Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Report stage
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her Amendment 1, which addresses the thresholds proposed in the Bill. As she knows, we on these Benches have similarly expressed concern about the proposed threshold. This restricts the effect of Clause 3 to offenders sentenced to four years or more. Given the evident consensus against the current threshold, we on this side look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendments 2 and 3, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, raise interesting and entirely reasonable points, revealing potential gaps in the present legislation, so again I look forward to what the Minister will say.

This brings me to Amendment 4, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. It seeks to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 so that it applies to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences—and I emphasise “cruelty”, as it is not just about sexual offences. It should be noted that in respect of the Crime and Policing Bill we understand that the Government have tabled a new schedule, which lists child cruelty offences, taking the step of treating sex offenders and child cruelty offenders analogously. Our amendment uses the very same definition of child cruelty, so it is wholly consistent with the Government’s thinking.

Our amendment asks the Government only to take the same stance in this Bill to ensure that the parental responsibility of offenders is restricted when serious child cruelty has been committed. If the Government are not inclined to support this, we ask why. I ask the House again, regarding parental responsibility, why should our response to a child who has suffered cruelty differ from cases where a child has been sexually assaulted? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government appreciate that this group of amendments is driven by a desire to safeguard the children who are, quite rightly, at the centre of these difficult and sensitive cases. As I said in Committee, this aim is one I share.

Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to apply our proposed parental responsibility measures to as yet unborn children. There are complexities to this, because there are three distinct groups of as yet unborn children who would be caught by this measure. These are as follows: first, a child who has been conceived as a result of the rape of the victim by the defendant, but who is as yet unborn at the date of sentence; secondly, a child who has been conceived but is as yet unborn when their father is sentenced to four years’ or more imprisonment for a child sex offence; and, thirdly, a child who will be conceived at some point in the future but has not yet been conceived. Different considerations apply in relation to each.

We thank the noble Lords and the noble Baroness for their amendment because, in the course of our consideration of it, we have realised that an unborn child who has been conceived as a result of rape is not covered by Clause 4, as currently drafted, to which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred. As my honourable friend Minister Davies-Jones said in the other place, safeguards are in place through the family courts which could restrict parental responsibility in these cases, but it is a serious gap in Clause 4, and I have asked my officials to look further at this and consider how we can best protect this group of children. This is complex, and I cannot address it today, here and now, but I will write to your Lordships with an update on this as soon as I can.

The second group, to which I have already referred in outline, consists of women who are pregnant by a man at the time he is sentenced to four or more years’ imprisonment for a child sex offence. I appreciate that these children are likely to be at the same risk as the living children for whom he already holds parental responsibility. Again, in relation to that category, I have asked my officials to consider what approach may be possible in these cases.

It is the third group covered by this amendment that causes us difficulties. It refers to any or all future children of someone who has received a four-year sentence for a child sex offence, in perpetuity. This would cover a child conceived, say, 50 years after that sentence had been imposed and served. It is this last cohort of children that is the reason the Government cannot accept this amendment. We cannot know what the circumstances of each case will be for future children, particularly when decades may have passed between the sentence and their birth. We cannot, therefore, be sure that we are acting in the best interests of a child who may not be conceived for many decades hence by automatically preventing the offender acquiring parental responsibility.

It is important that I restate what has already been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton: these measures are not an additional punishment for the offender. The point of them is to offer rapid protection to the offender’s existing children who are deemed to be at an immediate risk, right then and right there, in the Crown Court. That is why under the Government’s proposals, the restriction can and should happen automatically, at the point of sentence—but a child conceived many years later is a much more complicated and challenging proposition. In general terms, the proper place to make decisions about the welfare of future children is in the family court, so in most cases it is the family court where these applications should be determined.

As I have said before, criminal court judges do not have the training, the experience or, frankly, the time to consider, in each individual case, whether the restriction of parental responsibility is in the best interests of that particular child. That kind of consideration should be made by the expert and experienced judges of the family court—judges such as the much-respected noble Lord, Lord Meston—who will have the benefit of reports from, for example, expert social workers. It is self-evident that this kind of determination cannot be made in advance of the child’s birth, possibly many decades in advance.

Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and probably other noble Lords are aware, parental responsibility can be acquired in multiple ways, and while it may be the noble Lord’s intention that this amendment should apply only to parents who automatically acquire parental responsibility, it would not prevent an unmarried father obtaining parental responsibility for future children by being named on the birth certificate if the mother wished to do so. It is a fact that not all mothers accept the guilt of their partners, even post-conviction and sentence. This would create a situation in which some offenders could never acquire parental responsibility for a future child without a separate order being made, while others could. That would be a significant inconsistency in the law which we cannot accept. For these reasons, we cannot accept this amendment, but again I thank your Lordships for bringing to my attention cases where the mother is pregnant at the time of sentencing. Those unborn children require protection, and we will look at how best to provide it.

I turn to Amendment 3, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell. This amendment seeks to create mandatory bail conditions preventing defendants contacting children for whom they hold parental responsibility while they are under investigation or awaiting trial on bail. We all want to ensure that children are protected when a parent has been accused of a serious sexual offence, but the Government cannot accept this amendment. Existing legislation already provides the police and courts with powers to impose robust bail conditions, which can include requirements not to have any unsupervised access to children and not to live and sleep at an address where children are living, and it is absolutely standard for there to be a condition not to contact prosecution witnesses, including children, in a case where those children are giving evidence. If there is a real danger to witnesses or to children, it is very likely that bail will be refused. However, in the real world, there will be some cases in which there is plainly no risk to the suspect’s children, so to remove the judge’s discretion would probably be incompatible with Article 8.

As the law stands, there are no mandatory bail conditions of any kind for any type of offence. To start introducing them would restrict the important discretion of the police and courts to apply conditions on a case-by-case basis to address real risks. It would also interfere with the presumption of innocence and the presumption of entitlement to bail, both of which underpin our whole criminal justice system. The amendment also seeks to impose a condition which would require the accused to disclose the nature of any bail conditions imposed to the family court while they are under investigation or on trial if there are existing children proceedings. The joint protocol on the disclosure of information between family and criminal agencies and jurisdictions already provides a clear framework for the sharing of information, so there is no need for such a statutory provision. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I have had a number of very useful conversations with the noble Baroness, whom I greatly admire, and I understand the aim of this amendment. I think and hope that she understands that I share her wish to protect as many children as possible, but Clause 3 is not a marker for when parental responsibility should be restricted; it is about when such a restriction should happen automatically at the point of sentence—that is to say, without the usual consideration by the family court. Any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise parental responsibility, but to restrict it automatically, we must be certain that the restriction is in that child’s best interests. The seriousness of the offences in scope of our measure, marked by a sentence of four years or more, ensures that we can be confident, in those cases, that that is the case.

That is not to say that an offender who has committed sexual offences against children but has received a sentence of less than four years’ imprisonment cannot or should not have their parental responsibility restricted; in some cases, that will be exactly what should happen, but an application to restrict parental responsibility can then be made to the family courts in exactly the same way as it can be now. They will consider all the circumstances of the case and make a decision in the child’s best interests.

Amendment 4 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to introduce an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility for offenders convicted of child cruelty and sentenced to imprisonment of four years or more. The Government believe the aim of this amendment is sound and principled; child cruelty offences are heinous, and we all wish to protect as many children as possible, so we understand why the noble and learned Lord seeks to extend the Government’s measures.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the important amendments in this group address real issues for victims and victim support. Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, seeks to introduce independent victim navigators on a national basis to act as a liaison between the police and victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. The principle behind this amendment has force. Victims of these offences often face complex barriers to accessing support. To navigate the criminal justice system can be daunting for those who have experienced exploitation or coercion. This specific service is needed. The amendment reflects recommendations made by your Lordships’ Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. We on these Benches therefore hope that the Government will give careful consideration to the proposal, and we look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Polak, introduced so eloquently by him and echoed by my noble friend Lord Farmer and others, likewise focuses on strengthening the framework of support available to victims. It places a duty on relevant authorities to commission sufficient and specific services for victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence and child criminal exploitation. The principle that victims should have access to appropriate and specialised services is widely shared across this House. To ensure that support provision responds to the varied needs of victims, including children and those with particular vulnerabilities, is an important objective. My noble friend’s Amendment 7 also draws on the recommendations made by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. It seeks to translate those recommendations into a more structured system of support. These are serious matters that deserve careful reflection. We hope that the Government will consider the intent behind this amendment with that in mind.

