(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, the insurance broker regulated by the FCA. A number of amendments in this group discuss the downgrading of the “have regard to” requirement for proportionality, which would be a backward step. At a time of intense global competition, the Bill should strengthen proportionality, not weaken it. These amendments do that by replacing Clause 17’s downgrading provisions with a clearer, more robust and more meaningful principle, based on the distinction between wholesale and retail markets.
There remains a clear need for a better balance between these two sectors. Evidence supports this. A survey of chief risk officers conducted by the City of London Corporation identified simplification of regulation as the single most important step that regulators could take to foster growth and innovation. Similarly, a recent Prudential Regulation Authority survey showed that fewer than 60% of respondents believe that its current approach to proportionality makes the UK a more attractive place to do business, with most of the remainder expressing neutrality. That is hardly a vote of confidence.
In practice, the current one-size-fits-all approach is flawed. London’s world-leading wholesale insurance market is increasingly subject to rules designed for retail consumers. These regimes impose additional compliance burdens and costs, yet offer little meaningful benefit to sophisticated corporate clients, who require flexibility to negotiate bespoke arrangements tailored to their risks. This is what I have spent my working career doing, and I have never dealt with retail consumers, other than being an insurance buyer myself. There is a massive difference between the companies I advise and seek insurance for and the consumers such as me. Indeed, their premiums are often significantly larger than what I am trying to insure. The two entities should not be regulated by a one-size-fits-all regime.
The Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted this issue, noting that failure to distinguish between wholesale and retail drives bureaucracy and costs. Evidence from the London Market Group revealed that one UK broker, for example, employs far more compliance staff domestically—almost four times more—than in the EU on a proportional basis. Stronger proportionality would not weaken consumer protection; it would enhance it, allowing regulators to focus on where risks are greatest. In short, we should seize this opportunity not to weaken proportionality but to make it work properly for growth, innovation and the effective protection of consumers.
I very much support the two amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is often an assumption that those of us who feel that regulation plays an important role have no instinct or desire to see proportionality in place, which could not be more untrue. My history is as a commercial banker, back in the days when we used to participate intensively in writing the loan documents and creating the covenants associated with our lending, whether to small companies or to some of the largest on the globe. Frankly, covenants that were off the shelf were completely inappropriate for providing the protection we needed in many cases. They were just useless exercises in paperwork for the companies involved. We used to reshape the loan agreements on that basis and, frankly, it worked exceedingly well.
When I look at the amendments, I am glad that proportionality is being recovered from the scrapheap that would result from Clause 17. That is important, and the way that my noble friend Lady Bowles, framed it is particularly significant. Both for the PRA and the SRA, the focus is proportionate to the benefits expected to result from the imposition of the burden or restriction, recognising the difference in size, nature and objectives. I agree with her that this really needs to be considered through the lens of genuinely sustainable—as in durable as well as environmental—growth. That is a very important addition to the discussion.
I am disturbed by Amendment 81. I am not disturbed by most of it, but when I read
“proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness”,
I begin to get somewhat queasy, because the lowest common denominator is not where we should be headed. We need to genuinely assess risk—the cost of dealing with and understanding it—in a very direct way. I have always thought that a distortion was introduced by the competitiveness objective, and I am afraid that it is reflected in Amendment 81, in my reading at least.
I hope that the Minister understands that proportionality is not something for five-year strategies. It is central to the work, culture and behaviour of a regulator; as such, it clearly belongs in principles that sit on the face of the Bill.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I remind the House of my interest as an employee of Marsh Ltd, the insurance broker. I offer my support to the amendments in this group, so thoughtfully proposed by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. My noble friend the Minister has indeed made improvements since Grand Committee, and for that I thank her, but I wonder whether the Government have gone quite far enough. I particularly thank the Minister for the generous amount of time she spent with me the other evening.
My noble friend the Minister’s amendment proposes two reports, 12 months apart, as has been mentioned, but I believe that it is important that reports from the regulators should become an annual occurrence concerning the competitiveness and growth objectives. The financial sector of the United Kingdom is a major driver of revenue for the country and we must ensure consistency over time, not just the immediate future. In turn, this suggests the need for consistent metrics on which to report, allowing for the proper comparisons.
