Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

I absolutely support what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. My amendments to both his amendments were partly in response to an earlier draft, which I think he changed before tabling them. However, the point remains the same: to tease out whether the words “if possible” are objective or subjective to the individual. I am not sure what “if possible” means in the context. I would certainly not want anything that the noble Lord has included to detract from the thrust of his important amendments and argument. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I disclose that I act from time to time in what have been control order cases and may be called on to act in future such cases. I reinforce the importance of having disclosure of the essence of the case. The reason for that is that from time to time I have seen that, when disclosure of the essence of the case takes place, it is possible to show that the inferences drawn from certain behaviour are not appropriate.

I give an example. The case involved a student living in a house with other students. We are always concerned that association can be an unfair way to judge someone. An assumption was made and disclosed in the essence of the case against him that a conspiratorial meeting took place at a particular time. It was possible for us to show that he must have been in his room using his computer because, during the period of the meeting, he was in direct contact with the department with which he was studying at university, drawing down the homework that he was required to do. Not only was the university able to confirm that but his computer, which was seized, showed that the timing coincided with when some others were involved in the meeting, when he was in his room studying. Just that allowed someone to show that an inference being drawn was incorrect.

Given that we are putting together a system which is in many ways a source of concern with regard to liberty, it is really important that opportunities are there for people to show that their actions are not the ones that the state is imagining. We must, in drawing up new proposals—some of which I am not completely happy with—draw on the decisions made by judges under the control order regime.

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2011

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the independent overseer of the review of counterterrorism and security powers. Like the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recently published report, I strongly welcome the Government’s conclusion that the current control order regime can and should be repealed, consistent with public safety. It is obviously essential that it is replaced with something that is very different in character and not simply a pale imitation. We shall have to look closely at the legislation that comes forward to ensure that that is not what the Government have in mind. The review has clearly shown that the present regime is inefficient, grants excessive power to the Government, and undermines traditional British norms and respect for the rule of law. This may not be surprising. It was introduced by accident, following a series of court judgments adverse to the last Government. It has been a bad mistake.

I also strongly welcome the Government’s renewed and strengthened commitment, expressed in their response to the review, to the absolute priority of criminal prosecution. Where people are involved in terrorism they must be detected with all the considerable power at the disposal of the state, then prosecuted and locked up. It is not just public confidence that demands this but also our traditional common-law attachment to the supremacy of due process in criminal justice and our courts. The fact is that the evidence gathered by the review has made it clear that the present control order regime acts as a fundamental impediment to prosecution. This is because the restrictions placed upon controlees forbid the very contact and activity that, under proper surveillance and investigation, lead to evidence fit for prosecution. It is also because far too many controlees are simply warehoused under the supervision of the security services, beyond the scrutiny of criminal investigation, and therefore beyond any real possibility of prosecution.

For good reasons, the instincts of the security services are protective rather than prosecutorial in nature but this practice, and the Security Service’s primacy within it, means that some serious terrorist activity remains completely unpunished by criminal law. This is a serious and continuing failure of public policy. Any new scheme introduced by the Government must not replicate this failure. To give reality to the primacy of prosecution, which is the Government’s stated aim, it should clearly become an intrinsic part of any new regime that restrictions placed upon individuals should be linked to a continuing criminal investigation. After all, if the Home Secretary, under the new regime, is to go to the High Court to assert her belief that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism so that she may obtain an order placing restrictions upon that person, it would be quite absurd for there to be no active criminal investigation into the individual in question attendant upon the Home Secretary’s application. Yet that is the position that we are in at the moment.

Of course, if there were always such an investigation in progress, court-approved restrictions mandated for the duration of that investigation, up to a maximum period of two years, would become much more constitutionally acceptable—a form of pre-charge bail. I have no doubt that such a reform would garner broad support for the Government’s new regime, including among those most bitterly critical of the current arrangements. This reform would encourage evidence gathering and therefore increase the likelihood of prosecution. It would bring the new regime much closer to criminal justice, which is an obvious good in itself with all the protections that criminal justice implies for suspects. The Government should urgently reconsider their preliminary view on this issue which, frankly, has been hostile.

Again frankly, any Security Service opposition to intense police activity around controlees should not be a trump card. The public interest is wider than the instincts of the Security Service. In fact, the trump card should always be found in locking up those people who want to wreak violence upon our communities and putting them in prison cells for long, long years. This is the true deterrent and it is also the process that truly protects the public in a way that control orders never have.

