Baroness Kramer
Main Page: Baroness Kramer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Kramer's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I take serious note of the comments of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because they reflect my fear that the amendments in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the first amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, could easily be interpreted as pressure to raise the international competitiveness objective and the growth objective very close, if not equal to the financial stability objective. Frankly, that should be a major concern to us all. I do not want to put the regulators on the back foot when they prioritise financial stability.
In many ways, that is how it was in the 1980s and the 1990s, and we saw how the industry responded to that set of priorities and arrangements. The industry was blithe about risk as long as it generated short-term profit. In discussing the new international competitiveness and economic growth objectives, I have heard from many in the industry that they want them not only to be given greater weight but even to be primary objectives and to stand entirely equal with financial stability. That is such dangerous territory.
At Second Reading, I quoted Paul Tucker, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England, who lived through all that turmoil of 2007-08 and after, who urged Parliament not to give the regulators—particularly the PRA—an international competitiveness objective, praying in aid former governors of the Bank of England, who knew the very soul of the industry and knew that that would be dangerous and unadvisable. Those were not his exact words—his were more excoriating.
Risk in the financial sector is asymmetric, as we saw in 2007. The profits of risky behaviour go to the leading figures in the industry, and they typically keep those proceeds, despite the failure of the sector and the organisation and, in many cases, despite the fact that if you were to go back and unpick it, one could say that such proceeds were based on false profits.
The taxpayer then had to come in and rescue the sector with £137 billion in 2007-09. Much of that has been recouped, but what has not, even to this day—and which we and the country live with—is the damage to the wider economy. We had more than a decade of austerity, and it is a price we are still paying to this day. At our peril do we put ourselves in a position where there is increased likelihood of a repeat of that cycle.
I remember from his memoirs that Alistair Darling was shocked that banking chiefs uniformly showed no gratitude for the massive rescue package that kept their businesses afloat after the 2007-08 crisis. I sat on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, but have yet to find one to take any significant responsibility, not only for their institution but for the broader sector.
On competitiveness, let me quote from the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, because this was central to its findings of why the industry had become so out of control and behaved as it did:
“There is nothing inherently optimal about an international level playing field in regulation. There may be significant benefits to the UK as a financial centre from demonstrating that it can establish and adhere to standards significantly above the … minimum. A stable legal and regulatory environment, supporting a more secure financial system, is likely to attract new business.”
That was the consequence of nearly two years of taking evidence.
I turn to other amendments. Those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in this group focus the need for mutual and co-operative financial services. I wholly support that. I very much support the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on the establishment of regional banks. Local services focused on geography or a specific group are often treated as an afterthought or a Cinderella part of the sector today in the UK, but they can be the best way to deliver opportunity to ordinary people, including those presently excluded, and to help small businesses, especially in difficult times. We shall return to some of these issues in later amendments that we will discuss today.
I also support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which, in essence, are on efficiency. They seem to mesh very well with the amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles, which are about transparency and mechanisms to evaluate the performance of regulators.
I return to my additional theme: I introduced a discussion on financial stability, almost out of shock that we now have such an intense focus on enhancing international competitiveness and economic growth—as if, somehow, financial stability were not the absolutely fundamental delivery that we expect from our regulators. Without that, frankly, everything else is worth nothing.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, I would just like to ask her a question about her very interesting speech. This also allows me to say that, in Amendment 45, the first “PRA” should read “FCA”—a good spot by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. But I do not quite understand how financial stability is threatened by a regulator being responsive, consistent and proportional. Could the noble Baroness explain that again?
The noble Earl may find that this is already a requirement of the regulator, but this is not about that. If the amendment were taken in the way that I suspect the noble Earl reads it, I might feel reasonably comfortable with it. However, as we listened to the discussion, we saw where this was going. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, captured that: the industry is looking at these kinds of amendments as a mechanism by which it can find leverage to enhance the status of the international competitiveness and economic growth objectives. If we could find a balance, in asking for the kind of language that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, is after, but making sure that that does not become weaponised and potentially raises those objectives to an equal status to financial stability, I would feel much more comforted.
