Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord the sponsor for his response, and I agree with him on Clause 1(1), as I said. However, my amendment seeks to bring the same precise language to subsections (2) and (3), because the conditions are not set out in the same way as they are in subsection (1); they are more descriptive. I tabled the amendments for that reason.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

They are more descriptive, but the provisions say “must” each time. Clause 32 says that someone can escape the consequences of the Suicide Act only if they have complied with all the provisions. I in no way disagree with the point that the noble Baroness is making but, as a drafting legal matter, I think it is covered.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Is the “must” there only a “may”?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am sorry; I did not quite get that.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I find the “must” in Clause 1(3) a bit puzzling. The noble and learned Lord can see that it reads:

“The steps to be taken under sections 8, 10, 11 and 19 must be taken … when the terminally ill person is in England or Wales, and … in the case of the steps under sections 10 and 11, by persons in England or Wales”.


My question of clarification is whether the steps in Sections 8, 10, 11 and 19 must be taken; is it not that they only may be taken?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

It is. The reason the two are different is that Clause 1(2) describes what is coming later in Clauses 8 to 30; Clause 1(3) is a mandatory requirement that the steps that come later have to take place when the person is in England or Wales. So they do different things. Subsection (2) is descriptive, and subsection (3) is a legal requirement. I am very happy to say that the shadow Attorney-General is nodding, which is very strengthening on this.

The one point that I have not dealt with properly, or at all, is that which the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, made about the interaction between the Mental Health Act and the Bill. I was not sure which specific amendment she was referring to; it may have been Amendment 38, but I do not know. However, as far as I can see, there is no legal difficulty in this Bill sitting with the Mental Health Act because, as long as these conditions are satisfied, the patient is entitled to have an assisted death. There is nothing in the Mental Health Act that would prevent that. I am more than happy to have a more detailed conversation with the noble Baroness and Professor Ruck Keene, if she wishes to bring him along and he is willing to come.

I hope that I have dealt with every amendment put forward.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support all six sub-paragraphs in the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, and is supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey. However, I urge that there should be an additional sub-paragraph. As they stand, the sub-paragraphs in Amendment 30 provide a checklist to help those deciding whether to allow an assisted suicide to go ahead to determine whether the person has been led to the decision by an improper type of motivation.

Some of the types of motivation listed here are improper because, if permitted, they would risk leading to a situation where people, under some circumstances, are pressed or influenced into suicide as a way of solving social problems. We have heard quite a bit about that today.

My extra subclause mentions families explicitly and would add to the idea of not being a burden on the family that of not causing distress. It is all too easy to imagine families pressing, influencing, perhaps coercing, an ill person into a suicide they do not genuinely desire by appealing to altruistic feelings that they do not want to be a burden or to cause distress, especially to those they most love. Even worse, it is all too easy to imagine how, in the dismal future of a world where the Bill becomes law—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Just so that I can properly respond to this, which amendment in the group is this addressed to?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

It is addressed to Amendment 30ZA amending Amendment 30. It is on page 2 of Today’s Lists.

It is all too easy imagine such appeals by a family to altruistic feelings. They do not want to cause distress or be a burden, especially to those they most love. In the dismal world where the Bill has become law, such ways of thinking will have become a social norm. That is very easy to imagine.

My amendment is designed to make that future a little less dismal, by putting in an obstacle to this insidious form of coercion by those the person in question may love most.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

This is not a technical point, but the way the amendment is drafted is very confusing. If your mental illness makes you come to this conclusion, that may well go to capacity. I am not clear what is being got at in relation to the mental health issue. However, if the position is that you may have a mental health condition but are perfectly capable of making a decision, you should be allowed to make it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this group. I am very grateful for the attention focused on the problems that people face in their lives, particularly those who have exceptional difficulties in exercising freedoms that we, as has been pointed out, all take for granted.

This suite of amendments sought to try to restrict the possibility of others pressurising people, particularly people in this very difficult position, to take a decision to seek assisted suicide under the Bill which they might not otherwise have taken had they had the support and had they not had the disabilities which have been mentioned in these amendments. They also seek to restrict the Bill to those who wanted to relieve pain only.

