Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Monday 1st December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my voice in support of Amendment 1A, which proposes a new Clause 1. All of us in your Lordships’ House and in the other place speak with one voice when we say that the intent of the Bill is good. We are as one in our agreement that the overarching ideal is to eradicate the festering sore of modern slavery from our society.

The reason we are gathered together on this is the outrage that burns within each of us that children can be spirited across borders against their will; that girls, boys, women and men are forced into sexual servitude; that some in our country have to work back-breaking hours for little or no pay, with the promise of only a beating if they try to escape; and that in this day and age, when so much progress has been secured, so many still live lives under the violent control of others, exploited for their labour and robbed of any free will or hope. However, it is not for our outrage that the Bill should exist. The current Bill suggests that our primary objective is to punish the perpetrators. While I understand that our first outraged impulse may be to punish the perpetrators in anger for their inhumanity, we must remember that we are acting for the humanity of the victims—for the thousands in this country and millions around the world who are locked away, isolated and invisible.

At Second Reading, I explained my view that all the people we represent in this country—whether they are born here or not—are our children. This perspective should set our standard for how victims should be treated: with compassion for their suffering and the will to give them a chance of a better future. It means, first, ensuring that victims are recognised and treated by public organisations, including the police, as victims, not criminals. This should be done not only out of compassion but from necessity, because without victims’ co-operation we will never secure the convictions we need to end modern slavery. It means putting their interests first in the process of tackling the perpetrators. As I mentioned earlier, Anthony Steen, the Government’s former special envoy on human trafficking, has made it clear that only a Bill with victims’ interests at its heart will be effective in enforcement. It means the Government considering the potential impact of their broader legislation, rather than instigating measures such as the 2012 visa changes for overseas domestic workers, which dramatically increased the risk of domestic slavery. It means the Government doing more, through the proposed anti-slavery commissioner and in partnership with other organisations, to help victims recover and build new lives of dignity and opportunity.

Saying this is not to suggest that we should not punish perpetrators: of course we must. It is to say that the overriding purpose of the Bill is to free those of our children who are enslaved and to work to ensure that there will be no more. The Bill is about them. That is why I support this amendment to create a new Clause 1. To repeat my words of two weeks ago, we must send a clear message to the boys, girls, men and women who are currently enslaved, living lives where hope becomes more distant and the future more bleak. We will not let you live lives without dignity, without rights, without a future worth living. You are our children, too. This amendment is one part of that message and it should have the support of this House.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I underscore what the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, has just said about the reason for the Bill. However, one has to remember that the idea of introducing laws to enable prosecutions to take place is not primarily for the purpose of having prosecutions: it is for the purpose of preventing conduct that is subject to prosecution. In so far as it is successful, it will do that. The number of prosecutions that happen under an Act is not necessarily the best test of whether the Act has been successful. If the conduct which is penalised under the Act stops, that is the best kind of success you can have, and with no prosecutions at all you are even better off.

I entirely accept the view that the Bill should clearly be dealing with the complete amelioration of the tragic circumstances of those who are subject to slavery, trafficking or exploitation. However, I wonder a little about the way in which the proposed new clause is constructed. First, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that judges of a Family Division know exactly what is meant by the “best interests” of the child in relation to disputes between parents about the child’s future. However, this is a more difficult issue. I shall make another point about that in a minute. To what extent does the court have power to determine the future circumstances of a victim of slavery, for example? That is a very important aspect of securing the best interests of the victim. I think we all would like to see the best interests of the victim secured but how you go about that, and which powers the court needs to secure that, is something we need to hear a little more about.

Secondly, I find it hard to distinguish between the circumstances in proposed new subsection (1) and those in proposed new subsection (2). I think that the court is a public authority. However, the power is based on interpretation by the court. The court has to interpret the provisions in such a way as to secure the best interests of the victim, whereas in proposed new subsection (2), it is a question of the public authorities and the Secretary of State, in exercising the powers given by the Bill and, ultimately, the Act, having the power to secure the best interests of the victim. I find it hard to know why that should be different and why proposed new subsections (1) and (2) should not have exactly the same framework. I do not object at all to the court being specially mentioned as one of the public authorities, but the powers conferred by proposed new subsection (2) would be better from the point of view of achieving the result in question.

There seems to be a somewhat unnecessary elaboration in proposed new subsection (3). It starts saying what the personal circumstances are but then gives up and refers to anything else that is relevant. Starting to make a definition that you cannot effectively complete strikes me as possibly unnecessary. If a new clause of this kind were to be incorporated, possibly with some elaboration, it may be wise to leave it at the personal circumstances of the victim.