship and insecurity for many group 2 refugees—who will be very much class 2 refugees. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I want to take the opportunity afforded by Amendments 46 and 54 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to which I was pleased to add my name, to probe the Government’s exact intention regarding the outworking of Clause 10 and the application of NRPF.

I have long been concerned about the NRPF policy, but I have profound concerns about its application to group 2 refugees. According to the Home Office’s own guidance, the NRPF condition must not be applied in circumstances where a person is destitute or at risk of becoming so. Can the Minister confirm that this understanding is correct, or would group 2 refugees not be able to receive asylum support and be subject to NRPF? Can the Minister also clarify what would happen should such a person qualify for the destitution test?

There are a number of areas where I would encourage the Minister to consider the impact of applying NRPF to group 2 refugees. I know that Members of this House would be happy to work with her if that is helpful. First, on the impact on local authorities, if the NRPF condition is extended to refugees subject to the new temporary protection status, the increase in the number of individuals subject to NRPF would increase the pressure on already overstretched local authorities. Such increased pressure could lead to more families with NRPF being wrongly refused assistance by local authorities. This would have a devastating impact on the health and development of children in these families and would counter any efforts to develop integration. In addition, it would affect already vulnerable families who have the same characteristics as those who are permitted to access public funds. This is an area of concern to me: they have just arrived here via different routes, but there is no difference in their vulnerability.

Imposing an NRPF condition will cause refugees to live without access to welfare benefits and housing support. When we are considering NRPF, we often think of out-of-work benefits, but this also affects in-work benefits. You could have the extraordinary circumstance of two auxiliaries working in a hospital, one being able to claim in-work support, and the other not. He or she would not be able to survive in those circumstances, even if they were doing everything right. There is also evidence from those already subject to the NRPF condition that this restriction can cause destitution and lead children to experience homelessness, hunger and mental health conditions.

If, as seems to be the case, group 2 refugees would be subject to NRPF, this policy may not achieve its intent. I would value the Minister setting out the exact policy intent of NRPF, as I have found it hard to find what the intent of no recourse to public funds is.

My work as chair of the Social Metrics Commission, a cross-party commission which measures poverty in the UK, finds that no recourse to public funds is a significant cause in driving poverty, homelessness and destitution. NRPF has been shown to have significant mental health consequences, including for children. It makes finding stable work more difficult, accessing education harder, and securing stable housing a challenge. These are all things we want to see for this community of people.

It is important for us to really understand who we are talking about. We are not talking here about asylum seekers or economic migrants. We are talking about people the Government recognise as bona fide refugees—that has already been decided—who have fled conflict, war or famine and arrived in Britain hoping to find a place of refuge. By tabling this probing amendment, I want to ensure that, purely by virtue of the route by which refugees arrive here, they will not be subject to profound insecurity, at a time when we are committed to ending rough sleeping, levelling up the UK and defining the character of the nation we want to be.

As this is a probing amendment, I ask the Minister to clarify whether group 2 refugees would or would not be able to receive asylum support. Would they be subject to NRPF, even when qualifying for a destitution test? If so, what is the exact policy intent of NRPF for this group of people? How would group 2 refugees have been provided for during Covid, when they would not have had access to furlough or universal credit? Finally, in what way is the Government’s commitment to ending rough sleeping, and NRPF for group 2, compatible?

Welfare Reform and Work Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Stroud

Monday 7th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I hate to intervene, but I point out that the evidence to which my noble friend referred was the Department for Work and Pensions’ own evidence. However, at this point I will go back to the amendments, which I support, as we will have another chance to talk about the principle of these nasty clauses later. I just want to ask a couple of questions.

In the impact assessment and elsewhere the phrase is used:

“The Government will develop protections for women who have a third child as the result of rape, or other exceptional circumstances”.

We have not yet had any clue as to what those “other exceptional circumstances” might be. My noble friend Lady Sherlock has suggested that domestic violence should perhaps be one of them because of the coercion that can be involved in domestic violence and abuse, which are not just about physical abuse but emotional and financial abuse—a kind of controlling which is very relevant in this situation.

Points have already been made about the potential intrusiveness of the questioning that might be required to decide whether a woman has had a child as the result of rape. Can the Minister assure us that there will be no requirement either for a conviction or evidence of a police report for the claim to be accepted? As I understand it, according to Rape Crisis only 15% of victims of sexual violence make a police report, and we have already heard about the potential intrusiveness of any questioning there might be. I hope that the Minister might be able to tell us a bit more about what will happen.

Can he assure us that Jobcentre Plus staff will be trained to handle any such conversations sensitively and to provide women who report that they have been raped or assaulted with information about available support services? Will lessons be learned from the experience of women who were subject to very intrusive and deeply personal questioning about the paternity of their children when the requirement to co-operate was enforced under the Child Support Act 1991? As I understand it, extensive guidance was developed at the time but this rule was subsequently abandoned as unworkable. I suspect that the same will apply now.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I thought the House might just like an issue to be clarified. I have the document with me which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, referred to. While nobody in the Committee would want any child to be brought up in poverty, the evidence clearly displays that the two key main drivers for poverty in the UK are, first, long-term worklessness and low earning and, secondly, low parental qualifications. Therefore the first key driver is current poverty and the second is a clear indicator of future poverty.