Amendment 19 concerns the principle of proportionality, recognising that not all financial services are the same. Again, I will look at the insurance market in particular, but I suspect there are similarities in other financial lines. I am all for keeping individual retail and small business customers safe when working with insurance companies, but there are significant differences to be found between them, users of the London wholesale insurance market—which is used by knowledgeable buyers, using one of many potential advisers—and captive insurance entities. Smaller customers need a level of protection not required by either of these other two groups.
In the debate on this amendment, I wish to refer particularly to captive insurance companies. Captives are wholly owned subsidiaries set up to provide risk mitigation services—insurance—for their parent company and/or related entities. The parent is inevitably a sophisticated entity, almost certainly hiring advisers. They should require a very different approach from the retail customer.
There currently seems to be a one-size-fits-all approach by the regulators when reviewing insurance companies that does not take into account the nature of the purchaser. This is not only time consuming but costly in comparison with other overseas regimes. Captives provide low risk to the financial system and the buyer of their services requires a significantly different level of regulation from an insurance company trading with individuals. They are fundamentally different.
There is no captive company authorised in the UK and even those of our major companies, including UK public bodies, are located in overseas jurisdictions. The captive insurance business generates in excess of $50 billion annually, and here lies a significant opportunity for growth in the insurance sector which, should the regulator alter its stance and act with proportionality, could, as an example, add significant additional capital into the country.
Amendments 40 and 41 refer to the requirements to publish regulatory performance on authorised firms and new authorisations. The Government certainly recognise in Clause 37 the need to improve the regulatory culture, but we need more teeth in terms of reporting metrics so it becomes standard practice within the regulators. This culture needs to become ingrained.
The metrics being proposed in Amendment 40 are granular concerning timing and would bring some needed haste to the system. In business, time is often of the essence and being held up disproportionately by a UK regulator, as opposed those in other jurisdictions, acts as a deterrent to trade in this country. The metrics being proposed in Amendment 41 link together to give a consistent window into the activities of the regulators. With quarterly reporting it will be possible to gain some comparative statistics that will tell a story.
Lastly, Amendment 92 concerns determination of application. London remains one of the world centres of insurance and we must do all we can to preserve its status, but there are for sure a number of other locations that can attract capital more easily and so challenge it. Unfortunately, regulatory burden is regularly raised as an issue damaging London’s ability to attract additional capital and support the market.
Concerns have been raised about the overall performance of the regulators in terms of timing, with authorisations and approvals taking longer they should. It is recognised that they are falling behind their KPIs. Insurance companies here have experienced delays in case handler assignment, which is the beginning of a domino effect. In addition, concerns have been expressed over some of the questions asked and the appropriateness of the data being requested, leading to additional time and expense. The regulators need to streamline their activities by being relevant.
These amendments refer to a great extent to measures designed to bring some more accountability to the reporting by the regulators. I realise there is a consultation with the financial markets, but I believe that the measures being proposed are the bare minimum that should be required and included in the Bill. These sets of metrics will prevent the regulators deciding which of their own sets of data to publish. Certainly, from an insurance perspective, this will allow life to proceed way more freely. This will ensure transparency from the regulators, which is surely what is being strived for.
My Lords, the amendments in this group fall essentially into two categories. Those that improve communication and representation to statutory panels are small but positive improvements and, although I remain of the view that these panels should be given proper independence, I am glad to see that at least there is some improvement in the regime.
The other amendments I view very differently, and I will pick up the issues raised by the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Davies of Brixton, that if the reporting requirements included a proper consideration of how the competitiveness and growth objectives as they became operational were also impacting on financial stability, systemic risk and consumer protection, I would find myself very much in favour of them. But actually I regard them as a sort of slightly disguised mechanism to enhance the status of the secondary objectives to something which I think the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, described on Monday as “secondary plus”, or even “secondary plus plus”. I think that is exactly what these various amendments are intended to do.
This House knows well that I join Sir Paul Tucker, Sir John Vickers, pretty much every former Governor of the Bank of England and many others in regretting the introduction of these objectives because, for exactly the reason that others have said, they will incentivise and drive risky behaviour and we will come to rue that. So this further enhancement of these secondary objectives, very much driven by the industry—we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, how strong the feeling was that we try and get towards making these objectives either primary or close to primary—should be a warning to all of us. So I cannot give these amendments my support, although we are obviously not going to vote on them today. However, it is necessary that the House takes note of some degree of warning.