Amendments 11 to 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, address different but no less important aspects of victim support. They include support for caregivers of victims, access to restorative justice services, and the assessment of their use. Each of these raises serious issues about how the criminal justice system supports victims and those adversely affected by crime. It is important to do something in this direction. They highlight questions around the availability of services, the role of restorative justice and the broader framework through which victims are to be assisted. They all deserve serious consideration. Again, I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 6, in the names of my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would require the Government to implement independent modern slavery victim navigators in every police force in England and Wales, and would also define their functions.

The Government welcome the interest shown in modern slavery and in providing assistance to survivors. I am grateful to my noble friend for meeting me to discuss the issue, and I was pleased to meet Eleanor Lyons, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I have also been extended an invitation irresistibly put by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I hope that I can respond in an equally irresistible manner by saying that of course I will make a commitment to meeting, particularly since I think that I am committing my noble friend Lord Hanson to doing so, rather than myself. If, however, it is me, I shall be delighted to meet Restitute and, indeed, would be genuinely interested to do so.

I am sorry to disappoint noble Lords, but the Government cannot accept this amendment because it would duplicate existing services, so statutory funding is not an effective use of taxpayers’ money. We are not saying that victim navigators, who are widely valued, cannot or should not be used. They are already successfully funded through police and crime commissioners, through central government grants such as the Ministry of Justice’s victims fund and through charitable donations. Of course local areas can continue to use them: it is right that each local area should determine their value and provide funding if it is appropriate to do so. Each police force, and other law enforcement bodies, such as the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, has the autonomy to fund a victim navigator if it is considered a necessary resource to help it carry out its functions.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will start first with Amendment 8, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier but introduced so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause. It would require a review of how domestic and overseas victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences could be better compensated. Crucially, such a review must look into how this can be done without the need for civil proceedings, which we all know would be drawn-out, expensive and not always fruitful. I have supported this concept since my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier first started arguing for it: certainly as long as I have been in the House and since I was a member of the Select Committee inquiry into fraud four years ago. Something must be done.

We hope that the Government have given this serious consideration since Committee and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what steps the Government are taking to address the issue and whether conclusions will be reported to Parliament. Warm words—which we have heard—butter no parsnips. We on this side want to hear that something will be done. If it is true that a review has been offered that will report in 2028, that is far too long. As Mr McEnroe would say, “You cannot be serious”.

Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, also addresses an important issue that we should not overlook. The amendment creates a clarification to support recognition of certain forms of online-only child abuse. It would bring them into the scope of recognition of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. We can only ask, “Why on earth not?” As I said in Committee, the scheme must keep pace with the way in which and the places in which criminal activity now takes place. We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 8, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Marks, has been spoken to most persuasively, as ever, by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I too join him in thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his ongoing commitment to this matter. I am sorry he is not in his place today, but he and I met recently with my noble friend Lord Hanson to talk about this in more detail.

There is a review and it is a priority for all of us, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his continued drive to champion victims and his expertise in this matter. The Government take the compensation of victims of economic crime very seriously. We are committed to ensuring that, wherever possible, funds are taken from criminals and returned to victims. As I have said on several other occasions and will not repeat now, there are several existing mechanisms that enable compensation for victims of economic crime. We accept that they are either not used sufficiently or they do not go far enough.

The Government have an existing public commitment through the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 to review UK policies and procedures for compensating victims of foreign bribery. There is a review; it is comprehensive and I have happy news for the noble Lord, Lord Murray: it is not 2028 but 2027—and that is next year. I understand the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to see this matter addressed as soon as possible and I completely understand his frustration, which he has expressed both in this Chamber and privately when we met, but given the existing review and the other current and future measures, the Government do not believe that it is appropriate for a legislatively required review to be introduced at this time.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.

The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.

This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.

Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.

The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.

The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.

Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.

Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.

The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.

The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.

Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.

It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.

The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.

Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.

Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.

If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.

In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.

Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have

“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,

even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.

This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.

The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.

Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.

In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.

I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.

A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.

We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.

It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.

Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.

We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.

I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.

There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.

I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.

Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.

I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.

The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.

For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.

I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.

Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.

Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.

We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.

The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.

For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.

The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.

This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.

I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.

However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.

Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, once again in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seek to give a victim or a bereaved family a defined role in the process of ordering someone to attend their sentencing hearing.

Victims have been at the forefront of this measure. It is precisely because an offender’s refusal to attend sentencing can compound the trauma for victims that we are giving judges an express power to order attendance, building on the judge’s existing common-law powers. Whether to order attendance must remain a judicial assessment of what is in the interests of justice. It will be made case by case, with the judge retaining the ultimate discretion having considered all the circumstances.