My Lords, we are on day three of six. I cannot possibly envisage the seventh day, so I will make short speeches. Our amendments in this group are 118 and 119. Amendment 118 would give the FCA a duty to report on mutual and co-operative business models, covering how it considers the specific needs of credit unions, building societies, mutual banks, co-operative banks, regional banks, mutual insurers and co-operative insurers. Amendment 119 would do the same for the PRA.
Following Second Reading, I read the Minister’s letter on this topic with interest and was pleased with her assurances on the matter. However, a letter has little substance; virtually nobody knows about it, to start with. Therefore, as a minimum, I hope the Minister will repeat the assurances in that letter about mutuals, et cetera, and get them on the record in Hansard.
I hope the Minister will assure me that the department takes a keen interest in the growth of the mutual and co-operative sector. The UK has a smaller industry than some international economies, particularly in Europe. I would be interested to know what the direction of travel is in government on this. If we are committed to consumer choice and a diverse, dynamic financial services mix, a strong mutuals and co-operatives sector is surely an important part of it.
There are many amendments in this group and, in general, I like the direction they take. I hope the Government will look at the thrust of these amendments and, as the debate on the Bill develops, try to come back with proposals that take the best of them.
I am very interested in the introduction of the word “proportionality”. My career has been in aviation, in railways, in nuclear and, indeed, even in the military. Proportionality, done well, is undoubtedly the optimal way of introducing and managing regulation. Of course, it is a dynamic concept. As things change, if you really do believe in proportionality, your interpretation of proportionality has to change with the changing facts.
The problem with this is that it needs very able and mature regulators. That is why so much of safety regulation and, in a sense, financial regulation is prescriptive. One knows how to interpret prescriptive regulation: you do what it says and, when you cannot agree, you go to a court. I hope that we persist with proportionality, but I feel that we will need a very special regulator to do it. If that can be achieved, it will give a dynamism to the regulation in this Bill.
If I could just interrupt, the noble Baroness might want to go back and take a look at the MREL rules. It is in the UK that smaller banks got loaded up with the MREL requirement. I do not have the exact numbers in front of me but I could easily get them for the noble Baroness. She will discover that within the EU, small banks do not have to deal with the MREL issue. This was the particular interpretation by the UK PRA and has long been a battle that I have every time I meet PRA officials.
I thank the noble Baroness for that. Of course, I got carried away by my usual desire to knock the EU and lost sight of the essential principle, which is that the PRA is in fact applying the MREL rules disproportionately. I think that on that, the noble Baroness and I will agree.
So the PRA is applying a system that is designed for systemic bank failure to smaller banks, which present no systemic risk at all. While some modifications were made in 2021, medium-sized banks still end up having to issue MREL-compliant capital, which adds to their cost of capital, and this in turn reduces their capacity to lend. A number of mid-sized banks told the Treasury late last year that this reduction in the capacity to lend could amount to £62 billion over the next five years. Everyone loses—except the larger banks, who see smaller competitors facing considerable competition barriers. I believe that the regulators need to focus more on proportionality, which is the aim of my amendment.
Earlier I said that I was sceptical about the regulatory principles in FSMA, but they exist and we need to make sure that they are comprehensive. My Amendment 77A introduces an additional regulatory principle of being evidence-based. We have inherited all those EU rules, which were drawn up in the context of the EU’s well-known precautionary approach to regulation. I can see how easy it is to slip into the habit of regulating in the UK in the same way, just because we had to regulate that way in the past.
On our first day in Committee, we had a short debate on short selling. There is no evidence that short selling is or has been a problem in the UK, and yet the Government and the FCA are lining up to carry on regulating it. We need a shift of mindset in financial regulation in the UK, because the regulators should regulate only where the evidence points to the need for regulation, and we should not be regulating on the basis of hypothesis or speculation. That may well mean stepping back from regulating in areas where there is a possibility of a problem but no evidence that problems actually exist.
If we have a nimble system with agile and responsive regulators—I accept that that might be a rather big assumption—we should have no problem in stepping back, because we can act when a problem emerges. I certainly do not recommend or seek the widespread dumbing down of our regulation, because good regulation is part of the strength of our financial services sector. However, I believe that we are failing to take advantage of our Brexit freedoms to liberate our financial services businesses where there is no evidence that it is not safe to do so. That is what lies behind my seeking to add an additional regulatory principle.
