Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 30th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, as the first of the winding speakers, I can repeat all the good points. This has been an exceptionally strong debate. I have welcomed the Minister on previous occasions and I welcome him again to his role. I can very much support this piece of legislation, picking up on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson. It seems to me to be one of the first sensible approaches to dealing with the failure of small banks and, I hope, minimising the exposure of the taxpayer. However, I very much pick up the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. If this happens on a mass or systemic basis, essentially the taxpayer is always going to be the body in play, and we should not fool ourselves that, in a really mass crisis, the banking sector as a whole will be able to pick up the problems of a large part of banking in the UK. We have to be realistic on this issue.

In fact, I have always thought that it was pretty unrealistic that most small banks could be allowed to fail, with depositors protected only up to £85,000 by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Therein lies the potential for a sudden run on many other banks, with flight based on rumour and social media. I suspect that, if the Government or the regulators attempt to allow failure to be a significant part of the programme for dealing with problematic banks, they are going to find once again that they are facing the impossible. Sometimes, we have to be realistic. Often, schemes which look good on paper just do not work out in the practices of real life.

The Treasury and the regulator found this out the hard way when Silicon Valley Bank UK effectively failed thanks to the troubles of its US parent. As others, including the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Eatwell, have said, SVB had to be saved through its forced sale to HSBC for £1. Perhaps this new, more realistic process could be done with an individual bank. Is that unrealistic? Can the Minister elaborate on this? Could we not just be much more open and say that we are looking for resolution? Failure would then come only in the most extreme and rare of circumstances. Picking up on the point made by my noble friend Lady Bowles, resolution is the path to go down if we are to have a banking system in which the general public at large continue to have real trust.

I want also to pick up the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. If there is to be trouble on a large scale and, as a consequence, the FSCS is turning to the banking system as a whole and asking for very large payments, does anybody within this chain have the ability to waive that and just say, “No, this demand is excessive. We are going to ask for a smaller portion from the banking system, or we are simply going to say, ‘This crisis is sufficiently large that we are going to turn to the taxpayer’”? To me, it is not realistic to suggest that, under every circumstance, the FSCS could turn to the banking system and be fully reimbursed. I would be grateful if the Minister enlarged on that. I am glad that he said that credit unions have been exempted from the levy. It would have been entirely improper to include them.

I have some related questions. The Minister knows that I was troubled by the sale of SVB UK. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, HSBC buying it for £1 was a real giveaway. HSBC played hardball, as it would, so the Government did not have a lot of choice. As the Minister knows—I have raised this before, and he referred to it in his speech—I still regard the terms of that sale as a mechanism which provided HSBC with a route to evading the ring-fencing rules that would normally apply to its retail banking, in order to separate it from investment banking activity.

When I raised this issue in Grand Committee, the Minister of the day was unable to give any kind of satisfactory answer. As far as I could tell, there was nothing to stop HSBC transferring those assets over to its Silicon Valley Bank entity, where it could engage in derivatives and securitisation on any scale it wished. If this final solution is now different, would he mind writing to me? It is probably impossible to answer that question now, but perhaps he would put a letter in the Library that makes it clear why busting the ring-fence was not a consequence of the way that sale was structured. That would be exceedingly helpful. As my noble friend Lady Bowles asked, could we get some assurances that, if the resolution pattern established for Silicon Valley Bank is going to be repeated, there will be measures in place to make sure that it does not become a backdoor to evading ring-fencing constraints? Following the 2008 crash, most of us—both in this House and in the other place—recognise that ring-fencing is a critical part of the defence against a repeat of the kind of crisis we saw back then.

As I say, I have long been sceptical of all schemes to resolve small banks, but, frankly, I am also somewhat sceptical of the plans to resolve large and medium-sized ones—those identified as systemic. As others and the Minister said, large and medium-sized banks are required to hold MREL—basically, bail-in bonds, to put it in English—to protect or provide a route to resolution. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, when Credit Suisse collapsed in 2023, the Swiss regulators immediately realised that the consequences of implementing its resolution plan would lead to lasting damage to the Swiss economy. Swiss regulators are not fools or softies; they were facing the absolute reality that, with a failure of a bank of that size, they could not allow the backstop of wiping out shareholders or owners of convertible bonds. In effect, they organised a takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. So does the Minister really expect that our regulators will implement the current bail-in resolution schemes, or will we also find that “too big to fail” still rules the day? It is time to be honest about this—with a new Government, perhaps it is time to look at this again much more directly.

Will the Minister also pick up an issue raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles: MREL and medium-sized banks? As she said, the market for bail-in bonds for medium-sized banks is so small that it is almost non-existent, so the bonds are exceedingly expensive. The consequence is that UK banks are now choosing not to grow from small into big because they see no way to put in place the MREL layer that would be required under current PRA regulations. Even if they did, because of the price they would have to pay for those bail-in bonds, they would face a competitive disadvantage compared to the big banks, which access a much more liquid bail-in regime. Is now not the time to take another look at the medium-sized banks and see whether a better scheme could be devised for their resolution, rather than assuming that MREL will be an adequate way for them to put in place that kind of protection?

I draw the Minister’s attention to the other issues raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles and ask for a full response. We are supportive of the Bill. We will look at it in Committee to see whether any amendments could improve it, but, as I say, this is the first time I have looked at a piece of banking resolution legislation and thought, “Actually, that could work in practice, not just on paper”.