As I said when responding to the previous group, we anticipate that judges who are considering making an attendance order will hear submissions from both prosecution and defence. Prosecuting counsel will inevitably be expected to advance the views of the victim and the family, having sought them beforehand and having asked them; I can tell the Committee from my own experience that if they have not spoken to the victim or the victim’s family, the judge is likely to tell them to go away and do so—so it happens now. If there is no victim personal statement, the judge will, in my experience, inevitably say, “Why isn’t there one? Does the victim want to make one?” I can tell the Committee, again from my own experience, that the views of victims and their families are given great weight by the judge.

That said, we are anxious not to create unrealistic expectations in the minds of victims or their families that they would have the right to require the offender’s attendance at court. That could lead to some difficult experiences for victims and their families. What if, for example, the judge were to find that the offender had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance but the family of the victim disagreed? Plainly, the judge’s decision would have to prevail, but at what cost to the family if they had believed that they had the right to require attendance? We do not want to make sentencing hearings any more stressful or distressing for victims than they already are.

Judges must have the discretion to do what is right based on the facts in front of them and the submissions that they hear. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of victims or families for the offender to be in court, including the occasions—thankfully rare—when the offender is likely to be disruptive or disrespectful and cause further distress.

To place a statutory duty on the court to consult a victim whenever an order is not made risks creating additional delay at the point of sentence. What, for example, if the victim’s family have chosen not to attend court, yet there is a mandatory statutory duty upon the judge to find out and consult them? As I have already said, the one thing that the Crown Courts do not need is any additional delay. In addition, such a statutory requirement risks placing an additional unnecessary emotional burden on victims and families.

The Bill preserves judicial discretion. We expect judges to take account of all relevant circumstances, including victims’ interests, and we are confident that they will do so because that is what they already do. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to this short but thoughtful debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This debate has underlined how crucial these provisions are to the overall purpose of the Bill, why they warrant close attention and the balance that may have to be struck. We must, of course, get this right.

The Bill was brought forward with the express purpose of strengthening victims’ rights and improving their experience of the criminal justice system. But, as drafted, if we are not careful, victims will remain on the sidelines of a key decision-making process: whether an order should be made to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. If the Bill does not allow victims to make explicit requests for compelled attendance then it will fall short of its own purpose and logic.

Notwithstanding the Minister’s assurance as to what happens in practice so far as the CPS is concerned—or happened when she was sitting in the Crown Court—surely it should be made obligatory for the CPS to ask the victim whether they wish the defendant to be compelled to attend and, if in receipt of a positive answer, to pass that view to the court. It will then be for the judge.

The current position is that judges have discretion to use their powers to compel attendance, even without a request from the prosecution, but we suggest that it is not clear when judges would exercise that power. We look to Ministers to confirm that—whether from them or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pressed for, from the judiciary—there should be guidance as to the exercise of the powers. We would also be grateful if the Minister would outline the reasoning behind why these orders are not automatic in the event of non-attendance and when reasonable force can be safely administered.

Our amendments offer a simple and straightforward improvement. They would have ensured that victims could make such requests and are consulted where the court is minded not to make a compulsory order, regardless of whether they had made the request. Sentencing hearings are often the final opportunity for victims to be heard and to feel that they are heard, so why would we deprive them of a say in decisions that directly shape that experience? Victims’ voices must be embedded in the process; they should not be treated as merely passive observers.

We have also observed that where a victim has died or is incapacitated, the system must not simply move on without them. Family members or appropriate representatives should be consulted in their place. We hope the Minister will carefully reflect on the points raised today to help fulfil the Bill’s stated purpose and fill what I am sure are unintentional gaps in its drafting. We look forward to hearing how the Government intend to move forward in due course but, for the moment, we will not press these amendments.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35, standing in both my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, would insert a new clause into the Bill to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 beyond serious sexual offending so that it also applied to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences. In effect, it would mirror Clause 3.

Before I address the amendment in detail, I want to place on record my thanks to Helen Grant, Member of Parliament, for her tireless work on this issue. Over a number of years and across several Bills, she has consistently drawn Parliament’s attention to a clear and troubling gap in our safeguarding framework—that is, the absence of a coherent, systematic response to the most serious forms of child cruelty. Her campaigns for a child cruelty register and her persistence in ensuring that these issues remain firmly on the parliamentary agenda are no doubt something that all noble Lords can both respect and support.