Thank you. We are desperately trying to work out what we do to remain winding speakers but, thanks to the flexibility, that is allowed in Committee. It disappears at Report, but it has been very useful.
I wanted to make a few comments because I want to ensure that we focus strongly on the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles: looking at the international competitiveness objective through the lens of efficiency of the regulator. When I talk to the industry, its beef is typically not with the regulation but with the way it is applied. It is the endless paperwork, delays, time-wasting, and everything else. The amendments that she has tabled get us laser-focused on that and tell the regulator, “This is unacceptable. It may mean that you need more resources, but then open your mouths and ask for them, because I think you would find that Parliament would row in behind you to ensure that you have that capacity to deliver that effective, efficient regulation.”
I was slightly taken aback by the example of a one-week approval authorisation in the Bahamas only because I am very conscious that the 2007-08 crash was finally tipped over the edge by AIG, the major US insurance company, saved at the last minute by a bailout of $150 billion. It has rectified itself today. I would hope that our regulators would take more than four or five days to look at authorisation for company with the capacity to bring down a very large part of the world’s economy. I just turned pale for a moment. I hope that we will not take that as a continuing example.
I also do not see the regulators as typically capricious—inefficient, but not really capricious. I am therefore concerned about the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, to the extent that they would remove agility. All of us who work in some way or other in relation to the financial services industry recognise that we are in a period of the most extraordinary change. Technology and globalisation are driving it, and all kinds of innovation are out there. We need a regulator that can cope with the pace of change that is taking place and does not come late to the table.
When I first got involved in politics, fintech was new. I remember asking every member of the fintech industry to meet me, and there were 12 people around the table. Now the leading figures associated with fintech would not fit in the Royal Albert Hall. That is brilliant—but I remember the difficulty then in trying to explain to the regulators that we needed a completely different regulatory environment, if fintech was going to develop. It wanted regulation. Being without regulation led the industry to fear that rogue players would suddenly enter that would disgrace the industry and cause a regulator to come on to its lawn with tanks blazing. There was a real desire to get appropriate and sensible regulation in place, but it had to be different and innovative and had to recognise the features of the industry.
When it comes to the word “predicted”, it seems to me that for a court it would be very hard to go through that kind of analysis, and to understand the business issues and the differences and risks in various industries, to understand whether or not predictability applied. When I looked at this issue, I thought, “My goodness, I bet this was drafted by lawyers because it looks rather like a lawyers’ charter.” I do not think that providing additional business to some of the law firms in the City is one of the purposes of the Bill. I have some real concerns, and they centre very much on that area. I hope we will think this through extremely carefully. Anyway, I consider that I have wound up, and I will sit.
My Lords, we have no amendments in this group. I have listened to this interesting debate. It comes back to the classic dilemma in all parts of life, from family dilemmas right through to how you manage an industry, and it comes right to this proportionality issue. It is very easy to create rules so simple that you cannot see what they are trying to achieve. It is very idealistic to try to create some ideas that the industry should contain. I look forward to listening to the Minister’s reply, but I have enormous sympathy with her, and I hope she might perhaps give some thought to whether we might try to develop some mechanism between now and Report to see if we can create common ground on this extraordinarily important issue.
My Lords, I start by speaking to my own two amendments in this group and will then move on to winding for the Liberal Democrats.
In a sense it is quite pertinent that I follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, because, as members of this Committee will know, I have some real concerns about the competitiveness objective and its effect and implications. It comes from people who are very much founded on the experience of the financial crash of 2007-08 and a fear at the time that lessons would be learned very briefly but the industry would very quickly push back as it is now, hoping that the crisis has been forgotten. I notice that all the speakers who are in favour of the competitiveness agenda seem very careful not to go back to that time, and they describe in some way why this is inherently different from then. If that cannot be done, or if they have all forgotten exactly what the experience was in that period, we are moving into difficult territory.