I am afraid I have been a bit disappointed, if I may say, with the noble and learned Lord the sponsor. In stressing autonomy and choice by one person, he is, I fear—perhaps inadvertently—neglecting the autonomy and choice of those who may want to live with their disability, with whatever ailment they have been born with or developed over their life but are facing terminal illness. We are concentrating on the autonomy of the person, but we are not giving enough attention in the Bill, I fear, to those who feel pressure, who feel they are a burden and who wish to avoid causing distress to those they love.

In doing so, we are doing a great disservice to the men and women of this country who do not want to be a burden to those they love. That burden is increased by virtue of the cost of living and the difficulties they have in making choices. We are putting the choice of those who want it and who have firm, clear intent, over those who may not wish to do it but feel pressured for the reasons of their life and their circumstances into doing so. I shall withdraw my amendment for now, but I hope to bring it back, if the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, wishes to bring hers back, and support the other amendments in this group.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Yes, we should get the information from those responsible for the care of the individual in a health sense. However, I am not willing to commit myself to that in relation to the family. The person making the decision should think, “What should we do about the family?”—but what if the patient has not seen their family for a long time or are at odds with particular family members? I believe that it should be done very much on a case-by-case basis.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord thought that it was ludicrous that a patient would see the same doctor. Is it ludicrous, in his view, that, on average, 3.5% of consultations between a patient and a doctor are face to face? Is it ludicrous that we should expect those consultations to be with the same doctor?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise for interrupting at this stage. This has been a very good debate, and it might be helpful if I indicate what my position in relation to this is. The thinking behind 18 is that that is the age at which you can make your own decisions about medical care. If you are suffering from a terminal illness, you can decide at 18 whether you want to withdraw treatment, for example, or what the treatment should be.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, we were aware of the different views about when your brain and maturity develop, and what the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, said is absolutely correct—she read Sarah-Jayne Blakemore’s view—in that these age cut-offs that the law imposes generally are not based upon a close study of neurology; they are the law’s attempt to reflect maturity. I am indeed very aware of the fact that if you are 18, you may be more emotionally impulsive and more easily influenced than somebody of 25, 24 or 23. Equally, anybody who has had contact with people who are young and terminally ill will have found that some 18 year-olds are incredibly thoughtful and mature and some are not, for obvious reasons.

I am very influenced by the fact that I have been listening to people expressing real concern about this issue in this House. I still think 18 is probably the right age, but I am very influenced by what the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Cass, have said: that maybe the answer is some assurance that there is a more intense assessment for people aged between 18 and 25. The Bill says that you can have an assisted death only if you have

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end”

your life, and it is being done voluntarily. How can we be sure about those aged between 18 and 25? Two doctors and a panel have to make the decision, but some additional thing might be required.

We are slightly going around in circles again and repeating ourselves, so I suggest that I talk in particular to the noble Baronesses, Lady Cass and Lady Finlay, and that we come back on Report and see whether we need a more thorough assessment for people aged between 18 and 25—although I am not saying I am going to change the age of 18. That is broadly my position.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his intervention, for which I am very grateful. I point out first that I think that many noble Lords feel there is a very great difference between a decision to refuse treatment or withdraw treatment, which may or may not end one’s life, and to ask for something which will definitely end one’s life. That point is brought up by supporters of the Bill.

I will speak to my Amendment 5 and to the related Amendments 250, 258, 305 and 338.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will come to that in a moment, because I have to get through the amendments—we have to make progress a bit. However, I completely understand the question.

Amendment 50 is from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. He basically said that when anybody tries to behave badly, trying to coerce or pressure somebody into making the decision to have an assisted death, that should be sufficient to bar it for ever, even if it had no impact whatever in relation to it. I see the force of that; I think it would be a wrong amendment, for the following reasons. Somebody—a doctor—might go over the line, but it is absolutely clear that the person definitely wants an assisted death. I do not think they should be barred from doing that because they are concerned about what might happen to the doctor or to the person they love if it is absolutely clear that they have not been coerced or pressured into it.

On Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, she is saying that somebody should not be subject to or at risk of coercive control. Everybody agrees that the person who is adopting the assisted death should not be subject to coercive control. If they are at risk, I would expect the two doctors and the panel to investigate that fully and, if they are not satisfied that the person is reaching a decision of their own, plainly an assisted death cannot go ahead. But I think we are all on the same page in that the risk has to be properly investigated and a conclusion reached.

Amendment 57A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, says you should not be allowed to have an assisted death if someone has been

“prompted to consider ending their own life”—

presumably in the context of assisted death—by any professional person. Clause 5 leaves it to the judgment of the doctor as to whether they raise the question with the patient. If they raise it, they have to raise it under Clause 5 in the context of the treatment available to the patient and all other options available, including palliative care. I do not think that if a doctor, or indeed any other professional person, makes a judgment that it would be sensible to raise it, that should thereby debar the person from having an assisted death. The noble Baroness wants to intervene. By all means let us prolong the debate if it is a new point.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

It is about the level of authority which the professional person, who is in a way a public servant, and the trust which one endows in one’s GP or family doctor. As we have heard today from other people who are medically qualified, that has great weight with the patient—I speak as someone who comes from a medical family. They constantly agonise about their prescriptions for patients and their emotional condition, and all that. But if one raises assisted dying with somebody who is terminally ill, the professional—the doctor, say—is planting the idea.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord finishes, can he clarify for the Committee that a person who can grasp only a diluted amount of information, or who cannot retain the information in any real sense that would be intelligible to us, can be deemed to have capacity for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act, but for this Bill, which is designed to give people agency and allow an individual as much choice as possible to choose treatment or have agency over medical and palliative care decisions and so on, an entirely different threshold should, quite rightly, be expected for such a serious measure as this?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I respect the noble Baroness for repeating her speech. Section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act says that if a person is unable to

“understand the information relevant to the decision … to retain that information … to use or weigh that information ... or … to communicate his decision”,

then they do not have capacity. I am content that that should be the approach under the Bill.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s determination to stop the boats, and I commend the provisions to disapply six sections of the Human Rights Act 1998 and to leave open to a Minister of the Crown whether to comply with an interim remedy from a court or tribunal that prevents or delays removal. I wish the Government success and hope the Bill will succeed, but it needs further tightening to avoid potential legal challenges that would prevent it from achieving its aims.

My Amendment 32 therefore is to disapply, for the purposes of the Bill, the relevant international arrangements and other law that prevents the UK from controlling its borders. The first reason for this amendment is a practical one. It is pointless to make a law that is unlikely to work. That, sadly, seems to be the case for the present Bill unless it is amended. The second reason is a deeper one. There is no doubt that there is a popular wish for the small boats to be stopped, and that one of the reasons why the Government were elected was to control our borders. Unless they make a law strong enough to withstand whatever challenge might be brought to it through national or international law, the Government will fail the people on whose support the laws made to govern Britain should be grounded. Trust in the democratic system, with its political parties, Parliament, Government and the judiciary, will be lost.

I do not accept the narrowness of contemporary theory about the dominant position that international treaty law should command. The apparent demand that international law should trump UK law is a form of legal and ideological utopian internationalism.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Is it therefore the noble Baroness’s position that if there were extensive refoulement by Rwanda, that would not be a reason for not having the Bill?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

That is not my view. My view is that, none the less, given the ingenuity of many noble and learned Lords in this House, and members of the judiciary, barristers and solicitors outside this Chamber, there may very well be intelligent and ingenious challenges that will hold up the operation of the Bill. That is why I want to bring forward my amendment.

By contrast, there are treaties that govern trade, diplomatic or military alliances, and they deal with the national interests of a state and, at one remove, its people. Many who advocate the pre-eminence of international law base themselves on theories of universal rights formulated in the heady days of treaty-making in the decades after World War II—for a European world, by and large, and circumstances very different to our own. These arrangements have provided a quasi-legal framework—