Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Kramer
Main Page: Baroness Kramer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Kramer's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Sikka, who again comes forward with a number of amendments that are common sense and seek to shine a light on what is actually going on, and would deliver the transparency that so many of us seek in the Bill. We come to the transition period and the retrospective application, which is the subject of one of the most important groups, if not the most important group, of amendments this evening. It relates to the speed at which the register is implemented, as well as new measures that will apply during a proposed six-month transition period.
My noble friend Lady Chapman, along with the noble Lord, Lord Fox—we are grateful for his support—tabled Amendments 56, 61, 80 and 83. They seek to accelerate the implementation of the register of overseas entities, requiring initial registration within 28 days of commencement—again, seeking to avoid a situation where individuals or entities simply circumvent the law. This is not just a view held by us: the ICAEW, an accountants’ body, in the briefing that it sent your Lordships, also supported three months as a new transition period, with the ability to extend it for a further three months, were there a need to do so.
It is also worth noting that the sanction provisions—Part 1 of the Bill—will not commence on Royal Assent. Rather, they will require a commencement order laid by the Secretary of State. We understand that various steps need to be taken before that order can be laid. Can the Minister indicate how many steps there might be and roughly how long that will take? Is the upcoming Prorogation of Parliament, for example, likely to delay the introduction of any of the enabling regulations? When the Government moved from 18 months to six months in the other place, that left many thinking that the register would be active before the year end. Could it not actually be longer, given the need to implement various IT changes, inform people of the new requirements and so on? The House requires some reassurance about the commencement: in other words, when do the six months actually start? It could be six months now before the six months start: that would be a year for the implementation period. That is of real concern to us all, given the concerns that there are about the six months; so while we welcome the measures outlined in government Amendments 86 and 87, they do not prevent land being sold, gifted or transferred, and neither do they further reduce the current six-month implementation window. As many noble Lords said at Second Reading, a register of overseas entities has been promised for a number of years, and we certainly do not want any further delay, but there are serious questions to be asked.
Along with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, we also tabled Amendment 92. This is an evolution of the David Davis amendment considered in the other place. We accept that one very high-profile person of interest was Roman Abramovich. He is now subject to sanctions, and he plans to leave Chelsea under whatever arrangements he manages to make—or not, given the sanctions on him. However, one of the concerns around his case was that the Home Office was actually studying his affairs, but had no powers to take interim action while that assessment was being carried out. Is there therefore not a great deal of merit in our amendment, which seeks to freeze assets on an interim basis where there is good reason for doing so? In other words, if we are looking to sanctioning somebody, surely we would want to freeze their assets to prevent them from getting rid of them before a full order is put in place. At the moment, as I understand it, that cannot happen. I am not sure that under the Bill it would able to take place either, without this amendment. The Government might wish to look at the interim freezing of assets.
It might be, for example, that a person of interest hails from Belarus, which continues to enable the actions of Russia’s armed forces. What can be done about that? Does the legislation cover people in that situation as well? Again, we pose these questions to be helpful to the Government and raise serious concerns. We want the initiatives to succeed, but it is only with scrutiny—and the Government reacting and responding to the scrutiny, and acting on the various amendments that noble Lords have put forward from across this House—that we can have confidence in them. There might be only a few bad individuals among the applicants to the new register but the truth is, as my noble friend Lord Sikka and others have said, that we simply will not know what the case is unless there is maximum transparency. That transparency cannot come quickly enough.
My Lords, my colleagues are doing all the heavy lifting from these Benches, and I am incredibly grateful to them. I have signed Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I think found itself in drifting into the wrong group: it is actually part of group 3. One of the reasons why I signed it is this frustration, which I know the Government share, that, before a sanction is actually put in place, the individual who is likely to be sanctioned has, in a sense, plenty of warning signs and can use that opportunity to move various resources to a safe haven.
Much of the conversation around this Bill has been on fixed assets that are difficult to liquidate—property or complex companies—and I can understand why they might be less concerned about people knowing they are about to be sanctioned having the opportunity to move those. However, those same individuals tend to have very large investments in far more easily transportable assets—cash equivalents. I know that the Government are going to be looking at cryptocurrencies, which I have been very concerned about, when they get to the second phase of this Bill. It would, however, also be wrong to ignore such assets as jewellery and art. That is not just a tale from an Agatha Christie novel. I was a banker for many years in the mid-west, and most of my clients were exemplary people, but we certainly had one scoundrel who made the slight mistake of trying to impress a very charming young woman with an English accent and, as a consequence and with the aid of specialists, I was able to seize something worth close to half a billion dollars in artwork and jewellery against an attempt to defraud the bank. I ask therefore that the Minister think about these liquid assets, which play a part of the picture, but have been very little part of the discussion.