My amendments are quite specific and are very definitely probing—I hope that the Minister will disabuse me. When talking with a leading player in the industry, who was encouraging me to support the competitiveness objective, I took the government and regulators’ line: “It is a secondary objective—financial stability is clearly the priority.” I was told, “No, you haven’t read the Bill. You need to look at the section that refers to mutual recognition agreements. You have to read the two together. When you look at mutual recognition agreements, that gives us the leverage, combined with the competitiveness objective, to force the regulator to always adopt for the UK whatever is the standard that is embedded in that mutual recognition agreement.”
I am extremely troubled by that strategy, but from reading the language I can see where that thinking comes from. The attractiveness of the mutual recognition agreement to this individual was that it was an arrangement—in effect a treaty or an agreement—that was not negotiated by regulators. They might have a discussion with regulators and there might be input from regulators, but ultimately it was negotiated by businesspeople, and therefore that would be the guiding principle, not concerns about financial stability—those are not the concern of a trade negotiator—but arrangements, while measures within a trade negotiation contain a lot of compromises and trade-offs. This disturbs me hugely, and I would like the Minister to explain how those concepts and clauses work together. I was talking with someone who was using their imagination, but there was a lawyer present who was confirming what was being said, so I am really quite concerned about that interaction. We need to understand how that works as we proceed with this Bill.
I very strongly support my noble friend Lady Bowles. I am not going to repeat the arguments that she made, which were really important, but I want to pick up on the issue of relevant international standards. Like others, I am troubled by the idea that we might have slavish adherence to a set of rules that are made elsewhere, but on the other hand I am trying to trade off in my mind what we do if we do not have international standards in significant areas of financial services. We may say, as the Americans often do, that we know better than everybody else, that the way we structure our industry means that international standards do not really apply to us and that their capital requirement standards veer quite considerably away from the standards that were agreed at Basel and were largely adopted within the EU. But how do we turn to other places and say that they need to use international standards or that they should not fall below them if we say that that is allowed to us? I am trying to work my way through that thinking process because we live in a very globalised world.
The financial crash of 2007-08, which essentially exposed huge weakness, abuse and mismanagement in the UK, was triggered by events in the United States—the way in which subprime mortgages there had been packaged up and sold as collateralised debt obligations. As I mentioned earlier, subprime mortgages brought down the largest insurance company in the world, AIG, which was rescued by the American Government who, when Lehman Brothers began to collapse, said “Wait a minute. Enough. Suddenly we’ll have to rescue everybody if we’re not careful. We draw the line here.” The consequences reeled not so much through the United States but through the UK, exposing all our various weaknesses.
With this globalised world, what happens in one country, what is done by one regulator, impacts others. How do we manage this unless we have some sort of standing for international standards? I am not arguing against the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; I am just saying that we somehow need to think this through, how it works, how we scrutinise it and how we consider it. It seems to me that it ought to be on only an exceptional basis that we decide that we do not apply those standards in the UK, but we need a mechanism for that and it seems to me that this should be largely something that Parliament determines, because it has significant consequences and would fit with much of the parliamentary accountability agenda that we have talked of today.
I want to pick up on the sustainability issue. Forgive me if I have the wrong person, because I had done that before, but I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, who mentioned sustainability and said, “How vague can you get?” As far as I remember, we have used sustainability in a lot of prior legislation, so I think there is a body of understanding. Some of the energy legislation that we dealt with certainly had the word “sustainability” in it, so there is a body of definition that sits behind that. I am one of those who would very much like to see sustainability attached to the words “economic growth”. I am not so concerned by the secondary economic growth objective, but I want growth to be sustainable. For me, that encompasses sustainability in every sense, both environmental—as it is often used—and economic.
As I say, I remain concerned about the competitiveness objective. We need to be very clear about its implications. If there are other levers that I have missed in the loan agreement that provide it in a non-obvious way with additional power and strength and the ability to get court rulings in its favour, I hope the Minister will explain them to us because I would find that very necessary for our future discussion.