There is a separate issue. A further conclusion of the review was that relocation—the practice under which people were forced to move to other parts of the country away from home, family and friends—should be abolished, and that long curfews should go. These were among the most bitterly resented aspects of the old regime and for good reason. They were also the most offensive to our traditional norms, imposed as they were without prosecution let alone conviction, and without the controlees being told any more than the mere gist of the allegations against them. Whoever would have thought that in Britain we would have a form of internal exile without prosecution or conviction?

The Government have now agreed that these provisions are excessive, disproportionate and, unnecessary—and I would add offensive. We do not need them, as the Government have now determined. They intend to abolish relocation and long curfews under their new regime. In those circumstances, they should do so now. How can it be right for this House to be invited to extend powers that the Government themselves have conceded are wrong in principle and excessive in practice, particularly when those powers impact so vividly upon civil liberties? I invite my noble friend to consider a way to proceed that does not include renewal of these quite excessive and, as we now know, unnecessary intrusions. Those subjected to them should not have to labour under these oppressive measures any longer. There can be no conceivable public interest in obliging them to do so when the measures themselves are serving no useful purpose.

Finally, it will be critical for this House and the other place to examine with great care the legislative proposals that come forward. It is always tempting for the bad old stuff to slip back into a piece of draft legislation. We must not end up in the position of approving a system later this year or early next year which is a form, as some people have put it, of “control order light”. We need real reform in this area. If there are to be restrictions, they must be coterminous with criminal investigation. There must be no restrictions which destroy the ability of the state to obtain evidence against people who might have been involved in terrorism, which is precisely the effect of the present regime. It has failed and must stop.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I will be brief. First, I suspect I am one of few people in the House who has been involved in some of these cases in the courts. I have seen them at close quarters.

Many noble Lords will also remember that I was one of those on the Labour Benches who strongly opposed the Labour Government introducing control orders. I opposed them then and ever since. I welcomed the fact that noble Lords on the other side of the House, whose faces are familiar, all went through the Lobbies with me opposing control orders. Now they are sitting in government and I want to remind them of the principled stand that they all took on control orders. It is easy, once in government, to hear poured into their ears the position taken by the security services that somehow this is the only way forward. With regard to the issue of dealing with persons suspected of links with terrorism where it would be difficult to bring them to trial, I have always advocated that surveillance, the use of intercept and so on can be done, but without interfering with liberty in the excessive way that control orders have meant. I am saddened and disappointed that the siren voices of the security services have persuaded the Government that something not very different from control orders should be the way forward. I am sure that I will be one of the people who take part in the debates when the legislation is presented to this House, and I will rigorously test some of the suggestions that have been made.

I strongly support what has been said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald: given the principled position that the Government are going to do away with control orders, and even if the position is that something else will come in of a lesser order but somewhat similar, it is quite wrong at this moment to keep the thing that they have criticised for so long with regard to the eight people currently subject to the level of suspicion that we have heard about. It cannot be right to continue that until the end of this year. At the very least, the Government should be reducing the constraints upon liberty to the standard that they are intending to introduce, and then that can be revisited in December. However, it cannot be right for them to continue with control orders when they so bitterly opposed their existence once they had been introduced by new Labour in government. I ask that, in the spirit not just of decency but of appropriateness, the cases that we have spoken about and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, mentioned be revisited.

I reiterate what my noble friend Lord Judd has said: one of the jewels in our crown, one of the great limbs of our democracy, is the way in which we interpret the rule of law. I am a proud champion of the common law. We have always believed that due process was vital before we in any way encroached upon the liberty of human beings. That is a proud tradition here and it is a sort of ceding to the terrorists if you abandon those values, which are so precious in our society. I strongly urge that we do not go down the road of introducing something similar, because it is a poison in the system. It is a way of saying that it was not just a temporary measure; somehow we have bought into this idea, and an alternative to the things that we have always believed in can now be introduced. I urge that we think again about that.

I was interested to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said that there are alternatives, and I hope that in the months to come the Government will look again at what they are intending to do.

[Baroness Afshar]

My Lords, I add my thanks for the decision by the Minister to abandon forced relocation. However, I have been given to understand by Liberty that this weekend a young man with a young family was forcibly sent off. I want to highlight the law of unintended consequences: a young family is left behind that will be deprived of rights that this very same young man is going to have in the very near future. That means that a child will be raised apart from the care of the father of the household, but that child has committed no crime. My understanding was that the House has always agreed that the interests of children should be put first. It surprises me that at this stage we still are forcibly sending off young people who may or may not be guilty and punishing their family in the process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

As I said, I am not going to make that promise. I was about to add a sentence when the noble Lord rose. We will take this under advisement and see whether we can give some kind of summary, but if the noble Lord does not mind, I do not want to give a totally definitive answer to that point this evening.