Clause 3 introduces an important and welcome provision for the protection of children. The logic is compelling: where conduct is so grave that it demonstrates a fundamental incompatibility with the exercise of parental responsibility, there should be an automatic safeguarding mechanism. Amendment 35 asks a simple but profound question: why should that logic apply only to sexual offences and not to other, most serious forms of child cruelty?

The new clause proposed by the amendment would mirror the architecture of Clause 3 in many ways. It would introduce a duty on the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order where an offender with parental responsibility was convicted and sentenced for a defined list of serious child cruelty offences. The threshold for such offences would be a custodial sentence of two years or more. We suggest that that is an appropriate balance between protection and practicability.

These offences have been carefully selected and reflect those on Helen Grant’s proposed child cruelty register, for which the Government have previously expressed support. They embrace serious crimes such as causing or allowing the death or serious harm of a child, child cruelty and neglect, infanticide, certain offences under the Offences Against the Person Act where the victim is a child, and offences relating to female genital mutilation, FGM. During the Crime and Policing Bill, the noble Baroness said,

“Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 250.].

The offences set out in this amendment strike at the very heart of a child’s safety and well-being. It is only right that a prohibited steps order be imposed.

If the Government truly believe in acting to prevent child cruelty, then to reject this amendment would be to defend an inconsistency in the current framework which we say is difficult to justify. A parent convicted of a serious sexual offence might automatically be prevented from exercising parental responsibility, while a parent convicted of causing severe physical harm or life-threatening neglect may not be. From the child’s perspective, that distinction is artificial. The harm is real, the risk is real and the need for safeguarding is just as acute. This amendment does not undermine family life unnecessarily. It does not sever parental responsibility permanently. It simply ensures that in the most serious cases, no steps may be taken by the offender without the oversight and consent of the family courts. They are best placed to make decisions concerning welfare and long-term outcomes. The amendment would bring coherence to the Bill and align it with the broader safeguarding principles that Parliament has repeatedly endorsed.

This amendment is motivated by a simple proposition. Children who have suffered the most serious forms of cruelty deserve the same automatic safeguarding protections as those who have suffered serious sexual abuse. I commend this amendment to the Committee and urge the Government to engage constructively with it, in the same spirit in which Clause 3 itself was conceived. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the automatic restriction of a person’s parental responsibility is a novel change to the law and must be done in a responsible and proportionate manner. The Government want to understand how these new measures operate in practice before we consider expanding the scope to other offences. We will carefully monitor how the provision operates once it is implemented and, as part of that implementation, officials will develop a system to help us understand the impact the measures are having, how the measures work in practice and how we can make improvements. For cases not in scope of the measure, whether that is because they fall outside the four-year threshold that has previously been debated or because they involve different crimes such as child cruelty, there are existing routes available in the family courts to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. It is our evaluation that it is right that children are protected in that way while we evaluate the effect of the measures in the Bill. For these reasons I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I find that an interesting reply. No reasons are given other than that this is novel. The provisions in Clause 3 are themselves novel, and all we ask is that where a serious offence of cruelty has been committed in respect of a child, that should be sufficient reason to adopt the same approach as that taken with sexual assault. What is the difference in practice for the child between being sexually assaulted and suffering cruelty? Having said that, we hear what is said and will engage with the Minister between now and Report, but we will wish to consider the position on Report.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Goudie, for bringing forward the amendments.

Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, proposes a new clause that seeks to place a duty on relevant authorities to commission support services for caregivers of victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence or exploitation. The amendment would ensure that those with responsibility for the victims are not overlooked by the system and have access to the appropriate support. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as to how the amendment could be delivered and might function in practice.

Amendments 43 and 44 would introduce new clauses concerning restorative justice. These build on the provisions in the Bill, better to enable victims to explain the impact of a crime to the offender and to participate meaningfully in the justice process. Some victims engage with restorative justice services, but such engagement must be voluntary. Victims should not be placed under any pressure to engage further with the offender. None the less, there are findings showing that these services reduce the likelihood of offenders reoffending and can result in other social benefits, including delivering value for money. We on this side are interested to hear from the Minister how the Government will ensure that services such as these are used where it is thought they are likely to be beneficial.