My Lords, I do not wholly associate myself or my party with my noble friend Lord Sikka’s comprehensive description of the finance industry, but I go back to one important area. I mentioned earlier that my previous career had a lot to do with safety. One of the things that it brought out was that people readily forget the catastrophic because the catastrophic occurs so rarely that attention drifts away and they get on with the day to day.
We broadly support the growth and competitiveness concept, although its impact will be modest. It would be a miracle if it added 1% per annum to the growth of the UK. If we read Alistair Darling’s autobiography—and yes, I am aware of the Mandy Rice-Davies test, “He would say that, wouldn’t he?” but it reads pretty convincingly—we see just how close we came to a totally catastrophic situation. It was only saved by a number of individuals, including Alistair and Gordon Brown, taking the very brave decision to do what had never been done before, which was essentially to throw the whole economy at a guarantee of the banking system. That is a pretty dodgy thing to do and, frankly, if you look at the timeline, it got very close to a catastrophic situation.
When one is looking at catastrophic risk—a low probability, perhaps, but catastrophic—you have constantly to bear that in mind. I do not think that the average practitioner in the finance industry works like that; I feel that day to day they are making trades and so forth. The sense of the primary objective is that that should be the salient thought behind all their decision-making: “We must not create another catastrophic situation.” To be fair to the Government, over the past decade or so quite a lot of sensible legislation has been introduced to protect ourselves from catastrophic risk. The Bank of England has a department working away at the regulation of financial institutions to make sure that they are orderly, safe and so on.
I have forgotten what the words are, but the concepts of stability, security and probity must be there in the primary objective and must be well-defined and clearly prime—the top objective. After that, competitiveness, growth and so on would be great.
Our Amendment 65 was a probing amendment and it has worked very well. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, assured me—perhaps the Minister will use similar words—that there is no question about the primacy of the objectives, that it is set in other rules and that if I looked at all the rules together, I would not be worried about it. I think that is basically what she said, and I hope it is right, because it is absolutely right that we bear in mind protection from catastrophic risk.
I note the assurances that the Minister gave in her letter following Second Reading, but I am still not clear about the specific mechanism whereby the primary objectives are expressly meant to take precedence in FSMA. To me, it appears that they are indeed split up, but there is nothing to define what it means to be primary. I may be wrong in that concern, and I am here to be persuaded that I am wrong. The more effort that is put into persuading me, the more will go on the record and form the environment in which financial services are delivered. I feel concerned that there is nothing in legislation, in the regulators’ rulebook or elsewhere to guarantee the primacy of the FCA’s and the PRA’s most important objectives. However, as I said, that is an open question, and this debate has been good.
Regarding the international dimension, I see the concerns being expressed about giving it too much primacy—although I do not want to use that word, because it has the wrong effect. My memory is useless but, about two years ago, we had what I will roughly call the Basel III Covid legislation. Many of us were there to debate it. If I remember rightly, it took out the EU law and made space for the regulators to create the situation we are talking about now. My recollection is that aligning with Basel III and the FSB—or whatever it is called—became an objective within that. I see the Minister is nodding, so my memory has some fragments of it.
Once again, it is clearly a good idea to be that bit looser if we are to be innovative. The probing worked brilliantly, as I far as I am concerned. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, quite openly said that competitiveness and growth should be equal to the regulators’ concern about stability and safety. Arguably, that is a properly viewed position, but it is not my position. Failure must be avoided—not quite at all costs but, wherever there is a debate between bigger risk and modest profit, the bigger risk should be avoided.
Would an MRA covering these issues be enabled only if an equivalence decision had already been provided by the Treasury? In other words, are these only for countries whose financial services industries are already covered by equivalence decisions or could they be in agreements where that standard has not been met in the eyes of the Treasury?
I suggest that I triple-check that for the noble Baroness and write to her. The provision to enable the implementation of MRAs included in the Bill does not enable the Government to change the clear hierarchy of the regulators’ objectives, only to specify the areas in which regulators should make rules to give effect to an MRA. If, after I have written to the noble Baroness, she wants to discuss the Government’s interpretation of international standards, or if my noble friend wants to discuss her points further, I will happily meet them if that would be helpful.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, can withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not move theirs when they are reached. The Government, of course, support Clause 24 standing part of the Bill.