I was asked a number of detailed points and I shall try, without detaining the House for too long, to go through some of them. Right at the beginning, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, asked a number of questions which I think bear on points made subsequently in debate. The implication of his remarks was: would we honour seriously what we have said about the importance of continuing to seek prosecutions? I have three things to say about that. One is that the CORG which he mentioned will conduct serious work. I think that it has always been a serious body but the Government are going to make absolutely certain that the conduct of the CORG—the review body that keeps these cases under continuous and pretty close scrutiny—is serious. We have, I hope, created a situation in which there will be greater possibilities for prosecution. I stress to the House that I think it is only fair to say that the primary purpose of these measures is still protective. Nevertheless, within the scope that is offered, we will certainly be looking at the possibility of continuing and bringing prosecutions. Indeed, the operation of the TPIMs themselves may allow that to happen.

I was also asked why, if we believe that the control orders are imperfect—as, indeed, I said myself—we do not abolish them straightaway. I was asked whether it would not be right to do just that. I remind the House of the condition which is very important to our ability to move to a looser regime, and that is the surveillance that needs to be put in place in order to provide the public with the necessary security. That surveillance does not exist at the moment. Individuals have to be recruited; people have to be trained; and we have to have extra capacity and capability in that area, which we do not have at the moment. I do not think it is reasonable to say that you should be able to abolish the existing regime for the individuals who are currently under control orders in the absence of the necessary conditions for a new regime. Having said that, clearly the current control orders come up for regular review. We shall be reviewing them and of course we will be looking at individuals’ cases in the light of their situations. As I have said, there is clearly a transition to be undertaken. I do not think that I can go further than that at the moment. I understand perfectly well the point that has been made but I hope that noble Lords will also understand the constraints that we are under in moving quickly from one regime to another.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, perhaps I can deal with the issue of moving people to places like Leicester or up to Norfolk and so on. We have decided that that is abhorrent and that it will not be sought by the Home Secretary. Therefore, can we not now bring back from exile the people who have been put on those orders?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

When the circumstances are in place and we have the necessary surveillance and protection for the public, we will be able to do so. First we must put in place the conditions that will enable us to operate the new regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, is absolutely right to say, as I should have said, that the Government are extremely pleased that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has welcomed the change. He will also have observed that I did not miss the fact that there were some qualifications in the views expressed by the committee. We shall certainly take those seriously. In particular, he mentioned the unhappiness about the conditions under which special advocates have to operate. In the report there are one or two instances of the special advocates’ conditions of work being eased. It is a big issue and it goes wider than control orders. That will be taken up and examined, and part of the Green Paper that the Government are to bring forward will be devoted to the use of special advocates and the conditions under which they should be able to work for their clients.

I would like to reiterate my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. He did us the honour of saying that he felt that the process had been an honest and thorough one. I am extremely grateful for that, as it is valuable to have that endorsement. I have to be honest and say that there is some light between us on the balance to be struck between protection and prosecution. That is an issue that we shall want to explore further in debate. We entirely agree with him about the supremacy of due process and I do not deny at all that the control order regime inhibits prosecution. We are trying to strike a balance that will enable us to have greater emphasis on the prosecution side of things. However, I cannot conceal from the House that the protective element in the TPIMs is a primary objective.

I believe that I have covered most points. One noble Lord mentioned the role of the reviewer. We now have a new statutory reviewer and, having met him, I have total confidence that he will do an extremely thorough and careful job. I think that he will be a safeguard against the danger to which the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, pointed—the difference that turns out to be not a difference but a continuation of the existing situation. I do not believe that that is the Government’s intention or the effect of implementation, but there will be that safeguard. He will also report on individual cases. It is right that we should leave that role to him; I do not want to do that role myself.

I hope that I have covered the main points raised in the debate. Perhaps not surprisingly, the noble Lord opposite tried to get me on to the effect of the police reform Bill. I remind him that the budget for counterterrorism is protected. There will be more information about the whole role of the National Crime Agency. I assure him that the national functions of the police will be just as protected as our desire to ensure that the accountability to local authorities on the part of the police and crime commissioners is also a feature of modern policing.