Amendment 45 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, seeks to implement the recommendation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee that victim navigators be rolled out nationally so that they are available in all cases. In response to that recommendation, the Government stated in December 2024 that they want to build on the research of the previous Government on how best to support victims. In addition, the Government said they had met the NGOs delivering the victim navigator programme to understand its impact and to explore options for expansion. We have also heard an authoritative and persuasive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who obviously has real hands-on experience in this area. We should listen carefully to what he has to say, and I hope the Minister will speak to him and engage with him.

We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister on what further research has been undertaken and what conclusions the Government have reached since then. I reiterate my thanks to noble Lords for raising these important issues, all of which speak to the purpose of the Bill: to ensure that victims receive the support and services they deserve throughout their journey through the justice system.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I shall speak first to Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. While entirely understanding the motivation for the amendment, the Government believe that it would be neither necessary nor helpful to place a statutory obligation on certain authorities to commission certain support services for this cohort. In a world of finite resources, that would prioritise provision to third parties.

I reassure the noble Baronesses that the parents and carers of victims of abuse and exploitation can already access support services. The funding that the Ministry of Justice provides to the Rape and Sexual Abuse Support Fund and to police and crime commissioners can be, and is, used to commission specific support services for parents and carers.

Parents and carers will often access services that the victim themselves is accessing, particularly where the victim is a child. Parents and carers of victims of crime can also seek mental health support or other support through local services and the NHS. Having said this, I recognise that more can be done to support this cohort. As part of the violence against women and girls strategy, this Government has committed up to £50 million to transform support for victims of child sexual abuse through expanding the use of child houses. These are incredible places, as anybody who has had a chance to visit the one in London can tell you. They offer vital wraparound support to non-abusing parents and carers in one physical location. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has founded the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse to develop an online directory of support services for those affected by child sexual abuse. This can be easily navigated to identify services for parents and carers and other affected adults.

I turn now to Amendments 43 and 44 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Jones and Lady Hamwee. This Government recognise the positive impact that restorative justice can have in appropriate cases and are very grateful to the restorative justice providers who continue to offer this important service. We agree that when delivered in the right circumstances restorative justice can improve victim satisfaction, reduce reoffending and bring benefits to victims, offenders and their communities. Under the current victims’ code, victims must be told about restorative justice services when reporting a crime, but we have been told that this may be too early—we are listening— and that is why under the new code consultation launched last week we are retaining this but have proposed an additional entitlement for the victim to be told about restorative justice again after an offender has been convicted. We look forward to engaging stakeholders during the code consultation.

Where services are available and victims and offenders are willing, referrals are already made, and that is supported through PCC-funded local services alongside our facilitation of restorative justice across prisons and probation. However, placing referral to restorative justice for all victims on a statutory footing, in our view, is neither necessary nor appropriate. Restorative justice self-evidently requires the consent and participation of both parties and the safety and welfare of those involved is paramount. Automatic referral is therefore not always suitable. For example, a victim of stalking who has fought tooth and nail to end all contact might understandably see the offer of restorative justice as, at best, insensitive and, at worst, a way in which the perpetrator in their case could continue their campaign.

The Government already monitor delivery. PCCs submit biannual reports as part of the MoJ grant management process, providing insight into victim support services, including restorative justice. Many PCC police and crime plans also set out clear commitments to supporting restorative justice. In our view, introducing a further national assessment would simply duplicate these existing measures. As we prepare for upcoming changes to the PCC commissioning model, we will explore changes to the delivery of victims’ funding, including restorative justice, to ensure that this is delivered in the best way in the future while avoiding unnecessary statutory requirements. For these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to not to press her amendments.

I turn now to Amendment 45 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We value the excellent work delivered by Justice and Care through its victim navigator programme. This Government are committed to ensuring that victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are supported to help rebuild their lives and to engage with the criminal justice system to bring those who have exploited them to justice. We recognise the positive impact that tailored support can have on securing victim engagement, and that is why we have already put provision in place across a number of areas important for supporting prosecutions. Adult victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are already supported by the modern slavery victim care contacts in England and Wales. That is where they have access to a dedicated support worker who will support them to help access legal aid, legal advice and legal representation and assistance during criminal proceedings.

