Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who has put his case with the precision and succinctness that we remember of our late friend Lord Judge. These amendments would render the safety of Rwanda, which we hope will come in the future, a rebuttable presumption rather than an absolute conclusion. They echo my Amendment 34, which we discussed in the first group, but put more flesh on those bones. I commend them to the Committee.

I also remind the Committee that the amendments echo a finding by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. Ministers say that it is precedented and normal to have lists of safe countries in asylum statutes. That has been the case in the past, but in those past cases the consequence of being a safe country on a so-called and unfortunately coined white list of countries has been only a rebuttable presumption. So Ministers were wrong, for example, to say during the course of the Illegal Migration Act, “Nothing special here, nothing new”, when they said that it will be an absolute conclusion and irrebuttable presumption that any country is absolutely safe.

We need to amend this Bill in good faith. We need belts and braces. We will have to look at other provisions and amendments around how it is that we will judge when Rwanda becomes safe, as we all want it to be. In any event, even when all the experts in the world—the UNHCR, independent monitors, parliamentary committees —say that things have gone well in the last couple of years and that the treaty worked out, and how wrong we were to be so sceptical as things have gone so well, so quickly, and Rwanda is considered to be one of the safest countries in the world for its treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, it is still right in principle that the presumption of safety should be a rebuttable presumption and not an absolute conclusion that squeezes out the judgment of civil servants, Border Force and Ministers, or ousts the jurisdiction of our courts.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 30 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. I am grateful to them for their support and to Redress and RAMP for their help, and I refer here to my interests in the register.

This amendment would mean that Clause 2(1) and related subsections concerning the treatment of Rwanda as a safe country would not apply where

“torture … has taken place in Rwanda in the two years prior”,

or where the person concerned

“is themselves a survivor of torture”.

As such, it seeks to minimise the risk of torture arising from the Bill and to safeguard those who are survivors of torture.

The prohibition of torture is guaranteed by the UK through its ratification of various international and regional human rights instruments, particularly the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As a JCHR report on the Bill explains, UNCAT

“provides that a person cannot be removed to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.

The JCHR emphasis that this is

“a core principle of international law, to which the UK has committed itself on numerous occasions over the past 70 years”.

The existential significance of torture is underlined by a former UN special rapporteur on torture and professor of law, Juan E Méndez, who is himself a torture survivor. He says:

“Torture aims to dehumanise survivors through calculated acts of cruelty to remove the survivors’ dignity and make them powerless. It is a very serious human rights violation and an international crime. It is also a crime under UK national law, no matter where the torture was committed. Torture is forbidden under all circumstances and can never be justified”.


He is saying that this prohibition on torture is absolute and non-derogable, meaning that it cannot be suspended or restricted in any circumstances. This prohibition includes a ban on sending someone to a country where they are at risk of torture or where there is a possibility that they will be sent on to another third country where such a risk may exist. The amendment simply attempts to ensure that the first of these does not happen, while protecting those who have already been subjected to torture.

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton referred to the issue of torture in the context of refoulement on Monday. However, this amendment concerns torture in Rwanda itself. Redress asked me to table this amendment because of consistent reports of torture being used in Rwanda by the military and the police. According to Human Rights Watch’s submission to the International Agreements Committee, serious human rights abuses continue to occur in Rwanda, including repression of free speech, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and torture by Rwandan authorities.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Baroness Chakrabarti

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am rationing my interventions on Report to facilitate the early and many necessary Divisions. I know that other critics of this Bill are doing the same; I am grateful for that.

Given the events in the last century that led to the creation of the refugee convention, it is particularly distasteful that so much of the Bill seeks to rewrite the convention and its jurisprudence against the interests of the refugee. The Government protest otherwise, of course, but all the world’s leading scholars, practitioners and custodians disagree. I am glad to say that your Lordships’ House gave its own view on that general proposition very clearly earlier this week.

Clause 31 is a case in point. I support the right reverend Prelate’s amendments to it, not least because, among other things, they seek to delete the cross-referencing to Clause 34, which absolutely denies refuge to those who do not currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in part of their country. If one looks at the end of Clause 34, there is no discretion there at all. Although we are grateful for the Minister’s earlier comments about Ukraine, convention protection is based on international law, not exceptional executive largesse. If these clauses are not amended, a Ukrainian refugee might well be denied refuge on the basis that they could return to, for example, a part of their country that is not currently occupied or being bombarded by Russia. There is no discretion in Clause 34 at all, despite Ministers waxing lyrical about discretion and case-by-case analysis being so important. This is discretion that works against the refugee, with convolutions and contortions, when it would be for the courts to protect the refugee.

Another trick that has been used in Ministers’ speeches at various times during the passage of this Bill is talking about Parliament having the right to rewrite and interpret the convention—“Parliament this, Parliament that”. However, they use “Parliament” as a euphemism for “the Home Office”, and it is not. I believe I know what your Lordships’ House of Parliament thinks about that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, although I support all these amendments, I will speak only to Amendment 45, to which I have added my name. Once again, I thank Women for Refugee Women for its support with the amendment.

The right reverend Prelate has made the case for returning to Clause 32. I just want to pick up some points made by the Minister in Committee. He argued that it is difficult to attack the definition in Clause 32 as wrong, yet, in effect, that is what the Upper Tribunal did in the 2020 judgment referred to by the right reverend Prelate, when it confirmed that this approach to membership of a particular social group is contrary to the humanitarian objective of the refugee convention. Moreover, in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, dismissed this approach as a grave mistake that would cause grave injustice. Was he wrong?

Having listened to his less than convincing justification of the definition in Clause 32, I ask the Minister this: does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted, as the UNHCR and myriad civil society groups have warned? His answer in Committee—given loyally, if I may say so—was this:

“What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1452.]


I will repeat the question and ask the Minister to give us a clear “yes” or “no” answer, given that clarity is supposed to be what this clause is all about. Does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted—yes or no?