Given the prospect of scrutinising the new regime with the thoroughness that I know this House will wish to apply, and with the clarification that I have been able to give, I hope the House will agree that the order can be renewed, and I commend it to the House.

Sex Offenders Register

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

It will be a proper consultation and, obviously, noble Lords and others will be free to put forward their views. On the evidence and information that will be taken into account by the police in the review, I can confirm straightaway that the MAPPA process, NOMS and those who have relevant information will be involved. It is right that NOMS has considerable experience of probationary periods, and the police will be under an obligation, which I am sure they will understand, to make the review both fair and thorough.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, it is deeply depressing to revisit this way of dealing with decisions made by the courts. It is familiar to those of us who are lawyers because we had to endure it under the previous Government, when tomorrow’s headlines dictated the way in which they responded to a wholly reasonable decision by the courts. In this case, the court decided that there should be an obligation to ensure that people have the right to appeal. It in no way suggested that paedophiles should be removed willy-nilly from the register.

There are occasions where someone should be able to appeal. For example, a young man in his 20s has sex with an underage girl and is put on the sex register. When he is a man in his 40s—married, with a family and holding down a job—it may seem reasonable to him that his name should be removed from the register on which it was placed for something that he did with an underage girl when he was in his early 20s. That is the kind of offence that the court envisaged when it said that there should not be a blanket situation where there can be no appeal whatever.

The reasonable response of the Government would have been to say clearly that an opportunity to appeal should be available, that it will be rarely used but that they support its existence. That is the position that the Government should have taken. I always get the feeling that there is something in the drinking water at the Home Office that makes sensible people lose their nerve and good sense when it comes to these matters.

As to the comment on the need for a Bill of Rights, how would the situation be any different if, as I have heard government Ministers say, all that is contained in the current European Convention on Human Rights would be in a British Bill of Rights, but with additional matters included? If that were the case and the Article 6 protections of due process, under which this kind of appeal, in given circumstances, is available, were included, how would it be any different? I suspect that this would be available in a British Bill of Rights, as it is now. Surely good sense should have been the response of the day.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The Government regard what they are doing as bringing them into compliance with their obligations under the Human Rights Act. Therefore we do not envisage that the work of the Commission—and of course the terms of reference have yet to be agreed—would be affected by what we are doing here.

The Government have put in place a review process. Sex offences are extremely difficult to make judgments about and we believe that those who are involved in their rehabilitation, NOMS and the police, who will have had the obligation to supervise their conduct in the interim, are better placed to do that than the courts. That is why we have instituted the review of the process that we have put in place. I also rely on London tap water—I find it keeps me entirely sane.

Identity Documents Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, this Bill is a most welcome step by the Government. Many people have argued for many years that the introduction of ID cards and the national identity register was flawed on political, technical and financial grounds and would do very little to prevent terrorism, crime or fraud. As we have heard, a national identity register database could actually increase the risk of fraud and terrorism.

At its heart, the ID card and database proposals would, if proceeded with, change irrevocably the relationship of the state with the individual. It is one thing to have some form of personal identification during wartime, as we did 70 years ago, and quite another to create a massive national identity database for which identity cards themselves are simply a means to an end and not an end in themselves. Every swipe of the card could be recorded, as my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury pointed out.

Why did the previous Government want such a database? Why did the obvious flaws not stop them? Why was the attack on individual civil liberties not seen as an issue? Why did the cost not seem to matter, given the serious structural weaknesses of the national identity register, which would have devoured far more money than the Government suggested? This Bill will stop the trend to a society in which private information becomes available on big databases that are accessible to large numbers of people, the vast majority of whom have no need of the information to which they would get access.

Never, since 2002, when the proposal for identity cards and the national identity register was first discussed, have I understood the justification for it. I cannot recall any reasoned, logical analysis of the need for it; that is because the proposal was never properly thought through. The official rationale seemed to be that the cards and the register would help in the fight against terrorism, but when terrorists are UK nationals entitled to an ID card or when they hold valid identification, as in the Madrid bombings, the case does not stand up to scrutiny.

Another ostensible reason was the need to prevent identity fraud, except that that is much more likely if you place lots of personal data in one place on one big database. Proponents of ID cards began to change the emphasis of the grounds of their arguments as the arguments were so convincingly won by those opposed, so we were told that there would be a convenience factor for young people when going to a pub or buying alcohol. As Liberty has pointed out, however, it is a very weak argument that we should construct a massive state database containing billions of biometric and other data, at a cost of several billion pounds, so that people can secure entry to a pub. Then we had the suggestion that ID cards might replace the concessionary bus pass for pensioners. Just imagine it: a multibillion pound scheme for identity cards being used to produce bus tickets.