The Home Office is also in the process of procuring the new support for victims of modern slavery contract for adults. To support child victims of exploitation and modern slavery, the government-funded independent child trafficking guardian service provides specialist modern slavery support and advocacy, across two-thirds of local authorities in England and Wales, to child victims and professionals who work with them. This includes help for the child to navigate the complexities of the criminal justice system. An invitation to tender for the national contract, which covers all of England and Wales from 2027, is currently live. Because of the existing provision, the Government do not consider it necessary to enact an additional statutory requirement to fund independent victim navigators, as this would duplicate the support services they have already put in place. I hope that, in the light of this, my noble friend will feel able not to press her amendment.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing forward their amendments and helping to shape what has been a valuable debate about the issue of just compensation for victims.

Amendment 40, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, raises an important concern about how the victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences can be better compensated both domestically and abroad. Indeed, I have heard his arguments on more than one occasion before and never failed to be persuaded by them.

These crimes do not just inflict monetary loss on victims; they often involve sophisticated deception. They can cause significant psychological distress, emotional trauma and lasting insecurity. More widely, they undermine trust in our society, and so deserve the Government’s attention. The Government must look carefully at my noble and learned friend’s suggestions for a review. It could be important and beneficial for the City of London, as a centre of finance of worldwide renown. If we can take the lead on this, that would be an encouragement to people to do business here.

This brings me to Amendment 67, in my name. I should say that a gremlin came in here—and I am not blaming the typist. Where it says:

“Sentencing guidelines on court fines”,


it should of course say compensation orders. The amendment is intended to correct an imbalance for victims. Its purpose is clear: to ensure that victims are compensated properly, according to the actual value of items stolen. This principle would apply in cases of fraud, burglary or theft, and in any other crime which has resulted in a victim suffering financial loss. The responsibility for repayment should be put squarely on the offender through the issuing of compensation orders. It is only right and just that offenders pay back the value of what they have stolen to their victims. There should be a direct link, so that offenders fully face up to the consequences of their actions in a real and logical way.

This measure is simply proportionate. At present, offenders may not be made even to begin to compensate for the damage inflicted, which only adds further insult to injury. To correct this imbalance, the amendment would require the Sentencing Council to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines within 18 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. This would lead to a more consistent approach across cases, and sentencing would recognise and account for the amount actually taken or lost. Justice for victims should be material, not merely symbolic. That would help to strengthen public confidence in our courts. We urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the amendment.

Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, concern the criminal injuries compensation scheme. The former seeks to broaden its eligibility to all victims of child abuse; the latter aims to bring online-only child sexual abuse into the scope of recognition of the scheme. It is important that the scheme keeps apace with the evolving landscape in which criminal activity now takes place. All victims must be properly supported, with access to the appropriate mechanisms for compensation and redress. I look forward to hearing the response of the Minister, on how the scheme can be updated.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords—

Trials: Timeliness

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises an interesting point. I can understand why it could be seen that the responses to the riots had been prioritised, but there are many reasons why those prosecutions took place very quickly. The first is that many of the cases were straightforward and could be dealt with in a magistrates’ court; the second is that, in relation to many of them, the evidence was very strong and people pleaded guilty; and the third is that the decisions involved were made by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the independent judiciary. The Government made sure that they had the resources if they needed them, but no pressure was put on them to decide how to do it.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

Recent data from the Criminal Bar Association shows substantial regional variations in trial delays. What specific steps are being taken to reduce these geographic disparities in trial delays?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. It is an interesting point. For example, the delays are much worse in central London than they are in Wales. There can be all kinds of reasons for that. I have already said that a trial, as the noble Lord knows, is a complicated factor. There are difficulties because you cannot just, for example, ship cases out to somewhere else; we cannot send a whole lot of London’s cases out to Cardiff because of the effect on victims, witnesses and defendants and the movement around of people within the prison estate. But it is important to look to see where lessons can be learned from other parts of the country and to see whether they are doing things that could be imported to other parts of the country so that we can do better there.

Financial Provision on Divorce

Debate between Baroness Levitt and Lord Sandhurst

Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I hesitate to interrupt, but does the Minister not appreciate that marriage is a status but non-marriage is not a status, and that the time has come for the two to be looked at separately: divorce on the one hand and how you look after those in other relationships on the other? The Law Commission has done a lot of work and the ground has been laid. We can go down parallel paths, but they should not be linked and heard at the same time. I see everyone else in this Chamber nodding.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am afraid I am going to have to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, because our assessment is that looking at these matters piecemeal will run the risk of creating new disputes and injustices. In the end, it is about making sure principally that children are protected when the relationships from which they are born end up dissolving.

I assure the noble and learned Baroness—