I think that is a story for the noble Baroness’s memoirs, and I look forward to reading it.
There are lots of good amendments in this group but I want to speak to Amendments 56, 57, 61 and 62 about the implementation period. For me, the six-month implementation period makes absolutely no sense. We are trying to rush this through—we here are going to sit until I do not know what time tonight or tomorrow morning to make this emergency legislation happen, but we are still giving people six months to do this. The Government are taking so long that activists are going into oligarchs’ mansions and seizing them in London and Paris to house refugees, if we ever get any refugees here. I cannot blame this Government for the Paris seizure, but it suggests that people are getting very tired of the fact that they are being so slow about this. Why would anyone need six months? If they have been honest about paying their taxes, declaring profits and detailing the origin of their money, why do they need six months? Surely, any decent accountant—I am sure that there are several in your Lordships’ House—could sort this out within 14 days or, at the worst, 28 days. I think there is no reason for the Government not to support one of these two pairs of amendments that shorten the implementation period.
My Lords, I will try to be brief on this issue. Amendments 40 and 41 both refer to whistleblowers and protection for them. Whistleblowers will be absolutely crucial if the register proposed in this legislation is to be accurate, but they will also be crucial for unexplained wealth orders and sanctions to be fully effective. Where those whistleblowers expose kleptocrats, hidden assets, money-washing schemes and individuals linked with owning, hiding and laundering, they will be taking really serious risks, both for themselves and for their families.
Confidential disclosure to a regulator or an enforcement agency only sometimes provides anonymity. It may be obvious who the whistleblower is because the information is held by so few people, or, as we have seen in many instances, it may be that the less scrupulous—whom we are going after—hire investigators in order to expose the identity of whoever spoke out.
At the very least, we need to be sure that there are genuine safe disclosure channels, and they need to be communicated in a very powerful way to everyone who might have information. The risk is not just physical harm by criminals, although that comes to mind when we think of the particular pool of individuals that this legislation is aimed at; it is also retaliation by enablers—the banks, the legal firms, the accounting firms and others. I fear that they have an unfortunate track record of quite devastating retaliation. Some obviously are very much better than others, but I anticipate that the kinds of entities that are sufficiently lax internally that they are willing to provide support to those engaged in money laundering and whose money has come through kleptocracy will be among the sternest in using retaliation against a whistleblower.
Individuals who lose their job or their contract are informally but effectively blacklisted—that probably is the least of their problems. Those who lose their jobs turn to employment tribunals. I know that the Government often pray in aid employment tribunals, but I suspect that many people are not aware of how costly an employment tribunal is for the individual seeking to make their case: we are talking about thousands of pounds and it can easily reach £100,000 or more. The entity they are up against can obviously afford the best lawyers and the most significant QCs. It is also very possible for an employer to string out an employment tribunal through various legal tools. Three years is not at all unusual, and seven years is not unknown, even for a successful whistleblower. During that time, the whistleblower has no income and must pay the high legal costs, with all the consequences for their family and their friends, from whom they borrow. This inequality of arms and the general stress of the whole process force many whistleblowers to settle and to sign agreements that prohibit disclosure.
The Government will say, “They can always make disclosures to regulators and enforcement agencies”, but it is certainly true that many whistleblowers become so afraid after they have been through the grinder of this process that they do not even dare to do that. This is part and parcel of how legal firms and others try to shut down anyone exposing wrongdoing by the powerful. We discussed SLAPPs at Second Reading, when my noble friend Lord Thomas went through some of the kinds of strategic lawsuits against public participation that have been levied against authors and journalists who have exposed kleptocrats. Imagine that same energy and attention turned on someone who is seen as an insider or an employee—it would be an even more bitter and devastating reaction.