The whole sorry exercise would have cost around £5 billion, at least—and that for a project that began life as a solution to a set of problems that were never clearly defined. Once the reasons were examined, they were found to be wanting and it became a project in search of a customer for, despite the fact that the Act has been on the statute book for over four years, only 15,000 ID cards have ever been produced. Of those 15,000, meanwhile, 3,000 were given free to airside workers. It now costs £5 million a year to run the current scheme, which is a cost of £400 per head each year. One is left with the impression that the previous Government, having finally grasped the nature of the flawed system they were creating, decided to head for the long grass under the guise of a slow start.

I am still left wondering why the previous Government believed so strongly in the value of big databases in which costs were rarely controlled and the security of data was so often not guaranteed. There are two kinds of scrutiny: first, who has access to what information; and, secondly, how secure it is from hacking or loss. As we know, there have been many major lapses in big government IT projects in recent years, and it seems pretty clear that the bigger the database, the higher the number of people who will need to access it and the weaker the security will inevitably be as a consequence. We should take note of some research undertaken by the Centre for Technology Policy Research at the London School of Economics, which tells us that,

“Despite a spend of as much as £21bn”,

a year,

“on public sector IT, it is difficult to find any compelling examples of direct productivity gains and improved public services”.

This is not just about waste on ID cards, but much more—not least the NHS database.

This Bill will stop the waste on ID cards and the national identity register, and stop the substantial erosion of civil liberties that was promoted by the previous Government. It is part of a broader rejection of intrusion by the state into people’s daily lives, for when the state acts it should be proportionate to the problem that needs resolution. The Bill will now prevent the second generation of passports, which would have added fingerprints to the facial biometric data already present on the biometric chip in UK passports. The previous Government’s plans for ID cards and a national identity register have been described by the director of Liberty as a grand folly. Well, that must be right; follies are created by people who have access to large sums of money and who have a fondness for frittering it on grand gestures. That seems to sum it all up.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, may I beg the indulgence of the House and be permitted to speak in the gap?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I now see the gap and hope that I will be permitted to step into it.

I opposed the ID card policy from the outset, seeing it as an affront to fundamental liberties in this country. So I am glad that the coalition Government have acted so expeditiously to abolish the scheme. I have always made it clear that I do not have any problem about enhancing the information contained within a passport for border control purposes. However, I objected to the ID card scheme and I particularly objected to the central multipurpose database. That is what makes it different from other identity cards; it is a sleight of hand when people say, “We in this House have identity cards for other purposes”. They are very different from the one that connects you to that all-powerful central database.

The ID card was presented very differently from the way in which it is now being presented. It was presented as a tool of empowerment and as a voluntary programme. I say to my noble friend Lord Brett that I have no false memory syndrome about this. It is too close to my heart. I remember only too well that ID cards were presented as the answer to a maiden’s prayer when it came to terrorism, crime, illegal immigration and abuse of the benefits system. We all pointed out that they would not be capable of doing any of that successfully. I also remember that they were going to be compulsory. Even after all the efforts in this House and the campaigning outside, and although our Government conceded to voluntariness, I always feared that, given the direction of travel, compulsory ID cards were waiting for us somewhere down the line.

The reason for my objection is that I believe ID cards create a different kind of relationship between the citizen and the state. That is what we have to hold on to. Inevitably, it would have meant the police being able to require a person to produce their identification on the street, which goes against the way in which our nation has worked. We have a common-law system. It is a great source of pride to us all that we are able to say when we are brought before a court: “Prove it”. When stopped by the police, we are able to say: “Do you have reasonable cause to stop me?”. Those things make for the British characteristic of not being supine or a compliant citizen, but somebody who knows who they are. We must always remind ourselves that the state is here at our behest; we are not here at the behest of the state. The ID card system was taking us down a very unfortunate road.

I say briefly that, while there may be an old guard on these Labour Benches that cannot accept that in government our party made some mistakes, happily there is a new generation now in leadership which takes a very different view.

Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2010

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Monday 19th July 2010 Lords Chamber

Terrorism is an enormous international challenge, and it is vital that we support the police and other agencies in their work to keep us safe from it. That is not just a priority for this Government but a public duty that we all share. However, we also share the commitment to upholding the hard-won democratic freedoms that are the thread running through our history. A six-month renewal will provide the opportunity to give full consideration to the important issues involved. I commend the order to the House.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I want to comment on the interesting statement by the Minister. I speak as the chair of Justice, which is the UK-based human rights and law reform organisation whose mission is to advance access to justice, human rights and the rule of law. It is also the British section of the International Commission of Jurists. This House will know that that international commission set up a panel of eminent jurists who reported last year on the issue of terrorism and in February 2009 produced a report, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights, in which it recommended that there should be a review of counterterrorism legislation in this country because of its concern that there had been so much erosion of civil liberties and of some of the protections and safeguards that are so important to our system, which is admired around the world.

We therefore welcome the Government's review. The steps they are taking to reinstate many of the liberties that we saw eroded are greatly welcomed by human rights lawyers. However, we are concerned that the Government are still going to continue with the 28-day pre-charge detention relating to terrorism, even for six months. In our view, with great care taken to look at the evidence, we are confident that 28 days is not necessary. We make the argument that it is not necessary because plainly it is at odds with the right to liberty. Also, the period is far longer than any other western democracy has in place, and there is a lack of effective safeguards.

I remind the House of a number of the facts of the cases that have come before the courts in recent times. Our review of the use of the 28 days over the period since 2006, when 14 days was raised to 28 days, found that six suspects had been held for as long as 27 or 28 days. Three of those were released without charge. Three were charged with terrorism offences but, of those three, two were acquitted and only one was convicted. In that one instance where there was a successful conviction, it appears that the great majority of admissible evidence was already available to the police at the time of arrest; it was certainly available before the 14 days were up.

We have also seen that five of the six suspects held for up to 28 days were arrested in the context of Operation Overt, the liquid bomb plot. I should declare that I was one of the counsels in that case so I am familiar with it in some detail. Indeed, all three men who were ultimately convicted were charged within 12 days of their arrest—the 28 days were not necessary in that case either.

Justice urges the House that to defer a decision on this matter even for six months is too long. I remind noble Lords that in other western democracies, particularly in common law countries, there is nothing like this erosion of safeguards and protections. In Canada, there is a requirement to charge within a day; in the United States, it is two days; in South Africa, it is two days; and in New Zealand, it is two days. Even in other parts of Europe which do not have the common law system, to which I am so committed, the position is different. For example, in Germany the period is two days; in Spain, it is a maximum of five days; and in France, it is a maximum of six days. Charging is expected to take place within those limits.

We are concerned that there is an incompatibility with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. We think that it is highly likely that Schedule 8, the authorisation procedure, will be found incompatible with the requirements of Article 5. We ask the Government to look again at whether there is even a need to have the six months’ extension which is now being considered.

However, I say all of that in the context of our view that the Government are taking the right steps in having this inquiry into what is needed. Clearly, no country should roll over in the face of terrorism and special steps have to be taken, but it is our view that the extension to 14 days, which was introduced, is adequate to the challenges that we all face.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I appreciate that we are debating this issue in the context of the Government’s very welcome announcement that they will conduct a review of the 28-day pre-charge detention limit. However, I am unpersuaded that there is any basis for continuing this power, even on a temporary basis.

There are three points which your Lordships will wish to have well in mind. First, this is an extraordinarily exceptional power. English law normally requires that suspects be charged or released within four days. The pre-charge detention limit for terrorist cases was limited to seven days until 2003, when it was raised to 14 days. English law jealously restricts the power of the state to detain people without charge, and rightly so. It is only when charged that the person concerned has the right to be told the accusation against him and to respond to it. For the state to hold a person without charge for up to four weeks is inevitably a very substantial interference with their freedom and inevitably has a very damaging effect on their work, family relationships and reputation in the community.

Secondly, there must, therefore, be a very heavy onus on the Government to justify such an interference with basic liberty. The real question is whether they can meet that heavy onus. I suggest that they have failed to identify any practical experience whatever which establishes, or indeed even suggests, that a 14-day limit would not suffice. This is, of course, not a new problem. The Home Office has all the relevant information. Will the Minister in her reply please identify for the House whether there are any cases in which pre-charge detention after 14 days was necessary to the successful prosecution of a terrorist suspect? It is surely not sufficient for the noble Baroness to assert—and who can disagree with the assertion?—that it is impossible to be sure that there might never in the future be an occasion when more than 14 days might be required, as she put it.