The United States knows the value of whistleblowers in a way that is, frankly, ignored in this country. It is why we have a history of so many fewer prosecutions and convictions. Indeed, most financial scandals are exposed first by the Americans. You can almost go through a list—if there is any American connection, you can pretty much guarantee that it was a US agency that first exposed the problem. US prosecutors, and I have talked to many, will tell you that at least half of the convictions for financial crime in the US depend fundamentally on whistleblower evidence. Whistleblower evidence also assists in many more cases. In this country, if you ask the regulators and enforcement agencies, they will say that whistleblowers make only minor contributions. That may explain why prosecution in this country is, frankly, quite rare.
Last year, the United States, in anticipation of the issues we are facing now, passed the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act with extraterritorial reach, both as an incentive to whistleblowers and to compensate them for what are recognised to be career-ending and, in these particular instances, potentially life-threatening disclosures. There is a very interesting preamble to the legislation that makes clear the depth of concern that Congress had. At this moment, I would have to say to any potential whistleblower in a case where there is the slightest US connection, “Go to the Americans, your information will be taken seriously, you and your family will be protected and you will not end up ruined”. I cannot say the same thing to any potential whistleblower here in the UK and I think that has to change, and quickly.
Sorry; I misunderstood.
It is right and proper that the Government review the whistleblowing framework once we have had sufficient time to build the necessary evidence of the impact of the most recent reforms. We acknowledge that an effective whistleblowing framework is an important part of the UK’s ability to tackle corruption and all forms of economic crime and illicit finance. These acts are, by their nature, often covert. The Government are committed to ensuring that individuals are able to speak up about the behaviour of bad actors.
In recent years the Government have continued to improve the whistleblowing framework, and we will continue to do so in future. It is important that whistleblowing disclosures are dealt with properly and by the right body. This is why BEIS maintains and regularly updates the prescribed persons order. Officials work closely with other government departments, the devolved Administrations and regulators to ensure the list is up to date. I can assure noble Lords that this work is ongoing, and we will continue to improve the whistleblowing framework in the near future.
With that, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Obviously, I am very disappointed with the answer and the ongoing complacency that undermines the legislation we are passing, but at this point in time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I entirely support what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said. It is very much along the lines of the recommendations of the Joint Committee which I had the privilege of chairing. I quote just one paragraph:
“It is regrettable that, as currently conceived, the proposed Register of Overseas Entities will have insufficient verification checks to deter criminals who wish to submit false information. It therefore seriously risks failing in its central policy aim: to provide a reliable and transparent record of the beneficial ownership information of overseas entities investing in the UK property market.”
We discussed a number of the points that the noble Lord made so eloquently at Second Reading and today, including placing a greater burden on professionals to verify information. It is clearly fundamental; without verification, the Bill will not be as successful as it should be.
My Lords, I will speak briefly on this issue, because I am very much of the opinion, as are many in the Committee, that a combination of both a public register—so that civil society groups, journalists, activists and people in different countries will have access to different kinds of information—and vigorous verification is the kind of safeguard we need if we are to end the history of the London laundromat and prevent London remaining a magnet for a great deal of dirty money that is floating around the globe.
Like many people, when I heard that there would be a register of beneficial owners of property that would have a verification component and that verification would be introduced at Companies House, I was elated. Then I actually read the language in the Bill and it seemed, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, so light touch that there might be something vigorous, but on an exceptional basis and not as a matter of routine. As there is little in the Bill to strengthen the responsibilities of the enablers, I am worried that we will end up with the worst of all worlds—a headline that makes it looks as though we are taking significant and serious action, but implementation that completely misses the mark.
I know the Minister has sometimes said that we have plenty of legislation to deal with enablers, and which has been strengthened somewhat, but if we had adequate legislation to deal with enablers we would not have a single instance of money laundering in this country, because nobody bringing in dirty money is able to buy a single piece of property, take control of a company or engage in any other activities without using an enabler. You need the lawyers, accountants and property developers. We clearly cannot choke off that particular avenue to sustain the London laundromat. All these things come together. I hope the Minister will look again at verification. It will partly be a matter of resources—those absolutely matter—but it also has to be standard practice that a very high level of verification is embedded to deal with every item in the register.
My Lords, I share the concerns expressed about the need for rigorous verification. I note that Clause 16 confers a broad power on the Secretary of State to make regulations in this field. Is the Minister able to assure the Committee that those regulations will impose a rigorous form of verification and requirements along the lines of those that have been proposed?